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Abstract:
The following will argue that the development o f the concept o f Global Governance 
has had a dramatic impact on the discourse o f United Nations Peacekeeping and has 
increased the gap between the official rhetoric o f the organisation and what occurs on 
the ground in peacekeeping operations. It will investigate the connection between the 
development o f the norms associated with the concept o f global governance and the 
increased demand being made for UN mandated peacekeeping operations. The thesis 
investigates how the development o f these norms can be directly connected to the 
increased demands being placed on UN mandated peacekeeping operations and the way 
in which these norms, which are directly associated with the concept o f Global 
Governance have become integrated into United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. It 
also argues that the integration o f these norms is having a detrimental impact on the gap 
between the rhetoric and reality o f peacekeeping operations. A detrimental impact 
which will be analysed using six key criteria including access to resources, fulfilment 
o f mandates, perceived legitimacy both local and global, challenges faced during the 
operation from both state and non-state actors, and issues o f command and control 
within the operation including organization and integration with other actors. In doing 
so the thesis offers a new and original assessment o f the relationship between the 
development o f global governance and peacekeeping operation by drawing on the 
unique data created in the fieldwork interviews, the analy sis o f mission mandates and 
the secondary literature.
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With the end o f the cold war in the early nineties the United Nations (UN) was at the 
forefront o f  the international communities attempts to forge a “new world order”, a 
world order that would be based on freedom, cooperation and universal respect for 
human rights. It was hoped that the UN would finally be able to fulfil its promise to 
“save succeeding generations from the scourge o f war.” 1 That with the removal o f  the 
adversarial superpower competition, which had frozen the UN into inaction in many 
cases, the UN would be able to intervene in more situations to ensure international 
peace and security. This idealistic dream was soon put to the test as the UN faced an 
increasing number o f  complex and diverse conflicts. Situations which were only made 
more complex by the dramatic changes which were occurring within the international 
system; the involvement o f new and more varied actors, the dramatic impact o f 
globalization and technological advances, and the development o f  global problems that 
were beyond the capabilities o f individual states to resolve, such as environmental 
degradation, terrorism, and health pandemics.
One response to these changes was the development o f the concept o f  Global 
Governance, which focused on ways in which these global problems could be both 
managed and mitigated. The main focus o f the concept has been the suggested diffusion 
o f power away from traditional actors, such as states, to newer and more varied actors, 
such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Trans-National Corporations




(TNC’s). It has also focused on the development and spread o f  particular norms and 
ideals such as democratisation, good governance and respect for human rights, norms 
which have also become associated with the wider UN organisation.
Thesis Outline
This thesis examines what changes the development o f Global Governance has 
created within the discourse o f United Nations Peacekeeping and whether or not it has 
had an impact on resolving the gap between the official rhetoric o f  the organisation and 
what occurs on the ground in peacekeeping operations. It demonstrates that the 
development o f global governance has transformed the environment in which 
international organisations, such as the United Nations, are operating and that the 
change in this environment has forced the organisation to undertake wider and more 
varied tasks in order to retain its relevance within the international system.
By focusing on the specific crisis which peacekeeping operations faced following 
the invasion o f Iraq in 20032 up to the creation o f the capstone doctrine in 20083, the
2 The United States o f  Am erica and the Coalition o f  the W illing, including forces from the UK , invaded  
Iraq on the 19lh o f  March under ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom '. The invasion took place fo llow in g  the failure  
o f  the Iraqi regim e, under the control o f  Saddam H ussein, to cooperate w ith inspections by the 
International A tom ic Energy A gency. There has been much debate as to the legitim acy o f  the invasion, 
particularly in relation to the lack o f  a second United N ations Security Council R esolution exp licitly  
authorising military action. For more see Thakur. Ramesh,IF«/- in our tim e: R eflections on Iraq, 
Terrorism  a n d  W eapons o f  M ass D estru ction  (United N ations University Press Tokyo: 2 0 07), Berdal, 
M ats, The UN after Iraq  (Survival: 46: 3: 2004) 83-101 , Franck. Thom as M ., W hat happens now ? The 
U n ited  N ations A fter Iraq  (Am erican Journal o f  International Law: 97: 3: 2 0 03) 6 0 7-621 , M ills, Greg, 
B etter w ith  the UN? Search ing  f o r  p ea ce  a n d  govern an ce  in Iraq. (G lobal Governance: 10: 2 0 0 4 ) 281- 
288 , Roberts, Adam , The law  a n d  the use o f  fo rc e  after Iraq  (Survival: 45: 2: 2 0 03) and N ye, Joseph S., 
US p o w e r  a n d  s tra te g y  after Iraq  (Foreign A flairs: 82: 4: 2003) 60-73.
3 The capstone doctrine was approved on the 18,h o f  January 2008 as part o f  a reform effort w ithin the 
Department o f  Peacekeeping O perations. It w as an attempt to codify the major lessons learned and w as  
intended to “ensure that the grow ing numbers o f  United Nations peacekeeping personnel deployed in the 
field, as well as those serving at Headquarters, have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the
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thesis demonstrates the impact that the development o f  the concept o f  global 
governance is having on peacekeeping operations as well as the w ider implications o f 
the continued association o f UN peacekeeping operations with that concept. The crisis 
differs from previous challenges which the concept o f  peacekeeping operations has 
faced in the past, including during the mid-1990s the failure to respond to the genocide 
in Rwanda after the debacle in Somalia.4 It is, unlike in the past, not a failure to 
respond to situations but is rather a failure to respond in an appropriate way to different 
crises. As Gowan argues the UN is currently facing both a systemic and paradigmatic 
crisis, one which he identifies as grounded in the period 2006-2008.5 This thesis argues 
that while this crisis period is well defined, in order to understand the crisis facing 
peacekeeping operations today you need to go further back to the invasion o f  Iraq in 
2003, which is where the basis o f challenges to the foundations o f  operations can be 
established. Challenges which are based on the continued emphasis o f  the liberal peace6
multitude o f  tasks they are required to perform." Foreword by Jean Marie G uehenno, Pg 7. For m ore see  
United N ations. U n ited  X ation s P eacekeep in g  O pera tion s P rin cip les a n d  G u idelin es  (N ew  York: United  
N ations:2008)
4 The failure to respond to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was one o f  the b iggest failures o f  the United  
N ations particularly during a period when the ability o f  the Security Council to m andate operations had 
dram atically improved follow ing the end o f  the Cold W ar. A victim  o f  the so called ‘m ogadishu lin e ’ 
Rwanda descended into chaos as the international com m unity prevaricated and world leaders avoided the 
use o f  the term genocide in order to avoid the obligations o f  the 1951 convention for the prevention and 
punishm ent o f  the crime o f  genocide. For more on the failings o f  the United N ations see  Carlsson, 
Ingvar, Han Sung Joo and Rufus M. KupolaU d ie  p o rt o f  the Independent Inquiry in to the A c tio n s o f  the  
U N  durin g  the 1994 G enocide in R w anda  (United N ations N ew  York: 1999). For m ore on this crisis 
period in peacekeeping see Roberts. Adam. The cris is  in pea cek eep in g  (1FS: 2: 1994)
5See G ow an. Richard. The S tra teg ic  ( 'ontext: P eacekeepin g  in c ris is , 2 0 0 6 -2 0 0 8  (International 
Peacekeeping: 15: 4: 2008)
6 The ‘liberal peace' m odel o f  peacekeeping operations is analysed by academ ics such as D uffield , 
R ichm ond and Paris. This understanding o f  peacekeeping is based on the idea that rather than being  
concerned with solv ing crises peacekeeping is instead concerned with the m aintenance o f  a particular 
liberal type o f  international order. D uffield for exam ple argues that the liberal peace is ideo log ica lly  a 
m ix o f  ncoliberal concepts o f  dem ocracy, market sovereignty and conflict resolution that determ ine 
contemporary strategics o f  intervention. For more see  D uffield, M arkA 'dobal G overnan ce  a n d  the new  
w a rs  (Zed B ooks London: 2001). D uffield. M arkJ)evelopm en t. Security  a n d  U nending W ar (Polity
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model o f peacekeeping operations. It is this emphasis, the thesis will argue, coupled 
with the integration o f the norms associated with global governance into the mandates 
o f  peacekeeping operations which have led to the current crisis.
The thesis investigates how the development o f these norms can be directly 
connected to the increased demands being placed on UN mandated peacekeeping 
operations and the way in which these norms, which are directly associated with the 
concept o f Global Governance have become integrated into United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. It also argues that the integration o f  these norms is having a 
detrimental impact on the gap between the rhetoric and reality o f  peacekeeping 
operations. A detrimental impact which will be analysed using six key criteria including 
access to resources, fulfilment o f mandates, perceived legitimacy both local and global, 
challenges faced during the operation from both state and non-state actors, and issues o f 
command and control within the operation including organization and integration with 
other actors.7 In doing so the thesis offers a new and original assessment o f the 
relationship between the development o f global governance and peacekeeping 
operation by drawing on the unique data created in the fieldwork interviews, the 
analysis o f mission mandates and the secondary literature.
The following sections go on to illustrate the surrounding literature, the background 
to the research project, the methodology utilised in undertaking the project and the 
organisational structure o f the chapters.
Cambridge: 2007), Paris, Rolandv l/ w ar's en d  (Cam bridge University Press Cam bridge: 2 0 0 4 ), Paris, 
Roland, B roadening the s tu dy  o f  p ea ce  opera tion s  (International studies R eview : 2: 3: 2 0 0 0 ) and 
Richm ond, O liver,M ain tain ing Order, m aking p e a ce  (Palgrave Basingstoke: 2002).
7 For more see Chapter two Pg 83 and Chapter six Pg 239 - 244
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Literature Review
Since the end o f the Cold W ar the number o f actors on the international stage has 
increased exponentially. The certainties o f  the balance o f  power have been removed 
from international politics and we are now living in an increasingly interdependent 
world where there are new items invading the security agenda. These new challenges 
“range from illegal drug trafficking and transnational criminal activity, to 
environmental degradation, economic and trade disputes, resource scarcities, mass 
human migrations, and excessive population growth.”8 Political problems have 
occurred in relation to a number o f developments in the international system including, 
the collapse o f empires leading to new independent states9, the ending o f the cold war, 
and the increasingly problematic issue o f the right to national self determination which 
has sparked civil wars all across the globe.10 The traditional theories o f international 
relations, such as Realism and Liberalism, have attempted to explain these new 
problems as a continuance o f international politics as it was. For realists the end o f  the 
Cold War was simply a shift in the balance o f power, while for liberals it represented
8 Klare in M ichael T. Klare, Y ogesh Chandrani. and Daniel C. Thom as W orld  Secu rity : C hallen ges f o r  a  
new  cen tu ry  (Palgrave M acm illan Five C ollege Program in Peace and W orld Security Studies (M ass.):
19 98) pg. 61
9 For a con cise  exam ination o f  the after effects o f  Colonialism  see  Tharoor, Shashi, The m essy  a fterlife  o f  
co lon ia lism  (G lobal Governance: 8: 2002) 1-5
10 For more on the issue o f  s e lf  determination see Marc W eller, Barbara M etzger and N iall Johnson, 
Settling  Self-determ in ation  D ispu tes: C om plex P ow er-sh arin g  in Theory a n d  P ra c tice  (Brill: N ew  York  
2 0 0 8 ) also, Hannum. Hurst,/iutonom y, S overe ign ty  a n d  Self-determ ination: The A ccom m odation  o f  
C onflicting R ights (P rocedu ra l A spec ts o f  In ternational Law) (U niversity o f  Pennsylvania Press 
Philadelphia 1996). For a more European focus on the issue o f  national self-determ ination see  Ronen, 
D o v j h e  challenge o f  ethnic conflict, dem o cra cy  a n d  s e l f  determ ination  in C en tra l E urope  (Frank Cass: 
London: 1997) and for a focus on the connection between globalisation and self-determ ination see  David  
R. Cameron. Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, G loba liza tion  a n d  se lf-determ in ation : is the nation  sta te  
under siege'.’ (Routledue: London: 2006).
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the clear victory o f  liberal democratic states over com m unism .11 Following the end o f 
the Cold W ar developments within the international system, including the exponential 
increase o f economic globalisation, coupled with rapid technological advances and an 
increase in actors on the international stage has led to large scale global change.
The concept o f Global Governance has been developed in relation to these changes 
in two key ways; first through the work o f  key writers such as Rosenau as an attempt to 
develop a comprehensive approach for analysing these changes12 and secondly as a 
way to emphasis the implications o f more specific global changes such as the growth in
• • • 1 3  • *civil society. As an emerging theory Global Governance is still a contested concept, 
with active debates as to how it has developed and why, and what role the theory will 
play in the development o f world politics. These debates surround issues such as the 
shift in location o f  authority away from nation states to other actors. With proponents o f 
the concept such as Rosenau and Held emphasising that shift whilst critics such as 
Soederberg and Murphy argue that states still retain the primary position in 
international relations.14
11 For the liberal v iew  on the post-Cold war international system  see Fukuyam a, F rancis,The e n d  o f  
h isto ry  a n d  the la st m an  (Free Press London: 1992). For a post 9/11 analysis see  M andelbaum , 
M ichael,The id ea s that co n q u ered  the w o r ld  (Public Affairs London 2 0 03) For analysis o f  the Realist 
position see  W altz, Kenneth N ., Stru ctu ra l R ealism  a fter  the C o ld  W ar (International Security: 25: 1: 
2 0 0 0 ) 5-41 and C ox, Robert W .J h e  new R ealism : P ersp ec tives  on M u ltila tera lism  a n d  W orld  O rd er  
(M acm illan: London: 1997). For a post 9/11 analysis o f  the realist position see M earsheim er, John ].,T he  
tra g e d y  o f  g re a t p o w e r  p o litic s  (WAV. Norton: N ew  York 2003).
12 For the structural analysis see Rosenau, James N . and Ernst-Otto C zem piel G overn an ce  w ithout 
governm en t: O rd er a n d  change in w o rld  p o litic s  (Cam bridge University Press Cambridge: 1992), 
Rosenau, James N ., G overnan ce in the 21st C entury  (G lobal G overnance: 1 1 1995) , Rosenau, James 
SI., The stu d y  o f  w o r ld  po litics: g lo b a lisa tio n  a n d  g lo b a l g o vern an ce  (Routledge: N ew  York 2 0 0 5 ) and 
Rosenau in Martin H ew son and Sinclair, Tim othy J. , A pproach es to  g lo b a l govern a n ce  th eo ry  (State  
University o f  N ew  York Press: Albany: 1999).
1' For more see  I lew son and Sinclair in Martin H ew son and Sinclair, G lo b a l G overnan ce Theory (1999)
" For arguments supporting the relocation o f  authority away from states see  R osenau ,W orld  P o litic s  
(2005) , Held, D i\\'u iJ )em ocracv  a n d  the g lo b a l o rder  (Stanford University Press Stanford: 1995) and
6
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Overtime the use o f  the concept has expanded and the term Global Governance is 
now used in reference to a wide variety o f  subjects including the study o f  international 
organisations, the increase in multilateral action and the growth in civil society as well 
as in relation to the study o f globalisation and the changing authority within the 
international system. The literature surrounding the debates can therefore be divided 
into four key areas relating to the spread o f the concept; the international governance 
approach, based on an understanding o f  the role o f international institutions, the ability 
o f new actors to enhance the potential o f global governance, the view that Global 
governance is transforming the international system and that authority has been 
relocated away from states to other actors, and finally the argument that the concept o f 
Global Governance itself needs to be refashioned in order to provide a more humane 
international system. Although it is possible to divide the literature this way there is 
also a large amount o f crossover between the various viewpoints and debates 
surrounding the concept.
The development o f the concept o f Global Governance as an understanding o f the 
roles o f international organisations can be attributed to an increased interest in 
international regime theories during the 1980s, and the writings o f  authors such as 
Keohane, Ruggie and Czempiel who were attempting to understand the ongoing 
changes in the international system .15 Their work focused on the role o f international
H eld, D avid ,G lo b a l C oven an t (Polity Press Cambridge: 2004). For the opposing v iew  see  Soederberg, 
Susanne ,G lo b a l G overnan ce in Q uestion  (Pluto Press: London: 2 0 06) and M urphy, Craig N ., G lo b a l  
G overnan ce: P o o rly  done a n d  p o o r ly  u n derstood  (International Affairs: 76: 4: 2 0 0 0 ) 789-803
15 International regim es were defined by Ruggie as “a set o f  mutual expectations, rules, and regulations, 
plans, organizational energies, and financial com m itm ents, w hich have been accepted by a group o f  
states.” In R uggie, John G„ In ternational respon ses to  technology: con cep ts a n d  trends  (International
7
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organisations and has been built upon by other academics such as Diehl in his edited 
volume on the politics o f global governance16 and, Nye and Donahue in their volume 
on governance in a globalizing w orld.17 Along with Abbott and Snidal18, M urphy and 
W riggins, these authors focus on the role o f international organisations in creating and 
managing the concept o f global governance.19 They also examine the ways in which 
these organisations can contribute to making global governance more democratic and 
accountable. Focusing on a state based view o f the international system they argue that 
powerful states should be subjected to greater demands for accountability and that in 
order to achieve that accountability there is a need for increased multilateralism in a 
variety o f  forms.
The need for an increase in multilateralism also forms the basis for the debates 
surrounding the potential for new actors to enhance the development o f  global 
governance. Clear arguments in support o f this point o f view can be found in the report
Organisation: 29: 1975) . For more see R uggie, John G. and Friedrich K ratochw il, In tern a tion a l 
organ iza tion : A S ta te  o f  the A rt on an A rt o f  the S ta te  (International organisation: 40: 1986) 753 -7 7 5 .  
A lso  K eohane, Robert^4fter H egem ony  (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 1984), Rosenau, 
Jam es N . and Em st-O tto C zem piel,G lo b a l C hanges a n d  T heoretical C hallenges: A p p ro a ch es to  W orld  
P o litic s  f o r  the 1990s  (Prentice Hall and IBD: London: 1989) and M ayer, Peter and V olker Rittberger, 
R egim e T heory a n d  In ternational R elations  (Clarendon Press London: 1995)
16 D iehl, Paul F., The p o litic s  o f  g lo b a l govern an ce  (Lynne Riener: usa: 2001)
17 N y e , Joseph S. and John D. Donahue. G overnance in a g lo b a liz in g  w o r ld  (B rookings Institution Press 
Cam bridge, M assachussetts: 2000)
18 Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal, 'Why s ta tes  ac t through fo rm a l in terna tion a l o rg a n isa tio n s’, in 
D iehl, Paul F., The p o litic s  o f  g lo b a l governance  (Lynne Riener: N ew  York 2 0 01)
19 For analysis o f  the changing role o f  international organisations see  Murphy, Craig N .,In tern ation al  
O rgan iza tion  a n d  Industrial Change: G lo b a l G overnance since 1850  (O xford U niversity Press N ew  
York: 1994) also W riggins, W. Howard, P rospec ts f o r  In ternational O rd er a n d  G overn an ce  (Book  
R eview )  (Journal o f  international Affairs: 46: 2: 1993) 525-537
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o f  the Commission on Global Governance.20 These arguments are supported by
academics such as Weiss and Gordenker who state that
"global governance...can be fostered by a better division o f  labour between 
universal membership and other intergovernmental and non-governmental 
institutions...Strengthening the UN system necessitates that the world 
organisation do what it does best, or at least better than other institutions, 
and devolve responsibilities when other institutions are in a position to 
respond effectively"21
Weiss has written extensively on the development o f global governance and he focuses 
on the importance o f a coordinating role for the United Nations in ensuring success.22 
The arguments raised by Weiss are supported by other authors such as Thakur and 
Ruggie who emphasises the importance o f coordination and the need for the UN to 
harness the power o f non-state actors.23 Along side the need to improve coordination 
other authors such as Stiglitz focus on the need to improve transparency and 
accountability in order to enhance global governance.24
One suggestion for improving this accountability is made by Richard Falk who 
outlines nine steps required in order to refashion global governance to provide a more 
humane international system.25 His work fits into the debates surrounding the growing
20 C om m ission on G lobal G overnance, O ur g lo b a l n e ighbou rhood  (Oxford: Press, O xford U niversity: 
1995)
21 W eiss, Thom as G. and Leon Gordenker 'D evolving R esponsib ilities: a  F ram ew ork  f o r  A n a lysin g  
N G O s a n d  Serv ices', in W eiss, Thom as G., B eyon d  U N  su bcon tractin g  (St M artins Press N ew  York: 
1998) pg xi
22 For more see  W eiss, Thom as G., G overnance, G o o d  g o vern an ce  a n d  G lo b a l G overnan ce: co n cep tu a l  
a n d  a c tu a l cha llen ges  (Third W orld Quarterly: 2 1 :5 :  2 0 00) 795-814 , R uggie, John G. and Thom as G. 
W eiss and Ramesh Thakur, G lo b a l G overnan ce a n d  the UN: An unfin ished jo u rn e y  (Indiana U niversity  
Press: B loom ington 2010), W eiss, Thom as G. David P. Forsythe and R oger A . C oate ,The U n ited  N a tion s  
a n d  C hanging W orld  P o litic s  (W estv iew  Press Boulder: 2 004) and, W eiss, Thom as G .,W hat’s  w ro n g  
w ith  the U n ited  N ations a n d  how  to f ix  it (Polity Press Cambridge: 2009)
2' R uggie,G lo b a l G overnance (2010)
24 Stiglitz, S oscph X llobaliza tion  a n d  it's d iscon ten ts  (Penguin: London: 2 002)
25 Falk, Richard A „On Humane G overnan ce  (Penn State Press U niversity Park, PA: 1995)
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influence o f civil society with questions as to what constitutes global civil society,26 
and what kind o f  impact it is having on the international system. The increase in Global 
civil society is also a key component in the development o f David H eld’s cosmopolitan 
democracy.27 According to Held, global governance today is undermining the 
democratic process which is necessary in order to create a truly cosmopolitan 
international society. The system o f governance therefore needs to be reformed in order 
to achieve a system o f multilevel governance based on an overarching cosmopolitan 
legal framework. The achievability o f this ideal is however questioned by other 
academics such as Keohane, who questions how feasible the achievement o f  a global 
cosmopolitan society really is.28 Keohane also questions how much the involvement o f 
newer actors such as NGOs will improve the accountability o f the international system 
given the potential disconnect between their accountability to wealthy donors and their 
claims to represent the underprivileged and marginalised.
The work o f Craig Murphy also focuses on the need for accountability within Global 
Governance.29 Rather than focusing on enhancing the already existing institutions o f 
global governance as outlined by Weiss. Murphy instead focuses on global governance 
as a transformation, or re-articulation o f authority within the international system.
26 For an in depth analysis o f  Global C ivil Society see Anheier. H elm ut, M arlies G lasius and M ary 
Kaldor (ed s .),G lo b a l C ivil S oc ie ty  2001  (LSE: London: 2001) and Kaldor, M ary ,G lo b a l C iv il S ociety: An  
an sw er to  w a r  (Polity  Press London: 2003)
27 For more on H eld 's concept o f  cosm opolitan dem ocracy see  Held, D avid ,D em o cra cy  a n d  the G lo b a l 
O rder: From  the M odern S ta te  to  C osm opolitan  G overnan ce  (Polity Press London: 1995), H eld, David, 
D aniele Archibugi and Martin Kohler, R e-im agin ing P o litica l C om m unity: S tu d ies in C osm opolitan  
D em o cra cy  (Polity Press London: 1998). A lso  Held, David and Anthony M cG rew , The g lo b a l  
transform ation s re a d e r  (Polity Press London: 2 003) and Held, David and Garrett W allace B row n, The 
C osm opolitan ism  R eader  (Polity Press London: 2010)
28 K eohane, Robert,'G lobal G overnance a n d  d em ocra tic  a cco u n ta b ility ', in H eld, David and M athias 
K oenig-A rchibugi. Taming G lobaliza tion : fro n tie rs  o f  govern an ce  (Polity Cambridge: 2003)
2<) Murphy, G lo b a l G overnance (2000)
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Within this debate the core argument is that Global Governance is trying to move away 
from the state based view o f international relations, towards a more inclusive 
understanding o f the global system.30 The key writer in this area is Rosenau who argues 
that
"global governance is conceived to include systems o f rule at all levels o f 
human activity -from the family to the international organization - in which 
the pursuit o f  goals through the exercise o f control has transnational 
repercussions."31
Rosenau sees a world in which the nature o f  authority is fundamentally changing 
and where global interdependence ensures that what occurs in one com er o f the world 
has the potentially for lasting impact across the globe. Connected to Rosenau’s work is 
the investigation by Cox o f the locations o f authority within these new systems. He 
emphasise the influence o f the ‘nebuleuse’ which he argues is an opaque cloud o f 
ideological influences which have nurtured a global consensus around the needs o f the
32world market. His arguments are then further examined by Murphy, who, by taking a 
more critical approach to the literature, examines the role o f the ‘nebuleuse’ and tries to 
establish how and why global governance has developed in the way it has and what is 
required to make it both more democratic and accountable/'’ By doing so Murphy 
attempts to address one o f the key problems within the academic debates surrounding
30 See D ingw erth, Claus and Pattberg, Philipp. G lo b a l G overnan ce a s a  p e rsp e c tive  on w o r ld  p o lit ic s  
(G lobal G overnance: 12: 2: 2006) 185-203 and Held, David and Anthony M cG rew, G overn ing  
g lo b a liza tio n : Pow er, au th ority  a n d  g lo b a l govern an ce  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2002)
31 Rosenau, G overnan ce  (1995)
32 For more see  C ox, Robert W ., Socia l fo rces , sta tes  a n d  w o r ld  orders: B eyon d  In tern ation al R ela tions  
Theory. (M illenium : 10: 2: 1981) . C ox. Robert W. and Tim othy J. Sinclair,.Approaches to  W orld  O rder  
(Cam bridge U niversity Press Cambridge: 1996), and C ox, Robert W ., C ivil so c ie ty  a t the turn o f  the  
m il/enium : p ro sp ec ts  f o r  an a ltern ative  w o rld  o rder  (R eview  o f  International Studies: 25: 1999) 3-28
33 See M urphy,In ternational O rgan iza tion  (1 9 9 4 ) , and Murphy, G lo b a l G overnan ce (2000)
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global governance which is the failure to incorporate the issue o f power and power 
relations into the understanding o f how actors behave in the international system. As 
Dingwerth and Pattberg argue "the notion o f global governance starts from the 
assumption that a wide variety o f  forms o f governance exist next to each other and that 
a hierarchy amongst these various mechanisms is hard, if not impossible to discern."34 
The need to address the issue o f power relations has also been recognised by other 
academics such as Barnett and Duvall who realise that the introduction o f  the issue o f 
power into global governance fundamentally changes the way in which the various 
relationships and interactions within the system can be understood.35 It raises important 
issues o f choice and legitimacy as well as leading to questions over participation and 
influence.
The understanding o f  power in global governance is paramount as it leads to 
numerous questions over the development and role which various institutions and 
actors play in the process. It informs opinion on who is responsible for decision making 
in global governance and whether it is states or other actors who really control the 
agenda.36 As Sir Jeremy Greenstock notes in relation to states ‘‘their own interests are 
in keeping power in their own domestic jurisdictions and in furthering their own 
national interests, and that's quite a damper on UN activities and on Global
34 D ingw erth, G lo b a l G overnance (2006) pg 192
35For an analysis o f  the role o f  pow er relations in global governance see  Barnett, M ichael, and Raym ond  
D uvall, P o w er in g lo b a l govern a n ce  (Cam bridge University Press: Cambridge: 2 0 05), H eld, G overn ing  
G lo b a liza tio n  (2002)
36 For academ ics such as Duffield the nature o f  pow er and authority has changed, see  D u ffie ld ,G lo b a l  
g o vern a ce  (2001) . This is how ever contested by other writers such as Lord David Hannay, w ho argues 
that states retain their prime position within the international system , see Hannay, D avid ,New  W orld  
D iso rd er  ( l.B . Tauris: London: 2009)
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37Governance.” It is not only the continued pre-eminence o f states which raises 
questions as to the legitimacy o f the concept o f global governance. It is also a matter o f 
who is setting the agenda? Who is producing or influencing the actions o f  numerous 
actors, and whether or not these actors are truly independent or overwhelmingly 
influenced and controlled by others with more power?
The issue o f power within Global Governance raises questions in relation to the 
substance, aims and possible outcomes o f the development o f the theory. One side o f 
the argument is that Global Governance is purely an ideological and theoretical project 
based on an investigation o f the development o f new connections, relations and 
networks and the development o f civil so c ie ty /8 For critics o f global governance such 
as Soederberg, Duffield, and Gaan, however, it is a hegemonic project which represents 
the actions o f a predominant actor type trying to realise a certain vision o f  o rd e r /9 As 
Gaan argues "the liberal framework o f multilateralism distorts the natural world order 
and stark reality o f power relations."40 This view is supported by others such as Kams 
who argues that "much of what has emerged to date in the way of global governance 
has been a product o f western conceptions o f government and governance."41 The 
association o f the concept o f global governance with the development o f the neo-liberal 
agenda and the question o f the dominance o f particular states within global governance
37 Interview with Sir Jeremy G reenstock 8,h D ecem ber 2009.
38 A s argued by supporters o f  the concept such as Falk. Rosenau and Held. For more see  Falk ,O n hum an  
g overn a n ce  (1995) , Y \eM ,G lobal O rder (1995) and Rosenau, G overnance w ithout g o vern m en t (1992)
S ee Soederberg, G lo b a l G overnance (2006) , D uffield, G lo b a l g o vern a ce  (2001) and 
D u ffie \d ,D evelopm en t (2007)
10 Gaan, Narottam, G lo b a liza tion  a n d  the in ternational system : econ om ic a n d  p o lit ic a l changes  
(International Studies: 43: 3: 2006)
41 K am s in Hobbs, Heidi, P ondering P ostin ternationalism  (SU N Y  Press Albany: 2 000) pg 56
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raises difficult questions; questions which make the understanding o f the role o f  power 
in the concept o f  global governance even more important.
Since the end o f the Cold War international relations has been based on the victory 
o f  liberal democracies and for many o f its critics such as Lederer and M uller global 
governance is nothing more than an extension o f the neo-liberal agenda.42 This 
argument is supported by Soederberg who notes that "restructuring does not occur in 
outer space but in and between nation states, as well as through international 
organisations."43 If  international organisations are key actors within the development o f 
global governance then their domination by a particular kind o f state also gives 
credence to the suggestion that global governance is nothing more than a hegemonic 
project. In more traditional international relations theory there is a clear understanding 
o f how power is gained and executed;44 states are viewed as the only legitimate 
representatives o f their citizens and are held accountable to those citizens in a myriad o f  
ways. This analysis o f the power is missing from the debates surrounding global 
governance.4  ^ Although there has been an increase in the participation o f other actors
42 See Lederer. Markus and Philipp S. Muller. C ritic izing  G lo b a l G overnan ce  (Palgrave M acm illan N ew  
York: 2005)
43 Soederberg,G’/o /w / G overnance (2006)
44 For realists power is based on states, military, econom ic, political, diplom atic, or even cultural 
resources. For an analysis o f  the Realist understanding o f  power see Carr, Edward H .,T w en ty  Years' 
C risis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the S tudy o f  In ternational R ela tions  (Harper Perennial: London: 
1964) and M orgenthau. Hans J ^ P olitics A m ong Xations: The S truggle  f o r  P o w er a n d  P ea c e  (A lfred A. 
K nopf N ew  York: 1985). For liberals pow er is based on the preferences and social pow er o f  individuals 
and groups w hich is then translated into state policy. State pow er is then constrained by the underlying  
identities, interests and power o f  individuals and groups. For a liberal analysis o f  pow er see  K eohane, 
Robert and Joseph S. N y e d 'o w e r  a n d  In terdependence  (Scott, Foresman and Co: London: 1989) and 
M oravcsik, Andrew, Taking P references Seriously: A L ibera l Theory o f  In tern ation al P o litic s  
(International organisation: 5 1 :4 : 1997) 513-553 .
45 Critics o f  G lobal G overnance such as Murphy argue that key thinkers such as Rosenau fail to address 
the issue o f  power and the impact this has on the developm ent o f  the concept. For m ore see  M urphy, 
G lo b a l G overnance (2000)
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this participation is, as will be demonstrated, controlled by states, particularly in 
relation to civil society actors such as NGOs. This is in direct contrast to the arguments 
o f supporters o f global governance who emphasise the diffusion o f  power away from 
states.46 Despite the emphasis placed on the importance o f democratisation and good 
governance, the theory fails to analyse the context in which these ideas have developed 
and how support for such ideas can impact on the influence and status o f  actors within 
the system.
W hat is clear is that the development o f the concept o f global governance has not 
only altered the understanding o f the international system but has also transformed the 
environment in which world, or international organisations, such as the United Nations 
are operating. As Rosenau argues “The international system is less dominant, but it is 
still powerful. States are changing, but they are not disappearing. State sovereignty has 
eroded, but it is still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can still 
throw their weight around."47 International organisations are now playing a more active 
role in the globalisation o f norms, ideas and standards o f behaviour which states and 
other organisations are expected to uphold. This is particularly true in relation to those 
norms which have become associated with the concept o f global governance, 
democratisation, good governance and respect for human rights. It is therefore in the 
emphasis and use o f these norms that the most tangible form o f global governance can 
be established.
46 Proponents o f  G lobal G overnance such as Rosenau argue that pow er is being diffused am ongst new er  
actors rather than remaining concentrated in the hands o f  states. For more on this see  R osenau, W orld  
P ali lies (2005)
47 Rosenau in M ichael T. Klare, W orld  Security  (1998)  pg 18
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One o f the ways in which norms are spread is through the actions o f United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. As Roland Paris argues peacekeeping mandates and practices 
emerge from the prevailing global norms that legitimize certain policies over others.48 
He also argues that peacekeeping missions provide a window into larger phenomenon 
within the international politics including the role o f norms, and the nature o f global 
governance. Along with other writers such as Bellamy49, Paris is looking at what the 
experiences o f peacekeeping operations can tell us about the wider changes in global 
politics. This examination o f peacekeeping operations moves away from the more 
traditional academic evaluations which have focused on either, the functions and 
capabilities o f peacekeeping operations, or on particular case studies which are utilised 
to illuminate wider practices.
Since the 1990s many academics have focused on creating taxonomies o f 
peacekeeping, focusing on the idea o f different generations o f operations, or different 
categories of operations. The number o f categories varies greatly amongst the studies 
from the original three generations outlined by Doyle and Richmond50, a somewhat 
chronological organisation which is again utilised by Macqueen in 2006 to identify 
what constitutes a peacekeeping operation.31 Rotberg outlines four categories in
48 See Paris, Roland, P eacebu ild in g  a n d  the lim its o f  L ibera l In ternationalism  (International Security: 22: 
2: 1997) 5 4 -89  and Paris, Roland, In ternational pea ceb u ild in g  a n d  the m ission  c iv ilisa tr ice  (R ev iew  o f  
International Studies: 28: 2002) 637-656
49 B ellam y, A lex J., The 'next sta g e ' in p ea ce  opera tion s theory?  (International Peacekeeping: 1 1 : 1 :  
2 0 0 4 )1 7 -3 8
50 D oyle , M ichael W.,11 av.v o f  W ar an d  P eace  (W .W . Norton and Co.: N ew  York: 1997), D o y le , M ichael 
W. and N icholas Sam banis M aking War a n d  build ing p eace: U n ited  N ations P ea ce  O p era tion s  
(Princeton University Press: Princeton: 2006). and R ichm ond,M ain tain ing o rd er (2002)
51 M acQ ueen, Norr'tc J ’eacekeep ing  a n d  the in ternational system  (R outledge N ew  York: 2 0 0 6 )
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relation to operations in Africa,52 whilst Thakur and Schnabel highlight six ‘cascading 
generations’ o f operations.53 Berdal suggest there are eight different categories o f 
operation54 but, the largest number o f  differing operations is suggested by Diehl, who 
differentiates operations into twelve different categories.55 More recently Bellamy and 
W illiams have identified seven key types o f operations which they have more 
importantly divided into westphalian and post westphalian operations.56 This division is 
particularly important in relation to the development o f global governance as it divides 
operations into missions based on the peaceful resolution o f conflicts between states 
(Westphalian) and newer operations which are based on the suggestion that "in the 
long-run, peaceful relations between states require liberal democratic regimes and 
societies within state" (post-W estphalian).57 Under this division the majority o f post- 
Cold war peacekeeping operations have been about, not only securing the international 
peace and security, but also about emphasising the fact that states’ domestic peace and 
the way in which they conduct their foreign relations is based on the nature o f  their 
internal political system. Bellamy and Williams also focus on the ways in which 
peacekeeping is shaped by the global context and how operations can illuminate 
developments in the wider international system.
52 Rotberg, R o b e r t P eacekeepin g  a n d  the effective preven tio n  o f  w ar', in Rotberg, Robert, P ea cek eep in g  
a n d  P ea ce  E nforcem ent in A frica  /'Brookings Institute W ashington: 2000)
53 Thakur, Ram esh and Albrecht Schnabel, U n ited  N ations P eacekeepin g  O perations: A d  H oc M issions, 
P erm anen t E ngagem ent (B rookings Institution: N ew  York: 2001)
54 Berdal, M aisAV hither UN p ea cekeep in g?  (IISS: London: 1993)
55 D iehl, Paul F.,'Forks in the road '  in D iehl, Paul F„ The p o litic s  o f  g lo b a l govern a n ce  (Lynne Riener: 
N ew  York 2001)
56 B ellam y, A lex J. and Paul D. W illiam s,U nderstanding P eacekeep in g  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2 0 1 0 )
57 Ibid. pg 4
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The investigation o f peacekeeping operations in relation to wider developments in 
international relations theory began with Alan James and his work on Peacekeeping in 
International Politics.58 Since then academics such as Keohane and Krasner have begun 
to examine peacekeeping as a tool for exploring other aspects o f the international 
political system including the ongoing use o f the concept o f sovereignty.59 This type o f  
investigation o f peacekeeping tends to focus on how operations relate to the 
development o f specific norms or ideas, for example academics such as W eiss60, 
Ayoob61, W elsh62, and Chesterman63 have focused on the development o f  humanitarian 
intervention. Chesterman64, along with Fukuyama65 has also focused on the role o f 
peacekeeping operations in post-conflict state-building situations. Another area o f 
growing interest is a re-examination o f the concepts surrounding the liberal peace, or 
democratic peace theory66, whereby democratic states are much less likely to be 
involved in conflict with other democratic states. The ideas that make up the
58 Jam es, A lan .P eacekeepin g  in In ternational P o litic s  (St Martin's Press: London: 1990)
59 K eohane, Robert. P o litica l au th ority  after intervention: g ra d a tio n s o f  so vere ig n ty  in H olzgrefe, J.L and 
Robert K eohane, H um anitarian intervention: Ethical. L egal a n d  P o litica l d ilem m as  (Cam bridge  
U niversity Press: Cambridge: 2003). Krasner. Stephen. S h ared  S overeign ty: N ew  Institu tions f o r  
C o lla p sed  a n d  I  a iling  S la tes  (International Security: 29: 2: 2004) 85-120 . Krasner, Stephen, The C ase  
f o r  S h a red  Sovere ig n ly  (Journal o f  Dem ocracy: 16: 1: 2005)
60 W eiss, Thom as G. . / lum anitarian  Intervention  (Polity : Cambridge: 2007)
61 A yoob , M oham m ed. H um anitarian In tervention a n d  In ternational Society. (C o ver sto ry )  (G lobal 
Governance: 7: 3: 2 001) 225. A yoob. M oham m ed. Third W orld  P ersp ec tive s on H um anitarian  
In terven tion  a n d  In ternational A dm in istration  (G lobal Governance: 10: 1: 2 0 0 4 ) 99 -118
62 W elsh, Jennifer M., f rom  Right to R esponsibility: H um anitarian In tervention  a n d  In tern ation al 
S o c ie ty  (G lobal G overnance: 8: 4: 2002) 503, W elsh. Jennifer M„ H um anitarian  In terven tion  a n d  
In ternational R elations  (Oxford University Press Oxford: 2004)
63 Chesterm an, Sim on You. the People: The U nited  Nations. T ransitional A dm inistration , a n d  S ta te-  
B uilding  (Oxford University Press Oxford: 2004)
64 Ibid.
05 Fukuyama. \:riww\s,State-building: govern an ce  a n d  w o r ld  o rder in the 21st cen tu ry  (Cornell University  
Press N ew  York: 2004)
66 Dem ocratic Peace Theory, or the Liberal Peace developed from the ideas o f  Immanuel K ant’s 
Perpetual Peace, for more see Kant, Immanuel P erpetual P eace  (C osim o: N ew  York: 2005 (originally  
published 1795)) D oyle, M ichael W „ Liberalism  a n d  W orld  P o litic s  (Am erican Political Scien ce  
R eview : 80: 1986) 1151-1 170, Kant J\>rpetual P eace (1795)
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foundations o f Democratic Peace Theory have become directly associated with the 
development o f the norms o f global governance and as Miall points out the argument 
for the spread o f both these concepts is now based on the question o f “what if 
democracy, complex interdependence, and global governance spread to the entire 
world? In this case, extrapolation from the findings about democracy and peace would 
suggest that a comprehensive liberal peace might come about.”67 The need for a 
reduction in conflict has become increasingly important as states become ever more 
interdependent and interconnected through the ongoing phenomenon o f  globalisation.
/TO
Academics such as Paris argue that operations are designed to support the 
continuation o f westphalian style states an argument also made by Jarstad and Sisk who 
highlight the ways in which democratization has become an integral part o f 
peacekeeping operations.69 This argument is also supported by MacQueen who again 
highlights the westphalian aims o f operation.70
In order to gain a greater understanding o f the role and impact o f peacekeeping 
operations there has been a clear shift towards examining the political and normative 
context o f operations, rather than focusing solely on the operations, independent o f 
larger changes in the international system. There is. as Cousens and Kumar argue, a 
clear need to understand peacekeeping and peacebuilding as political, both in
67 M iall and M cK inlay in Ingham, Hilary Ingham and M ike, E U  expansion to  the east: p ro sp e c ts  a n d  
p ro b lem s  (Edward Elgar: London: 2002) pg 255DuffieId,G 7o/>a/g o vern a ce  (2001)
68 Paris, P eacebu ild in g  (1997)  , Paris, Study o f  p e a ce  opera tion s (2000)  , Paris, Roland, P ea cek eep in g  
a n d  the constra in ts o f  g lo b a l culture  (European Journal o f  International Relations: 9: 3: 2 0 0 3 ) 441
60 Jarstad, Anna K. , 'D ilem m as o f  w a r to  d em ocracy  transitions' in Jarstad, Anna K. and T im othy D. 
Sisk, From  w ar to  d em ocracy  (Cambridge University Press Cambridge: 2008)
70 M acQ u een ,P eackeep in g  (2006)
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motivation and realisation.71 Many other academics have also begun to examine both 
the political and normative context o f peacekeeping operations and how these are 
shaped by the wider global context. Academics such as Richmond72, and Woodhouse 
and Ramsbotham73 examine the normative assumptions that form the basis o f 
peacekeeping operations whilst others such as Bellamy and W illiams74, Johnstone75
•  76and Finnemore examine how the wider global context influences the norms o f 
peacekeeping operations. This means that the investigation o f peacekeeping operations 
has a dual benefit, it not only improves the understanding o f operations themselves, but 
also as Paris argues provides a window into changes in the wider international system. 
This then makes peacekeeping operations a useful way o f examining the impact o f the 
development o f the norms associated with the concept o f global governance.
Ruggie, Weiss, and Thakur77 have utilised peacekeeping operations to help identify
n  o
five key gaps in the development o f global governance, whilst McClintock sees the 
development o f global governance as a solution to the current problems facing the 
wider UN organisation. What also needs to be investigated in more detail is the impact 
which the development o f the norms associated with global governance is having on 
peacekeeping operations within the field. This is particularly important when connected
71 C ousens, Elizabeth M. and Chetan Kumar. P eacebu ild ing  a s P o litic s  (Lynne Rienner London: 2 0 0 1 )
72 R ichm ond, Oliver. The g lo b a liza tio n  o f  respon ses to C onflict a n d  the P ea ceb u ild in g  consensus  
(Cooperation and Conflict: 39: 2: 2004) 129. Richm ond. O liver, UN P eace  opera tion s a n d  the d ilem m as  
o f  the pea ceb u ild in g  consensus  (International Peacekeeping: 11:1:  2 0 04) 83-101
73 W oodhouse, Tom and O liver Ramsbotham, C osm opolitan  p ea cek eep in g  a n d  the g lo b a liza tio n  o f  
secu rity  (International Peacekeeping: 12: 2: 2005) 139-156
74 Bellam y, U nderstanding pea cek eep in g  (2010)
75 Johnstone, Ian, ( AS- ( AY re la tions after Iraq: The en d  o f  the w o r ld  (order) a s  w e  know it?  (European 
Journal o f  International Law: 15: 4: 2004) 813-838
7<’ Finnem ore, Martha. The purpose  o f  Intervention  (Cornell University Press: London: 2003)
77 R uggie,G loba l C overnance (2010)
78 M cClintock, John, The uniting o f  nations: An e ssa v  on g lo b a l govern an ce  (Peter Lang Oxford: 2 0 10)
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to the questions being raised around the development o f global governance in relation 
to whether or not it is a hegemonic or ideological undertaking. The United Nations is 
based on the principle o f the sovereign equality o f all its member states and the norm o f 
non-intervention. Within the General Assembly all states are equal with one member 
having one vote, the Security Council however is a different matter altogether. As the 
organ responsible for the mandating and operation o f peacekeeping missions the 
Security Council, with its hierarchical power structure, offers a clear demonstration o f 
the continued importance o f nation states within the international system, and presents a 
direct challenge to the theory o f global governance as purely an ideological project.
As noted above the concept o f global governance has become directly associated 
with several international norms, including democratisation, good governance and 
respect for human rights. These norms have also become directly integrated into United 
Nations peacekeeping operations, as Johnson argues "The underlying liberal norms that 
structure global governance projects internationally have been institutionalized in the 
post-conflict reconstructions efforts undertaken by the UN. EU and N A TO ."79 With the 
emphasis the theory places on the diffusion of power the fact that UN peacekeeping 
operations are focused on creating a particular kind o f post conflict society, based on 
the liberal democratic model, offers further evidence that the development o f global 
governance may not be as benign as its supporters suggest.
These concepts are not passive, they represent the influence o f powerful states, and 
have been utilised to successfully engineer the rebuilding o f post conflict societies in a
79 Johnson in Lederer, C ritic izin g  G lo b a l G overnance (2005) pg 176
21
Introduction Kate Seaman
m anner which suits the agenda o f those states. For example the UN intervention in the 
Former Yugoslavia which was afforded more resources and political will than the 
intervention in Somalia which occurred at the same time.
In this respect United Nations Peacekeeping operations are being utilised by 
powerful member states to enforce the norms associated with the concept o f global 
governance in order to create a society o f stable liberal democratic states capable o f 
cooperating to resolve global problems. The fact that these norms are not being applied 
consistently across all operations is another clear demonstration o f  the ways in which 
peacekeeping operations are influenced by the power politics and national interests o f 
the Security Council members.
By examining both the theoretical concepts and the practical application o f the 
norms associated with global governance, argues that the development o f the concept o f 
global governance is having a tangible impact on the discourse o f United Nations 
Peacekeeping in a variety of ways. This impact will be analysed using six key criteria 
including access to resources, fulfilment o f mandates, perceived legitimacy both local 
and global, challenges faced during the operation from both state and non-state actors, 
and issues o f command and control within the operation including organization and 
integration with other actors.80 These criteria will be analysed alongside the extent to 
which particular norms associated with the concept o f Global Governance including, 
democracy, human rights, and good governance have been integrated into the mandates 
o f peacekeeping operations.81 By examining these issues and the connection between
80 For more sec  Chapter Two Pg 83 and Chapter Six Pg 243 - 265
81 For more see  Chapter T w o pg 99 -  101 and Chapter Six Pg 243 - 265
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the development o f the norms associated with global governance, the gap between the 
rhetoric and reality o f  peacekeeping operations, and the crisis in peacekeeping between 
2003 and 2008, this thesis provides a new and original assessment o f the relationship 
between global governance and peacekeeping operations. The following sections 
explain the background to the project before looking at the methodology and chapter 
structure.
Methodology
The main aim o f the research project was to examine the impact that the 
development o f the concept o f global governance is having on United Nations 
peacekeeping operations and the apparent disconnect between what the organisation 
says it can achieve and what it actually achieves in the field. In order to explore this 
issue the project approach was based on the accumulation o f qualitative data which 
represented the interviewees' subjective views o f both the organisation and its 
peacekeeping operations.
The research project was based on a constructivist ontology in which the assumption 
is that people have an active role in constructing both social reality and social 
structures. Because o f this role any social structures are therefore in a constant state o f 
flux as both people and societies change. This approach was chosen over the objectivist 
approach which views social structures as independent and objective, free from the 
influence o f humans and with an existence independent o f social phenomena. The 
constructivist approach was more appropriate in relation to this research project as it is
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examining the constantly changing status o f the United Nations as an international 
organisation. The status o f the UN within the international system is constantly 
changing as member states alter their perceptions o f the organisation and the 
international system as a whole. It is this changing perception which the research 
project aimed to reveal particularly in relation to the developing concept o f global 
governance.
As the research project was aimed at understanding the changing status and 
capabilities o f the United Nations it was conducted utilising an interpretevist 
epistemology through which it seeks to understand human behaviour, or in the case o f 
this project the behaviour o f member states o f the United Nations. Because o f this 
epistemology there is an increased need for the appreciation o f the subjectivity o f the 
findings as well as the potential for bias in both the interpretations o f the researcher and 
the interviewees. There is a need for the project to not only understand the basis for the 
information received but also the added meanings and values which both the subject 
and researchers ascribe to social structures. This is opposed to a positivist approach 
which would seek to gain information in a value free objective manner, more associated 
with pure scientific research in search o f a single knowable truth. The other potential 
approach which could have been taken is a realist approach which argues that there is 
an objective reality that is possible to know separate from description or understanding. 
Because the research project was looking to understand the meanings and values behind 
both peacekeeping operations and the United Nations position in the international 
system a qualitative approach was the most effective means o f gaining such
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information. The next section o f this chapter will now go on to outline the research 
question before moving on to examine the approach taken, the positives and negatives 
o f that approach and why this was chosen over alternatives.
The Research Question
For the first few weeks o f the project the majority o f time was spent on refining the 
research question to be examined. The field o f UN peacekeeping has been widely 
researched so it was important to find a way o f contributing something which was both 
new and relevant to peacekeeping operations today. Previous studies o f  peacekeeping 
operations have been concerned with why and how things go wrong in the field but not 
necessarily on what happens before operations deploy which can also impact on the 
potential success o f any mission.82 The conceptual basis o f peacekeeping operations 
has also not been examined in great detail, although there are many studies on the 
various types o f peacekeeping operations which have been deployed there is again less 
focus on the wider aims o f these operations in relation to the continued stability o f the 
international system.81 The official studies as referenced above tend to focus on
82 For exam ple the analysis undertaken in Biermann, W olfgang and Martin Vadstet UN  P ea cek eep in g  in  
Trouble: L essons L earned  from  the F orm er Yugoslavia  (A shgate Aldershot: 1998) and Barnett, M ichael 
E yew itness to  a  gen ocide  (Cornell University Press Ithaca: 2002). Or reports by the United N ations such  
as N ations, U n ited ,The I N a n d  Som alia  (Department o f  Public Information UN: N ew  York: 1996) also, 
United Nations, Report o f  the Secretary General pursuant to General A ssem bly resolution 53/35  
< http://daccess-dds-nv.un .oru/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 99/348/76/lM G /N 9934876.pdf7Q penE lem ent> ( 
23rd August 2 0 10) into the fall o f  Srebrenica and United Nations, C om prehensive  rep o rt on lessons  
te a m e d  from  U nited  N ations A ssistance M ission for R w anda (UNAM IR) (N ew  York: United N ations  
Deparment o f  Peacekeeping Operations Nations. United: 1996)
83 For analysis o f  the evolution o f  peacekeeping operations see  Durch, W illiam  J.,77?e E volu tion  o f  UN  
P eacekeeping: ('u se  S tudies a n d  C om para tive  A nalysis  (Palgrave M acm illan: London: 19 93), D oyle , 
M ichael W. and Olara A. O w .\nm \d\’acem aking an d  P eacekeepin g  fo r a  new cen tu ry  (Row m an and 
Littlefield Oxford: 1998), B ellam y, P eace opera tion s (2004) , BeWamy, U n derstanding  p ea cek eep in g  
P 0 1 0 )  , G oulding, Marrack. The evolution o f  UN pea cek eep in g  (International Affairs: 69: 3: 1993) 451 -
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particular missions and the reasoning behind those, whilst outside evaluations focus on 
the changes in wider peacekeeping trends, but again there has not been a large amount 
o f research into the broader aims the United Nations and its member states have in 
deploying peacekeeping troops to conflict zones.
The lack o f focus on the norms that are now being associated with peacekeeping 
operations such as good governance, democratisation and respect for human rights, 
provided the basis for this project. From this initial starting point the project became 
more focused on the gap between the official rhetoric produced by the UN, as to how 
post conflict societies will be reconstructed to ensure the application o f those norms, 
and what is actually occurring in conflict zones where peacekeepers are deployed, in 
relation to the resources provided to reconstruct those societies. The gap between the 
rhetoric and resources is directly connected to the ongoing development o f the concept 
o f Global Governance which is focused on the spread o f the norms mentioned above. 
The development o f the concept, with its emphasis on the need for increased 
management o f global crises and the spread o f the norms associated with it has had a 
tangible impact on the success rate o f UN peacekeeping operations. This impact has 
occurred in a number o f ways, through the selective use o f the norms which has 
brought the legitimacy o f operations into question, through the misuse o f norms to 
justify interventions, which again raises the issue o f legitimacy, and also through the 
large increase in the number and variety o f tasks which peacekeeping operations are
464, M acQuccn J ’eackeeping  (2006) . and N eeth ling, Theo, In tern ation al p ea cek eep in g  trends  
(Politikon: 3 1 :1 :  2004) 49-66.
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now being mandated to undertake in relation to the spread o f the norms associated with 
the concept o f global governance.
As the research progressed it became increasingly clear that the United Nations 
plays an essential role in coordinating the agenda o f global governance, marshalling the 
actors and attempting to ensure that progress is made. From this it was then posited that 
peacekeeping operations were playing an increasing part in that coordination and in the 
development o f  the concept o f global governance and the spread o f  the norms 
associated with the concept in relation to the creation o f a society o f stable states which 
would be able to work together to combat global problems. Although this might be the 
end aim o f the United Nations it was also posited that the abilities o f  the organisation 
and its member states to achieve this were severely limited and that this was being 
clearly demonstrated by the ongoing crisis within peacekeeping operations and the 
disconnect between the operations being mandated and the resources provided to 
complete those mandates. The research question was then formulated as below:
What changes has the development of Global Governance created within the 
discourse of United Nations Peacekeeping and has it had an impact on resolving 
the gap between the official rhetoric of the organisation and what occurs on the 




Once the research question had been defined the different approaches to 
investigating it were examined. As mentioned above the project is based on a 
constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology. Because o f this the use o f  a 
qualitative method o f investigation was the best method o f enquiry as qualitative 
research is often based on subjective data items, which cannot be given a numeric 
value, for example the attitudes and opinions o f a range o f individuals on an issue. This 
was exactly the kind o f information which the project was hoping to generate, the 
experience and understanding o f a variety o f actors involved within peacekeeping 
missions in relation to the changes brought about by the development o f the concept o f 
global governance. It was also decided to combine the qualitative fieldwork with the 
use o f specific case studies in relation to peacekeeping operations in the field as this 
would provide the practical application o f the issues raised through the fieldwork 
investigation.
After careful consideration the use o f semi-structured interviews was selected as the 
means o f fieldwork. This was chosen over other options such as focus groups or 
observation because o f the kind o f in-depth information about specific experiences 
which the project required. The use o f semi-structured interviews meant that there was 
enough flexibility within the questions to adapt to the specific interviewee whilst still 
providing the breadth of information required to make analysis o f the results possible. 
As the research question focuses on the development o f global governance which 
involves a range o f newer actors in the international system as well as more established
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organisations such as the United Nations it was important to engage a wide variety o f 
research subjects in the interview process. It was also important to cover as many 
different perspectives as possible so the subjects were broken down into five key 
groups; Academics, who would provide insight into the development o f the conceptual 
background as well as into past research on UN peacekeeping, Military operatives, 
including former peacekeepers, advisers to the Security Council and M inistry o f 
Defence Officials, Representatives o f NGOs, who could provide insight into the 
expanding roles o f  these type o f  organisations, United Nations officials, who could 
provide evidence o f the inner workings o f the organisation, and finally external 
observers o f UN peacekeeping missions which included subjects such as reporters and 
civilians.
As the project was based on a qualitative means o f data production the collection o f 
the data and the analysis were somewhat intertwined. The semi-structured interview 
format utilised meant that the researcher and the responder were involved in an 
interactive process in which the respondent had an active influence on the analytical 
process. This fits in with the interpretivist epistemology on which the project was 
based. It also meant that as the interviews were conducted the questions could be 
adapted to incorporate any new evidence which might be presented. Conducting the 
interviews was a learning experience, particularly in terms o f encouraging participants 
to share their views in detail, views which perhaps they had not necessarily analysed in 
great detail prior to the interview.
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The interviews were generally conducted on a semi-formal basis more often than not 
at the location at which the subject worked. The subjects were presented with a consent 
form which outlined the research project and asked whether or not they required 
anonymity throughout the project. They were also asked whether or not the interview 
could be recorded, and if  it was whether or not they would like a copy o f the transcript 
produced. The consent forms were produced in line with the ethical requirements o f the 
universities ethical review board. This involved analysis o f any potential impact on the 
right to privacy o f the interviewees and also any potential risks that may be posed if  
they participated in the research process. In order to meet with the ethical requirements 
the process had to be assessed in terms o f anonymity, confidentiality and data 
protection. It also required that all participants been informed as to how the data would 
be utilised and stored in line with the Data Protection Act.
At the outset o f the interview each participant was informed that the data produced 
would be utilised for the project specified, with potential for future publication, and that 
the only people who would have access to the complete records o f the data and 
interviewee details would be the researcher, the supervisor and the two examiners. 
Participants were also given the option to opt out o f their comments being utilised in 
future research, although only one chose to do so. As the research was focused on high 
level persons the risk involved in participation was minimal and the majority o f the 
interviewees would not be classed as 'persons at risk’. In order to ensure the lowest 
level o f risk the consent forms offered the choice o f anonymity to participants in order 
to protect them from any potential backlash for participating in the research, although
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this was again deemed to be a minimal risk because o f the content o f  the research. 
Those who have requested anonymity were also given the option o f establishing an 
alternative way in which they could be referred to, the location o f specific interviews 
will also not be disclosed to a wider audience although the dates will, this is another 
measure designed to protect the anonymity o f those who have requested it. Finally once 
the interviews had been transcribed, those participants who requested a transcript were 
sent a copy. Several participants also asked for specific quotes to be sent in context in 
order to be edited. Once the changed were received these were then incorporated into 
the final thesis. All o f the above measure ensured that the project met the guidelines for 
a low risk project as outlined by the ethical review board. In order to complete the 
process a self assessment form was also submitted to the board.
Overall the interviews were a positive experience and provided a vast amount o f 
unique information which was both relevant and important to the development o f the 
project. There were some problems with this form o f fieldwork, the biggest being the 
length o f time required to generate enough interviews for a solid basis o f data. The 
largest hurdle in generating these interviews was in finding a reliable way o f contacting 
potential interviewees, for some groups this was straightforward, particularly the 
academics, but for others, in particular the former peacekeepers and UN officials it was 
much more complicated than had been anticipated at the outset. There were also 
inevitable delays in terms o f scheduling interviews, as many o f the subjects are high 
level operatives their daily working lives are obviously extremely hectic which meant 
that the time scale between the interview request being sent and the interview being
31
Introduction Kate Seaman
scheduled and then occurring was sometimes quite substantial. The variety o f  locations 
involved also posed some logistical challenges, particularly in relation to scheduling. 
Interviews were conducted both in the United States and in the UK which required a 
large amount o f  coordination and time management to ensure all interviews could be 
conducted with the minimum interference to the progress o f the project. The locations 
also raised other issues, particularly in relation to the recording o f interviews and the 
problems of background noise. In order to minimise the impact o f this on the recording 
a microphone was utilised although in most cases this did not remove all o f  the 
background noise. A few o f the interviews were also conducted over the telephone, 
when a face to face meeting was unable to be scheduled. These presented their own 
unique set o f problems, particularly in relation to the interaction between the 
interviewer and interviewee. There was also a logistical issue in terms o f recording the 
interviews and ensuring the consent form was adequately dealt with. In most cases the 
interview was recorded directly through a speakerphone and the consent form was sent 
in advance to be returned, either by fax or post.
The data produced from the interviews was generally o f an excellent quality and it 
provided a unique insight into the functioning o f both UN peacekeeping operations and 
the wider international system. The analysis o f the data was conducted directly in 
relation to the research question and the already established research as highlighted 
above. This was again an interactive process between the unique data generated by the 
interviews and the previous research conducted by others in the field. As will be 
explored in later chapters the information which was generated does contest some of
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the previous research which as well as answering the current research question opens 
up avenues for further investigation in the future.
As mentioned above the project also makes use o f four specific case studies in 
relation to the overall research question. The four cases selected are the ongoing 
conflict in Somalia, the UN interventions in the Former Yugoslavia, in particularly the 
intervention o f UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the UN intervention in Burundi ONUB, and the 
ongoing situation in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo currently being monitored 
and managed by MONUSCO. These case studies provide a clear practical application 
o f  many o f the issues raised in the fieldwork. They cover two distinct regions which 
have seen a marked disparity in the level o f resources applied to interventions, a 
disparity which is only highlighted by their occurrence in a similar time frame. These 
interventions have also involved other international actors outside o f the United Nations 
system, in the FYR the involvement o f the EU and NATO alongside various NGOS, in 
the DRC the support o f the EU, and in Somalia, the U SA 's intervention and again the 
involvement o f various NGOs. Because o f the involvement o f a variety o f actors they 
are also highly relevant to the more conceptual arguments o f the research project, 
particularly in relation to the development o f the concept o f global governance.
The following section will now go on to outline the chapter breakdown and how 




Chapter one argues that there is indeed a tangible form o f global governance and that 
different parts o f this, states, international organisations, and civil society are all 
involved in trying to create a more stable international system. That whilst newer 
actors, such as non-governmental organisations, are becoming increasingly involved in 
resolving international problems, states retain their privileged position as the most 
important actor in the international system. This importance, as the chapter argues, is 
clearly demonstrated by the continued emphasis placed on the sovereignty and 
sovereign rights o f states. This leaves the United Nations in a precarious position, 
trying to both ensure the sovereign rights o f states whilst also securing the protection o f 
citizens within those states. The UN is also dealing with increased challenges to its 
authority, both from member states and other regional organisations.
All o f these new developments will be examined in relation to their impact on the 
UN and its ability to function in a peacekeeping capacity. By looking at the conflict 
between the more traditional norms o f the international system and more recent 
developments the chapter will argue that all o f these issues are only increasing tension 
between what the UN as an organisation sets out to achieve and what in reality it is 
actually capable o f achieving. Finally this chapter demonstrates the essential role the 
UN plays at the forefront o f international peacekeeping endeavours and argues that the 
UN is a key organisation in the international system and an important building block in 
the development o f the concept o f Global Governance for the international system. 
However the role which the UN is both taking and being assigned in the development
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o f  the norms associated with the concept is having a detrimental impact on the ability o f 
the organisation to function in its peacekeeping role and it is clear that the UN is an 
organisation under pressure. Pressure from its member states, from the international 
system and from those it is meant to help and protect. It is the only organisation with a 
specific mandate to maintain international peace and security but, in order for it to be 
able to fulfil that mandate, changes need to occur.
This chapter offers a different perspective on Global Governance; By looking at the 
conflict between the more traditional norms o f the international system and the norms 
associated with the concept o f Global Governance it argues that the misuse o f these 
norms is having a detrimental impact, not only on the development o f the concept but 
also on the tension between what the UN as an organisation sets out to achieve and 
what in reality it is actually capable o f achieving.
Chapter Two follows on from these arguments and examines in greater detail the 
impact that these norms are having on United Nations peacekeeping. The chapter 
argues that the evolution o f United Nations peacekeeping, along with the increasing use 
o f the UN as an enforcer for particular ideals, has in part led to the crisis now facing the 
organisation in relation to this key role. That over time the increasing complexities o f 
the international system in the post Cold War era and the development o f the concept o f 
global governance have led to the organisation compromising its abilities to respond to 
crises on an international level. It also argues that the development o f the norms 
associated with the concept o f global governance, including democratisation, good 
governance and respect for human rights are connected directly to the increased amount
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o f tasks which peacekeeping missions are now mandated to undertake. An increase in 
tasks which has not seen an equivalent increase in the resources required in order to 
complete those tasks successfully.
This chapter offers a different perspective on the development o f peacekeeping in 
relation to the concept o f global governance. It directly connects the developments 
within peacekeeping operations to the increased emphasis being placed on the norms 
associated with global governance. By examining the impact o f global governance on 
the UNs role as the most prominent international peacekeeper it also offers a new lens 
through which to view the development o f the concept o f global governance. It offers a 
practical application o f some of the theoretical ideas under debate within global 
governance and highlights some o f the potential problems that the misuse o f the norms 
associated with the concept poses both to UN peacekeeping operations and the 
development o f the wider notion o f global governance.
Chapter Three then argues that the challenges facing the UN today are directly 
attributable to the way in which the United Nations has become increasingly involved 
in the development o f the concept o f global governance and is being utilised to spread 
the norms and ideals espoused by supporters o f that concept. It argues that the UN has 
become directly involved in promoting the concept o f global governance and that the 
role that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, has taken in helping 
to rebuild states in post conflict situations, through resolutions mandating peacekeeping 
operations, plays a key role in the transmission o f the particular norms and ideals 
associated with that concept. These norms and ideals then influence the way in which
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these states are reconstructed which is then having a direct impact on the way in which 
operations mandate by the Security Council are viewed by the wider international 
community.
The operations being mandated are now being directly associated with the norms o f 
global governance which is problematic as many member states o f the organisation, and 
many states which face potential interventions in the future, view the concept as 
nothing more than an extension o f the neo-liberal agenda, and as little more than a 
mask for powerful states to continue to do as they please. The argument will be 
illustrated by outlining the increasing emphasis placed on rebuilding states as liberal 
democracies and the ways this is being used to underline the importance o f  creating an 
international system o f stable, democratic states. It also argues that the role the UN is 
undertaking in the transmission o f these norms is having a detrimental impact on its 
role as an international peacekeeper.
The new perspective in this chapter comes from the argument that the UN needs to 
be more careful in the application o f norms and ideals in peacekeeping missions as the 
misuse and selectivity in the use o f particular ideals is currently undermining the 
legitimacy o f the United Nations as an international peacekeeper and has only increased 
the likelihood o f failure, loss o f international support and, legitimacy which the 
organisation constantly battles.
Chapter four continues this line o f argument by looking at the role o f the Security 
Council and the ways in which particular member states are utilising their power and 
influence. It argues that the asymmetrical power relations within the Council are having
37
Introduction Kate Seaman
a negative impact on peacekeeping operation mandates as these are utilised by member 
states to transfer particular norms and ideals to conflict situations. This transfer is then 
directly impacting on the development o f the idea o f global governance as the UN 
becomes involved in the reconstitution o f states that can once recovered, move forward 
to become responsible members o f the international community, and partners in 
resolving global problems. This chapter emphasises the importance o f the 
understanding o f power within global governance through examination o f the Security 
Council, an understanding which is lacking in some o f the other literature which tends 
to focus on global governance as a powerless development.84 From Chapter Four it will 
be clear that the inequality within the Council, between permanent members and non­
permanent, developed countries and developing, troop contributors and those 
mandating the operations is having a negative impact on the actions o f the Council 
itself.
Chapter Five then examines three o f the issues connected to this inequality which 
are having a large impact on the provision o f peacekeeping operations; sovereignty, 
legitimacy and conditionality. It argues that the Security Councils legitimacy, whilst 
under scrutiny is still robust. That despite this robustness there has however been 
increasing attempts to establish legitimate alternatives to the Security Council and the 
success o f these alternatives will also be examined. It also argues that there has been a 
clear shift in the concept o f sovereignty, that there are new conditions being applied in
84 For more see  Pg 5 o f  the Introduction and Chapter One.
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order for states to earn this right and that this is making it easier for interventions to 
occur.
There is however a need to understand how this shift in sovereignty is being applied 
in relation to interventions and to establish if  some states are treated as more sovereign 
than others. It goes on to argue that some states still guard their sovereignty more 
jealously than others and that this is having an impact on how those states view the 
legitimacy o f council actions. Finally it argues that this is having a direct impact on 
peacekeeping operations as they are asked to undertake a much wider variety o f  tasks 
than ever before. That UN peacekeeping missions, or ‘peace support operations’ as they 
are now often termed have become directly involved in the rebuilding o f  post conflict 
states, in the reconstruction o f sovereign entities and that this role is having a 
detrimental impact on the role o f the UN as a peacekeeper as these projects are not 
always viewed as legitimate.
This chapter offers a new perspective on the changes within state sovereignty, 
arguing that while there has been a shift this is not applied or accepted on a uniform 
basis. Whilst more developed states have proved somewhat willing to have limitations 
placed on their sovereignty, secure in the knowledge that they have control o f any 
potential threats to that right, other developing states are less inclined to remove the 
protection which the traditional understanding o f the norm affords them. The chapter 
argues that it is the failure to appreciate this that has led to failures within peacekeeping 
operations which are not viewed as legitimate by those on the ground and that this has 
led to a desire on behalf o f some states to search for alternatives to the UN Security
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Council, particularly in the form o f regional organisations where their influence might 
be larger.
Chapter Six will further some o f the arguments raised in the last chapter in relation 
to peacekeeping operations. Utilising four case studies it argues that the development o f 
the concept o f Global Governance is having a detrimental impact on peacekeeping as 
operations are given ever increasing mandates. It also argues that the UN has been 
tasked with the responsibility o f helping to create a society o f ‘good’ states based on the 
liberal democratic model and that this emphasis is causing problems in the UNs ability 
to intervene in conflicts, particularly in relation to resource allocation. It examines the 
new organisations developing peacekeeping abilities and how all o f  these organisations 
are coordinated within the field. It also analyses the impact on resources and mandates 
that increasing demands have made and the successes and failures o f the UN in the 
field.
Alongside the look at newer organisations it will also examine the changing attitudes 
o f states especially the shift in Am erica's attitude towards the UN and how this has 
limited the organisations ability to deal with conflict management. It assesses the 
disparity in both resources and action in relation to the different case studies and 
examine the reasoning behind this arguing that certain conflicts are more important in 
relation to the development o f the liberal project than others. This chapter is the 
practical application o f the theoretical concepts o f the previous chapters. It provides a 
new perspective on the problems facing peacekeeping operations and the evident 
disconnect between rhetoric and reality within UN operations.
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Chapter Seven then argues that the UN is the only organisation capable o f 
legitimising interventions despite the challenges it faces in the international system. It 
examines the idea that global governance is in fact weakening the UN by removing its 
influence in particular areas and bypassing it altogether in others. It argues that this loss 
o f influence can be directly attributed to the development o f the norms associated with 
the concept o f Global Governance as these have contradicted more traditional norms 
which offer states protection from intervention. This then leads states to search for 
alternatives to the UN in which they can have more influence and power over any 
potential interventions.
From this it argues that the UN has been co-opted into the liberal project o f global 
governance to act as an enforcer for certain ideals and how this role is detrimental to 
the organisation as it only serves to highlight the structural and organisational 
deficiencies o f the organisation. It argues that while reform o f the Security Council is 
necessary to improve the legitimacy o f operations it is unlikely to succeed as those 
states in a powerful position are unlikely to relinquish this status. It also argues that 
reform in fact could be detrimental as although it would make the organisation more 
representative it might also lead to more clashes and the potential for the council to be 
unable to act in the face o f international crises.
It examines the role o f the UN in relation to bestowing legitimacy on interventions 
and how this has been undermined by member state 's actions. It then argues that the 
UN needs to retain the prime position in relation to the authorisation o f peacekeeping 
interventions particularly in relation to the development o f international law and that it
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needs to avoid becoming nothing more than a rubber stamp for individual state actions 
as it increasingly appears to be.
This chapter offers a new argument in that global governance is in fact weakening 
the UN and having a detrimental impact on its operations, rather than a positive impact
o r
as suggested by other literature ; that the association o f the UN with a particular set o f 
norms is leading some states to question its legitimacy and representativeness which is 
again having a negative impact on operations. It also offers a slightly different 
perspective on potential reform o f the Security Council which, although seen as 
necessary does also pose dangers to the institution itself. This will then lead to the 
conclusion which will synthesis the findings and illuminate the possibilities for future 
research.
In order to assess the impact which the development o f Global Governance is having 
on the gap between the rhetoric and reality o f peacekeeping operations it is important to 
understand how and why the concept has been developed and what impact it has had on 
the wider international system. Chapter One goes on to examine the development o f  the 
concept o f Global Governance and the different ways in which this has impacted on the 
role o f the United Nations as an international peacekeeper.
85 See for exam ple Edwards, M ichael,Future P o sitive  In ternational C o o p era tio n  in the 2 1 st C entury  
(Earthscan: London: 1999) and Pugh, M ichael and W .P.S Sidhu, The UN a n d  reg io n a l secu rity  (Lynne  
Rienner: London: 2003). A lso  R u ggie ,G lo b a l G overnance (2010) , W eiss, Thom as G. and Gordenker, 
Leon, N G O 'sjh e  UN a n d  G lo b a l G overnan ce  (Lynne Rienner: London: 1996)
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Chapter One: The United Nations, Global Governance and Peacekeeping. 
Where does the United Nations fit?
In order to understand the position o f the United Nations you need to first 
understand the international system in which it operates. Over the past few decades 
various different theories as to how the international system operates have both gained 
and lost popularity.1 One o f the most recent theories to emerge is that o f global 
governance.2 By unpicking the role o f new actors, key issues such as sovereignty and 
power, and problems surrounding the development o f the concept this chapter will 
demonstrate that global governance is a useful tool in both examining and 
understanding the United Nations as an organisation and its role as an international 
peacekeeper.
The international system in which the UN resides today is vastly different to that in 
place at the time o f its inception. As Kaldor argues “The 1990s witnessed the 
emergence o f global governance -  stronger and more active international institutions,
1 For exam ple during the Cold War. Realism  was the dom inant theory o f  international relations. 
F ollow ing  the end o f  the Cold War there w as a resurgence o f  Liberalism as the dom inance o f  Pow er  
based politics w as called into question. For the liberal v iew  on the post-Cold war international system  see  
Fukuyama, Francis,The en d  o f  h istory  a n d  the last m an  (Free Press London: 1992). For a post 9/11 
analysis see  M andelbaum, M ichael.The ideas that co n q u ered  the w o r ld  (Public Affairs London 2 003) 
For analysis o f  the Realist position see  W altz. Kenneth N ., Stru ctu ra l R ealism  after the C o ld  W ar 
(International Security: 25: 1: 2000) 5-41 and C ox, Robert \ \ . .T h e  new  R ealism : P ersp ec tives  on  
M u ltila tera lism  a n d  W orld  O rder  (M acm illan: London: 1997). For a post 9/11 analysis o f  the realist 
position see M earsheim er, John i.J 'h e  tra g ed y  o f  g rea t p o w e r  p o litic s  (WAV. Norton: N ew  York 2003). 
The dissatisfaction with these theories explanation o f  the changes within the international system  then led 
to the developm ent o f  alternative concepts such as Global Governance.
2 For more on the developm ent o f  Global G overnance see Rosenau, James N.,7T7e stu d y  o f  w o r ld  p o lit ic s : 
g lo b a lisa tio n  a n d  g lo b a l governance  (Routledge: N ew  York 2005), Held, D avid ,D em ocracy  a n d  the 
g lo b a l o rd er  (Stanford University Press Stanford: 1995) and Held, D avid ,G lo b a l C ovenant (Polity Press 
Cambridge: 2004). f  or critiques o f  the concept see Soederberg, Susanne ,G lo b a l G overnan ce in Q uestion  
(Pluto Press: London: 2006) and Murphy, Craig N ., G lo b a l G overnance: P o o rly  done a n d  p o o r ly  
u n derstood  (International Affairs: 76: 4: 2000) 789-803.
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more multilateralist behaviour by states, a new discourse o f human rights and 
humanitarianism, and the rise o f global civil society pressing for treaties on landmines, 
climate change, or the International Criminal Court.”3 The number o f actors has 
increased exponentially as has the number o f problems with which the organisation has 
to grapple. With the increasing development o f the phenomenon o f  globalisation and 
the accompanying complexity this brings to the international system, it has become 
apparent that “a globalizing world requires the mechanisms to manage the growing 
complexity o f cross-national interactions.”4 This chapter argues that the United Nations 
has a key role to play in managing these interactions and that the retention o f the 
legitimacy the organisation has gained is essential to ensure success in this role. The 
organisation needs to demonstrate its continued relevance within the international 
system and one o f the ways it can do so is by working to ensure a greater sense o f 
coordination in dealing with international issues. The reality is that Global Governance 
is not a form o f world government.3 It has no central overarching authority with 
sovereignty over resources. It is instead a complicated system o f different networks, 
processes, actors and institutions that attempt to bring a modicum o f organisation to a 
chaotic international system. At the centre o f this chaos is the institution that offers the 
most governmental form o f control in global governance, the United Nations. The
3 Kaldor, Mary,,Ye*r a n d  O ld  Wars: O rg a n ized  V iolence in a  G lo b a l E ra  (Stanford University Press 
Stanford: 2007) pg ix
4 Barnett and Finnem ore in Barnett. M ichael, and Raymond Duvall, P ow er in g lo b a l govern an ce  
(Cam bridge U niversity Press: Cambridge: 2005) pg 161
A s N y e  argues, a hierarchical world governm ent is neither feasible nor desirable, see  N y e , Joseph S., 
G lo b a liza tio n s dem o cra tic  deficit (Foreign Affairs: 80: 4: 2 001) . This is contradicted by others such as 
Baher and Gordenkcr w ho argue that “It would seem  that only cooperative behaviour - or e lse  a world  
governm ent and the end o f  the national states- can lead to regulation and order in a situation o f  
interdependence." For more see Baehr, Peter R. and Leon Gordenker,7/7e UN  at the e n d  o f  the 1990s  
(M acm illan: London: 1999) pg 3
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United Nations plays an essential role in coordinating the agenda o f global governance, 
marshalling the actors and attempting to ensure that progress is made.
Global Governance itself is a highly contested and politicized concept. Developed in
the period following the end o f the cold war global governance stemmed from
“a sense o f dissatisfaction with long established ways o f thinking, a 
recognition that fundamental changes are occurring in international (or 
better global) politics and less often commented upon, the post cold war 
ideological hegemony o f liberal democratic and expert led conceptions o f 
social order.”6
It does not view the international system as a state centric one, instead it tries to 
incorporate the many new and varied actors that now have a role to play in global 
relations. Actors as varied as Non-Governmental Organisations, Trans-National 
Companies, Pressure Groups, International Organisations and International Regimes. 
Global Governance is aimed at creating an understanding o f “international governance 
in the absence o f a sovereign”7 and providing a new viewpoint on how the international 
system could or should operate. It is the numerous different and often opposing views 
o f how the international system should operate which have caused much friction within 
the debates surrounding Global Governance. The terminology surrounding the theory 
has become increasingly politicized as critics, such as Murphy and Soederberg, raise 
questions over the motivations o f the 'global governance project' and the motivations 
o f those behind it.8 The key question remains as to whether or not it is possible to
6 Selby in Cochrane, Feargal, D uffy, Rosaleen, Selby, Jan, G lo b a l governance, conflict a n d  resista n ce  
(Palgrave M cM illan: 2 0 0 3 ) pg 4
7 Barnett and Duvall in Barnett, P ow er (2005) pg 7
8 For more see  Murphy, G lo b a l G overnance (2000) , Soederberg,G lo b a l G overnan ce (2006) , and for a 
variety o f  different critiques see W ilkinson, Rorden, G lo b a l G overnance: C ritica l P ersp ec tive s  
(R outledge London: 2002)
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“explain the nature o f global governance without understanding the ways in which 
powerful states construct and pursue their grand strategies.”9 Again the problem 
remains as to how to view the role o f the state, is it the key agent in the conduct o f 
international relations, is it purely an intermediary between other levels o f governance 
or is it something else? Whilst supporters o f the development o f  the concept o f  Global 
Governance argue that power is being diffused away from States to a variety o f  new 
actors, this viewpoint fails to take into account the power and influence States still 
retain over these actors, particularly in relation to International Organisations such as 
the United N ations.10
The main aim o f supporters o f the development o f the concept o f  Global 
Governance has been to provide an alternative understanding as to how the 
international system operates today, to incorporate all o f  the many actors, not only 
states and to create an understanding o f how everything fits together. Proponents o f the 
concept do not view the international system as a state centric one, instead writers such 
as Rosenau and Cox attempt to demonstrate the important role that international 
organisations play in limiting the actions o f states by providing proscribed boundaries 
within which it is acceptable for states to operate." What then becomes important is 
how to understand the intentions of all of the actors involved in the multiple networks,
9 Murphy, G loba l G overnance (2000)
10 For arguments supporting the relocation o f  authority away from states see  Rosenau, W orld  P o litic s  
(2005)  , H eld ,D em ocracy  (1995)  and \\e k \,G lo b a l C ovenant (2004) . For counter argum ents see  Luck, 
Edward C., R ediscoverin g  the sta te  (G lobal Governance: 8: 2002) 7-11
11 See for exam ple, Rosenau, James N., G overnance in the 21 st C entury  (G lobal Governance: 1 1 1 9 9 5 ) ,  
also Rosenau in Martin H ew son and Sinclair, Tim othy J. , A p proach es to  g lo b a l govern a n ce  th eo ry  
(State University o f  N ew  York Press: Albany: 1999) and, C ox, Robert W ., So c ia l fo rc es , s ta te s  a n d  
yvorld orders: B eyon d  In ternational R elations Theory. (M illenium : 10:2: 1 9 8 1 ).
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processes, organizations and regimes which make up the tangible form o f  global 
governance?12
This chapter argues that there is indeed a tangible form o f global governance and 
that different parts o f this, states, international organisations, and civil society are all 
involved in trying to create a more stable international system. That whilst newer 
actors, such as non-governmental organisations, are becoming increasingly involved in 
resolving international problems, that states retain their privileged position as the most 
important actor in the international s y s te m .T h is  importance, as the chapter argues, is 
clearly demonstrated by the continued emphasis placed on the sovereignty and 
sovereign rights o f states. This leaves the United Nations in a precarious position, 
trying to both ensure the sovereign rights o f states whilst also securing the protection o f 
citizens within those states.
The UN is also dealing with increased challenges to its authority, both from member 
states and other regional organisations. In the aftermath o f the September 11th terrorist 
attacks the USA appeared to turn its back on the international system and returned to a 
policy o f unilateral action with the Invasion o f Iraq in 2003. By failing to push for a 
second UN resolution and bypassing the Council it was argued that the USA had 
undermined the legitimacy o f the United N ations.14 This left the UN at odds with one
12 The ‘tangible form o f  global governance' w ill be exam ined later in the chapter. For more see  pages 49- 
73.
13 For arguments relating to the continued dom inance o f  states, see W altz, Stru ctu ra l rea lism  (2000) A lso  
see, Hannay, David,A'cnr W orld  D iso rd er {I.B. Tauris: London: 2009).
14 For more on this see Johnstone, lan, US- UN re la tion s after Iraq: The en d  o f  the w o r ld  (order) a s w e  
know it?  (European Journal o f  International Law: 15: 4: 2004) 813-838 , also N y e , Joseph S., US p o w e r  
a n d  strategy! a fter Iraq  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 4: 2 0 03) 60-73 and Roberts, Adam , The law  a n d  the use o f  
fo rc e  after Iraq  (Survival: 45: 2: 2003) . For analysis o f  why the Security Council failed to prevent the 
intervention see G lennon, M ichael J., Why the Security  C ouncil F a iled  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 3: 2 0 03)
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o f its most powerful and influential members and has had a detrimental impact on the 
organisations ability to intervene in conflict situations, particularly as American 
military might has been focused on both Afghanistan and Iraq.15 This sidelining o f the 
UN has also been accompanied by increasing activity amongst regional organisations, 
most notably the EU and NATO, who have begun to undertake peacekeeping activities 
in regions outside o f their normal zone o f operation, for example the European U nion’s 
operations in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo, codenamed Operation Artemis, 
and the ongoing NATO involvement in Afghanistan.16
All o f these new developments will be examined particularly in relation to their 
impact on the UN and its ability to function in a peacekeeping capacity. By looking at 
the conflict between the more traditional norms o f the international system and more 
recent developments the chapter argues that all o f these issues are only increasing 
tension between what the United Nations Security Council sets out as achievable 
through the mandating o f peacekeeping missions, and what in reality the troops 
deployed are actually capable of achieving.
Finally this chapter demonstrates the essential role the UN plays at the forefront o f 
international peacekeeping endeavours and argues that, with “its ability to reach out
and for the contradictory arguments see Luck. Edward C. and Ian Hurd and Ann-M arie Slaughter Stayin ' 
A live: The rum ors o f  the UN's dea th  have been ex a g g era ted  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 4: 2003)
15 For exam ination o f  the United N ations after Iraq see, Berdal, Mats, The UN after Iraq  (Survival: 46: 3: 
2 0 04) 83-101 also, Tharoor, Shashi, Why A m erica  s till  needs the UN  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 5: 2 0 03) See  
also Misra, Am a\endu^'ifghanistan: The Labyrin th o f  I io len ce  (Polity Press London: 2004)
16 For analysis o f  the E U ’s Operation Artemis see. Ulriksen, Stale, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona M ace, 
O peration  A rtem is: The shape o f  things to com e?  (International Peacekeeping: 1 1 : 3:  2004) 508 - 525. 
For N A T O  operations in Afghanistan see, Daalder, Ivor and James G oldgeier G lo b a l N A T O  (Foreign  
Affairs: 85: 5: 2006) . For a detailed analysis o f  the ongoing situation in Afghanistan see  
M isra,A fghanistan: The Labyrin th o f  Violence .
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into virtually every society"17 the UN is a key organisation in the international system 
and an important building block in the development o f the norms associated with 
Global Governance.18 However the emphasis being placed on the development o f these 
norms, including democratisation, good governance, and respect for human rights, and 
the misuse o f these norms by powerful states to justify interventions, is having a 
detrimental impact on the ability o f the organisation to function in its peacekeeping role 
and because o f this it is clear that the UN is an organisation under pressure. Pressure 
from its member states, from the international system and from those it is meant to help 
and protect. It is the only organisation with a specific mandate to maintain international 
peace and security but, in order for it to be able to fulfil that mandate, changes need to 
occur.
What is Global Governance?
Global Governance is an emerging theory o f international relations. Moving beyond 
more traditional theories it attempts to understand the changes taking place in the 
international system, to assess the roles o f new actors and the influences these have, 
and to attempt to merge the old with the new. Global Governance as an idea is hard to 
define. It does not fit into more traditional theoretical systems and does not view the 
international system from the same perspective. Instead it has developed from a 
frustration with more traditional theories such as Realism and Liberal-Institutionalism
17 Gaer in W eiss, Thom as G. and Gordenker, Leon, N G O 'sjh e  UN  a n d  G lo b a l G overnan ce  (Lynne  
Rienner: London: 1996) pg 55
18 For more on the role o f  the UN in the developm ent o f  G lobal G overnance see  W eiss, T hom as G., 
B eyon d  UN su bcon tracting  (St Martins Press N ew  York: 1998), also W eiss, Thom as G., G overnance, 
G o o d  govern an ce  a n d  G lo b a l G overnance: conceptual a n d  ac tu a l challenges  (Third W orld Quarterly: 
2 1 :5 :2 0 0 0 )  795-814
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and from the realisation that "these failed to capture adequately the vast increase, in 
both numbers and influence, o f  non-state actors and the implications o f  technology in 
an age o f  globalisation."19 Although many o f the norms associated with Global 
Governance are also associated with the development o f neo-liberal ideas, supporters o f 
the developing concept argue that it is not a continuation o f those ideas and agenda but 
is instead an attempt to refashion a more equitable and humane form o f world 
governance.20 The differences are however questioned by critics o f the concept, such as 
Craig N. Murphy, who argues that in spite o f the role intergovernmental organisations 
have played in making moderate advances in the empowerment o f  women and the 
promotion o f liberal democracy, the current system o f global governance is likely to 
remain lacking in its ability to address global inequalities in income and wealth.21 By 
examining the debates around the development o f the concept o f Global Governance 
this section demonstrates that whilst the concept does not represent a unified project, it 
does consist o f policies and norm development which are aimed at managing the 
increasing number o f global problems. It also argues that while supporters o f the 
concept argue it will create a more stable and equitable international system through the 
inclusion o f newer actors, this understanding neglects the continued importance o f the 
role o f states and the realities o f the inherent weakness o f already existing international 
organisations.
The terminology surrounding global governance is highly contested within the 
academic world. There is no single definition as to what constitutes global governance.
19 W eiss, G overnan ce (2000) pg 796
20 For more see  Falk, Richard A „On H um ane G overnance  (Penn State Press University Park, PA: 1995)
21 For more see Murphy, G loba l G overnance (2000)
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Instead it is used in reference to a wide variety o f  subjects including, the study o f 
international organisations, in relation to the increase in multilateral action and the 
growth in civil society as well as in relation to the study o f globalisation and the 
changing authority within the international system. There are also numerous viewpoints 
within the study o f Global Governance as to how it has developed and why, and what 
role this idea will play in the development o f world politics. There are however, within 
these contested concepts, some generally accepted ideas. These include agreements on 
some o f the basic principles and definitions o f what global governance is and what it is 
attempting to do. Some o f these concepts can be found in the Commission on Global
• 17Governance report, Our Global Neighbourhood.- The report emphasises that, for the
most part, Global Governance is trying to move away from the state based view o f
international relations towards a more inclusive understanding o f the global system. It
is an attempt to demonstrate that international relations can no longer be
"Viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but ...m ust now be 
understood as also involving non-governmental organisations (NGOS), 
citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital 
market."23
That power no longer rests only in the hands o f states but with other actors as well. I f  as 
Keohane argues the international system ‘i s  anarchic in the sense that it lacks an 
authoritative government that can enact and enforce rules o f behaviour.”24 The various 
debates surrounding global governance are trying to uncover and explain how and why, 
in this apparently anarchical system, different actors gain power and influence and then
22 See C om m ission on Global G overnance. Our g lo b a l neighbou rhood  (Oxford: Press, Oxford  
University: 1995)
23 Ibid. pg 2-3
24 Keohane, Robert,/tfie r H egem ony  (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 1984) pg 7
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utilise the system in place to maintain that position o f  power and influence. Because o f 
this debates surrounding global governance have become highly politicized.
For some theorists, such as James Rosenau, Global Governance is simply an attempt 
to understand the "the collection o f governance related activities, rules and 
mechanisms, formal and informal, existing at a variety o f levels in the world today."25 
For him, instead o f focusing on the actions, reactions and interactions o f states Global 
Governance instead attempts to uncover "the sum o f the many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.”26 It understands the 
international system as “a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken.”27 In other 
words "Global governance is conceived to include systems o f rule at all levels o f 
human activity -from the family to the international organization - in which the pursuit 
o f  goals through the exercise o f control has transnational repercussions."28 Alongside 
the political integration that has occurred is a continuing revolution in both industry and 
technology, the phenomenon o f Globalization. This phenomenon has led to "greater 
integration and interdependence between people and states"^ and "fostered new and 
intensified forms o f transnational collaboration as well as new social movements that 
are serving as transnational voices for change."30 As Koppell argues ““The basic
25 Karris, Margaret P. M ingst, Karen A. in te rn a tio n a l O rgan iza tions  (Lynne Rienner: Boulder: 2 0 0 4 ) pg 
4
26 C om m ission on G lobal G overnance, O ur g lo b a l n e ighbou rhood  (1995) pg 2
27 Ibid. pg 2
28 Rosenau, G overnance (1995) pg 13
29 Karns,In ternational o rgan iza tion s (2004) pg 22
30Rosenau, G overnance (1995) pg 13
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argument for global governance is that there are benefits to the creation and
maintenance o f global standards and rules.”31
For other theorists however Global Governance is an inherently liberal conception,
focusing on how power should be diffused throughout the international system and
more importantly on how people should be represented within the international system
as the world becomes more integrated. Although Global Governance could be viewed
as an “attempt to promote a more humane, cooperative and peaceful international
order;” For critics, such as Susanne Soederberg, rather than representing a new "way
o f  organizing international politics in a more inclusive and consensual manner"33, it
instead represents “a deepening, heightening and broadening o f neoliberal
domination.”34 The problem with the more mainstream view o f Global Governance is
that it fails to question who benefits the most from the new forms o f organisation and
why?
It is clear to see that
“the international system has gone through a series o f dramatic changes in 
the past twenty years, unleashing an unusual set o f cross-country 
connections, cooperative effects, and forms o f integration. The dramas have 
largely been connected to the field o f international peace and security. They 
stem from the need for democracy, accountability, welfare, dignity and 
sustainability.”35
31 K oppell, Jonathan G .S, G lo b a l G overnan ce O rganizations: L eg itim acy  a n d  A u th ority  in C onflict 
(Journal o f  Public Adm inistration Research and Theory 18: 2008) 177-203
32 Soederberg,G lo b a l G overnan ce (2006) pg 5
33 Barnett and Duvall in Barnett, P o w er (2005) pg 5
34 Soederberg,G lo b a l G overnance (2006) pg 4
35 W allensteen in Hettne, Bjorn, H um an Values a n d  g lo b a l G overnan ce  (Palgrave M acm illan: N ew  
York: 2008) pg 198
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The world has become increasingly interconnected and the international system now 
faces numerous problems which are beyond the capacities o f individual states to solve 
on their own. This has led not only to an increase in cooperation between states "rooted 
in the desire to bring as much o f the worlds affairs under rule governed environments as
•  36possible" but has also led to "transformations in the locations and scales at which 
politics is conducted".37 The international system is now composed o f “formal 
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their 
interest." What global governance fails to do in some cases is in not asking who these 
new actors are? Does the development o f these institutions benefit all o f  the actors 
within the international system equally? And most importantly who is wielding the 
power?
For its supporters “The core o f the global governance argument concerns the
acquisition o f authoritative decision making capacity by non state and supra state
actors”39 as it demonstrates that states are no longer the only actors in the international
system and instead that
“the world can be represented as a pattern o f interacting social forces in 
which states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the 
global structures o f social forces and the local configurations o f social 
forces within particular countries”.40
36Stants in Vayrynen, Raimo, G lo b a lisa tion  a n d  g lo b a l govern an ce  (Row m an and Littlefield: 2 0 0 1 ) pg 
72
37 Selby in Cochrane, G lo b a l G overnance (2003) pg 6
38 C om m ission on Global G overnance, O ur g lo b a l neighbou rhood  (1995) pg 2
39 D ingwerth, Claus and Pattberg, Philipp, G lo b a l G overnance as a  p e rsp ec tive  on w o r ld  p o litic s  (G lobal 
G overnance: 12: 2: 2006) 185-203
40 C ox, S o c ia l fo r c e s  (1981) , C ox, Robert W . and Tim othy J. Sinclair,. (p p ro a ch es  to  W orld  O rder  
(Cam bridge University Press Cambridge: 1996) pg 105
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It refers simply “to rules and institutions that embody the collective responsibilities o f 
states, citizens and businesses to address global threats through democratic negotiation 
and burden sharing.”41 For writers such as Rosenau the world is a place where the 
nature o f authority is fundamentally changing: where the structures o f global politics 
are in flux: where “societies implode, regions unify, markets overlap” and where 
“politics swirl about issues o f identity, territoriality, and long-established patterns and 
emergent orientations.”42 In this understanding the realities o f global governance are 
constantly changing and Global Governance "it seems reasonable to anticipate, is likely 
to consist o f proliferating mechanisms that fluctuate between bare survival and 
increasing institutionalization, between considerable chaos and widening degrees o f 
order."43 Rosenau also argues that Global Governance should be transformed from the 
ground up that "in order to acquire the legitimacy and support they need to endure, 
successful mechanisms o f governance are more likely to evolve out o f bottom-up than 
top-down processes."44 This argument is supported by other academics such as 
Slaughter who states that “The foundational norm o f global governance should be 
global deliberative equality.” 4^
This is in direct contrast to other writers such as Craig N. Murphy; who examines 
the relationship between international organisation and industrial change, the link 
between global governance and globalisation. He focuses on the dominance o f liberal
41 Edwards, M ichael,Future P ositive  In ternational C oopera tion  in the 21st C entury  (Earthscan: London: 
1999) pg vii
42 Rosenau, James N.,A long the dom estic-foreign  fron tier: exp lorin g  g o vern an ce  in a  turbulen t w o r ld  
(Cam bridge University Press Cambridge: 1997) pg 6-7
43 Rosenau, IVorld P olitics (2005) pg 127
44 Ibid. pg 152
45 Slaughter, Ann-M arie, D isa g g reg a ted  Sovereign ty: T ow ards the P ublic  A ccou n tab ility  o f  G lo b a l  
G overnm ent N etw orks (G overnm ent and Opposition: 39: 2: 2004) 159-190
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ideology and how this impacts on global governance. For Murphy, Global Governance 
goes too far in undermining the traditional concept o f sovereignty, which is one o f  the 
key stumbling blocks for supporters of global governance, and in some cases seems “to 
be defining a particular form o f government which is impossible in some places and 
probably highly, certainly biased towards a particular set o f cultural practices.”46 For 
Murphy
"Contemporary global governance (or, 'what world government we actually 
have') avoids attacking state sovereignty, favours piece-meal responses to 
crises, and has emerged at a time when creative intellectual leadership was 
not matched by courageous political leadership."47
The emphasis on the spread o f neo-liberal ideology within Global Governance is 
problematic and raises more questions in relation to which actors have power and 
influence within the international system.
The introduction o f the issue o f power into global governance fundamentally 
changes the way in which the various relationships and interactions within the system 
can be understood. It raises important issues o f choice and legitimacy as well as leading 
to questions over participation and influence. The understanding o f power in global 
governance is paramount as it leads to numerous questions over the development and 
role which various institutions and actors play in the process. It informs opinion on who 
is responsible for decision making in global governance and whether it is states or other 
actors who really control the agenda. Power relations in global governance are not only 
a matter o f "the ability o f one actor to deploy discursive and institutional resources in
16 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3 rd Septem ber 2008
47 Murphy, G lo b a l G overnance (2000) pg 789 - 803
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order to get other actors to defer judgem ent to them ."48 It is also a matter o f who is 
setting the agenda? Who is producing or influencing the actions o f numerous actors, 
and whether or not these actors are truly independent or overwhelmingly influenced 
and controlled by others with more power? It is important to establish whether 
“International organisations matter not only because states have designed rules to 
resolve problems, but because those IOs (international organisations) themselves are 
independent actors that interact strategically with states and others"49 or if  states are the 
most important actors controlling the actions o f international organisations. Questions 
o f power also lead to important questions concerning the role o f non state actors and 
how they wield power and influence. Without understanding the power structures 
within global governance there is no way to fully understand and appreciate the 
complexities within the international system.
The issue o f power within Global Governance raises questions in relation to the 
substance, aims and possible outcomes o f the development o f the theory. For writers 
such as James Rosenau and David Held, Global Governance is an ideological project. It 
is an investigation o f the development o f new connections, relations and networks and 
the development o f civil society. For Rosenau civil society and the interactions taking 
place within it are neutral and take place within a space devoid o f power relations. For 
critics o f global governance however it is a hegemonic project. Writers such as Murphy 
argue that the use of the concept of global governance, it's vague descriptions o f power 
and control actually disguise the influence o f specific actors. In this case Global
‘18Barnett and Finnemore in Barnett, P ow er (2005) pg 169
,l)Flawkins and W ade in Hawkins M ichael J. and Darren G. Lake, David A. N ie lson , Daniel L. Tierney, 
D elegation  a n d  agency in in ternational organ izations  (Cam bridge U niversity Press: Cambridge: 2 006)  
pg 200
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Governance represents the actions o f predominant actor type trying to realise a certain 
vision o f order. For Murphy, Rosenau ignores the predominance o f the neo-liberal 
agenda within and across states and the impact that this is having on the development o f 
global governance. This idea is backed by other critics such as Susanne Soederberg 
who argues that “mainstream assumptions underpinning global governance assist not 
only in supporting, but also legitimising the relations o f power associated with the 
dominant US state.”50 For critics such as Soederberg Global Governance is merely 
another demonstration o f "the ability o f great powers to establish international 
institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions o f 
advantage into the future."51 This argument is further supported by Luck who argues 
that
“An underappreciation o f the centrality o f the state has also encouraged 
exaggerated rhetoric about the capacities and purposes o f international 
organization and civil society, as well as about the nature o f their 
relationship”32
If this is the case, it then makes it even more essential to understand the role o f power 
in the development o f global governance.
The traditional understanding o f power in international relations stems from Realism 
in which “one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something 
it does not want to do".53 Applied to Global Governance, this understanding o f power is
50 Soederberg ,G loba l G overnance (2006) pg 159
51 Barnett, M ichael and Duvall, Raym ond, P ow er in in ternation al p o litic s  (International organisation: 59: 
1: 2 0 0 5 ) pg 58
52 Luck, R ediscoverin g  the s ta te  (2002) 7-11
53 Barnett, In ternational P olitics (2005) pg 40
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described as Compulsory Power54, or the ways in which states use their material
advantages to set the agenda. W ithin Global Governance however writers such as
Robert W. Cox, whose main focus has been on the new sources o f authority within the
international system and his concept o f the nebuleuse55, argue that
"The world can be represented as a pattern o f interacting social forces in 
which states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the 
global structures o f social forces and local configurations o f social forces 
within particular countries."36
For Cox power emerges from social processes rather than from the material capabilities
o f individual states. This is counteracted by arguments from writers such as Robert
Keohane who explores the ideas o f state cooperation through international institutions
and how these institutions have been used by states. He argues that
“states are crucial actors, not only seeking wealth and power directly but 
striving to construct frameworks o f roles and practices that will enable them 
to secure these objectives, among others, in the fu tu re /07
He also examines the idea o f 'global society* and whether or not this idea is universal 
and if indeed there is such a thing as common values. Keohane also argues that there is
54 Barnett and Duvall offer several different conceptions o f  pow er and its use within the international 
system . They offer four different understanding o f  pow er within international relations, com pulsory  
power, institutional power, structural power and productive power. Com pulsory pow er fo llo w s in sim ilar  
vein to a realist understanding o f  pow er it does not how ever limit this pow er only to state actors and 
instead em phasises that all actors within global governance have resources which w ould enable them to 
utilise com pulsory power in order to resolve conflict or achieve particular aims.
55 The concept o f  the nebuleuse: As Cox describes, it is an opaque cloud o f  ideological influences that 
have nurtured a global consensus around the needs o f  the world market. In his understanding, the 
econom ic restructuring o f  the global econom y has been instigated by a nebuleuse or a system  o f  
governance without formal governm ent: Characterised by short range thinking o f  financial gain not long  
term thinking o f  industrial developm ent. The nebuleuse has the ability to com m and econom ic reforms 
which results from the structure o f  pow er capital (the ability o f  business considerations to dom inate 
econom ic policym aking), the restructuring o f  production (w hich has weakened the pow er o f  labour), the 
role o f  debt (the constraints placed on governm ents and corporate actors by foreign indebtedness and 
assessm ents o f  credit w orthiness.) For more see  Cox., tp proach es to  W orld  O rd er (1996) p87. Or C ox, 
S o c ia l fo rces ( 1981)
56 C ox,. ipp ro a ch es to W orld O rder (1996) pg 105
57K eohane,/l//er hegem ony (1984) pg 25
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a need for greater accountability in Global Governance which is another challenge, 
along with the challenges posed by state sovereignty which global governance faces.58
In more traditional theory there is a clear understanding o f how power is gained and 
executed, states are viewed as the only legitimate representatives o f their citizens and 
are held accountable to those citizens in a myriad o f ways. In global governance 
however "The broad, complex and differentiated global social context for the operation 
o f governance is really left as unfathomable and unmasterable, and yet it is taken to be 
governable and sustainable.'09 Global Governance is "a broad, dynamic, complex 
process o f  interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to the 
changing circumstances."60 This reality makes it almost impossible to pin down the 
sources o f legitimacy in Global Governance and to establish ways in which those in 
power are accountable. The issues o f power and accountability will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Four, where N ye's arguments relation to the use o f ‘hard" and 
‘soft’ power will be examined in relation to other illustrations o f the use o f power such 
as Barnett and Duvall's compulsory power.61
For supporters o f the concept o f global governance as an ideological project "the 
notion o f global governance starts from the assumption that a wide variety o f forms o f 
governance exist next to each other and that a hierarchy amongst these various
58 For more on accountability in G lobal G overnance see  Keohane, Robert,'G lobal G overnance a n d  
dem ocra tic  a cco u n ta b ility ', in Held, David and M athias K oenig-A rchibugi, Taming G lobaliza tion : 
fro n tie rs  o f  g overn an ce  (Polity Cambridge: 2003), K eohane, Robert and Ruth Grant, A cco u n ta b ility  a n d  
ab u ses o fp o w e r  in w o r ld  p o litic s  (Am erican Political Science R eview : 99: 1: 2005) 2 9 -4 3 ,H ale, Thom as 
N ., Transparency, accou n tab ility  a n d  G loba l G overnance  (G lobal Governance: 14: 2 008) 73 -9 4 , and 
Slaughter, D isa g g reg a ted  sovere ig n ty  (2004)
5 > Latham in Martin l lew son and Sinclair, G loba l G overnance Theory (1999) pg 33
60 C om m ission on Global G overnance, O ur g lo b a l neighbou rhood  (1995)  pg 4
61 For more see  Chapter Four, pg 179 - 181
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mechanisms is hard, if  not impossible to discern."62 Therefore there is no overarching 
authority, no power to be held accountable. This situation becomes increasingly 
questionable when it is recognised that the majority o f those with influence over the 
global governance agenda are unelected officials or experts working in the numerous 
international organisations and non governmental organisations. Many writers on 
global governance call for an increase in accountability and democracy within the
63  *system. There are too many actors in the system with no one regulating their actions 
or holding them responsible for any consequences o f these actions. This is especially 
dangerous if  these actors have access to large amounts o f material resources. 
Unfortunately
"Asymmetrical power relations drive many o f  the decisions in international 
forums, whether intergovernmental or civil society, and the capacity to go it 
alone or to revert to extra-institutional venues seems increasingly the rule 
rather than the exception in international behaviour."64
It is the ability to take exception to the rules which has led to demands for an increase 
in the democratic accountability of organisations along with an increase in transparency 
in the functioning o f many international organisations and other key actors. As Ignatieff 
argues
“To the extent that the process o f global governance is, at bottom, a 
conversation, a collective deliberation about common problems and towards
62 D ingwerth, G lo b a l G overnance (2006) pg 192
63 See Held, David, D em ocratic  A ccou n tability  a n d  P o litica l E ffectiveness fro m  a  C osm opolitan  
P ersp ec tive  (G overnm ent and Opposition: 39: 2: 2004) 364-391 , Scholte, Jan Aart, C ivil S o c ie ty  a n d  
D em o cra tica lly  A ccountable G lo b a l G overnance  (G overnm ent and O pposition: 39: 2: 2 0 0 4 ) 2 1 1 -2 3 3 , 
Slaughter, Ann-M arie, G lo b a l G overnm ent Networks, Inform ation A gencies a n d  D isa g g reg a te d  
D em ocracy  (Warvard Law School:Network, Social Science Research: 2 0 1 0 ),and Bexell, M agda len a  a n d  
Jon as Tallberg  a n d  A nders Chi in. D em ocracy in G loba l G overnance: The P rom ises a n d  P itfa lls o f  
T ransnational A ctors  (G lobal Governance: 16: 2010) 81-101
64 Forman, Shepard and Segaer, Derek, New coalition s f o r  G lo b a l G overnance  (G lobal G overnance: 12: 
2 :2 0 0 6 )
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common global objectives, then all affected individuals, or their 
representatives,are entitled to participate.”65
It is important to remember that Global Governance is essentially viewed as “control 
and orientation in the absence o f formally legitimated coercive power”66, and although 
it has been suggested that “as a possible answer to the question o f  political
order global governance provides a concurrent model to state sovereignty as the
basic principle o f political organization.”67 Within the international system states still 
retain their formal, legitimate coercive power which lends them an elevated status in 
international affairs. The continuing importance which many states place on their 
perceived sovereign rights, and the reality that international organisations are severely 
limited in their abilities to challenge this also challenges that assumption. Although 
there has historically “never been a set concept o f state sovereignty”68 since the signing 
o f the Treaty o f Westphalia in 1648 state sovereignty defined as, "that in which prime 
political authority is conceded to those institutions, called states, claiming the 
monopoly o f violence within their respective territorial borders"69 has been the defining 
norm o f the international system. As states are still viewed as the “primary source o f 
political legitimacy” 70 it means they “are able to determine the content and direction o f 
global governance by using their decisive material advantages.”71 This directly impacts
65 Ignatieff, M ichael,Human Rights a s P olitics a n d  Ido la try  (Princeton University Press Princeton: 2 0 0 1 )  
pg 94-95
66 C ox, Robert W ., C ivil so c ie ty  at the tarn o f  the millenium: p ro sp ec ts  f o r  an a ltern a tive  w o r ld  o rd er  
(R ev iew  o f  International Studies: 25: 1999) 3-28 pg 10
67Spaith in Lederer, Markus and Philipp S. M uller, C ritic izin g  G lo b a l G overnan ce  (Palgrave M acm illan  
N ew  York: 2005) pg 21
68 Interview with Professor lan Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
69 Strange, Susan, The w estfa ilure system  (R eview  o f  international studies: 25: 1999) 345 - 354
70 Buzan, Barry and Little, Richard, B eyond W estphalia?  (British International Studies A ssociation  1999) 
P g 7
71 Barnett, In ternational P olitics (2005) pg 59
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on the efforts o f organisation such as the UN as the privilege afforded to “state 
sovereignty and the lack o f political will by members inhibit the long-term prospects o f 
those organizations for creating effective structures o f global governance.”72
Over the past twenty years progress has been made towards the evolution o f this 
concept however the continued importance placed on the norm by states has made it 
impossible to "envisage global solutions to the major problems facing the world today, 
without recognition o f the constraints imposed by state sovereignty."73 W hilst 
"sovereignty's status and relevance are contested increasingly within international 
organisations and forums"74 states still retain their privileged position. There are 
however those who would argue that global governance is undermining this privilege 
and the concept o f state sovereignty. Although there are clear rules on state recognition 
and for some it would be an overreach to change the concept o f state sovereignty.75 An 
idea which is backed by academics, such as Professor Ian Johnstone, who argues that 
redefining sovereignty is a counterproductive move. Instead he argues that any changes 
should occur incrementally on a case by case basis, rather than through “some rewriting 
of the rules o f international law.” 76
One attempt to redefine sovereignty is the development o f the responsibility to 
protect, based on Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen's work on sovereignty as 
responsibility. It is based on the argument that “ international law should see state 
sovereignty as requiring the state to protect its citizens from at least gross violations o f
72 D iehl in D iehl, Paul F„ The p o litic s  o f  g lo b a l govern an ce  (Lynne Riener: usa: 2 0 0 1 ) pg 5
73 D iehl in Ibid. pg 3
74 W eiss, G overnance (2000) 795-814
75 Interview with former UN official 2 6 th August 2009
76 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
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human rights” .77 However, for many involved in the debate, such as Former NATO 
Secretary General Lord George Robertson, “it w on’t be easy because issues o f national 
sovereignty are still involved” 78 and states fiercely guard that right. This would seem to 
be demonstrated by the fact that rather than cooperating for mutual gain many states are 
utilising the organisations involved in global governance to meet their own ends and 
secure their own futures. This is particularly apparent in the United Nations Security 
Council which is viewed by many as the “closest approximation to global governance 
in the peace and security realm yet achieved.”79 Whilst it may be at the forefront o f 
establishing the norms and ideas o f global governance, the Security Council’s 
“performance never the less offers compelling testimony to the limits o f  global 
governance in an era o f sovereign states” 80, this was clearly demonstrated by the US 
Invasion o f Iraq and the bypassing o f the Security Council.81
Within the supporters o f global governance however there are many who argue that 
"states and governments should be posited not as first among equals, but simply as 
significant actors in a world marked by increasing diffusion o f authority and a
O ')
corresponding diminution o f hierarchy." “ That “understanding is no longer served by 
clinging to the notion that states and national governments are the essential
77 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3 rd Septem ber 2008
78 Interview with Lord G eorge Robertson 28 lh July 2009
79 Luck, Edward C .,U n ited  N otions Security  C ouncil P ractice  a n d  P rom ise  (Routledge: London: 2 0 06)  
P g 3
80Ibid. pg 3
81 There has been much debate surrounding the legality o f  the intervention in Iraq, with the U S and UK  
arguing that previous Security Council Resolutions justified  the action, whilst other m em ber states 
question the authority which these resolutions provided. For a more detailed analysis see  Berdal, UN  
after Iraq (2004) and Johnstone, U S-U N  (2004)
82 Rosenau in Martin H ew son and Sinclair, G loba l G overnance Theory (1999) pg 292
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underpinnings o f the world’s organization."83 These challenges to sovereignty are also 
supported by other academics such as Thomas Weiss who argues that global 
governance is trying “to capture and describe the confusing and seemingly ever 
accelerating transformation o f the international system.” And that while “States are 
central....their authority is eroding.” He is less convinced however about the potential 
success o f global governance as he goes on to argue that the state “creations, inter­
governmental organisations, are no more in control than they were.”84 This is in 
contrast to supporters o f the theory who argue that global governance offers a way to 
“bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond
o r
the capacities o f states to address individually.” The problem is that, as Weiss and 
Ruggie argue
“While the source and scale o f most o f today’s pressing challenges are 
global and any effective solution must also be global, the policy authority 
for tackling them remains vested in states.”86
They go on to argue that
“this gap is especially striking within the UN system because neither 
powerful global institutions with overarching authority over members nor 
even flimsy ones with resources commensurate with the size o f transborder
8^7problems they are supposed to address exist.”
This contradicts the arguments made by advocates o f Global Governance that this is an 
entirely plausible scenario when you factor in the growing number o f Non-
83 Rosenau in Ibid. pg 287
84 W eiss, G overnance (2000) pg 808
85 Gordenker and W eiss in W eiss, NG O's (1996) pg 17
8(5 R uggie, John G. and Thom as G. W eiss and Ram esh Thakur,G lo b a l G overnance a n d  the UN: A n  
unfin ished jo u rn e y  (Indiana University Press: B loom ington 2010) pg 15
87 Ibid. pg 15
65
Chapter One Kate Seaman
Governmental Organisations, Multi-National Corporations, and others who have seen 
their influence increase as they cooperate with International Organisations such as the 
United Nations and the World Trade Organisation providing them with a variety o f 
services. However the extent to which this influence has increased is still much 
debated. For staff at the United Nations NGOs play a valuable advocacy role in 
ensuring that issues are kept on the agendas o f both international organisations and
o o  # t  O Q
states and whilst “they have had a steadily growing impact on the security council” 
this impact seems to come more from their interactions with national governments “for 
example Oxfam in the UK or faith based organisations in the USA” as “they have the 
potential to embarrass governments into action.”90 This influence then translates into 
actions taken by states within international organisations. What is important to note 
though is that NGOs still have to act to influence states their emphasis is on achieving 
their agendas by gaining support from the powerful states within these organisations.
This is in direct contrast with the suggested diffusion o f power to non-state actors 
which global governance emphasises and in contradiction to the idea that there are now 
“a plethora o f forms o f social organization and political decision making ... that are 
neither directed towards the state nor emanate from it.”91 Rather it seems that these new 
forms o f social organisation and political decision making are still reliant on states to 
take action, that they are viewed by states as useful tools for greater information and
88 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw. OCHA 28 ,h August 2008, Interview with U N  official A ugust 28 th 
2008
89 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating, Security Council Report, 2 8 ,h August 2008
90 Interview with Former UN  official 2 6 lh August 2008
91 D ingw erth, G lo b a l G overnance (2006)
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understanding and that it is “therefore highly desirable to engage with them to 
develop that understanding.”93 States remain central to the functioning o f  the 
international system and retain their position at the top o f the pile again counteracting 
the ideas established within Global Governance theory. States also retain this position 
“because they are the principal site where claims are made and policy changes 
implemented.”94
Although “a variety o f regimes and institutions are providing elements o f  global
governance in some specific areas o f policy”93 or as Chesterman argues
“Though international agencies might generate norms through 
intergovernmental processes, the execution o f these norms was traditionally 
the purview o f states or exceptional entities such as the European Union 
(EU). This limited view of global governance is no longer tenable. Though 
most advanced in the economic sphere, areas such as the environment and, 
increasingly, international security are subject not merely to regulation but 
to global administrative control as well.”96
It is important to remember that states still retain their formal, legitimate coercive 
power which lends them an elevated status in international affairs. Whilst it is obvious 
that “the prospects for peace and peaceful change can be enhanced greatly by the 
collective leadership provided by a dominant coalition o f states able and willing to steer
97  •the system in a manner that offers incentives for others to follow.” It is also clear that 
"the concepts and practices o f global governance privilege certain actors, ideas, values
92 Interview with source from the stabilisation unit 19th June 2009
93 Ibid
94 G rugel, Jean and N ico la  Piper,C ritica l P erspectives on G lo b a l G overnance  (Routledge: London: 2 0 0 7 )  
pg 155
95 C ox, C ivil so c ie ty  ( 1999) pg 10
96
97 K egley , Charles W .,C ontroversies in in ternational re la tions theory  (St Martin's Press: N e w  York: 
1 9 9 5 )pg 211
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and interest groups over others"98 but does this reality make it a less legitimate means 
o f organising the international system than more traditional theories? When you couple 
this privilege with the idea that "an institution need not be conducive to the interests o f 
all its members”99 even more questions are raised about the possible coercive methods 
used or dominance o f particular states or groups. It also raises questions regarding the 
possibility o f some institutions involved in global governance being more legitimate 
than others.
The question o f dominance o f particular states within global governance is a difficult
one. Since the end o f the Cold War international relations has been based on the victory
o f liberal democracies and for many o f its critics global governance is nothing more
than an extension o f the neo-liberal agenda. For writers such as David Held it is the
first step in the creation o f a cosmopolitan democracy where diverse and overlapping
power centres will be shaped and delimited by democratic law .100 Following the
collapse o f the Berlin wall
“Liberalism is now widely regarded as having an important connection to 
international security. The twin propositions -  that liberal democratic 
republics do not seem to go to war with one another yet seem to be as war- 
prone as any other regime -  are seen as the foundation o f the great global 
changes of our time”. 101
This is an extension o f the so called peace dividend and Democratic Peace Theory, or 
Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace. For Immanuel Kant the perpetual peace was based 
on the development o f federalism
98 Cochrane and D ufiy in Cochrane, G loba l G overnance (2003) pg 222
1)9 Gruber in Barnett, P ow er (2005) pg 103
100 For more details see H eld ,D em ocracy  (1995)
101 D oyle, M ichael W J V a v s  o f  W ar an il P eace  (W .W . Norton and Co.: N ew  York: 1997) pg 284
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“It can be shown that this idea o f federalism, extending gradually to 
encompass all states and thus leading to a perpetual peace, is practicable and 
has objective reality. For if  by good fortune one powerful and enlightened 
nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek perpetual 
peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other 
states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom o f 
each state in accordance with the idea o f international right, and the whole 
will gradually spread further and further by a series o f alliance o f this 
kind.” 102
This idea would support the notion that the spread o f liberal democracy can only
benefit the international community. The argument being that “they have (liberals)
strengthened the prospects for world peace established by the steady expansion o f  a
separate peace among liberal societies.” 103
The supposed benefits o f the spread o f liberal democracy would then justify the
domination o f international organisations by liberal democratic states. This domination
is what critics of global governance question. The problem stemming from the fact that
“Within liberal theories, international organisations have been viewed not 
only as facilitators o f cooperation but also as carriers o f progress, the 
embodiments o f triumphant democracy and purveyors o f liberal values, 
including human rights, democracy and the rule o f law.” 104
If international organisations are key actors within the development o f global 
governance then their domination by a particular kind o f state gives credence to the 
suggestion that global governance is nothing more than a hegemonic project, and that 
“Global governance is a tyranny speaking the language o f democracy.” 105 This then
102 Kant, Immanuel P erpetu a l P eace  (Cosinio: N ew  York: 2005 (originally published 1795))
103 D oyle , W ar an d  p ea ce  (1997) pg 252
101 Barnett, M ichael and Martha, F m nem ore,R ules f o r  the W orld  In ternational O rgan iza tions in G lo b a l 
P olitics  (Cornell University Press London: 2004) pg ix
105 Thakur, Ramesh, Law. L egitim acy a n d  the U nited  A d d o n s  (M elbourne journal o f  international law:
11: 2 0 10) 1-26
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poses problems for the organisations themselves. International organisations are viewed
by academics such as Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore as powerful institutions
in and o f themselves, because o f their ability to orient action and create social reality.
For Barnett and Finnemore, “IOs can also constitute the world as they define new
categories o f problems to be governed and create new norms, interests, actors and
shared social tasks.” 106 For critics o f global governance the problem with this role for
international organisations is that “international organisations reflect the underlying
power o f the inter-state system.” 107 . As Held recognises
“O f course, nation states have often found it necessary to collaborate and 
establish international institutions in order to solve collective action 
problems. However, the rationale for such institutions has been grounded in 
“reasons o f state,” and thus they have been shaped through the calculus o f 
power politics. The result has been a system o f global governance that, by 
and large, freezes the prevailing power structures, and is ill adapted to a
1 09more complex and interconnected world.”
The development o f global governance is directly tied to already existing international
institutions and the reality is that
“Discussions about global governance quickly turn to the global institutions 
we already have (such as the United Nations Security Council) and how 
unprepared they are to deal with the challenges o f the 21st century. There are 
many reasons for this, but underlying them all is the gulf that has opened up 
between international regimes and the people whose cooperation is required 
to enforce them.” 109
106 Barnett,R ules f o r  the W orld  (2004) pg 17
107 Soederberg,G7o/>a/ G overnance (2006) pg 8
108 Held and W allace in Held, David and Garrett W allace Brown, The C osm opolitan ism  R ea d er  (Polity  
Press London: 2 0 10) pg 12
'°l) Edwards,Future P ositive  (1999) pg 166
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States still continue to dominate within the international system, and some states are
more dominant than others. This is particularly true in relation to the United Nations, as
James argues, the UN
“fundamentally is nothing more than an association o f sovereign 
states...each member will be trying to use the United Nations to further its 
own interests...States have not joined out o f respect for the ‘UN idea’ (but) 
for what they can get out o f it.” 110
The problem is that dominance within an organisation such as the UN leads to other 
members questioning the legitimacy o f actions as well as the potential for the 
organisation to be truly representative. The reality is that every state has an agenda 
which they bring to the Security Council and the real issue is “how many states can it 
co-opt into helping it realise that agenda.” 111 When an organisation’s legitimacy is 
question, the actions it takes are also questioned and in this case that then leads to 
questioning o f the development o f the concept o f Global Governance.
From the arguments explored above and for the purposes o f this project it is clear to 
see that Global Governance, if not a unified project, does consist o f “strategic 
interventions or policies that aim to manage the stresses o f global politics and 
globalization through global rule making.” 112 What then becomes important is who is 
making the rules, and establishing the interventions? Whilst supporters o f global 
governance emphasise its attempts to create a more stable international system based on 
the participation o f new and varied actors the key actors remain states what becomes 
apparent is the problems with the “ increasing demand for policy to address global
110 James in Rivlin, Benjamin and Leon Gordenker, The challenging ro le  o f  the UN S ecre ta ry  G eneral: 
M aking the m ost im possib le  jo b  in the w o rld  p o ss ib le  (Praeger: Westport: 1993) pg 24
111 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
112 G ruge\,C ritica l pe rsp ec tive s  (2007) pg 1 1
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problems versus the recognized weakness o f contemporary international organisations
113and states." Although there has been an increase in the participation o f other actors 
this participation is, as demonstrated above, controlled by states, particularly in relation 
to civil society actors such as NGOs. This is in direct contrast to the arguments o f 
supporters o f global governance who emphasise the diffusion o f  power away from 
states.114
Global Governance and the United Nations
The following section o f this chapter examines the role o f peacekeeping as an 
intervention project within the wider global governance agenda. It assesses the 
interventions being undertaken and their role in creating stable states which are able to 
integrate into the international system. It also argues that “the underlying liberal norms 
that structure global governance projects internationally have been institutionalized in 
the post-conflict reconstruction efforts undertaken by the UN, EU and NATO.” 115 This 
then leads into the issues raised in Chapter Two which argues that there have been 
significant changes in the activity o f peacekeeping itself with the need for troops to 
undertake much wider and more varied tasks, leading perhaps to the suggestion that 
what the UN is now involved in is no longer purely peacekeeping but is something 
more akin to peacebuilding or nation building.
Within Global Governance the United Nations is seen as the “obvious forum for 
conciliation not only among governments, but also between governments and
113 M ingst in Vayrynen, G lobalisa tion  (2001) pg 92
114 For arguments supporting the relocation o f  authority away from states see Rosenau, W orld  P o litic s  
(2005) , Held, D em ocracy  (1995) and Held ^ Global C ovenant (2004) .
115 Johnson in Lederer, C ritic izing  G loba l G overnance (2005) pg 176
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NGOs.” 116 It is one o f the longest surviving International Organisations and has been 
given “legitimacy as the premier global international institution” this, coupled with “its 
ability to reach out to virtually every society and to establish universally applicable 
norms” 117 makes it an ideal starting point for global governance. In order to understand 
the role which the UN currently plays in the development o f Global Governance it is 
important to acknowledge the way in which the organisation has developed and the fact 
that it is an organisation facing numerous problems both political and structural and that 
these problems pose a potential threat to any future development o f  both the 
organisation and global governance.
The United Nations is based on the principle o f the sovereign equality o f  all its 
member states and the norm o f non-intervention. Within the General Assembly all 
states are equal with one member having one vote, the Security Council however is a 
different matter altogether. Here the permanent members, Britain, France, the USA, 
Russia and China all have a veto power. When the organisation was created the veto 
was "rationalized by the expectation that they would bear the burden o f the UN's 
w ork"118 over time however it has created much tension within the organisation as 
other states call for fairer representation and council reform. The issue arises from the 
claim that the UN structure is clearly out o f date and in relation to the power structures 
in place at the time of its creation the world doesn't look like that anymore. However, 
even though this is the case, “the balance o f power system is central to cooperation and
116 W eiss and Gordenker in W eiss, N G O 's (1996) pg 8
117 Gaer in Ibid. pg 55
118 O ’N eill in D iehl, G lo b a l G overnance (2001) pg 135
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peacem aking” 119 This again poses the problem, as examined earlier, in relation to 
dominance within an international organisation, and the questions raised by more 
powerful states utilising these organisations to support their own agenda. The reality o f 
the council is each member state is looking to co-opt other members to their cause, and 
the only question is how many will get on board?120
This is especially true for the powerful states just as it was during the Cold War 
when the veto power could have resulted in stalemate in the Security Council. With two 
superpowers determined to turn an organisation designed to enhance international 
cooperation into “a political battlefield where victories are to be won, rather than as a 
conference table where accommodations are to be reached” 121 the United Nations could 
have foundered before it had truly begun. In order for the United Nations to remain a 
viable organisation throughout the cold war it had to be viewed by the superpowers as a 
non-threatening organisation in which all states would be on an equal footing and this 
meant that the United Nations had to determine “how to intervene in a way that holds 
the prospect o f resolution o f a crisis, while remaining within the framework o f the UN 
charter”. 122 To do this the organisation focused on interventions based on consent, non­
intervention and impartiality.
In the years following the end o f the cold War there was an increasing shift away 
from the idea o f non intervention based on state sovereignty towards a more flexible 
and, some claimed, more moral approach based on the idea o f human rights and
119 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd Septem ber 2008
120 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
121 W ilcox, Francisco and II. Field Haviland Jr.,77/e U nited  S ta tes a n d  The U n ited  N ations  (Johns 
H opkins Press Baltimore: 1961) pg 110
122 D oyle , M ichael W. and Olara A. O tunnu,P eacem aking a n d  P eacekeep in g  f o r  a  new  cen tu ry  (Row m an  
and Littlefield Oxford: 1998) pg 148
74
Chapter One Kate Seaman
security. The end o f  the cold war had led to “the nature o f the threats to the peace 
assuming characteristics for which the founders o f the UN had not planned and with 
which the UN was not well prepared to deal” 123 and the increasing emphasis placed on 
human rights meant that the idea that “sovereign boundaries are moral constructions 
that are not immutable” 124 became increasingly popular. This lent much weight to 
arguments in favour o f intervention for humanitarian reasons and in response to 
violations o f human rights. It was no longer “the case that states have a right not to be 
intervened in solely by virtue o f their constitutional independence.” 125 It was felt that in 
the post Cold W ar world “all victims should be equally important.” 126 The United 
Nations was now operating under the notion that national sovereignty was no longer the 
only guideline to be followed. Instead it embarked on various missions in response to 
violations o f human rights and other humanitarian situations which during the cold war 
would not have been possible due to the limits imposed by the superpower veto in the 
Security Council.
As the restrictions on action were lifted there was an increasing belief and 
“expectation that the international community, in a new global era, could and would act 
swiftly in the name o f peace, justice and global solidarity” 127 but, as the number o f 
peacekeeping missions being deployed to conflict zones increased, it became 
increasingly clear that the United Nations was relying on inadequate ideas and methods
123 Sutterlin, James S.J'he UN a n d  the m aintenance o f  in ternational secu rity  (Praeger: Connecticut: 
1 9 9 5 )pg 7
124 Ibid. pg 39
125 Sem b, Anne Julie, The new p ra c tice  o f  U N a u th orised  interventions  (Journal o f  Peace Research: 37: 
4: July 2000)
126 Ryan, Stephen,'/ftc? UN a n d  in ternational p o litic s  (M acM illan: London: 2000) pg 31
127 United N ations, U nited  N ations a n d  R w anda  (N ew  York: information, United N ations Department o f  
Public: 1996) xi conclusion
75
Chapter One Kate Seaman
designed to fit with Cold War conflicts and Cold War combatants no longer applicable 
to the increasingly complex internal conflicts developing across the globe. In an 
increasingly globalised world it was becoming more obvious that a new more 
moralistic interpretation was required to understand and highlight the importance o f the 
role the UN played in maintaining international peace and security. This led to the 
development o f international norms based on the prioritisation o f democratisation, good 
governance and respect for human rights. These norms have presented a direct 
challenge to more traditional norms such as sovereignty and non intervention and have 
also become directly associated with the development o f the concept o f global 
governance. The emphasis placed on the spread o f these norms has also led to an 
increased work load for the United Nations in relation to its peacekeeping operations, 
as will be explored in Chapter Two.
Since the end o f the Cold War the Security Council has played a fundamental role in
re-examining the importance of the concept o f sovereignty and
“The Councils decisions have eroded conceptions o f state sovereignty 
firmly held during the Cold War years, altering the way in which many o f us 
see the relationship between state and citizen the world over.” 128
At the beginning o f the 1990s it seemed that the defining norm o f sovereignty was 
“ increasingly ceding moral ground to the rights and needs o f groups and individuals 
within states, particularly in cases where gross human rights violations are being
128 M alone in M alone, David M., The U nited  N ations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: London: 2 0 0 4 ) pg 
1
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190
committed." Following the 1st G ulf W ar it was also possible to argue that there was 
"an 'emerging norm' that the boundaries o f legitimate international concern about the 
atrocities within sovereign states should be shifted so as to allow military intervention
1 30as a last resort."
The new focus on the sovereignty o f the individual has been coupled with an 
increasing occurrence o f ‘failed states’ “where the model o f the sovereign state, an 
autonomous, self sustaining body that monopolizes the use o f force on its territory and
131 •ensures basic security or the inhabitants has temporarily at least broken down” . This
increase in so called state failure coupled with
"changes in the law on humanitarian intervention as evidenced by security 
council action in Iraq, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavian Republics have 
further enhanced the scope for UN involvement in matters previously 
deemed to be 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' o f  its member 
states."132
The norm o f non-intervention has been challenged more frequently as the UN has 
become increasingly involved in intra-state wars which were defined in the ICISS 
report as "a convulsive process o f state fragmentation and state formation that is 
transforming the international order itself."| JJ
Over time the UN has had to adapt to an increasingly interdependent world where 
there are new items invading the security agenda. These items cover areas as diverse as 
economics, politics, social problems and health issues. Economic problems tend to
129 Sarkin, Jeremy, The Role o f  the U nited  Nations, the A frican Union a n d  A frica's Su b-R egion al 
O rgan iza tions in D ealin g  w ith A frica's Human Rights P roblem s: C onnecting H um anitarian  In tervention  
a n d  the R espon sib ility  to  P ro tect (Journal o f  African Law: 53: 1: 2009) 1-33
130 N ew m an, M ichael. R evisiting the R 2P  (The Political Quarterly: 80: 1: 2009) pg 92
m M ortimer, Edward, In ternational A dm inistra tion  o f  W ar-Torn Societies  (G lobal G overnance: 10: 1: 
2 0 0 4 )7 -1 4
132 Berdal, M ats, W hither UN peacekeep ing?  (IISS: London: 1993) pg 3
133 ICISS, The respon sib ility  to p ro te c t  (Ottawa 2001) pg 5
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revolve around the areas o f trade and investment, the organisation o f global productions 
and the ever expanding interlocking financial markets. Political problems have occurred 
in relation to a number o f developments in the international system including, the 
collapse o f empires leading to new independent states, the ending o f the cold war, and 
the increasingly problematic issue o f the right to national self determination which has 
sparked civil wars all across the globe. Whilst the political problems still tend to 
revolve around the traditional idea o f “security in terms o f threats, by way o f actual or 
potential military incursion, to the territorial and political sovereignty o f states” 134 there 
are many newer problems in the realm of social and health problems which cannot be 
tackled in conventional ways. These problems include the pandemic o f aids, the 
increasing trade in illegal narcotics and also the cross border sale o f people.
As Former UN Secretary General Boutros-Gahli stated in an interview in 1993 
“many of today's pressing international problems are transnational and interrelated in 
nature and cannot be solved by any one country acting alone.” The UN however, as 
explained above, is not a supranational organisation and cannot act without the support 
o f its member states: The UN as Luard explains “can never be anything but a mirror o f 
the world as it is” 136, and if the member states are unwilling to provide the resources to 
tackle a particular problem then there is little the UN can do. Whilst some states still 
attempt to argue that sovereignty should be held in the highest regard and that consent 
is an important necessity before intervention for the most part it is now respect for
134 Evans, GarethC o o p e ra tin g  f o r  P eace  (A llen and Unwin St Leonards: 1993) pg 5
135 Boutros-G hali, Boutros and Carolyn, Reynolds, Setting  a  new agen da  f o r  the U n ited  N ations  (Journal 
o f  international Affairs: 46: 1993)
136 Luard, Ewan f  he UN :H ow it w orks a n d  w hat it does. (M acM illan: London: 1987) pg 3
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human rights that is placed at the forefront o f UN action and ideology. This means that 
the United Nations
"as an institution suffers from the contradiction between a liberal vision that 
makes harmony depend on the right kind o f state (liberal national) on the 
one hand, and an international system that requires a heavy dose o f 
international regimes and organizations aimed at overcoming the drawbacks
1 ^ 7o f state sovereignty on the other."
At the end o f the twentieth century it was hoped that states would now start to live up to 
their responsibilities to their citizens and that a new era based on respect for human 
rights had begun. Fast forward to the beginning o f the 21st century however and looking 
back "the brutal legacy o f the twentieth century speaks bitterly and graphically o f the 
profound failure o f individual states to live up to their most basic and compelling 
responsibilities, as well as to the collective inadequacies o f international 
institutions."138
The situation the UN now finds itself in is increasingly precarious. There are more 
and more actors becoming involved in the international system and in the resolution o f 
international problem s.139 Demands on the organisation continue to increase but the 
number o f resources being allocated to meet those demands is shrinking. The 
organisation is becoming involved in challenging some o f the key concepts which make 
up the foundations of the international system without examining fully the potential 
consequences o f that challenge. The United Nations was created to help aid the creation 
o f a more peaceful and stable international system. One o f the ways in which has
137 Hoffm an, Stanley, The crisis o f  lib era l internationalism  (Foreign Policy: 98: 1995) 159
138 United N ations, R eport o f  the S ecre tary  G eneral: Im plem enting the R espon sb ility  to  P ro tec t  2 0 09)  
Pg5
130 For analysis o f  the role o f  N G O s see Alger, Chadwick, The em erg ing  ro le  o fN G O s  in the U N  system  
(G lobal Governance: 8: 2002) 93-117
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attempted to create that ideal system is through peacekeeping, preventing the spread o f 
conflict and hopefully helping to resolve situations within and between countries who 
are unable to resolve it themselves. The problem with this role and action today is that 
it has the potential to be misused by powerful states, states who are involved not only in 
creating a more stable international system, but states who are involved in creating a 
very particular kind o f international system, one based on liberal democratic principles 
and ideals. This has led to a certain vision o f what constitutes a ‘good’ state taking 
precedence over alternatives and has led to an increase in activities for the United 
Nations.
Chapter Two argues that this vision o f a ‘good state' and the promotion o f the norms
association with the global governance concept has meant that the United Nations has
become directly involved in the development o f the concept and has begun, selecting
interventions in order to create a society o f ‘good states', in line with the democratic
peace ideal. It argues that states are using the UN to plug
“an enforcement gap that needs to be filled if global governance is to be 
effective at all. Norms o f security, democracy and human rights cannot be 
upheld in the absence o f  international institutions and other capabilities by 
which to address the problems of com pliance."140
And that this use o f the UN is having a detrimental impact on the abilities o f the 
organisation in relation to its peacekeeping mandates
By examining the development o f peacekeeping operations and the continuous 
challenges these have faced it argues that the emphasis being placed on the norms 
associated with global governance is clearly having a detrimental impact on
140 Vayrynen in Vayrynen, G loba lisa tion  (2001) pg xi
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peacekeeping operations. It then goes on to argue that this has led to a search for 
alternatives to the organisation in the form o f the development o f regional organisation. 
The chapter will look at the positive benefits which regional organisations represent 
including the suggestion that the proliferation o f serious organisations should help the 
United N ations.141 Despite the potential benefits the chapter argues however that these 
developments must be carefully managed and these organisations must remain under 
the umbrella o f the United Nations charter in order to ensure the legitimacy and 
accountability required in international interventions because as Keating argues, “if  its 
not handled well by one or both sides o f the equation then it could actually be misused, 
to the detriment o f international peace and security.” 142
The development o f these alternatives feeds into wider arguments surrounding the 
development o f the concept o f global governance, particularly in relation to the 
suggestion that the concept aims to make the international system more representative 
and accountable. Again this understanding fails to address the issue o f power, and the 
influence which states continue to have over these organisations. It also ignores the 
large disparities in the capabilities o f these organisation to undertake peacekeeping 
operations, operations which when they fail lead to increasing calls for UN action, and 
again increased pressure on the organisations resources and political will, issues which 
are examined in more detail in the following chapter, Chapter Two.
141 Interview with FCO O fficial 2 0 th M ay 2009
142 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating, Security Council Report, 2 8 th A ugust 2008
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Chapter Two: The impact of Global Governance on United Nations
interventions in violent conflicts.
Following on from the arguments outlined in Chapter One, this chapter examines in 
greater detail the impact that the development o f the concept o f Global Governance is 
having on United Nations peacekeeping. This chapter argues that the evolution o f 
United Nations peacekeeping, along with the increasing emphasis placed on the 
application o f norms associated with global governance, has in part led to the crisis now 
facing the organisation in relation to this key role. It demonstrates that a large part o f 
the crisis now facing UN peacekeeping operations stems from the challenges being 
articulated against the liberal-peace model o f peacekeeping operations as supported by 
the development of global governance.1 Because o f these challenges the chapter argues 
that the current crisis differs from previous crises as it is not, as in the past, a failure to 
respond, but is instead a failure to respond in an appropriate manner to situations which
■y
have a different context to those o f the past." This lack o f contextualisation and the 
continued emphasis on a top-down approach based on the reinstatement o f a liberal 
democratic form of governance have led to direct challenges to the UN ‘paradigm ’3 o f
1 For more see  D uffield , Mark,G loba l G overnance a n d  the new  w a rs  (Zed B ooks London: 2001), 
D uffield , M ark,D evelopm ent, Security  a n d  U nending W ar (Polity Cambridge: 2007), Paris, R o la n d ^ / 
w ar's en d  (Cam bridge University Press Cambridge: 2004), Paris, Roland, B roadening the stu d y  o f  p e a c e  
o pera tion s  (International studies R eview: 2: 3: 2000) and Richm ond, O liver,M aintain ing Order, m aking  
p e a c e  (Palgrave Basingstoke: 2002).
2 For more on previous crisis periods in peacekeeping see Jones, Bruce, P eacekeep in g  in C risis?  (The  
RUSI Journal: 154: 5: 2009) 78-83, Pugh, M ichael, The c risis  in p ea cek eep in g  (International 
Peacekeeping: 11 :1 : 2 0 0 4 ) ,  Roberts, Adam, The crisis  in pea cek eep in g  (1FS: 2: 1994) and Introduction 
Pg3
3 The UN paradigm o f  peacekeeping is based on various assum ptions and concepts that have inform ed  
U N  practice in the field, the m ost important o f  which is the concept o f  the ‘liberal peace’. The clearest 
outline o f  the paradigm o f  peacekeeping operations can be found in the Capstone Doctrine published in
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peacekeeping operations as this chapter argues. It also argues that these challenges, 
coupled with the change in the situational deployment o f peacekeeping operations to 
ongoing conflict zones where peace agreements are not in place, and where the 
operations lack the necessary leverage and resources to respond to ongoing hostilities, 
has placed an increasing strain on operations in the field.
The chapter also argues that over time the increasing complexities o f the 
international system in the post cold war era and the development o f the concept o f 
global governance have led to the organisation compromising its abilities to respond to 
crises on an international level. This detriment will be analysed using six key criteria 
including access to resources, fulfilment o f mandates, perceived legitimacy both local 
and global, challenges faced during the operation from both state and non-state actors, 
and issues o f command and control within the operation including organization and 
integration with other actors. It will be illustrated using the experience o f  peacekeeping 
missions in the field, with direct reference to four specific case studies including the 
Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic o f the Congo, and Burundi,4 as 
well as the experiences o f member states within the Security Council.
2008  and in various other official reports, for more see United N ations, U n ited  N ations P eacekeep in g  
O pera tion s P rin cip les an d  G uidelines (N ew  York: United N ations:2008), Boutros-G hali, Boutros 
A gen da  fo r  P eace  (N ew  York Nations, United: 1992), United N ations, C om prehensive  re p o rt on lesson s  
lea rn ed  from  U nited  N ations A ssis tance M ission fo r R w anda (UNAM IR) (N ew  York: U nited N ations 
Deparment o f  Peacekeeping Operations Nations. United: 1996), United N ations, R eport o f  the P a n e l on 
U n ited  N ations P eace O pera tions to the S ecre tary-G en era l (N ew  York: United N ations General 
A ssem bly 2000), and United Nations, H igh L evel P anel R eport on Threats, C hallenges a n d  Change, A  
m ore Secure W orld: our sh a red  respon sh ility  2004). For analysis o f  the paradigm see  CIC, P eacekeep in g  
O verstretch : Sym ptom s, Causes, a n d  C onsequences  (N ew  York: Center for International Cooperation  
2009), Durch, W illiam  J. and M adeleine L. England, The p u rp o ses o f  p e a ce  o p era tion s  (N ew  York: 
Center for International Cooperation:2009), G owan, Richard, The S tra teg ic  C ontext: P eacekeep in g  in 
crisis, 20 0 6 -2 0 0 8  (International Peacekeeping: 15: 4: 2008) For more on the ‘ liberal peace’ see  
Introduction Pg 3 and Chapter One Pg 69 
4 For more on the case studies see Chapter six  pg 243 -  265
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This chapter offers a different perspective on the development o f peacekeeping and 
global governance. By examining the impact o f global governance on the UNs role as 
the most prominent international peacekeeper it offers a new lens through which to 
view the development o f the concept o f global governance. It offers a practical 
application o f some o f  the theoretical concepts under debate within global governance 
and highlights some o f the potential problems which the misuse o f norms associated 
with the concept could pose to both the development o f global governance, and the role 
o f the United Nations as an international peacekeeper.
The United Nations was founded in the aftermath o f the Second W orld W ar as a
replacement for the failed experiment o f the League o f Nations. The defining aims o f
both the League of Nations and the United Nations are outlined in President W oodrow
W ilson’s Fourteen points speech in which he stated that the main aim o f the
organisation established at the end o f the first world war was to ensure
“the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made 
safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its 
own life, determine its own institutions, be assured o f justice and fair 
dealing by the other peoples o f the world as against force and selfish 
aggression.’’5
These aims formed the basis o f the United Nations system, however, following the 
failure o f its predecessor the League of Nations, attempts were made to form a more 
robust organisation capable o f dealing with the realities o f the international system. 
Focusing instead on the rationality o f states the UN was based on a much more liberal 
interpretation o f the international system and the belief that while actors will rationally
5 W ilson, W oodrow, F ourteen P oin ts Speech  (8th January 1918)
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pursue their own interests there is a great potential for harmony o f  interests between 
actors and therefore a great potential for cooperation.
Although it was rooted in a liberal tradition the founders o f the United Nations also 
had to make concessions to the realities o f the international system. At the time o f its 
creation states were the key actors and would be the key units in creating and sustaining 
the UN as an international organisation. In liberal theory states “attempt to tie one 
another down by locking each other into institutions that mutually constrain one 
another”6 which helps to limit the actions o f states but, in order to ensure the 
cooperation and participation o f all states, at the time o f its creation the UN had to 
provide protection within its charter for the notion o f the sovereign equality o f  all 
states. The international system was recovering from a massive conflict in which the 
sovereignty o f states had been undermined leading to massive abuses o f population, and 
many states were extremely concerned with how an organisation such as the UN would 
impact on their ability to defend themselves should the need arise again.
The emphasis placed on the importance o f state sovereignty severely limited the 
development o f the United Nations especially in relation to the prevention o f 
international conflict. This meant that although the UN had at its creation been intended 
to be “an instrument to prevent war”7 at the outset o f the Cold War it seemed that 
instead the UN, rather than being at the forefront o f international cooperation, was 
instead “groping for a significant role which it might be able to play in the politics o f a
6 Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, John, The nature a n d  sou rces o f  lib era l in ternational o rd er  (R eview  o f  
International Studies: 25: 1999) 179-196
7 Scott, W illiam  A. and Stephen B. W ithey The US a n d  the UN, the P ublic  View  (Manhattan: N ew  York: 
1958) pg 252
85
Chapter Two Kate Seaman
world tom asunder by the Cold War.” 8 The Cold War effectively turned the United 
Nations and most importantly the Security Council into “a propaganda battlefield and a 
scene o f political confrontation.”9 How then did the UN survive when the odds were so 
clearly stacked against it? With two superpowers determined to turn an organisation 
designed to enhance international cooperation into “a political battlefield where 
victories are to be won, rather than as a conference table where accommodations are to 
be reached” 10?
The United Nations did not falter in the face o f crisis and instead set about creating a 
unique and unexpected role for itself. In order for the United Nations to remain a viable 
organisation throughout the cold war it had to be viewed by the superpowers as a non­
threatening organisation in which all states would be on an equal footing and this meant 
that the United Nations had to determine “how to intervene in a way that holds the 
prospect o f resolution o f a crisis, while remaining within the framework o f the UN 
charter.” 11 Despite the problems it faced only months after its creation the UN managed 
to forge a role for itself within the international system. The Cold War was not simply a 
conflict between the two superpowers, “as a power struggle, the Cold War had the
appearance o f a traditionally territorial contest but its ideological wrappings gave it a
12scope with no territorial boundaries” , proxy wars were fought all over the globe as the 
USA and USSR attempted to gain global dominance. Rather than focusing on the
8 Claude, Inis C .,S w ords into P loughshares  (Random H ouse N ew  York: 1984) pg 325
9 Ibid. pg 325
10 W ilcox, Francisco and H. Field Haviland i r .J h e  U n ited  S ta tes a n d  The U n ited  N ations  (Johns H opkins 
Press Baltimore: 1961) pg 110
11 D oy le , M ichael W. and Olara A. Otunnu ,P eacem aking an d  P eacekeepin g  f o r  a  new  cen tu ry  (Row m an  
and Littlefield Oxford: 1998) pg 148
12 C alvocoressi, Peter, W orld  P o litics 1945-2000  (Longman: London: 2001) pg xvii
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conflicts o f great importance to the two superpowers the UN focused on areas outside 
o f superpower influence and on creating a role for itself as the new ‘international 
peacekeeper’. As Durch illustrates “Peacekeeping became a strategic tool by which the 
United Nations Security Council could help keep conflict-prone parts o f the 
international system from shaking the stability o f the Cold War standoff.” 13
The next section o f this chapter is going to explore the development o f  that role and 
will argue that the UN’s position as an international peacekeeper is under threat as it 
faces numerous challenges in today’s international system. The following chapter will 
then argue that the challenges facing the UN today can be attributed to the ways in 
which the United Nations has become increasingly involved in spreading the concepts, 
norms and ideals espoused by supporters o f the development o f global governance.
The Development of Peacekeeping
In order to understand the role which United Nations Peacekeeping has played and is 
continuing to play in the development o f the concept o f Global Governance you first 
need to understand the ways in which the concept o f Peacekeeping itself has evolved. 
This section examines that evolution before the following section demonstrates the 
ways in which this evolution, and the challenges facing peacekeeping operations today, 
are in many ways attributable to the development o f the concept o f Global Governance 
and the norms associated with that concept.
13 Durch, The p u rp o se s  o f  p e a c e  opera tion s (2009) pg 1
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Peacekeeping within the United Nations was the brainchild o f  Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjold, who referred to it as chapter six and a h a l f 14 Peacekeeping rested 
in the grey area between the pacific measures outlined in chapter six o f the charter, 
including negotiation, arbitration, mediation and conciliation, and the more forceful 
measure o f chapter seven, which includes the use o f armed force.15 From its original 
attempt at peacekeeping with the UNEFI force in Egypt the UN then went on to 
intervene in various conflicts across the globe.16 At a time when the organisation could 
have faltered with the onset o f the cold war the UN instead created a unique role for 
itself as "an effective instrument to reduce violent conflict within the international 
system ."17
Throughout the development o f the concept o f peacekeeping emphasis was 
continually placed on the importance o f respect for sovereignty in order to allay the 
fears o f many world leaders who, at the time of the UN’s creation, were not looking for
a form o f world government but were instead looking for “a bold prescription for
1 8maintaining international peace and security.” In the years following the creation o f 
the organisation, state sovereignty continued to be defined as "unrivalled control over a 
delimited territory and the population residing within it."19 With each state guaranteed
14 United N ations, Peacekeeping w ebsite < http://ww w.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/>  (12th  
April 2010)
15 United Nations, C harter o f  the U nited  N ations  Information, Department o f  Public: 1945)
16 For a detailed look at various UN  operations see W oodhouse, Tom  and O liver  
KamsboXYiam,Encyclopedia o f  In ternational P eacekeeping  O pera tions  (A B C -C L IO  Ltd: Oxford 1999) 
also N ations, U n ited ,The Blue H elm ets: A rev iew  o f  U n ited  N ations P ea cekeep in g  (U nited N ations  
Department o f  Public Information N ew  York: 1996)
17 Berdal, Mats,07»7//c'/- UN peacekeep ing?  (1ISS: London: 1993) pg 3
18 Evans, Gareth, C oopera tin g  f o r  Peace  (A llen and Unwin St Leonards: 1993) pg 17
14 Jennifer M. W elsh in W elsh, Jennifer M., H um anitarian Intervention a n d  In ternational R ela tions  
(O xford University Press Oxford: 2004) pg 52
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autonomy in both their external dealings and internal affairs. This definition continued
throughout the Cold War as it was deemed that
“The necessary condition for sovereignty among states is non-intervention.
If  states are states only because they have control over force within their
territory and other states recognise that control, then military intervention is
00an explicit challenge to sovereignty.”
The reality was however that non-intervention was never strictly applied. Instead the 
UN operated a peacekeeping policy throughout the Cold War based on the three key 
principles o f consent, neutrality and non use o f force. This doctrine worked so well 
because, as Duffield explains, conflicts tended to have organisational cohesion, with 
well-structured groups o f combatants operating along well-defined combat lines.21 This 
enabled the UN and its agencies to operate within and around the conflicts supporting 
displaced people outside the conflict zone and providing emergency aid. W hilst the UN 
would provide aid to those in need, “during the Cold War, the UN seldom intervened in
ongoing conflicts, when it did it was usually in the context o f policing an agreed
22ceasefire.” This meant that during the Cold War
“The United Nations had a coherent doctrine o f peacekeeping. When there 
were agreements among warring parties who had command and control over 
their people with weapons, the United Nations would interject troops in 
order to assist the parties in keeping the peace.”"
20 Finnem ore, Martha, The p u rp o se  o f  Intervention  (Cornell University Press: London: 2 0 03) pg 7
21 D uffield in N ederveen, Pieterse, W orld  O rders in the M aking: H um anitarian in terven tion  a n d  b eyo n d  
(M acM illan: London: 1998) pp. 80-110
22 D u ffie ld ,G loba l govern ace  (2001) pg 52
23 Daniel, Donald C.F and Bradd C. Hayes,Z?evo/7<:/ Traditional P eacekeep in g  (St M artins Press N ew  
York: 1995) pg 41
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This doctrine served the UN well during the Cold War culminating in the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Forces being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.24 This 
policy did however lead to several contradictions in the operation o f the UN the most 
problematic being the preference accorded to state sovereignty whereby “treating states 
as equals prevents treating individuals as equals.”25 Whilst the sovereignty o f states was 
enshrined in the charter and upheld by the organisation and states were protected from 
unwanted intervention, the populations o f many states were suffering and the UN was 
incapable o f response. The matter o f consent, whilst overriding the principle o f 
sovereignty, was a massive roadblock to any UN action throughout the cold war.26
With the collapse o f the Soviet Union in the late eighties it was hoped that liberal 
ideals would finally triumph as the United Nations and peacekeeping were given a 
renewed sense o f purpose. Throughout the Cold War peacekeeping activities remained 
within the realm o f what has come to be defined as ‘traditional peacekeeping’. This 
concept was based on the three key foundations, consent, impartiality and non-use o f 
force.27 Developed in the grey area between chapter VI, relating to the peaceful 
settlement o f disputes, and chapter VII, which focuses on the use o f force to resolve 
disputes, o f  the UN Charter peacekeeping as a concept has evolved over time.
In the period immediately following the end o f the Cold War much emphasis was 
placed on the idea o f a ‘new world order" where “the cessation o f great power war
24 N obel Peace Prize Organisation, http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1988/index.htm l ( 12th April 
2010 )
25 Tharoor, Shashi, Why A m erica  s till  needs the UN  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 5: 2 0 03)
26 Interview with Former UN official 2 6 th August 2008
27 The m ost w idely accepted definition o f ‘traditional peacekeeping’ can be found in the Brahimi Report 
available online at United Nations, Brahimi Report,
http://ww w.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/docs/part2.htm  (1 2th April 2010)
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would dethrone military interaction from its millennia long reign as the principal 
defining process o f the international systems”28 and where democratic states now 
possessed the ability to become the “dominant mode o f interaction in world politics.”29 
W hilst for realists the end o f the cold war was “no more than an important shift in the 
power structure o f the international system” for others it signalled a new beginning 
for international relations and “a world in which nations would be safe because o f  the 
capacity o f the United Nations to guarantee their security through collective
31measures.” Whilst non-intervention had never been strictly applied throughout the
cold war, it was now hoped that the UN could intervene with greater legitimacy.32 This
hope was coupled with a realisation on the part of the United States o f America that it
“was no longer as balanced in its power and therefore had fewer outside constraints
than it did during bi-polarity.” This led to an increasing involvement by the US in
peacekeeping operations, providing support and logistics which during the cold war
was limited by the “traditional question o f the extent to which the largest powers are
directly involved in peacekeeping, in the cold war it was rather a taboo.”34 This was
based on the reality that
“In the first decades o f UN peacekeeping operations, the requirement o f 
impartiality and disinterestedness was among the factors leading to the 
general practice o f not using certain countries' troops. In particular, the UN
28Buzan, Barry and Little, Richard, B eyon d  W estphalia?  (British International Studies A ssociation  1999) 
P g 3
29 Chan, Steve, In search  o f  dem ocra tic  p e a ce  (International studies R eview : 4 1 :1 :  1997) 59-91
30 Buzan, B eyon d W estphalia? (1999) pg 1
31 Sutterlin, James S.,The UN a n d  the m ain tenance o f  in ternation al secu rity  (Praeger: Connecticut: 1995) 
pg51
32 Interview with Former U N  official 26' August 2008
33 Interview with Professor Joseph N y e  7th M ay 2008
34 Ibid, N ye.
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for the most part avoided use o f contingents from the permanent five 
(especially China and the two superpowers).”35
Following the end o f the superpower rivalry however this taboo was lifted and it was 
hope that the use o f permanent five troops would result in peacekeeping operations 
becoming “a symbol o f the determination o f the international community to see its 
decisions implemented.”36
However the newly emerging international system left the UN with a much more 
complex and daunting situation as “the end o f the Cold War had left many places over­
armed, divided, indebted and vulnerable to gangsterism.”37 With the end o f  superpower 
dominance the international system and its member states now had to face up to the 
problems stemming from “boundaries based on colonial expansionism rather than on 
the preserves o f tribal or ethnic entities.”38 Even though decolonisation had occurred 
during the cold war, “ending empires and making international society multi­
continental, multi-racial and multi-religious, the Cold War negated that diversity by 
demanding ideological conformity and strategic subordination.”39 It was only with the 
removal o f superpower constraint that problems began to surface.40 With “the 
increasing volatility and unpredictability of a global security system in which the near­
certainties o f the Cold War had been replaced by a ‘violent peace’, with conflicts
35 Roberts, The crisis  in pea cek eep in g  (1994) pg 9
36 Ibid. pg 27
37 D ouglas, Bennet Jr., P eacekeepin g  a n d  m ultila tera l re la tion s  (U S Department o f  State Dispatch: 15: 
4 9 :1 9 9 4 )
38 Burton and Vayrynen in Groom , A. J. R and M argot Light, C ontem porary In ternational R elations: A 
gu ide  to  theory  (Pinter publishers: London: 1994) pg 70
39 D aniel,B eyon d  T raditional P eacekeep in g  (1995) pg 25
40 See Tharoor, Shashi, The m essy  afterlife o f  colon ialism  (G lobal Governance: 8: 2 0 02) 1-5
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continuing across most regions o f the world”41 it was important for the UN to reassess 
its position and role within the international system.
Throughout the early 1990s "As the restrictions on action were lifted there was an
increasing belief and expectation that the international community, in a new global era,
could and would act swiftly in the name o f peace, justice and global solidarity”42 and
from 1992 -  1996 the Security Council undertook one o f its most active periods with
the average number o f decisions taken at a high o f 13443; but as the number o f
peacekeeping missions increased it became increasingly clear that the United Nations
was relying on inadequate ideas and methods designed to fit with Cold W ar conflicts
and Cold War combatants which were no longer applicable to the increasingly complex
internal conflicts developing across the globe. Traditional peacekeeping which
“referred to the interposition o f a neutral force between two warring states once a
ceasefire had been agreed to”44 was not designed to cope with these new challenges.
The UN soon became overwhelmed and it was clear that the organisation was headed
for disaster. The failure o f the UN to respond to the escalating situations in both
Rwanda and Somalia and the fact that
“The largest slaughter o f civilians since Pol Pot's Cambodia could have 
transpired in a context not o f international inattention but o f multiple forms 
o f international engagement provides compelling evidence o f just how weak
41 Rogers, Vau\,Losing C on tro l (Pluto Press London: 2002) pg 132
42 United N ations, U n ited  N ations an d  R w anda  (N ew  York: information, United N ations Departm ent o f  
Public: 1996)
43 Statistics from Report, Security C ouncil, Update report no.4 Reduced Security Council D ecision  
M aking in 2009
http://w w w .securitycouncilreport.O rg/site/c.glK W LeM TIsG /b.5761801/k.2242/U pdate_R eport_N o_4brR  
E D U C E D  SECURITY CO UNCIL DECISIO N M A K IN G J N  2009  A _Y E A R  0 F  D E C L IN E 8 2 1 2 0  
R_ARE_TH E_STA TISTICS_M ISLEAD ING br22_January_2010.htm  (17th March 2011)
44 Bratt in Pugh, M ichael, The UN, p ea ce  a n d  force  (Frank Cass London: 1997) pg 64
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the existing multilateral systems for preventing the escalation o f  violence 
actually were.”45
Following these dramatic failures there was “growing reluctance in the capitals o f the 
west, especially Washington, to tackle militarily the ever-burgeoning number o f 
complex emergencies”46 which led to a marginalisation o f the UN and an increasing 
emphasis on unilateral or coalition action by states. This coupled with “the desire by 
UN officials and member states to pick winners and to avoid failures meant that the UN 
was as interested in its own security as it was in human security.”47 The UN was once 
again fighting for survival in an international system which provided little support both 
financially and politically.
In an increasingly globalised world it was becoming more obvious that to assume 
“that the mere presence o f 'neutral' soldiers will separate warring parties, calm heated 
passions and prevent renewed combat o f the kind that brought about the need for the 
mission in the first place" was a misguided hope. The UN also had to deal with the 
increasing reality o f “the huge gap between the demands on the UN to deploy forces in 
order to secure peace, and the ability o f those forces to do the job”48 coupled with “the 
willingness o f security council members to pass ambitious resolutions and the 
reluctance o f states to provide the means to fulfil them.”49 As demand increased the 
ability o f the UN to perform the tasks assigned to it appeared to be diminishing. During 
this period there was also an increasing emphasis placed on the importance o f
45 Jentlesen, Bruce W .,O pportunities m issed, opportun ities se ize d  (Row m an and L ittlefield  N e w  York: 
2 0 00) pg 238
46 D aniel,B eyon d Traditional P eacekeepin g  (1995) pg 14
47 Barnett, M ichael, The UN Security  Council, indifference a n d  g en o c id e  in R w an da  (Cultural 
Anthropology: 12: 4: 1997) pg 560
48 Pugh in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg ix
49 Pugh in Ibid. pg ix
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expanding the potential roles o f  regional organisations. This role will be explored later 
on in the chapter.50
Since its creation peacekeeping has been viewed both within the United Nations 
system and the international system more generally as "one o f the most significant 
innovations o f the organisation."51 It has been the focus o f much academic debate, 
particularly in relation to the way in which the concept has developed and evolved 
overtime. Peacekeeping was initially established as a unique way for the United 
Nations to remain valid in an international system divided by the onset o f the Cold 
War. However, following the end o f the Cold War the concept became associated with 
a much wider range o f interventions and activities and has been used, as MacQueen 
argues "to help preserve, by providing a stabilizing mechanism, the state- based 
international system."52
In the early 1990s there was much emphasis placed on the idea o f ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ and it was hoped that “it was part o f a larger process whereby the 
sovereignty o f states would take second place to the human rights o f citizens."53 This 
emphasis also led to a much broader range o f tasks being undertaken by peacekeepers 
than ever before. They now became involved in issues relating to the domestic 
governance o f states, election monitoring, provision o f police and judicial services.54 
The involvement in new tasks can be partly attributed to the
50 See Pages 111-120.
51 Roberts, M o m ,P re s id in g  o ver a  d iv id e d  w orld: C hanging U N  roles, 1945 - 1993  (L ynne Rienner: 
London: 1994) pg 41
52 M acQ ueen, Norri^^Peacekeeping a n d  the in ternational system  (R outledge N ew  York: 2 0 0 6 ) pg 13
53 Roberts, Adam, H um anitarian A ction  in W ar (Adelphi Papers: 305: 1996) pg 7
54 For more on humanitarian intervention see Chapter Three Pages 129-135
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“increased public awareness o f  crises” that “has led to the clamour to 'do 
something' which has too often encouraged a premature and ill-prepared 
response, unsupported by a political strategy to deal with the root cause o f 
the problem ."55
Within the UN system there was a continuous inability throughout this time
period to recognise that
"All conflicts have underlying causes and almost all have possible solutions.
More often than not the greatest determinant o f a successful outcome to any 
involvement will be whether key decision makers can take the time to 
understand the causes, and have the political will to vigorously pursue a 
solution."56
The problem within the UN stemmed from the fact that the majority o f the key decision 
makers were unwilling to take the time to understand the root causes and this was 
exacerbated by "states that were ready to delegate new tasks but without the requisite
S7resources."
The evolution o f the concept o f peacekeeping has been examined by numerous 
academics, each o f whom has come up with a differing categorisation for the different 
stages o f this development. The first form of analyses, used by academics such as 
Michael Doyle and Oliver Richmond, is based on the division o f operations into three 
generations. The first generation is defined as ‘traditional peacekeeping' based on the 
three key components o f consent, impartiality and non-use o f force. The second is 
intervention into ongoing conflicts where peacekeepers undertake a much broader 
range o f tasks but with the consent o f all parties to the conflict, and the 3rd generation is
55 Laurence, Com m odore Tim, H um anitarian A ssistance a n d  P eacekeeping: An uneasy a lliance?  (R U SI 
W hitehall Papers Series 48: 1999) pg 3
56 Ibid. pg 3
57 Barnett, M ichael and Martha, Finnem ore,R ules f o r  the W orld  In ternational O rgan iza tions in G lo b a l  
P o litic s  (Cornell University Press London: 2004) pg 131
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what has come to be known as peacebuilding, whereby the UN undertakes enforcement 
action to end an ongoing conflict, not necessarily with the consent o f the parties
• 58involved. This concept is however challenged by other academics who question the 
generational development o f peace operations, arguing instead that the UN has 
undertaken many different types o f  operations at different points and that these have 
evolved over time, not in a particular order but based on the needs o f the particular 
ongoing crises involved. The number o f types o f operation varies from academic to 
academic. The amount ranges from as few as five types59 including, preventive 
diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict 
peacebuilding, to as many as twelve.60
Within their comprehensive work, Understanding Peacekeeping, Alex J. Bellamy 
and Paul D. Williams identify seven key types o f operations including, preventive 
deployments, and traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
assisting transitions, transitional administrations, and peace support operations. 
Bellamy and Williams then go further beyond the definition based on type o f operation 
and separate peacekeeping activities into two broader categories, Westphalian and Post- 
Westphalian. This division is particularly important in relation to the development o f 
global governance as it divides operations into missions based on the peaceful
58 For a more detailed explanation o f  the generations o f  peacekeeping see D oyle ,P eacem akin g  (1998) For 
a detailed analysis o f  what constitutes a peacekeeping operations see M acQ ueen,P eackeep in g  (2006) For 
analysis o f  the changes in peacekeeping see M alone, David M. and Karin W ermenster, B oom  a n d  Bust?  
The changing nature o f  UN P eacekeeping  (International Peacekeeping: 7: 4: 2000) 37-54
59 This is the number o f  types o f  operation outlined in Boutros-G hali’s 1992 report ‘An agenda for peace’ 
which is available online at Boutros-G hali, A genda for P eace (1992)
h ttp ://w w w . un. o rg  D ocs S (1 a g p ea ce. html.
60 For a breakdown o f  the tw elve types o f  operation see D iehl, Paul F. and P. Druckmann and J.A. W all, 
Linking pea cek eep in g  w ith  conflict resolution: A taxonom ic analysis w ith  im plica tions  (Journal o f  
C onflict Resolution: 42: 1998) 33-55
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resolution o f conflicts between states (Westphalian) and newer operations which are
based on the suggestion that "in the long-run, peaceful relations between states require
liberal democratic regimes and societies within state" (post-W estphalian).61 Under this
division the majority o f post-Cold war peacekeeping operations have been about, not
only securing the international peace and security, but also about emphasising the fact
that states’ domestic peace and the way in which they conduct their foreign relations is
based on the nature o f their internal political system. This is an argument supported by
other academics such as Mary Kaldor who states that
“The key to any long-term solution is the restoration o f legitimacy, the 
reconstitution o f the control o f organized violence by public authorities, 
whether local, national or, global. This is both a political process -  the 
rebuilding o f trust in and support for public authorities -  and a legal process 
-  the reestablishment o f a rule o f law within which public authorities 
operate.”62
For Bellamy and Williams UN peace operations are shaped by the global context in 
which they operate and with the development o f global governance and the emphasis it 
places on particular values, these operations have become involved in “the business o f 
fostering and maintaining world order based on liberal democracy."63 This raises 
difficult questions for the UN, including whether or not the UN should be utilising 
peace operation to impose a particular type of ideology, and perhaps more importantly 
whether the UN is in fact capable o f undertaking these kinds o f operations. There is no 
doubt that this poses particular challenges to the role o f the UN as an international
61 Bellam y, A lex J. and Paul D. W illiam s .U nderstanding P eacekeepin g  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2 0 10)  
Pg 4
62 Kaldor, Mary,/Vtnr a n d  O ld  Wars: O rgan ized  Violence in a G lo b a l Era  (Stanford U niversity Press 
Stanford: 2 0 07) pg 1 1
63 B ellam y, U nderstanding pea cek eep in g  (2010) pg 13
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peacekeeper and the next section o f this chapter explores some o f these other 
challenges, including the lack o f resources and political will. The next section also 
argues that all o f  these challenges can be linked to the development o f  global 
governance theory, the emphasis being placed on the norms associated with it, and the 
shift which this has caused within international relations. Following this the final 
section looks at the role o f regional organisations and whether these offer a potential 
solution to some of the challenges facing the UN or if they might actual present an even 
bigger to challenge to the organisation with the potential they possess to undermine the 
U N ’s role as an international peacekeeper.
Challenges, Resources, and Political Will
The system in which the UN operates today is vastly different to that in place at the 
time o f its inception. The organisation is facing numerous challenges, not only in the 
field o f peacekeeping, but across the whole range o f its activities. Many o f these 
challenges can be attributed to the development o f global governance, the emphasis o f 
the norms associated with it including democratisation, good governance and respect 
for human rights, and the impact this is having on both the behaviour o f member states 
and the organisation itself. The emphasis o f these norms is particularly apparent in the 
mandates and Security Council resolutions relating to peacekeeping operations with 
missions being assigned a range o f tasks. These tasks relate to the conduct o f elections, 
with phrases such as “the establishment o f a secure environment for free, transparent
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and peaceful elections to take place”64, and “Assisting also in the ongoing political 
process ...which should culminate in the installation o f  a democratically elected 
government”65 becoming commonplace within peacekeeping mandates. It includes the 
promotion o f human rights through phrases such as “to assist in the promotion and 
protection o f human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable 
persons”66 and “To develop the capacity o f national institutions and non governmental 
organisations in the field o f human rights.”67 In some cases it also provides permission 
for tasks involving the extension o f the authority o f the state in which the mission is 
taking place through phrases worded as “extending State authority and utilities 
throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions”68 and “to
promote and advance political reconciliation and the re-establishment o f national and
regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country.”69 Through these 
tasks peacekeeping missions are now involved in a large number o f tasks that fall 
within the realm of domestic governance. By emphasising a particular type o f domestic 
governance, namely liberal democratic institutions, the organisation gives rise to the 
argument that "the perceived view of peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral
64 See United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1565, http://daccess-dds-
ny .un .org /doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 04/531/89/PD F/N 0453189.pdf?O penE lem ent (19th April 2 0 1 1 ) and 
United Nations, Annex 1A o f  the Dayton Peace Agreem ent as Referred to in Security Council R esolution  
1031, http://daccess-dds-ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 95/405/26/PD F/N 9540526.pdfPO penE lem ent 
(19th April 2011)
65 See United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 897, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 94/065/62/P D F/N 9406562.pdf?O penE lem ent (1 9th April 2011)
66 For more see  United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1565,
67See United N ations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1118, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 97/178/44/P D F/N 9717844.pdf?O penE lem ent (18th April 2011)
68 See United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1545 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/U N D O C 7G E N /N 04/359/89/PD F/N 0435989.pdf?O penE lem ent (19th April 2011)
69See United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 93/226/18/lM G /N 9322618.pdf?O penE lem ent (19th April 2 011)
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but serves the purpose o f an existing order within which problem-solving adjustments
70 • • •can occur." This perception is then used to directly challenge the role o f  the UN as an 
international peacekeeper. This section examines some o f the particular challenges the 
UN faces in relation to this perception including, resolving the issue o f consent, 
questions regarding the impartiality o f the organisation, the use o f force in operations, 
resource deficits, and the problem o f generating political will in support o f operations.
Today the UN still seeks to gain consent from those parties involved in any conflict 
and will for the most part refrain from intervening until a peace agreement is in place 
and levels o f violence have decreased. The issue o f consent does however pose many 
problems to other ideals upheld by the UN including the importance placed on 
upholding human rights, the emphasis on good governance and the developing idea o f 
legitimacy. In order to gain access to a conflict the UN must deal with all parties 
involved which in many cases involves negotiating with those responsible for 
perpetrating human rights abuses. It may also involve negotiation with a despotic 
government which does not conform to the UN 's ideals o f good governance and finally 
it can also confer legitimacy to those undeserving o f such status. As DeWaal argues in 
some cases “the peacekeeping mission becomes just another buyer and seller in the 
auction o f loyalties, and usually a rather inept one, readily manipulated or bypassed by 
the better-endowed and cannier national players.”71 This can then lead to situations 
where the UN is faced with dealing with either a government who does not want help 
or one which is completely incapable o f helping itself and is therefore entirely reliant
70 Pugh, M ichael, P eacekeep ing  an d  critica l theory  (International Peacekeeping: 11: 1: 2 0 0 4 ) 39-58
71 DeW aal, A lex, M ission w ithout end? P eacekeeping in the A frican p o lit ic a l m arketp lace  (International 
Affairs: 85: 1 :2 0 0 9 ) 99-113
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on the UN to sustain its existence. Consent has also posed difficulties to UN operations 
as it can lead to situations whereby the peacekeeping force has “its entire continued 
existence dependant on the whim o f every local leader.”72 This problem is further 
highlighted by Joseph Nye who makes reference to both Sudan and the DRC,
“if you look at something like the resistance that the Sudan has mounted to 
having full cooperation with peacekeeping forces, or if  you take the Congo, 
just the total ineptitude o f the Congolese government in terms o f dealing 
with the Eastern Congo.”73
Both o f these situations highlight the difficulties the UN faces when intervening in a 
conflict situation.
Another concern which the UN often fails to deal with is the reality that the 
organisation can influence the conflict on the ground by choosing who to deal with, and 
who is viewed as a legitimate party within the conflict. By dealing with the UN all 
groups involved in a conflict are granted equal status and as such gain exposure and 
involvement which may not be justified. In reality what the UN attempts to do is 
cooperate with a legitimate government if they can find one, if not one with a modicum 
o f authority and legitimacy is acceptable particularly if they espouse democratic 
principles. Unfortunately in many cases the UN is left simply “to identify the least bad 
option in order to engage with something.”74 The implication being that consent, even 
if it is from an illegitimate party, is better than no consent at all. Consent is clearly a 
key factor in success o f some operations and has become “integral in the practice o f UN
72 Roberts, The crisis  in pea cek eep in g  (1994) pg 21
73 Interview with Professor Joseph, N ye  7 th May 2008
74 Interview with M O D  O fficial 2 4 th February 2009
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peacekeeping in part because they differentiate the UN from other actors using coercive 
means o f dispute resolution and help define the UN's special role in world politics."75
Consent also helps the UN overcome the "widespread suspicions o f  states that
interventions for humanitarian protection purposes may conceal, or lead on to, some
broader and more power-political agenda."76 This suspicion is particularly prevalent in
developing countries, which is o f course where the majority o f UN peacekeeping
operations have taken, and continue to take place. As a consequence o f the emphasis
place on democratization and other norms associated with global governance there is
concern that UN operations are involved in a colonial style ‘civilizing mission’ and that
if the reliance on consent was removed peacekeeping would simply be "the new code
word for old fashioned intervention undertaken for punitive purposes that had little to
do with humanitarian concerns."77 This concern will be examined in the next chapter in
relation to the dangers o f state building and the development o f the Responsibility to
Protect.78 The reality is that
"traditional peacekeeping is all very well if the only crises confronting the 
UN are those which are ripe for the peacekeeping treatment. But classical, 
consensual peacekeeping does not respond fully to the nature o f the world 
we live in and the challenges the new world disorder poses to the
• 79international community."
Consent from those involved in the conflict is not the only form o f consent the UN 
must gain it must also persuade its member states that intervention is the most
75 Barnett,/?7//e.y/w the W orld  (2004) pg 19
76 Roberts, Adam , Intervention: One step  fo rw a r d  in the search  f o r  the im possib le  (International Journal 
o f  Human Rights: 7: 3: 2003) 142-153
77 A yoob , M oham m ed, H um anitarian Intervention an d  In ternational Society. (C over sto ry )  (G lobal 
G overnance: 7: 3: 2 0 01) 225
78 For more see  Chapter Three Pages 141 - 166
19 Tharoor, Shashi, Sh ould  UN pea cek eep in g  g o  back to basics?  (Survival: 37: 4: 1995-6)
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appropriate form o f action. The UN however, as explained above, is not a supranational 
organisation and cannot act without the support o f its member states: The UN as Luard 
explains “can never be anything but a mirror o f the world as it is”80, and if  the member 
states are unwilling to provide the resources to tackle a particular problem then there is 
little the UN can do.
Following the terrorist attacks on September the 11th 2001 the UN was again faced 
with another challenge as the USA retreated to a much more isolationist and aggressive 
foreign policy based on President Bush’s ‘war on terror’. Following 9/11 the United 
Nations was increasingly marginalised; to such as point that it was claimed that the 
organisation was now only capable o f and, would increasingly be “confined to 
mandating UN humanitarian, peacekeeping and transitional government mop-up
o 1
operations after US led military interventions.” As Held argues “the war in Iraq
dramatised the weakness o f the UN system as a vehicle for global security cooperation
82and collective decision making on the use o f force.” For Craig N. Murphy however it 
was a simple demonstration o f the reality that “the UN has never been able to prevent 
military action by one o f the great powers, if anyone has thought that was the case, they 
are missing the point of the organisation, this was just a sign that that’s still true.”83 
This argument which is connected to the role which powerful states play in the creation 
and control o f international institutions will be examined in Chapter Three in relation to
80 Luard, Evan,77je UN :H ow it w orks a n d  w hat it does. (M acM illan: London: 1987) pg 3
81M alone in M alone, David M ., The U nited  N ations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: London: 2 0 0 4 ) pg
2
82 H eld, David, R efraining G lo b a l G overnance: A poca lypse  Soon o r R eform ! (N ew  Political Econom y: 
11:2 : 2006)
82 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd September 2008
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global governance and the spread o f democracy.84 It will also be explored in even more 
detail in Chapter Four relating to the role o f power within the Security Council.85
The situation in Iraq also raised questions as to the continuing relevance o f another
o f the key concepts o f peacekeeping intervention, that o f impartiality. Traditional
peacekeeping operations were mandated on the basis o f their impartiality to the
conflict, troops would not become party to the conflict. For many o f those involved in
peacekeeping it “has to be impartial by definition”86 however those same people accept
that it is “difficult to define what impartial is”87 and that this is often decided on a case
by case basis due to the many reasons for interventions. What is important however is
“impartiality in the execution o f peacekeeping missions impartiality in the
execution o f the mandate and in terms o f the principles o f the UN charter
and it doesn’t mean neutrality, which means treat both sides equally for all
88purposes at all times.”
This idea was most clearly outlined in the Brahimi Report which focused on the issue
o f reform within peacekeeping. Within the report impartiality was defined as
“adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives o f a 
mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not 
the same as neutrality or equal treatment o f all parties in all cases for all 
time, which can amount to a policy o f appeasement. In some cases, local 
parties consist not o f moral equals but o f obvious aggressors and victims, 
and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but
8^9morally compelled to do so.”
84 See Chapter Three Pages 122 - 141
85 See Chapter Four Pages 178 - 192
86 Interview with FCO O fficial 20 ,h May 2009
87 Ibid.
88 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
89United Nations, Brahimi Report (2010),
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This would also seem to imply a shift in policy for peacekeeping operations whereby
peacekeeping troops would no longer have to standby in the face o f atrocities but would
be empowered to act. This shift can be attributed to the continued emphasis being place
on the importance o f the spread o f human rights, a consequence o f which has been the
increased deployment o f UN peacekeeping operations into situations where there is not
necessarily a peace to keep. The extent to which this has occurred will be examined in
chapter six which relates to operations in the field.90 The report also argued that
“Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and 
renewed commitment on the part o f Member States, the United Nations will 
not be capable o f executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building 
tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years. There 
are many tasks which the United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be 
asked to undertake, and many places they should not go. But when the 
United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be 
prepared to confront the lingering forces o f war and violence with the ability 
and determination to defeat them.”91
Within the report several challenges the UN has faced in the past were also outlined. 
At the top o f the list o f those challenges is the lack o f clarity within mandates. This 
problem with lack o f clarity within mandates is one that continues to plague the UN 
today, there is often “almost too much room for interpretation and that's been the result 
o f  political compromises in the Security Council. You know the only thing you can get 
agreement on is something kind o f fuzzy.”92 This argument is born out by Joseph Nye 
who argues that the lack o f clarity within mandates is one o f three key problems facing 
the UN. For Nye the problem stems from
90 See Chapter Six Page 277
91 United Nations, Brahimi Report (2010),
92 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
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“the terms o f  engagement, are they to be pure peacekeepers or can they be 
more active. That we seem to have made progress on, that they can be 
somewhat more active. I mean if  you look at the Eastern Congo UN 
peacekeepers have actually used force as opposed to Bosnia where they 
didn’t use force at all.”93
This issue becomes even more important when you have different organisation on 
the ground in conflict situations; particularly if  those different organisations have 
different interpretations o f what the mandate enables them to do. What is clear is that 
there has been a change in the amount o f force which peacekeepers are allowed to use, 
from limitations on the use o f force within Bosnia and Rwanda which led to criticism o f 
the UN troops, to the situation in the DRC whereby the Security Council has effectively 
involved the UN in war fighting on behalf o f the Congolese government.94 What is not 
clear however is the extent to which troops on the ground will actually use this force, or 
perhaps even more importantly how well they are resourced to enable them to do so?
The issue o f resources has also been an ongoing problem for the UN in creating
peacekeeping operations capable o f dealing with the myriad o f problems the
organisation faces. The key problem is getting
“the personnel and the equipment that you need and that’s been difficult. If  
you look at Darfur you have a large peacekeeping force but it doesn’t have 
all the equipment it needs and you don 't have all the personnel you 
need.”95
The UN to some extent has been happy to create mandates on the basis that
“this is what all peacekeeping missions do and it’s everything under the sun 
and you just try to keep doing that for as many years as the US and others
93 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye 7th May 2008
94 For analysis o f  the change in the use o f  force and goals o f  peacekeeping operations see  M alone, B oom  
a n d  Bust? (2000) and Pugh, The UN (1997)
95 Ibid, N ye
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are willing to fund the operation. Without any real sense o f what the
circumstances require, the beginning, the middle, the end.”96
This top down approach can again be connected to the development o f global 
governance and the norms associated with it including democratization, good 
governance, and the spread o f human rights. The Security Council includes these types 
o f tasks in a peacekeeping mandate without assessing whether or not they are 
appropriate to the ongoing situation and whether or not the mission has the resources in 
order to complete the tasks successfully. This issue will be examined in greater detail in 
chapter six, which looks at the impact which the development o f global governance is 
having on UN peacekeeping operations in the field.97
Another large problem that the UN currently faces is that o f political will, or 
political acceptance both for the validity o f the initial intervention and then for a 
sustained operation. This is true on two levels, both internationally and then on the 
ground within the state in which the conflict is occurring. During the Cold War the UN 
would not intervene in any conflict unless it was specifically invited and when it was 
invited it tended to remain only in those areas controlled by the recognised government 
o f  the country. This changed in the 1990*s with the end o f the Cold War. During this 
period it seemed as if the UN would finally be able to fulfil its capacity as an 
international peacekeeper. The Security Council was more united than it had been in 
the past and was imbued with a new sense o f purpose. This new sense o f optimism was 
however quickly removed by events, including the dramatic failures o f the UN missions 
in both Somalia and Rwanda. The optimism was replaced with a return to caution in
96 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
97 See Chapter Six Pages Pages 265-284
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interventions and restriction on the situations in which peacekeepers would be 
deployed.
"To ensure that peacekeeping would be effective, and to shore up the 
organizations authority and political support, the secretariat and the Security 
council narrowed the conditions under which peacekeepers were deployed 
(emphasizing the need for stability on the ground before deployment) and 
restrained their actions in the field (reemphasizing consent and impartiality.) 
Peacekeepers were no longer to be used in civil wars where there was no 
peace to keep."98
Although there was a resurgence o f hope between 1998 and 2002 with the authorising 
o f the missions in East Timor and the NATO action in Kosovo this was again overtaken 
by events. In the aftermath o f 9/11 the UN again appeared incapable o f an adequate 
response to Am erica’s actions but this lack o f response must be analysed in connection 
with the reality that as an organisation it has no ability to act independently o f its 
member states.
The UN is once again facing its biggest underlying problem in that “the charter is 
based on assumptions which are invalid in a world in which states are not prepared to 
defend the existing order in situations where their national interests are not directly 
affected.”99 The danger is that the UN will become embroiled in situations which 
undermine its ability to remain impartial and that this will lead to a delegitimizing o f  it 
peacekeeping positions. It is clear that post 9/11 capabilities to tackle failed and failing 
states will become increasingly important as “policy makers have come around to the
98 Barnett, Rules f o r  the W orld  (2004) pg 123
99 Ciechanzki in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 83
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idea that they need focus more on out o f area operations, for example in Afghanistan
where undesirables were given freedom to plot attacks.” 100
The problems now facing the UN are ones based on the complexities o f today’s
international system and also on how to reconcile the need for intervention with the
foundations o f UN ideology which were established in the original charter.101 W hat is
apparent is that before the UN intervenes there is a need for there to be a peace to keep
and the parties must agree to rules with the UN acting as referee.102 This understanding
is further illustrated by Durch who argues that
“Peacekeeping is a very useful tool o f international politics, but an 
inherently limited tool. It can and must take on violent local challenges to 
peace implementation, but only at the margins o f a peace process. Should 
the core o f that process lose cohesion, a multinational operation will itself 
have insufficient cohesion— and likely insufficient military strength— to 
make the center hold.” 103
Whilst some academics such as Duffield argue that “the international system within 
which the UN was founded has all but disappeared” 104. Others, such as Hannay and 
Soederberg, argue that states still retain their privileged position and that the UN is a 
key organisation in ensuring their retention o f that position.103 What is clear however is 
that there is an ever increasing need for cooperation and global action to solve global 
problems and that one o f the challenges facing international organisations, states and
100 Interview with FCO Official 20 lh May 2009. For a detailed analysis o f  the situation in Afghanistan see  
Misra, A m alendu ,Afghanistan: The Labyrinth o f  Violence (Polity Press London: 2004).
101 For more see Chapter Three Pages 124 - 129 on Humanitarian Intervention and Chapter F ive Pages 
205 - 214 on Sovereignty.
102 Interview with Former UN O fficial 26 lh August 2008
103 Durch, The p u rp o ses o f  p ea ce  operations (2009)
104 D uffield in N ederveen, W orld O rders (1998) pp. 80-110
105 See Soederberg, Susanne,G /o/w / G overnance in Q uestion  (Pluto Press: London: 2 0 0 6 ) and Hannay, 
D avid ,N ew W orld  D isorder  (I.B. Tauris: London: 2009)
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other actors is how to achieve that level o f cooperation whilst still ensuring their own 
autonomy?
The following section goes on to argue that the developing role for regional 
organisations is in part an attempt by states to ensure their autonomy and also that it is 
aimed at reducing some o f the difficulties the UN faces. Following on from this it 
examines the possibility that in fact this developing role constitutes another challenge 
to the UN and its role as the international peacekeeper, that regional organisations 
represent a direct threat to both the UN’s capability and legitimacy.
Regional organisations and ‘subcontracting’: solution or challenge?
This section begins by assessing the increasing role o f regional organisations and the 
challenge this poses to the UN. It examines both the positive and negative aspects 
which a role for regional organisations presents to UN peacekeeping. It then goes on to 
argue that unless carefully managed regional organisations present a direct threat to the 
legitimacy and ability o f the United Nations as an international peacekeeper. Finally it 
demonstrates that this increasing role can be connected to the development o f global 
governance theory and the increasing emphasis this places on accountability and 
representation within the international system.
Since the end o f the Cold War regional organisations including the African Union, 
the European Union, the Economic Organisation o f West African States and NATO, 
have been involved in peacekeeping missions, either independently o f the UN or in 
coordinated operations. There has been a shift in opinion and the emphasis is now
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placed on viewing “regional organisations as an asset not as a liability.” 106 It is felt that 
“involving regional organisations in conflict management provides an opportunity for 
local actors to have greater input into the conflict management process.” 107 Following 
the end o f the Cold War these organisations are now viewed as legitimate tools o f 
intervention, whereas during the cold war the UN was the only body seen as capable o f 
undertaking a peacekeeping intervention.108
This shift in opinion can be attributed directly to the fact that the UN, following 
several failures, came to be viewed as “overburdened, underfunded and incapable o f 
undertaking alone the increasingly complex and diverse range o f peace and security 
operations that the post-Cold War environment presented.” 109 It can also be connected 
to the push for ‘local solutions to local problems’110 which was directly in response to 
and was designed to reduce the perceived burden o f peacekeeping, particularly in 
relation to the funding and troop provision for operations, which had been placed on 
more developed countries following the end o f the Cold War. In relation to the 
development o f global governance this can be viewed as way o f increasing the 
democratisation and representation within peacekeeping operations. Local actors will 
provide a more nuanced and perhaps more locally acceptable solution to problems 
which outside organisations may not understand.
106 Interview with Professor Thomas G. W eiss 9 th July 2008
107 Boulden in Boulden, Jane, D ealin g  w ith  C onflict in A frica  (Palgrave M acm illan N ew  York: 2 0 03) pg  
2
108 For the proposed developm ent o f  the U N ’s relationship with regional organisations in relation to  
peacekeeping see  United Nations, A new p artn ersh ip  agenda: C harting a new  horizon  f o r  UN  
pea cek eep in g  ( N e w  York: United Nations Department o f  Public Information 2009)
109 Fawcett in Pugh, M ichael and W .P.S Sidhu, The UN a n d  reg ion a l security  (Lynne Rienner: London:
2003) pg 16
110 See United N ations, R eport o f  the S ecre ta /y-G en era l on p ea cebu ild in g  in the im m ediate a fterm ath  o f  
conflict (N ew  York: United Nations General A ssem bly:2009)
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In many ways the acceptance o f  a potential role for regional organisations in
peacekeeping is a demonstration o f the way in which
“the UN has survived because it is highly adaptable and capable o f making 
midcourse corrections, o f championing new agendas, and o f learning to 
employ new tools as the needs, values and demands o f the member states 
shift.” 1"
Although the existence o f and cooperation with regional organisations is foreseen in the
United Nations Charter, under Chapter VIII, an increased role in peacekeeping for these
organisations raises some difficult questions which need to be examined further.
The first question relates to the legal authority by which the Security Council
mandates operations and whether or not the same kind o f authority is attributable to
regional organisations. For academics such as Thomas G. Weiss the key issue is who
provides authority for operations although he recognised that “after the cold war was
slightly different in the sense that there were other options, ECOWAS, NATO etc.
112which I for one see as just as legitimate as the UN.” There is still a need for input
from the Security Council however, as he explains;
“one o f the big factors is who signs off, and there is a real pressure to have 
the Security Council sign off, to suggest that this is not a Trojan horse for 
western imperialists or whatever the going logic is because if the Security 
Council approves clearly there is a much wider legitimacy.” 113
This standpoint however, is challenged by other academics such as Craig N. Murphy 
who argues that the sole legitimacy o f the council is questionable and that in some 
cases regional organisations, from the basis o f their makeup and on the legal authority
111 Luck, Edward C., H ow not to  reform  the U nited  N ations  (G lobal Governance: 11 :4 : 2 0 05) pg 412
112 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss 9th July 2008
113 Ibid, W eiss.
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o f their agreements, has a stronger form o f legitimacy than the Security Council. He 
argues that there is
“stronger legitimacy when you have that kind o f international agreement 
that actually describes things that are internal conditions within particular 
countries and therefore the interventions, the intervening bodies probably 
have greater legitimacy than the UN does.” 114
This could be argued in reference to organisations such as the European Union and the
African Union. However in relation to peacekeeping operations the legitimacy o f
regional organisations in comparison to the UN is questionable.
There is an argument to be made that in fact “the UNs own moral authority is
potentially undermined by regionalization, fostering a reordering o f legitimacy that
dilutes the idealism o f universal entitlements.” 113 The UN gains its authority from its
universality; this authority therefore is not transferrable to regional organisations. This
argument is furthered by Marrack Goulding in his autobiography where he outlines the
use o f regional organisations in peacekeeping as contrary to the ethical vision o f
universalism. He argues that decentralizing will lead to the fragmentation o f security
and a potential ‘peacekeeping apartheid’, that it is unethical for people in a region to
only receive the level o f peacekeeping that the regional organisation can provide.116
This disparity between organisations is underlined by practitioners in the field, one
practitioner states that while
“The UN certainly welcomes the EU as a player in peacekeeping and it says 
it welcomes the AU, however the AU has got a long way to go before it is 
capable o f producing anything worthwhile on the ground.” 117
114 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3 rd Septem ber 2008
115 Pugh in Pugh, The UN (2003) pg 37
116 G oulding, Marrack,P eacem onger  (Johns Hopkins University Press N ew  York: 2 003)
117 Interview with UK M ission O fficial Tw o 27 th August 2008
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This argument is backed up by academics who argue that “there is an immense gulf 
as regards means and resources that effectively separates organisations in the developed 
world from regional organisations in the developing world.” 118 This is however 
contradicted by other viewpoints such as that o f academic Ian Johnstone; who argues 
that “peacekeeping done by regional organisations has to a certain extent strengthened 
the UN, strengthened the UNs ability to function in some places like the DRC for 
example it helped to have the EU there.” 119 This ability to strengthen the UN is 
however highly dependant on which regional organisation is involved in the operation.
Whilst regional organisations “can provide legitimacy, local knowledge and 
experience, and some resources especially in the form of personnel”, they also suffer 
from “several limitations, including a lack o f mandate, the difficulty o f maintaining 
impartiality and forging common positions, limited resources and organisational
shortcomings.” 120 What is clear is the “co-ordination is o f utmost importance for
1 2 1 * • •success.” This co-ordination is not however present in all regional organisations,
there is too much variation as to composition, purpose, membership and strength. So
whilst “the quality and interoperability o f the EU forces and the complementary nature
122o f its contingents could strengthen UN peacekeeping capacities” other organisations 
with less coordination could be detrimental to the abilities o f the UN.
Another problem with utilising regional organisations is also highlighted by 
Professor Johnstone, who admits that the use o f regional organisations has
118 N eeth ling, Theo, In ternational p ea cekeep in g  trends  (Politikon: 3 1 :1 : 2004) 49-66
119 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
120 Alagappa, Muthiah, R egional institutions, the UN a n d  in ternational secu rity  (Third W orld Quarterly: 
18: 3: 1997)421-441
121 Pugh in Pugh, The UN (2003) pg 69
122 Pugh in Ibid. pg 87
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“complicated the UNs peacekeeping role, all o f these relationships and these 
partnerships between the UN and regional organisations have proven to be 
difficult and more time goes into trying to coordinate these relationships 
than actually doing the work on the ground.” 123
An example provided by Professor Johnstone o f these difficulties was the current
hybrid UN-AU operation in Darfur where
“you’ve got a recalcitrant government trying to obstruct the peacekeepers at 
every step o f the way and you can’t reach agreement between the two 
organisations involved, the UN and African union, as to how to react to that 
recalcitrance.” 124
This problem was further illustrated by a UN official who noted that “in many cases 
that (coordination between organisations) is a good practice and its working more and 
more smoothly, however there are also cases where this is a little bit more 
problematic.” 125 Another danger highlighted by Johnstone is the risk “that the multiple 
organisations involved in peacekeeping can be used by parties against the 
peacekeepers, they can be played off against each other.” 126 Again the example o f 
Darfur was raised with the tension between the AU and UN, also the operations within 
the Democratic Republic o f the Congo where EU forces intervened in support o f the 
UN and in Chad again with the EU and UN.
The problems posed by regional organisational involvement in peacekeeping should 
not however undermine the positive benefits which these organisations can offer. They 
provide support to the UN in terms o f logistics and capabilities and help to overcome 
one o f the problems of peacekeeping which is o f course that
123 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
124 Ibid, Johnstone
125 Interview with UN official 28 th August 2008
126 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
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“it all starts with the political will and the resolution, but then its all 
complicated about who is going to provide the soldiers to go somewhere 
and the troops and its always not very obvious and its very expensive so a 
lot o f governments even if  they first think it’s a very good idea don’t have 
the means.” 127
Regional organisations, for the most part can provide troops at short notice, and these
troops more importantly have the ability to work together instantaneously with no need
for translators. It is important to note that
“In any military operation, personnel, equipment and procedures must be 
integrated in such a way as to achieve unified direction o f effort in the field, 
guided by and in support o f overall strategic objectives. Recent UN
i ? o
operations have exhibited anything but those characteristics”
And regional organisations represent a solution to that problem. The domination o f 
particular states within regional organisations has led them to act quickly in response to 
local situations and this ability has been clearly demonstrated on a number o f 
occasions, with ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo.
However, although the use o f regional organisations does remove some o f this 
pressure, it again raises questions as to the accountability and legitimacy o f those 
organisations and the actions they are undertaking. For example there is concern that 
the failure o f the Security Council to address actions taken without explicit Council 
authorisations such as the ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia will lead 
to an undermining o f the primacy of the UN charter which is key to the position o f the 
UN as the lead international peacekeeper. There is also a danger that if regional
127 Interview with U N  O fficial 28th August 2008
128 R uggie in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 14
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organisations undertake action when the UN is unable or unwilling to do so and this 
action proves successful, that the need for the UN to act as an international peacekeeper 
will be open to question.
What is clear is that although these organisations are for many, such as Lord 
Robertson “a patchwork o f regional organisations that should be being built up by the 
United Nations to do these sorts o f operations.” 129 There is a clear need for careful 
management o f the role they play in peacekeeping. Although regional organisations 
represent “one way o f addressing the growing gap between demand and supply and 
reducing the burden on the UN” lj0, the reality is that many of the peacekeeping 
operations undertaken by regional organisations are facing similar problems to those 
undertaken by UN troops. This reality has been “exemplified in conflict stricken 
African states where the demands for peacekeepers are arguably the greatest and 
regional contributions to UN peacekeeping face the most constraints.” ,jl There is also a 
risk that the use o f regional organisations is a way for dominant regional states to serve 
their own selfish interests. It is also possible that neighbouring states could utilise an 
intervention as a mask for attempts to gain influence over mineral resources, or to enact 
revenge for previous conflicts. These realities can be seen in the recent Ethiopian 
intervention in Somalia, and the numerous interventions by Rwanda, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, and other neighbouring states into the ongoing conflict in the Democratic 
Republic o f Congo (D RC).132
129 Interview with Lord G eorge Robertson 28 th July 2009
130 Alagappa, R egion al Institu tions (1997) pg 421
131 N eeth ling, In ternational p ea cekeep in g  trends (2004) pg 50
132 For more see  Berdal, Mats and David M. M alone,G ree d  a n d  G rievance: E conom ic agen d a s in C iv il  
W ars (Lynne Rienner: London: 2000)
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There is also a need to focus on the justification for the increased role o f  regional 
organisations in peacekeeping activities. This justification comes in two forms, the 
reduction o f the burden placed on the UN, and the increased legitimacy o f locally 
based, locally operated missions. The argument is that these operations provide much 
more accountability and representation than those undertaken by the United Nations. 
This does however pose problems as mentioned above in relation to the potential 
disparity o f capabilities between different organisations and the risk o f ‘a peacekeeping 
apartheid’. Another strand o f the argument is based on the translation o f solutions into a 
locally acceptable solution, with the emphasis being placed on the ability o f regional 
organisations to provide these solutions. The one area this falls down is in the use o f 
regional organisations, such as NATO and the EU, outside o f their traditional fields o f 
activity.
The emphasis on accountability and representation feeds directly into the
development o f norms associated with Global Governance including, democratisation
and good governance. The use of regional organisations is a way to increase the
accountability o f the international system and to improve the development o f  locally
appropriate solutions to global problems. The problem is that this understanding o f the
use o f regional organisations again ignores the role which power and influence play in
the mandating o f operations. Regional organisations are just as open to influence by
powerful member states as is the United Nations. Although they may represent a
solution to the increasing challenges facing the UN, the reality is that not all regional
organisations are equal, this reality undermines other key arguments o f Global
Governance in the creation o f a more fair and equitable international system, in that
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those in need o f peacekeeping operations should be able to receive the same level o f 
capability across the board. If  regional organisations are to play a larger role in the 
development and application o f the norms associated with Global Governance then this 
role needs to be carefully monitored to ensure it doesn’t have a detrimental impact on 
the role o f the United Nations as an international peacekeeper.
It is also clear that the use o f regional organisations offers a direct way to reduce the 
burdens on the United Nations in relation to peacekeeping operations, particularly in 
relation to the increasingly complex types o f intervention require. The extent to which 
that burden will be removed is however questionable as the capacities o f  regional 
organisations vary so widely, with some still dependant on the UN to provide the 
necessary resources to undertake complex operations. If  the UN is to continue to be 
involved in these operations, including the reconstruction o f post conflict societies, then 
the issue o f resources needs to be addressed as soon as possible.
The next chapter moves on to look at the role the UN, and other organisations, are 
playing in the reconstruction o f states, the dangers this poses to the organisation, and 
the transmission o f ideals which have become directly associated with the global 
governance project. The chapter argues that the role the UN is being assigned, as a 
potential enforcer for the norms associated with global governance, coupled with the 
increasing pressure being placed on the organisation by the development o f  new norms 
such as the Responsibility to protect, R2P, is only going to increase the likelihood o f 
failure, loss o f international support and legitimacy which the organisation constantly 
battles.
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Chapter Three: The development and enforcement of norms of Global 
Governance; Democracy and the Responsibility to Protect.
This chapter examines the role that the United Nations, and in particular the Security 
Council, has taken in helping to rebuild states in post conflict situations. It argues that 
the Security Council, through resolutions mandating peacekeeping operations, plays a 
key role in the transmission o f particular norms and ideals. Ideals that influence the way 
in which these states are reconstructed which is then having a direct impact on the way 
in which the Security Council is viewed by the wider international community. It also 
argues that the roles being assigned to the UN by some of its more powerful member 
states are having a detrimental impact on its role as an international peacekeeper. The 
argument will be illustrated by outlining the increasing emphasis placed on rebuilding 
states as liberal democracies and the ways this is being used to underline the 
importance o f creating an international system of stable, democratic states.
Following on from this the chapter then argues that the selective enforcement o f 
particular norms by the Security Council is dependant on the interests o f the most 
powerful members. This selective use o f the norms, coupled with the increasing 
pressure being placed on the organisation by the development o f the concept o f 
Responsibility to Protect has only increased the likelihood of failure, loss o f 
international support and, legitimacy which the organisation constantly battles. It 
argues that the involvement o f the UN in the reconstitution o f states through 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, based on the ideas o f Democratic Peace Theory, 
needs to be more carefully managed as it is currently undermining the legitimacy o f the 
United Nations as an international peacekeeper.
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Global Governance, Democracy and the Dangers of State Building
The United Nations Charter is based on the assumption that the international system 
is composed o f sovereign states. Since the signing o f the Treaty o f W estphalia in 1648 
state sovereignty has been defined as; "that in which prime political authority is 
conceded to those institutions, called states, claiming the monopoly o f violence within 
their respective territorial borders."1 As such it has been the key defining norm o f the 
international system. Whilst the world has become increasingly interdependent and 
borders have become ever more porous the norms o f state sovereignty and non­
intervention have remained as strong as ever. Together these two norms have in the past 
made it impossible to "envisage global solutions to the major problems facing the world 
today, without recognition o f the constraints imposed by state sovereignty."2 The 
United Nations has had to orchestrate a careful balancing act between respect for state 
sovereignty and the other values which it espouses, particularly its emphasis on the 
promotion o f Human Rights as outlined in the Charter and detailed in the Universal 
Declaration o f Human Rights.3
The main aim o f the United Nations Charter was “to delegitimize individual acts o f 
war by vesting sole authority for the non defensive use o f force in the Security 
Council.”4 By limiting a states use o f force it was hoped that the UN could help bring 
about an era o f peace and cooperation in the international system. Through its role as an 
international peacekeeper the UN has also according to Roland Paris taken on another
1 Strange, Susan, The w est fa ilu re system  (R eview  o f  international studies: 25: 1999) 345 - 354
2 D iehl in D iehl, Paul F„ The p o litic s  o f  g lo b a l governance  (Lynne Riener: usa: 2 0 01) pg 3
3United N ations, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights,
< http://w w w .ohchr.ori;/EN /U D H R /D ocum ents/U D H R  Translations/eng.pd£> (12th June 2 010)
4 W elsh, Jennifer M ., From Right to R esponsibility: H um anitarian Intervention a n d  In ternational S oc iety  
(Global G overnance: 8: 4: 2002) 503
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role, that o f the transmission o f standards o f appropriate behaviour from the western 
liberal core o f international system to ‘failed states’5 at the periphery. Paris claims it is 
impossible to “neglect the role that peace operations play in the diffusion o f norms and 
institutional models from one part o f the international system to another”6 and that this 
transmission bears a close resemblance to the civilizing mission o f the colonial era. But 
what are the norms which the UN is transmitting and transferring from one area o f  the 
globe to another? Are they the norms of the organisation or merely o f its most powerful 
members?
As an organisation the United Nations has been instrumental in the furthering o f 
human rights around the globe, rights such as “the right to life, liberty and security o f 
person.”7 It places heavy emphasis on democratization, good governance and respect 
for human rights as key indicators for a states development. It also emphasises respect 
for state sovereignty but this respect has been open to interpretation and adaptation. In 
September 1999 then Secretary General Kofi Annan gave an address to the general 
assembly in which he went “so far as to suggest that the classical legal concept o f state 
sovereignty may have to yield in some circumstances to the sovereignty o f the 
individual.”8 This is further emphasised by academics in the field including Thomas 
Weiss who argues that sovereignty does not include a licence to murder even though
5 For more on ‘Failed States’ and the debate surrounding the term inology see: D iehl, G lo b a l G overnan ce  
(2001) , W eiss, Thom as G. ^Humanitarian Intervention  (Polity: Cambridge: 2 007), W eiss, Thom as 
G .,S w o rd  a n d  sa lve: C onfronting new w a rs a n d  hum anitarian crises  (Rowm an and Littlefield: N ew  
York: 2006), Rotberg, Robert,State fa ilu re  a n d  sta te  w eakness in a  tim e o f  terro r  (W orld Peace  
Foundation: Cambridge, MA: 2003)
6 Paris, Roland, In ternational peacebu ild in g  a n d  the m ission  c iv ilisa trice  (R eview  o f  International 
Studies: 28: 2002) 637-656
7United Nations, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, (13th June 2010)
8 Evans, Gareth and M oham ed Sahnoun, Intervention a n d  S ta te  Sovereign ty: B reaking N ew  Ground. 
(C over sto ry)  (G lobal Governance: 7: 2: 2001) 119 -126
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lots o f states claim that Article 2.7 does that, and that “there has been a remarkable 
evolution in the last ten or fifteen years which is not over and which not everyone 
believes or approves, namely that sovereignty doesn’t include the licence to kill.”9 
Despite the support that this argument has gained, both among academics and 
practitioners within the field o f peacekeeping it has also been open to criticism from 
numerous angles. One critic is Lord David Hannay who argues that no-one “has 
challenged the basic principle that a state is sovereign and remains sovereign.” Instead 
he argues that
“Where the situation has shifted quite a bit in the last few decades has been; 
what is the responsibility o f the international community? If  the sovereign 
state still recognised as sovereign, does not fulfil its responsibilities under 
international law. Now that is not, I would argue, a challenge to the doctrine 
o f state sovereignty, it is recognition that state sovereignty can be abused.” 10
This is backed up by academics such as Jennifer M. Welsh who argues that there need 
not be a conflict between sovereignty and intervention, that the issue o f sovereignty is 
put aside by the reliance o f the UN on consent for peacekeeping operations, and the use 
o f Chapter VII mandates. The argument is also furthered by the idea that “Divisions 
over peacekeeping and sovereignty are misleading because the majority o f large-scale 
UN operations are deliberately designed to extend rather than limit the authority o f 
states.” 11 For Welsh sovereignty only becomes an issue post intervention as the new
9 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss 9 th July 2008
10 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6 lh October 2009
11 Center for International Cooperation, B uilding on Brahimi: P eacekeepin g  in an E ra  o f  S tra teg ic  
U n certa in ty  (N ew  York: Center on International Cooperation 2009) pg 10
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state attempts to rebuild legitimacy and viability, which can in some cases, be 
undermined by the intervention o f international administrative authorities.12
This issue with international interventions is also raised by Mohammed Ayoob who 
argues that international intervention could impair rather than improve the ability o f 
states to provide order within their political frontiers.13 This again fits with the 
arguments outlined by Michael Walzer; that sovereign states provide a protective shell 
for the process o f self determination, and as such should be provided with the right o f 
non-intervention, this provides protection for developing and former colonial countries. 
He does however provide a caveat to this, whereby the protective shell is removed if  
popular sovereignty is called in to question.14 This would seem to imply that in certain 
situations interventions are acceptable even if they may potentially undermine state 
sovereignty. The issues surrounding sovereignty and the arguments regarding 
intervention will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.15
What is apparent is that there has been a change in the way sovereignty is viewed. 
What is not clear however is who accepts this change and how is it being applied? 
There appears to be a move away from emphasis on traditional state sovereignty 
towards a focus on the sovereignty of the individual. This emphasis on the individual is 
connected to the importance that the UN places on respect for human rights and the 
organisation is now moving towards a new definition o f sovereignty, not in the 
traditional sense o f territorial control but as a state demonstrating respect for a
12 W elsh, From  R ight to  R esponsib ility  (2002)
13 A yoob , M oham m ed, H um anitarian intervention an d  sta te  so vereign ty  (International Journal o f  Human 
Rights: 6: 1 :2 0 0 2 ) 81-102
14 W alzer, M ichael, The m oral standin g  o f  sta tes: A response to fo u r  critics  (Philosophy and Public  
Affairs: 9: 3: 1980)
15 See Chapter Five Pages 201-211
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minimum standard o f human rights.16 This does however raise questions as to whose 
minimum standard is being enforced and how? It also gives rise to important questions 
about who has the power and influence to authorise interventions and this will be dealt 
with in chapter five which examines the role o f power in the Security Council and again 
in chapter six which looks at sovereignty, legitimacy and conditionality.
The new focus on the sovereignty o f the individual has been coupled with an 
increasing occurrence o f ‘failed states’ “where the model o f the sovereign state, an 
autonomous, self sustaining body that monopolizes the use o f force on its territory and 
ensures basic security or the inhabitants has temporarily at least broken down.” 17 This 
change in the emphasis on traditional sovereignty has also led to questions regarding 
the UNs reliance on consent based peacekeeping operations; as the lack o f legitimate 
governments in situ rendered “the idea that intervention constituted a violation o f
10
sovereignty unless requested by the government...outright absurd.” Overtime the UN 
has worked to develop a norm o f international intervention for humanitarian purposes, a 
guideline which “predicates legitimate intervention on the welfare o f populations 
subjected to persecution rather than on calculations o f national interest and security” 19. 
These interventions have been predicated on a humanitarian response to situations 
where people’s human rights are being violated on a large scale in a variety o f ways.20
16 W elsh, F rom  R ight to  R esponsib ility  (2002)
17 M ortimer, Edward, In ternational A dm in istra tion  o f  W ar-Torn Societies  Ib id .10: 1: 2 0 04) 7 -14
l8Ottaway, Marina and Bethany Lacina, International interventions a n d  im peria lism : L essons fro m  the  
1990's (SA IS R eview : XXIII: 2: 2003)
19 Day, Graham and Christopher Freeman, O pera tionalizin g  the resp o n sib ility  to  p ro te c t  (G lobal 
Governance: 1 1: 2005) 139-146
20 For analysis o f  these interventions see W oodhouse, Tom and Oliver Ram sbotham ,H um anitarian  
In tervention in C on tem porary Conflict: A reconceptualiza tion  (Polity London: 1996)
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In response to these situations the UN is in the process o f developing a new norm o f
intervention predicated on the idea o f responsibility to protect, which will be examined
in the next section in more detail. That is
“the argument that international law should see state sovereignty as 
requiring the state to protect its citizens from at least gross violations o f 
human rights ....is also, connected to the idea there is a global 
responsibility, regional responsibility, responsibility o f neighbours, 
responsibility o f everyone, to deal with those situations where an individual 
state is not able to do that.”21
This concept and the arguments in support o f it are based on the idea that
"there are exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states 
have in maintaining stable international order requires them to react when 
all order within a state has broken down or when civil conflict and
repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with massacre,
22genocide, or ethnic cleansing on a large scale."
In order to resolve these conflicts the UN often becomes involved in much larger 
projects than can be defined by traditional understandings o f peacekeeping. For 
example the international administrations within Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and East 
Timor and enforcement operations undertaken within Somalia and the Democratic 
Republic o f the Congo.23 It is no longer a matter o f interposing neutral forces between 
combatants. Instead the UN Security Council has become involved in many projects 
involving the rebuilding of conflict torn societies and states. The reconstitution o f these 
states is based on the argument that the key to resolving conflict is the reconstruction o f
21 Interview with Professor Craig N. Murphy 3 rd September 2008
22ICISS, The resp o n sib ility  to p ro tec t (Ottawa 2001) pg 31
23 For a detailed analysis o f  the role o f  Humanitarian Intervention in Bosnia and Som alia see  Chapters 
Six and Seven in W o o d h o u sejh tm a n ita r ia n  Intervention (1996) . For a review  o f  peacekeeping  
operations until 1997 see Nations, U nited ,The Blue H elm ets: A rev iew  o j U n ited  N ations P ea cek eep in g  
(United N ations Department o f  Public Information N ew  York: 1996)
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legitimate political authority.24 By participating in and mandating these projects the UN
Security Council is furthering the norm that the global political space should be divided
into Westphalian states.25 The reality is that
“peace restoration is not possible without the establishment o f law and 
order. But in a country where the writ o f government has either collapsed or
is non existent, the law that is made and enforced so as to provide order can
26only be that o f the UN or o f another foreign power (or coalition).”
It has been argued that peace support operations conducted by the United Nations 
sustain a particular order o f world politics that privileges the rich and powerful states in 
their efforts to control or isolate unruly parts of the world.27 This argument is furthered 
when you examine the role o f non-governmental organisations and other actors, such as
the World Bank, IMF, and national governments who predicate their aid on reaching
28certain standards, such as free and fair elections. As David Williams and Tom Young 
explain, most non-governmental development organisations share a “common vision o f 
what development means which is rooted in Western notions o f the state, “civil 
society” and the self.”29 That UN peacekeeping operations carry shades o f  neo­
colonialism is an issue which has been raised by many critics o f the development o f the 
norm o f  humanitarian intervention. There are concerns, such as those raised by
24 For more on this see: Kaldor, M ary,New a n d  O ld  Wars: O rgan ized  Violence in a  G lo b a l E ra  (Stanford  
University Press Stanford: 2007)
25 Paris, In ternational pea ceb u ild in g  (2002)
26 Thakur, Ram esh, From  P eacekeep in g  to P eace operations  (C onflict Trends: 4: 2004)
27 Pugh, M ichael, P eacekeepin g  a n d  c r itica l theory  (International Peacekeeping: 11: 1: 2 0 04) 3 9 -58
28 For more on this see: B aylies, Caroline, P o litica l conditionality  a n d  dem ocra tiza tion  (R ev iew  o f  
African Political Econom y: 65: 22: 1995) and Chand in W eiss, Thom as G., B eyon d UN su bcon tractin g  
(St Martins Press N ew  York: 1998)
29 W illiam s, David and Tom Young, G overnance , the W orld Bank a n d  L ibera l Theory  (P olicy  Studies: 
42: 1: 1994) pg 98
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Mohammed Ayoob, that it threatens to erode the legitimacy o f international society. 
This is particularly true in relation to the development o f the responsibility to protect 
which, as will be discussed later on, “has been viewed as a pretext for regime
T1change.” Other arguments raised focus on the potential impact which interventions 
with state building facets could have on existing political structures and the possibility 
that these interventions might only further impair the capacity o f weak states to provide 
political order within frontiers with no alternative to take its place.
In reality
“The blunt approach o f international interventions has been to rely on ‘free 
and fair’ electoral exercises as a single event, and to promote global 
standards o f political rights and North Atlantic concepts o f democracy that 
do not resonate with local communities and that are not translated into their 
paradigm.” 33
There is a firm belief in certain states that "external actors wield the ability and moral 
authority to bring about the peaceful change that local communities failed to do."34 This 
is linked with the idea that states capable o f taking action should be authorised to 
engineer peaceful solutions to conflicts and, be allowed to undertake the rebuilding o f 
states under the principle o f humanitarian intervention/3 However, there is an inherent 
danger in espousing the principle o f humanitarian intervention as Chesterman outlines; 
with the clear potential for two negative consequences, firstly that the right o f 
humanitarian intervention would not operate in the manner prescribed by its advocates
30 A yoob , H um anitarian Intervention (2002)
31 Interview with Former UN O fficial 26 lh August 2008
32 A yoob, H um anitarian Intervention (2002)
33 Chopra, Jarat and Hohe, Tanja, P artic ip a to ry  Intervention  (G lobal Governance: 10: 3: 2004) 289-305
34 Large in Cochrane, Feargal, Duffy, Rosaleen, Selby, Jan, G loba l govern an ce , conflict a n d  resistan ce  
(Palgrave M cM illan: 2003) pg 100
35 For a detailed analysis o f  Humanitarian Intervention see Woodhouse,//wma/7/toA7'a« In tervention  
(1996)
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and will instead likely licence self interested interventionism under the guise o f
humanitarianism. Secondly the creation o f the new norm would be contrary to the
project o f establishing rule o f law by weakening constraints o f use o f force, enabling
unilateral interventions under the norm is not an alternative to collective action under
the charter but is instead the antithesis o f it.
What is important to remember when discussing the UN is that the organisation has
“no power beyond that which its members grant it and no legitimacy beyond that which
its members afford it”37 and “the answer to the question ‘why didn’t the UN do
something? Is often simply that the member states had not given it either the authority
or the power.”38
In traditional or formal empires o f the past
“Colonial conquests and the establishment of many protectorates and trust 
territories were portrayed in their time as humanitarian interventions to deal 
with particularly abusive leaders, to bring civilization and higher standards 
o f morality to heathen populations and to improve the world”j9.
Many critics o f humanitarian interventions have argued that the new interventionism is 
merely a reinvention o f the old imperial mission of civilization. That the UN and its 
more powerful member states are engaged in a liberal mission to remake the world and 
that "post modem colonialism is almost entirely about enforcing a standard o f 
civilization, and in particular a liberal vision o f human rights."40 There are concerns “it 
may well be the case, for example, that by maintaining and reproducing a particular
36 W elsh, F rom  R ight to  R esponsib ility  (2002)
37 Puchala, D onald J., A m erican  in terests a n d  the UN  (Political Science Quarterly: 97: 4: W inter 1982 - 
1983)
™fbid-
Ottaway, In ternational interventions (2003)
40 Buzan, Barry and Little, Richard, B eyon d W estphalia?  (British International Studies A ssociation  1999) 
Pg 15
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type o f  world order, UN member states are partly responsible for creating the problems 
they are trying to resolve.”41 As Thakur argues “A world order in which developing 
countries are norm-takers and law-takers while Westerners are the rule-setters, 
interpreters and enforcers will not be viable because the division o f  labour is based 
neither on comparative advantage nor on equity.”42 The UN however is not an 
independent organisation, it relies on its member states for both influence and resources 
and it is in this reliance that the real crux o f the issue emerges.
The UN has been responsible for promoting ideas which have become directly 
associated with the spread o f liberal democracy; mutual respect for the sovereignty o f 
states, democratisation, and respect for human rights, development, and respect for the 
rule o f law. These ideas, although not necessarily unsuitable, are highly subjective and 
contested. They have been based on the historical understanding o f the victory o f 
liberal democracies over communism at the end o f the Cold War. Liberal democracy 
has been declared the victor and the emphasis is now on utilising this concept to further 
peace and security around the world. As explored in Chapter One the spread o f Liberal 
Democracy is directly tied to the so called ‘peace d iv idend/43 This idea would support 
the notion that the spread o f liberal democracy can only benefit the international 
community. The basis o f the argument rests on the assumption that "because liberal 
democratic states are peaceful in their relations with one another, peace operations need 
to be in the business o f fostering and maintaining world order based on liberal
41 B ellam y, A lex  J., The 'next s tage ' in p ea ce  operations theory?  (International Peacekeeping: 1 1 : 1 :  
2 004) 17-38
42 Thakur, Ram esh, Law, L egitim acy a n d  the U nited  N ations (M elbourne journal o f  international law: 11: 
2010) 1-26
43 For more details see Chapter One Page 68
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democracy.”44 For academics such as Duffield the resurgence o f  the liberal peace 
represents an ideological mix o f neoliberal concepts o f democracy, market sovereignty 
and conflict resolution that determine contemporary strategies o f intervention. The 
problem with this is that, for Duffield, the UN, and more importantly the Security 
Council has become involved in the globalisation o f a particular model o f domestic 
governance - liberal market democracy.4;> This then causes conflict when the absence o f 
democracy is viewed as a threat to international peace and security, a more extreme 
version o f democratic peace theory which could lead to arguments in favour o f 
interventions for democratisation.46
There are however arguments in favour o f this notion, as outlined by Michele 
Griffin, who notes that principles o f non-interference in internal affairs could be viewed 
as artificial and unnecessary in an economically, cultural and politically interdependent 
world. In her view interventions in order to establish democracies can be justified by 
reference to 'democratic peace theory' and she argues that “a state desiring international 
legitimacy should manifestly seek to democratize, and that external intervention to 
promote this is acceptable.”47 This challenges the more traditional argument that “N on­
intervention is a vital rule for encouraging order in a world without international 
government.”48 However there is some evidence to suggest that the international 
system is moving towards an "international norm of'pro-democratic' intervention”49 as
44 Bellam y, A lex  J. and Paul D. W^JWYiams,Understanding P eacekeepin g  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2 0 1 0 )  
Pg 13
45 For more see: D uffield, M ark.G  loba l G overnance a n d  the new w ars  (Zed B ooks London: 2 0 01)
46 W eiss ,/lum anitarian  intervention (2007) pg 49
47 Griffin in W ilkinson, Rorden, 1'he G loba l G overnance R eader  (Routledge: London: 2 0 0 5 ) pg 194
48 D oyle, M ichael W ., Ways o f  War a n d  Peace  (W .W . Norton and Co.: N ew  York: 1997) pg 411
49 W eiss,H um anitarian in tervention (2007) pg 49
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“The evidence shows that the extension o f state authority, through military 
means and policing as well as civilian assistance, has become a core 
function o f the UN peacekeeping. The UN’s large, multi-dimensional 
missions now frequently use (or at least project) force not merely to fend o ff 
direct attacks from spoilers, but as part o f deliberate strategies to expand and 
secure the authority o f a government in contested territories.”50
Overtime the concept o f democratic governance has become increasingly embedded in 
both Security Council resolutions and peacekeeping mandates.
Since the publication o f An Agenda for Peace in which then Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali placed “great emphasis on democracy and its significance both
for economic development and for international peace"51 the UN has become
increasingly involved in election monitoring which directly "associates the UN with the
idea o f multi-party democracy.'02 It is clear that "democracy, in the council's repertoire
o f practice, is above all a means o f ending, preventing, sublimating, and diverting
violent internal conflict.” 53 Whilst there has been some success in the implementation
o f democratic transitions there are however serious problems. As Roberts outlines,
"The nature o f post-conflict societies can make the realization o f democracy 
a distant goal. A United Nations which concerns itself with the type o f 
government in member states may find itself involved in a wide range o f 
complex and dangerous disputes."34 
This was clearly demonstrated by the case of Rwanda which
"suggests rather clearly that there are dangers in pursuing the kinds o f ends- 
growth, democracy, that statistics may show are positively correlated with a
50 Center for International Cooperation, Building on B rahim i (2009) pg 10
51 Roberts and Kingsbury in Roberts, Adam and Benedict, K ingsley, U n ited  N ations, D iv id e d  W orld
(Clarendon Press Oxford: 1994) pg 57
52 Roberts, Adam, The cris is  in peacekeep in g  (IFS: 2: 1994) pg 15
53 Fox in M alone, David M., The U nited  N ations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: London: 2 0 0 4 ) pg 70
54 Roberts, The crisis  in pea cekeep in g  (1994) pg 15
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lack o f conflict without adequately considering the possibility o f  violence 
by those threatened by these processes."55
The other problems arise from the argument that the supposed benefits o f the spread o f 
liberal democracy would then justify the domination o f international organisations by 
liberal democratic states.
The key issue with the spread o f liberal ideals arises when you examine the ways in 
which the agenda o f the UN is set by those member states with the most power and 
influence. These member states include the Permanent Five o f the Security Council 
comprised of, the UK, France, Russia, China and the United States o f America. Further 
problems appear when you also examine the ways in which these states utilise the 
values o f the UN for their own gains. The argument for these states domination o f the 
UN system is that
"The prospects for peace and peaceful change can be enhanced greatly by 
the collective leadership provided by a dominant coalition o f states able and 
willing to steer the system in a manner that offers incentives for others to 
follow."56
The area which has not been examined enough is what incentives there are for these 
states to take the lead in the first place or the problems that occur when they utilise the 
supposedly international values o f the UN to justify their own ends. There is now a 
valid concern that "humanitarian justifications usually mask the exercise o f  raw power
57motivated by strategic, economic, or political interests."
55 Berdal, Mats and David M. M alone,G reed  a n d  G rievance: E conom ic agendas in C iv il W ars (Lynne  
Rienner: London: 2000) pg 38
56 K egley, Charles W .,C ontroversies in in ternational re la tions theory  (St Martin's Press: N ew  York: 
1995) pg 211
57 W eiss,H um anitarian in tervention  (2007) pg 33
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Although the United Nations was intended to uphold “the sovereign equality o f  all
ro
its members” there is a distinct hierarchy within the structure o f the organisation. At
the top o f the pile is the Security Council. The Security Councils mandate is outlined in
chapter five o f the charter which states that
“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance o f international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.” 59
Under the charter the Security Council is therefore designated to be in control o f all 
matters relating to the maintenance o f international peace and security; by gaining 
membership to the UN states are therefore relinquishing a small portion o f their 
sovereignty to the Security Council. The Security Council is composed o f  fifteen 
members, including the five permanent members; Russia, the United States o f America, 
The United Kingdom, France and China. Each o f the permanent members hold a veto 
power over any resolution the council may create. This means that the five permanent 
members have an even greater degree o f control over actions which the UN may take in 
order to secure international peace and security.
As the only remaining superpower the USA has a huge influence on the actions o f 
the Security Council and it seems that "the ability o f the United Nations to achieve its 
goals and expand its roles will be largely determined by the political and material 
support it receives from the United States."60 This reliance o f the UN on the US has
58 United N ations, C harier o f  the U n ited  N ations Information, Department o f  Public: 1945) Chapter 1 
Article 2
59 Ibid. Chapter 5 Article 24
60 D iehl, G lo b a l G overnance (2001) pg 465
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however led to charges that the US is misusing humanitarian arguments to justify its
own attempts to influence the development o f the international system and that
"American imperial ambitions are now legitimated by public relations 
intellectuals as part o f the responsibilities o f empire-building, which in turn 
is now celebrated as a civilizing process for the rest o f the globe."61
Following its victory in the Cold War the USA now sees itself as the moral arbiter o f 
international society, the protector o f humanitarian values and the guardian o f  the 
‘liberal peace’. It is this use o f humanitarian issues to justify interventions which is 
causing concern; there are worries that simply using the phrase humanitarian lends 
weight to the argument for intervention purely through the connotations associated with 
the terminology. There has also been an argument made that the use o f 
humanitarianism as a reason for intervention “is no more than a convenient cover used 
by stronger, developed countries to further national interests that may be far from 
humanitarian.”62 This argument is furthered when you look at the selectivity applied to 
interventions across the board, for example the disparity between the NATO response 
in Bosnia Herzegovina and the UN operation in Rwanda which occurred at the same 
time but received dramatically different levels of political support and resources.
The failure to prevent the mass genocide in Rwanda was one o f several abject 
failures to act on behalf o f the international community during the 1990s, as was the 
inability to protect safe areas in Bosnia including Srebrenica before the NATO 
intervention, and the reluctance to intervene in states such as Somalia where previous
61 Giroux, Henry A .,The terro r o f  neoliberalism  (Paradigm: London: 2004) pg x ix
62 Evans, In tervention (2001)
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interventions have ended in the death o f western (particularly US) soldiers. Whilst
major world leaders have demonstrated
"greater willingness to go on the record explicitly promoting the 
international prerogative that state sovereignty can be overridden in the face 
o f gross violations o f human rights or humanitarian law."63
They have been less willing to act on this prerogative where their national interests are
not at stake. In fact it could be argued that "many states may look upon international
organizations principally as instruments for preserving their hegemony or improving
their status"64 rather than real tools for engineering change in the international system.
W hat needs to be recognised is that humanitarian interventions undertaken by major
powers often "fuel regional tensions and democratisation can destabilise transitional
societies"65 and that states "will act on the basis o f their interests whatever the
international constraints."66 These realities need to be taken into account when pushing
for new international norms o f interventions based on humanitarianism as
"eroding the existing normative basis of international society in order to 
provide major powers the facility to intervene selectively in the domestic 
affairs o f weaker states ought not to form part o f the humanitarian 
intervention argument. Otherwise the moral basis o f the argument itself is 
diluted, detracting tremendously from the legitimacy o f the humanitarian 
enterprise"67.
63 Griffin in W ilkinson, G lo b a l G overnance R eader (2005) pg 193
64 Cox and Jacobsen in D iehl, G loba l G overnance (2001) pg 102
65 M iall in Cochrane, G lo b a l G overnance (2003) pg 59
66 M iall in Ibid. pg 61
67 A yoob, M oham m ed, H um anitarian Intervention a n d  International Society. (C over s to ry) (G lobal 
Governance: 7: 3: 2001) 225
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This potential dilution leaves the principle open to exploitation. That is not to say that
the principle o f humanitarian intervention should be abandoned entirely instead it
should be made clear that
"In the absence o f a clear legal basis for intervention, political 
considerations will continue to play a dominant role, and decisions will be 
made not on the basis o f when states can intervene but on the basis o f  when 
they will"68.
That often these interventions will be based on the interests o f the states themselves and 
not some loftier ideal or as Tanner argues that “the dominance o f state sovereignty over 
global governance allows for the compartmentalization o f peacekeeping actions to 
respond to national interests rather than to a common will.”69 There are however many 
dangers in allowing states to utilise the justification o f humanitarianism for intervening 
in other states and the following section will go on to examine some o f these dangers.
The UN today is facing numerous challenges to its status as the dominant 
international organisation with the responsibility for the maintenance o f international 
peace and security. It is constantly battling with the “increasing demand for policy to 
address global problems versus the recognized weakness o f contemporary international 
organisations and states"70, including its own weaknesses and failures as an 
organisation. The UN was created with an idealistic goal in mind and it has made great 
strides towards achieving it but now many are questioning the abilities o f the 
organisation insisting that "the united nations has been revitalized to such an extent that
68 Griffin in W ilkinson, G lo b a l G overnance R eader (2005) pg 193
69 Tanner, Fred, A ddressin g  the P erils o f  P eace O perations: T ow ard  a G lo b a l P eacekeep in g  System  
(Global G overnance: 16: 2010) 209-217
70 M ingst in Vayrynen, Raim o, G lobalisa tion  a n d  g lo b a l governance  (Rowm an and Littlefield: 2 001) pg 
92
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members have become acutely aware o f its constitutional deficiencies, neglected 
infrastructure, costly budget and outmoded procedures."71
The organisation is also facing increasing pressure to justify its actions and to 
explain why it has failed, with the help o f globalization and the end o f the cold war, to 
create a global village and why many o f the key norms and values it was fighting to 
promote have become “a convenient metaphor for the US to promote its own political 
and economic thinking on all nations”72. There is great concern that “the doctrine o f 
humanitarian intervention comes not from a renewed commitment to human rights, but 
from a need for a new pretext for imperialist interventions”73 and that the failure o f 
international organisations to act in defence o f these principles has meant that “the 
capacity to go it alone or to revert to extra-institutional venues seems increasingly the 
rule rather than the exception in international behaviour"74.
This reversion to unilateral action increasingly marginalises the UN and only serves 
to further undermine the little authority it has built up over the past sixty years. It is 
clear that “To be authoritative, international organizations must be seen to serve some 
valued and legitimate social purpose and, further, they must be seen to serve that 
purpose in an impartial and technocratic way”73. The increasing misappropriation o f 
UN values has left the organisation open to charges o f selectivity and partiality in their
71 Ferguson and M onsbach in Martin H ewson and Sinclair, Tim othy J. , A p proach es to  g lo b a l  
govern an ce  th eo ry  (State University o f  N ew  York Press: Albany: 1999) pg 201
72 Gaan, Narottam, G loba liza tion  a n d  the in ternational system : econom ic a n d  p o litic a l changes  
(International Studies: 43: 3: 2006) pg 305
73 Conlon, Justin, S overe ign ty  vs. tin m an  Rights or sovereign ty  a n d  hum an righ ts  (Race and Class: 46: 
7 5 :2 0 0 4 )
74 Forman, Shepard and Segaer, Derek, A cor coalitions f o r  G lo b a l G overnance  (G lobal Governance: 12:
2 :2 0 0 6 )  pg 208
75 Barnett and Finnem ore in Barnett, M ichael, and Raymond Duvall, P o w er in g lo b a l governance  
(Cam bridge U niversity Press: Cambridge: 2005) pg 175
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actions, charges which are not unjustifiable given the differing levels o f response to 
conflict situations, for example the failure to intervene successfully in Somalia in 
comparison to the action in Kosovo.76 What is important to highlight is that “The UNs 
defects are largely attributable to the way it is managed by the most powerful 
members.”77 The danger is that these powerful members will continue to abuse their 
power and by doing so will continue to undermine the legitimacy o f the UN Security 
Council which is already under attack.
The UN is aiming to globalize values and systems which have become aligned with 
the interests o f developed nations, to ensure the continuation o f the sovereign state as 
the building block o f the international system, to promote liberal democracies as the 
best way o f organising those states, and to ensure liberal economic policies as the 
foundation o f the road to development. The problem with these values is that as the 
values also aligned with the ongoing process o f globalization within the international 
system they are often viewed by those on the receiving end of the policies as “nothing 
but another subterfuge for the continuing dominance o f the underdeveloped by the 
wealthiest western countries by controlling their resources and wealth.”
The most recent development in the debates on intervention is the development o f 
the concept o f the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The development o f the concept and
76 For more on the selectivity o f  the U N  Security Council see:A yoob, M oham m ed, Third W orld  
P ersp ec tive s  on H um anitarian Intervention a n d  International A dm in istra tion  (G lobal G overnance: 10: 1: 
2 004) 9 9 -118 , W heeler, N icholas J Saving S trangers  (Oxford University Press Oxford: 2000), W eiss, 
Thom as G. and Jane Boulden Terrorism  a n d  The UN  (Indiana University Press 2004: B loom ington:
2004), Hettne, Bjorn, Human Values a n d  g lo b a l G overnance  (Palgrave M acmillan: N ew  York: 2008), 
and Roberts, Adam, H um anitarian A ction in W ar (Adelphi Papers: 305: 1996)
77Pugh, P eacekeep in g  (2004) 39-58
78 Gaan, Narottam, U nited  States, G lobaliza tion  a n d  the in ternational system : E conom ic a n d  p o litic a l  
challenges  (International Studies: 43: 3: 2006) pg 305
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the impact it is having on the role o f the United Nations in peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding will be examined in the final section o f this chapter.
Responsibility to Protect and the UN as Enforcer of Global Governance
As the United Nations remains committed to resolving conflicts around the globe,
“The ideology o f human rights is being embraced by the United Nations and 
academics, among others, as the moral foundation o f global order, or the 
‘glue’ that holds the political project o f global governance together by 
creating the common moral understanding necessary to legitimize global 
political authority.”79
Whilst this has given new justification for interventions it has however led to a whole
host o f new and even more complex issues as “intervention for humanitarian purposes
leads inevitably to political tasks”80, the majority o f which the UN is not capable o f
undertaking. In the post-Cold War era
“The UN is being overwhelmed by escalating demands that cannot be met, 
undermined by the lack o f resources and capability and perplexed by the 
complexity o f some of these internal conflicts.”81
Despite numerous failures in the post Cold War world there were increasing “calls 
for the UN to do more rather than recognition that the UN might be fundamentally 
limited in acting in these contexts.”82 Rather than attempting to reform the United 
Nations, to provide more support or to produce more realistic mandates the member 
states instead continued to place increasing pressure on the UN to take more action and
79 O wen in Lederer, Markus and Philipp S. Muller, C ritic izing  G loba l G overnance  (Palgrave M acm illan  
N ew  York: 2005) pg 221
80 M andelbaum, M arcus, The reluctance to intervene  (Foreign Policy: 95: 1994)
81 D oyle , M ichael W. and Olara A. Otunnu,Peacem aking an d  P eacekeeping  fo r  a  new  cen tury  (Row m an  
and Littlefield Oxford: 1998) pg x
82 Fox in M alone, S ecurity  C ouncil (2004) pg 103
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achieve more in the face o f overwhelming obstacles. By pushing the UN without 
providing enough support the idea that the UN could be used as “a potential source o f 
power, to promote common cause or legitimate common action”83 has been slowly 
eroded. Overtime
“Post cold war peacekeeping has exposed the paradoxes o f global 
governance. Peacekeeping is increasingly a phenomenon o f situations where 
domestic state sovereignty, as a legal and political principle, is barely 
sustainable and where other states are attempting to act in concert to restore 
it. Yet economic interventionism by the relatively coherent states, through 
such institutions as the IMF and IBRD, may be the cause o f social, legal and 
political collapse. Even more paradoxically, the autonomy o f troop- 
contributing states in areas of foreign and security policy, broadly 
conceived, may also be increasingly subverted by transnational and global 
processes, not least in the demands for new global doctrines for 
peacekeeping.” 84
It would appear that the more the UN intervenes to ensure stability and prosperity, the 
more it “undermines its efforts to develop peaceful, democratic systems that respect 
human rights and foster economic prosperity because it strips state leaders’ authority
85and therefore their capacity to lead.”
Along with the renewed importance of Human Rights as a component o f United 
Nations action is the concept o f good governance and this has been adopted by the UN 
in relation not only to its own operation but to the operation o f those states to which it 
is providing assistance. During the cold war years it was not the place o f the UN to 
comment on the internal governing o f any state, based on the dominance o f the 
concepts o f non-intervention and sovereignty it was deemed to be outside the
83 Ogata, Sadako, What is the In ternational com m unity? G uilty p a r tie s  (Foreign Policy: 132: 2 0 02) 39
84 Pugh in Pugh, M ichael, The UN, p ea ce  an d  fo rc e  (Frank Cass London: 1997) pg 193
85 Johnson in Lederer, C ritic izing  G loba l G overnance (2005) pg 183
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organisations area o f accepted intervention. Today however the UN comments much
more freely on the actions o f states, both those it is assisting and those which it feels
require assistance. However what cannot be denied is the “susceptibility o f  the UN to
the agendas o f the most powerful states”86 and the reality that
“Asymmetrical power relations drive many o f the decisions in international 
forums, whether intergovernmental or civil society and the capacity to go it 
alone or to revert to extra institutional venues seems increasingly the rule 
rather than the exception in international behaviour.”87
The UN is not capable o f taking action without its member states and if  its member 
states do not agree with the stance o f the UN they can quite simply bypass it which has 
occurred with increasing frequency over the past few years. The problem with the UN 
is that
“it suffers from the contradiction between a liberalism that makes harmony 
depend on the right kind o f state (liberal national) on the one hand and an 
international system that requires a heavy dose of international regimes and 
organizations aimed at overcoming the drawbacks of state sovereignty on 
the other.”88
This severely hampers any action that the UN can take as it is in the process o f 
attempting to establish a more peaceful cooperative world made up o f  liberal 
democratic states whilst at the same time slowly eroding the concept o f the sovereignty 
o f such states by emphasising the importance o f human rights and individual freedoms.
In the preamble to the UN charter it states that one o f the aims o f the organisation is 
“to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth o f the human
86 Held, D avid,G loba l C ovenant (Polity Press Cambridge: 2004) pg 108
87 Forman, New coalition s (2006)
88 Hoffm an, Stanley, The crisis o f  libera l internationalism  (Foreign Policy: 98: 1995) 159
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person, in the equal rights o f men and women and o f nations large and small” 89. As an
Organisation the United Nations “establishes norms that many countries would like
everyone to live by”90 and it was hoped that with the end o f the Superpower conflict it
would become “an instrument for the mobilization o f collective concern”91 on a wide
variety o f issues affecting the global community. This came alongside a shift to a more
‘morally’ based policy towards intervention in conflicts. Many, such as former
Secretary’s General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan, felt that the world should
no longer tolerate regimes which did not promote or respect the idea o f human rights,
that those states who violated human rights should forfeit their right to be treated as a
legitimate sovereign.92 It was proposed that
“The focus o f a post-Cold War United Nations should be on human security 
-  not just the security o f the states which are members o f the United Nations 
but the security o f populations within these states.”
This idea can be seen to develop from various other shifts in international awareness 
in relation to human rights stemming from the abolition o f slavery and the end o f 
colonialism, both o f which promoted the right of self-determination. There had been 
throughout the Cold War years a reassessment o f who is human and therefore who 
deserved protection from violation of their human rights. Human rights had become a 
universally applied concept in the period following the end o f the Cold War as had the 
concept o f legitimacy o f statehood, no longer would despotic governments be
89 United N ations, C harier (1945)
90 Tharoor, Shashi, Why A m erica  still needs the UN  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 5: 2003)
91 W ilcox, Francisco and H. Field Flaviland ir., The U nited Sta tes a n d  The U nited  N ations  (Johns H opkins 
Press Baltimore: 1961) pg 107
92 See for exam ple, Boutros-Ghali, Boutros A genda f o r  Peace  (N ew  York N ations, United: 1992) and 
Annan, K ofi, Two concepts o f  S overeign ty  (The Econom ist 18th September 1999)
93 Sutterlin, James S.,The UN a n d  the m aintenance o f  in ternational secu rity  (Praeger: Connecticut: 1995) 
p g x i
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guaranteed de facto statehood, legitimacy was deemed to be limited to the sphere o f 
democratically governed states. Throughout the Cold War foreign policy and 
international relations had been “seen as necessarily amoral”94 that concern should only 
be for the national interest and for the security o f the state. In the post-Cold W ar era 
however morality became the basis o f and justification for a large proportion o f many 
states foreign policy actions.
In the years following the end o f the Cold War humanitarian intervention, including
international humanitarian law and, international humanitarian assistance in times o f
crisis that is based on the principles o f impartiality, neutrality and universality has
become the norm. These developments have been enshrined in a variety o f sources o f
international law including international conventions such as the 1948 Genocide
Convention95, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in Security Council resolutions and
General Assembly documents such as the World Summit Outcome Document 2005.96
There is an argument to be made that Member States at the UN have realised that they
“have a long term national interest as well as a moral responsibility to promote human
rights”97 that they should aim to emulate Gareth Evans ideal o f ‘good international
citizenship.’98 In today’s international system
“respect for national sovereignty is no longer the guiding principle o f the 
relationship between states, where the world community only has the right 
to intervene if one country attacks another.
94 Harries, O w en, M orality  an d  foreign p o licy  (Policy: 21: 2005)
95 United N ations, 1948 Convention on the prevention o f  the crime o f  gen ocid e  
http://w w w .un.org/m illennium /law /iv-l.htm  (12th April 2010)
96 United Nations, United Nations World Summit Outcom e Docum ent 2005 , http://daccess- 
ods.un.org/T M P/1796323.65703583.htm l (12th April 2010)
97 Harries, M ora lity  (2005) pg 43
98 Evans, G areth ,C oopera tin g  f o r  P eace  (A llen and Unwin St Leonards: 1993)
99 Harvey, Robert,G loba l D isorder  (Constable London: 2003) pg 4
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The most recent development in relation to interventions for humanitarian reasons is 
the proposed development o f the concept o f a ‘Responsibility to Protect’. This concept 
is predicated on the recognition o f a shift in the basis o f state sovereignty, which will 
allow the international community to intervene if  a state fails to act to protect the rights 
o f its citizens. If  a state fails to do so, and if  large scale human rights abuses are being 
committed then this concept allows the overriding o f state sovereignty in order to 
protect the sovereignty, and safety o f the citizens. At the hard end o f the concept will be 
"coercive action by one or more states involving the use o f armed force in another state 
without the consent o f its authorities, and with the purpose o f preventing widespread 
suffering or death among the inhabitants."100 It is based on the idea that there are limits 
to what the international community will accept. That there is a line and “if  you step 
over that you have gone too far and you temporarily lose your sovereignty and then 
there’s an international obligation, certainly responsibility to act to correct that.” 101 
Fast forward to the beginning o f the 21st century however and looking back "the 
brutal legacy o f the twentieth century speaks bitterly and graphically o f the profound
failure o f individual states to live up to their most basic and compelling responsibilities,
102as well as to the collective inadequacies o f international institutions." Following the 
failures o f the UN to respond adequately to various crises including Rwanda, Darfur 
and Somalia and the subsequent NATO intervention in Kosovo a debate was ongoing 
about unilateral humanitarian intervention and the role this had to play in securing 
international peace and security. This debate first began with the work o f Francis Deng
100 Adam Roberts quoted in W eiss,H um anitarian intervention (2007) pg 5
101 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss 9th July 2008
102United Nations, R eport o f  the Secre tary  G enera l: Im plem enting the R esponsbility  to  P ro tec t 2 0 09) pg5
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and Roberta Cohen who outlined the concept o f sovereignty as responsibility.103 The 
concept was based on the idea that "only those states that cherish, nurture, and protect 
the fundamental rights o f their citizens and thereby fulfil their sovereign responsibilities 
are entitled to the full panoply o f sovereign rights."104
The idea was then championed by former Secretary General Kofi Annan who posed 
a challenge to the international community. How to reconcile the tension between 
sovereignty and human rights? The challenge was taken up by the Canadian 
government who proceeded to form the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS). The main aim of the commission was to examine the tension 
between sovereignty and human rights and to explore potential solutions to this 
problem. In doing so "The report aimed to escape the irresolvable logic o f 'sovereignty 
versus human rights' by focusing not on what interveners are entitled to do (a 'right o f 
intervention') but on what is necessary to protect people in dire need and the 
responsibilities o f various actors to afford such protection.103
The report divided the responsibilities o f the state and those o f the international 
system. States had to demonstrate that they were capable o f fulfilling their 
responsibilities to their citizens in terms o f protection from human rights abuses and if  
a state failed to do so or "if a state is unable or unwilling to carry out that function, the 
state abrogates its sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect devolves onto
103 For further information see Deng, Francis M ., Donald Rothchild, W illiam  Zartman, Sadikiel K im aro, 
Terrence Lyons S overe ign ty  as respon sib ility  (Brookings Institute N ew  York: 1996)
104 B ellam y, A lex  J.,R esponsib ility  to  p ro te c t (Polity: Cambridge: 2009) pg 19
105 Bellam y, A lex  J., The respon sib ility  to  pro tec t and  the prob lem  o f  m ilitary  in tervention  (International 
Affairs: 84: 4: 2 0 08) 615 - 6 3 9
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international actors."106 In arguing this the commission established the Responsibility 
to Protect as "a highly significant breach in the doctrines o f state sovereignty and non-
• * 107intervention." In contrast to this breach o f sovereignty the report also focused on 
rebuilding states that would be capable o f protecting their citizens in the future. In this 
respect "the concept o f sovereignty as responsibility appears wedded to preserving 
international order."108 It is wedded to the creation o f a society o f stable states capable 
o f protecting their citizens and participating fully in the international system.
There had been several abject failures on behalf o f the international community to 
react to crises such as Rwanda in either a timely or decisive manner. These failures had 
left the UN open to charges of selectivity and even worse charges o f neo-imperial or 
neo-colonial actions. Many critics o f humanitarian interventions have argued that the 
new interventionism is merely a reinvention o f the old imperial mission o f civilization. 
That states are attempting to undertake a “civilizing mission.” 109 That the UN and its 
more powerful member states are engaged in a liberal mission to remake the world and 
that "post modem colonialism is almost entirely about enforcing a standard o f
civilization, and in particular a liberal vision o f human rights."110 Whilst for its
supporters '"R2P is an ethical response to periodic eruptions o f mass killings and 
genocide it raises hackles among many governments who see themselves in the 
crosshairs o f more powerful actors.” 111 It suggests that the UN can take action against
106 Badescu, Cristina G. and Linnea Bergholm , The R 2P  a n d  the conflict in D arfur: The b ig  le t-d o w n  
(Security D ialogue: 40: 2009) 287
107 N ew m an, M ichael, R evisiting the R2P  (The Political Quarterly: 80: 1: 2 009) pg 92
108 Badescu, The R 2P  (2009) pg 303
109 Interview with Former UN O fficial 26lh August 2008
110 Buzan, B eyon d W estphalia? (1999) pg 15
111 Ibid. Pg 189
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perpetrators o f  crimes against humanity and other horrors whereas in reality they don’t. 
Political realities make it hollow and there is concern that R2P is more likely to 
discredit the UN than give it a greater legitimacy or validity because it is so difficult to
The Commission hoped to move away from the more sticky debates on the use o f 
force and be able to establish "acceptance o f and commitment to new policy behaviour 
aimed at avoiding mass atrocities."113 It wanted to move away from the idea o f 
intervention as "various forms o f non-consensual action that are often thought to 
directly challenge the principle o f state sovereignty,"114 to a point where intervention 
could be viewed as a means o f strengthening sovereignty. The development o f the 
principle was aimed at garnering "a political commitment to implement already existing 
legal obligations in a manner consistent with international law ."11:> This commitment 
was clearly demonstrated at the 2005 World Summit, where all member states o f the 
UN approved the Summit Outcome Document.116 Whilst generally hailed as a success 
the adoption o f these paragraphs at the World Summit has also been open to criticism. 
In some cases it has been argued that the paragraphs merely reflect the political realities 
ofR 2P. For others, such as Thomas Weiss it has heralded the creation o f ‘R2P lite’, 117 a
112 Interview with M O D O fficial 24 ,h February 2009
113 H elly, D am ien, Africa, the E U  an d  R2P: Tow ards p ragm atic  in ternational su bsid iarity?  (IPG: 1: 
2 0 0 9 ) pg l
114 ICISS, The respon sib ility  to pro tect: Background, Research, B ib liography  2 0 0 1 )p g  15
115 B ellam y, A lex  J. and Sara G. D avies, The R2P in the A sia  - Pacific  region  (Security D ialogue: 40: 
2 0 0 9 )5 4 2
116 The tw o key paragraphs in the summit docum ent were paragraph 138 which outlined the 
responsibilities o f  the state and paragraph 139 which outlined the responsibilities o f  the international 
com m unity. For more see United Nations, World Summit (2005),
1,7 See for exam ple W eiss, Thom as G., R2P after 9/11 a n d  the w o r ld  sum m it (W isconsin  International 
Law Journal: 24: 3: 2006) and Bellam y, A lex J., W hither the R esponsib ility  to  P ro tec t?  H um anitarian  
in tervention a n d  the 2005  ir or Id summit. (Ethics and International Affairs: 20: 2: 2 0 06) 143-170
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norm which has little political impact and places no pressure on the international 
community to act in ways different than they have previously.
As Bellamy outlines, the paragraphs o f the World Summit only authorise 
intervention under the auspices o f the Security Council, whereas the ICISS 
recommended the development o f the potential o f regional and other actors. The 
paragraphs also limit action to situations where the state is ‘manifestly failing’ a phrase 
which lends little further clarity to the situation. The strength o f  this coalition is 
however questioned by Ian Johnstone who suggests that the question o f the evolution o f 
the concept o f R2P is “is now at the point where there is a certain amount o f resistance 
and fear among the developing countries and if the agenda is pushed too much further
1 1 o
there could be a backlash.”
This argument is furthered by developments since the world summit whereby many
states have backtracked from their initial support o f the R2P. This potential problem
was related to the danger that if pushed too far the reliance on a norm o f a responsibility
to protect could create a backlash from those who fear a “potential return to
colonialism.” 119 This fear is linked to the reality that, as Nye explains “ if you are living
in a society which you fear may be intervened upon and you also have post colonial
concerns about sovereignty you are more likely to jealously guard your sovereignty.” 120
One example raised was the debate over Myanmar which
“appeared in a number o f op eds by a lot o f the people who came up with 
the notion o f the responsibility to protect. Gareth Evans, Bernard Kouchner,
Lloyd Axeworthy, Ramesh Thakur, a couple of other people, Alan Rock I
118 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
119 Interview with Former UN  O fficial 26 lh August 2008
120 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye 7 ,h May 2008
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think the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, all wrote op ed pieces on 
whether the Myanmar regimes refusal to allow assistance gave rise to R2P.
The feeling among some o f those people was that this is really pushing it 
too far and if its pushed that far the suspicion about the responsibility to 
protect its going to turn into full blown opposition and you’ll never see 
evolution in the direction o f more humanitarian principles and good
| j |
governance.”
This reality has led those in retreat from the principle to argue that the summit 
document only pointed to further debate around the concept. The problem with the 
development o f the concept stems from a lack o f clarity surrounding particular issues. 
When is a situation serious enough for international intervention to be required? What 
will be the criteria used for deciding this? Should the authorization o f the use o f force 
rest only with the Security Council? The failure to clarify these issues has left the 
concept open to misunderstanding and misuse and has raised many questions about the 
potential for the operationalisation o f the concept.
The main problem with the principle is what does the norm mean? “What does R2P 
mean in terms o f you know do we start characterising crises as R2P crises and how is 
an R2P crisis different from any other type o f crisis.” 122 The responsibility to protect is 
meant to form the basis for a new activism within the international community, as the 
ICISS report outlines for some it is an internationalization o f human conscience but for 
others it is an alarming breach o f an international state order dependant on the 
sovereignty o f states and on the inviolability o f their territory.123 The concept raises as
121 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
122 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw O CH A 28 th August 2008
123ICISS, R 2P  (2001) pg VII
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many questions as it answers, particularly in relation to the potential use o f force in
interventions. As Thakur argues
“The tension is both powerful and poignant with respect to moving the 
globally endorsed responsibility to protect from norm to action (or words to 
deeds, principle to practice). Here we enter the realm both o f normative 
inconsistency —  selective application and enforcement o f global norms 
against friends and adversaries, for example downplaying the human rights 
abuses o f Central Asian states and Israel while highlighting those o f Iraq 
and Iran —  and normative incoherence —  when different norms clash with 
each other —  as between human rights requirements and prohibitions 
against the use o f force. Is it permissible (or legitimate) to violate some 
aspects o f international law in order to enforce respect for human rights 
laws? Is it still legitimate if some states are more equal than others in facing 
international pressure and sanctions, including military intervention as the 
ultimate sanction?” 124
Although it covers a wider range o f activities, most o f which the UN is already 
involved in various capacities, R2P is a concrete recognition o f the much debated issue 
that "the sovereignty o f individuals can trump that o f states"125 and an attempt to create 
“a doctrinal basis for robust UN peace operations” which “must be formulated if  the 
UN is to have a future in the terrain between traditional peacekeeping and war 
fighting.” 126 This new concept has led to increased debate surrounding interventions 
and how they are authorised.
Opponents argue that “Non-intervention is a vital rule for encouraging order in a 
world without international government” 127 and that “Given all the instabilities o f 
regime change, democratization may provoke more war.” 128 This argument relates to
124 Thakur, Law, L egitim acy a n d  the UN (2010)
125 W eiss ,H um anitarian in tervention  (2007) pg 18
126 R uggie in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 1 1
127 D oyle, W ar a n d  p e a ce  (1997) pg 411
128 Ibid. pg 299
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the writings o f John Stuart Mill who once wrote that “it would be a great mistake to 
export freedom to a foreign people that was not in a position to win it on its own.” 129 
W ithout earning freedom, Mill argued, people have no idea o f its worth, or how to go 
about ensuring they retain it. The opponents o f R2P also argue that “a right o f 
humanitarian intervention represents a serious threat to the element o f order constituted
• * 1  TOwith international society.” If the sovereignty o f states is overridden then how will 
states survive, and how will international society be organised? There is a genuine fear 
among some countries that if R2P is accepted as a legitimate norm o f intervention that 
it could “open a lot o f doors that you don’t want to open because then what protects
131sovereign states against intervention by everybody?” This is particularly true in 
countries where “new generations are still affected by colonialism and have seen
1 Pgovernments propped up by outside support.”
What is clear is that “today’s peace operations are complex affairs that involve a 
range o f activities that go to the heart o f domestic governance.” ljj The UN is more 
often than not becoming involved in the reconstitution o f states following civil wars, or 
abject state failure. Whilst these states "fail to exhibit an important demonstration o f 
sovereignty, especially an adequate display of authority over their entire territory"134, 
the UN is left attempting to "to conceptualise, legitimise and operate a state that 
remains awkwardly suspended between the global norms that it is expected to embody,
129 M ill, John Stuart, A fe w  w ords on non-inletwention  (1859)
130 Brems Knudsen in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 150
131 Interview with UN O fficial 28th August 2008
132 Interview with Former UN Official 26 lh August 2008
133 Johnstone, Ian, US- UN rela tions after Iraq: The end  o f  the w o r ld  (order) a s w e know it?  (European  
Journal o f  International Law: 15: 4: 2004) 813-838
134 W eiss,H um anitarian intervention (2007) pg 15
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and the local populations from whom it must draw it's support."135 The UN as an
organisation does not have the resources and capacities to continue to rebuild states.
Today States are contracting out problems to the UN in a form o f global burden
sharing. “However the responsibility of permanent members is not less if  the problem is
not in their strategic interests even though they often act as if it is.” 136 Other opponents
argue that R2P is simply the best example o f political rhetoric which pushes buttons
and makes the world feel better. That it
“squares the circle, it gives at least a rhetorical way of solving a particular 
problem that has been there for a long time. The principle has created a 
coalition o f people who believe that it crosses north-south lines which is 
really important because historically intervention, non-intervention has
1 37primarily been a north-south issue.”
Since the 1990s the emphasis on humanitarian intervention has posed problems for 
the UN in its role as an international peacekeeper. Overtime the type o f missions being 
undertaken by the UN have shifted dramatically from traditional peacekeeping in 
countries such as Cyprus to much more complex peace building operations in the 
Democratic Republic o f the Congo and the Former Yugoslavia. The only countries with 
the resources able to undertake these kinds of missions are the more developed 
countries as “Those states are the only states that could authorize activities that call for 
occupying, pacifying and rebuilding countries torn by war. They are the only states 
with the military credibility to do so.” 138 The danger is that these missions are then 
viewed as “no more than a convenient cover used by stronger, developed countries to
135 Clapham in Cochrane, G loba l G overnance (2003) pg 42
136 Interview with Former UN O fficial 26 ,h August 2008
137 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd September 2008
138 Jackson, Robert, International Engagem ent in W ar-Torn C ountries  (G lobal Governance: 10: 1: 2 004)  
21-36
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further national interests that may be far from humanitarian.” 139 This argument is 
furthered by Simon Chesterman who claims that “it (R2P) is likely in practice to 
licence self-interested interventionism under the guise o f hum anitarianism."140
Unfortunately the Responsibility to Protect does not provide a clear cut answer to 
this problem. While it makes it reasonably clear that missions must be conducted under 
the auspices o f UN control if they are to have any shred o f legitimacy in the eyes o f 
international society. What needs to be made clear is that "R2P is embedded in existing 
international law and that the principle does not expand the scope for coercive 
interference in the domestic affairs o f states beyond the UN charter."141 Alongside this 
is the argument that "the responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the 
legal obligations o f member states to refrain from the use o f force except in conformity 
with the charter."142 These arguments are emphasised by supporters o f R2P to 
demonstrate that the concept does not infringe upon the principle o f state sovereignty 
and that instead it is “the necessary first step toward the revival o f legitimate and 
effective state authority."143
The R2P focuses on "instilling and installing democracy, human rights promotion 
and protection, good governance, the rule o f law and anti-corruption strategies."144 It is 
not purely focused on military intervention and is instead, it's  supporters argue, focused
139 Evans, Gareth and M ohanied Sahnoun, Intervention an d  State Sovere ign ty: B reaking N ew  Ground. 
(C over story)  Ibid.7: 2: 2001) 1 19
140 W elsh, Jennifer M., From  R ight to  R esponsibility: H um anitarian Intervention a n d  In tern ation al 
S oc iety  Ibid.8: 4: 2002) 503-568
141 Bellam y, R 2P  in A sia  (2009) pg 5
142 United Nations, Im plem enting R 2P (2009) pg 5
143 A yoob, Third W orld  (2004) pg 101
144 Sarkin, Jeremy, The Role o f  the U nited Nations, the A frican Union a n d  A frica's Su b-R egion al 
O rganizations in D ealing w ith  A frica's Human Rights Problem s: C onnecting H um anitarian In tervention  
a n d  the R esponsib ility  to  P ro tect  (Journal o f  African Law: 53: 1: 2009) 1-33
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on creating strong stable states as "the state, by fulfilling fundamental protection 
obligations and respecting core human rights, would have far less reason to be 
concerned about unwelcome intervention from abroad."145 However despite these 
arguments in favour o f the concept there are equally persuasive questions raised by 
opponents o f the concept. The most convincing o f which is that "there is a real danger 
that states o f all stripes will co-opt the language o f R2P to legitimate inaction and 
irresponsibility."146 There are even arguments to be made that the international 
community could remain inactive in the face o f a situation as serious, or more so, than 
Rwanda, and could place the blame squarely on the shoulders o f the ‘irresponsible 
government’. For some opponents this is the case with the continuing crisis in Darfur. 
There are also questions as to which situations the R2P could be applied to, should it 
only be restricted to the four key crimes as outlined in the World Summit? Or is it 
possible to apply it to natural disasters such as the Cyclone in Myanmar, as called for 
by the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner at the time? Is the concept only 
applicable to situations occurring after the 2005 summit? Or can it be applied to 
ongoing crises such as the Democratic Republic o f the Congo and Somalia? Although 
R2P for many is a new tool in the maintenance of international peace and security what 
is less clear is “how is that guided, lets say in actions in Darfur the answer is many 
countries are not particularly willing to live up to what R2P says and that’s not just a 
US problem.” 147 This argument is not purely academic and is also borne out by 
practitioners working in the field who have questions in relation to “what happens to
145 United N ations, Im plem enting R 2P  (2009) pg 6
146 Bellam y, W hither R2P? (2006) pg 169
147 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye 7th May 2008
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existing conflict situations? Do they now get characterised as R2P and how does 
characterising a situation as an R2P situation then alter the response from the UN?” 148 
One situation in which R2P was claimed successfully applied was in the aftermath 
o f the election in Kenya when violence erupted along ethnic lines. However the claim 
this action has with those outlined in R2P documentation is tenuous. The action 
undertaken was not under the auspices o f the Security Council, but was rather an 
independent NGO that negotiated access and a resolution. This only further served to 
undermine the clarity required to make the concept operational. Alongside the lack o f 
definition in the type o f situation to which it is applicable is the lack o f clarity in how 
exactly it should be operationalized. How should the international community help to 
prevent genocide? Where are the resources going to come from? Who will be the 
legitimating body for action?
In this respect the R2P faces the same problems as Humanitarian intervention, lack 
o f political will and resources. It is clear that "there is no consistent political will from 
powerful states, especially those that have declared their support for R2P, to commit 
military forces in ways that would challenge the traditional meaning o f sovereignty."149 
However “traditional notions o f sovereignty alone are not the only obstacle to effective 
action in humanitarian crises. No less significant are the ways in which states define 
their national interests."150 As Paul Diehl argues it is that same fundamental problem 
that confronts the UN in peacekeeping that is preventing the operationalization o f R2P 
and that is “the gap between 1. the wisdom occasionally manifested by representatives
148 Interview with U N  O fficial OCHA 28th August 2008
149 Badescu, The R IP  (2009) pg 303
150 Annan, Two C oncepts (1999)
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o f states assembled in UN bodies and 2. the conventional policies for UN participation 
made in the capitals o f these states."151 This argument is further emphasised by Damien 
Helly who writes that "what underpins the absence o f collective will to intervene (in 
Africa or elsewhere) is the weakness o f transparent and coordinated governance, be it 
in foreign or domestic policy."152
Whilst it is clear that
"there are exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states 
have in maintaining stable international order requires them to react when 
all order within as state has broken down or when civil conflict and 
repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with massacre, 
genocide, or ethnic cleansing on a large scale."153
It is also clear that "a lack o f will and political division produces slow, incoherent and 
under resourced responses which leave civilians facing enduring vulnerability."154 
Although "under the right conditions the UN can indeed help to build a new peace"155 
the conditions do need to be right otherwise taking action can pose more dangers to 
those suffering within the conflict and to the organisation itself.
For most proponents o f R2P “ it involves interventions o f different kinds in different 
stages o f a situation. The vast majority o f which are envisaged to be non-military and to 
a large extent the UN is already doing a huge number o f these anyway through the good 
offices o f the secretary general, the political missions established by the general 
assembly, the conflict prevention activities supported by the UN, the mediations
151 A lger in D iehl, G lo b a l G overnance (2001) pg 49
152 H elly, Africa, EU, R 2P  (2009)
153 IC lS S ,/? 2 /> f 2 ^ / ; p g 3 1
154 B ellam y,R 2P  (2009) pg 2
155 Bertram, Eva, R e-inventing G overnm ents  (Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 39: 3: 2005) pg 390
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activities, all o f the chapter six activities o f the security council.” What is less clear is 
what will happen
“at the very hard end o f activities, when all that fails and still something 
needs to be done, will anything be done? Is there willingness and capacity 
for hard end involvement against the consent o f whoever has got control o f 
a particular piece o f territory and necessarily being willing to use force to 
prevent mass atrocities? Will the international community be anymore ready 
for that now than they were in Rwanda in 94? I suspect probably not 
because they have not yet really come to terms with the kind o f capacity that 
is necessary to do that.” 156
W hat is clear is that “the concept requires a great deal o f development and in real world 
situations.” 157 However it is likely that “once the concept is in the UN and people are 
using it what the UN says to justify missions becomes what others use to justify
• • 1SRmissions.”
It is clear from this that the UN still plays a leading role in the development o f 
international norms. The danger then comes from countries unwillingness not to live up 
to these norms, and the action which the UN is tasked to undertake to ensure their 
compliance. One o f the goals of the UN following on from peacekeeping missions is 
the reintegration o f states into the international system and the argument is that “no 
viable global governance architecture can come about without strong and effective 
nation states.” 159 If the UN is not strong enough, or willing to undertake the tasks 
required to ensure this who then is going to take responsibility for ensuring failed states
156 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating 28 lh August 2008
157 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd September 2008
158 Interview with FCO O fficial 20 lh May 2009
159 M essner in K ennedy, Paul; M essner, Dirk and Nushceler, Franz, G lo b a l Trends a n d  G lo b a l 
G overnance  (Pluto Press London: 2002) pg 37
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and those recovering from conflict can reintegrate into the international system? And 
what will the international system look like when they are done?
The concept o f a Responsibility to Protect is still, in terms o f development, fairly 
new. It has been hailed as a watershed development in international relations, a 
representation o f a new political commitment to take timely and decisive action in the 
face o f gross human rights violations. In reality however there are still many questions 
which need to be answered and R2P is perhaps the latest example that "the international 
community comes to life more on account o f the substance to which it aspires rather 
than the entity it represents."160 As emphasis has shifted away from the protection o f 
traditional notions o f sovereignty toward the sovereignty o f individual or ‘sovereignty 
as responsibility’ the international community has had to come up with new ways o f 
resolving crises. The responsibility to protect has the potential to become a resolution to 
many o f these problems however "a responsibility to protect must also entail a 
responsibility to do it right"161 and before it can be done right a lot more work needs to 
be done on the concept itself. If this work is not undertaken it risks placing increasing 
pressure on the United Nations and its peacekeepers to undertake ever more complex 
tasks with the same limited resources and support which have always been provided.
The responsibility to protect does challenge the traditional understanding o f the way 
the international system functions, but this challenge may not be as successful as its 
supporters hope. The reality o f international intervention is that it occurs only when the 
situation has developed to such a stage as to shock the world into action, or in other
Ogata, G u ilty  P arties (2002)
161 Day, O pera tionalizin g  R 2P (2005) pg 140
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words “you don’t build a pedestrian crossing until somebody has been killed.” 162 In 
some cases even this level o f shock is not enough to motivate states. Therefore the 
emphasis that R2P places on early warning and prevention may be redundant before it 
is implemented, there is no way, in the mind o f states, to justify spending large amounts 
o f funding on preventing something that might not happen, because “nothing happens 
in a democracy in terms o f spending preventive money until a disaster has 
happened.” 163 In terms o f reaction again the R2P will face the same issues as 
humanitarian intervention did a lack o f resources and political will. With wars still 
ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan those key contributors o f support and logistics are 
already stretched and without them no operation can get off the ground. The problem is 
that for R2P to become operational “it requires a huge amount o f additional investment 
in the UN by the member states” and without this investment there is potential for the 
norm to be “extremely damaging to the UN and to the existing peacekeeping capacity if 
one tried to blur the distinction between the two.” 164
There are also questions to be raised about the final pillar o f R2P, rebuilding, who 
should be deciding what format the rebuilt state should take? How will it be managed? 
This raises challenging issues, most importantly the spectre o f colonialism, as weak or 
failing states tend to be former colonies that will protect the concept o f sovereignty 
more fiercely than those who have less likelihood of facing an intervention. Again this 
will lead to charges o f selectivity and double standards all o f which only erode the little 
legitimacy which the UN has spent the last sixty years accumulating. This dilemma and
162 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6 lh October 2009
163 Ibid, Hannay.
164 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating 28 lh August 2008
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the issues o f power and influence then tie the development o f the R2P directly to the 
need for Security Council reform.
Without a world body viewed as legitimate by all members o f the international
system there is little hope o f a successful implementation o f the concept.165 There is
also a danger that if the UN Security Council is seen as a partial body that this will
increase the utilisation o f the concept by regional organisation or individual states
justifying their actions on the basis of R2P not justifying interventions from “a renewed
commitment to human rights, but from a need for a new pretext for imperialist
interventions.” 166 There is also another danger inherent in the potential failure o f the
Security Council, that if another organisation was to take action which did meet the
criteria for an R2P intervention "this may have enduringly serious consequences for the
stature and credibility o f the UN itself."167 The supporters o f the R2P need to
"ensure that R2P is seen not as a trojan horse for bad, old imperial, colonial 
and militarist habits but rather the best starting point the international 
community has and is maybe ever likely to have, in preventing and 
responding to genocide and other mass atrocity crim es."168
This will however more than likely prove easier said than done.
Along with the issue of legitimacy the R2P also faces more practical challenges in 
its development, the lack of political will and resources. The golden age o f
165 For more on the issue o f  legitim acy see, Clark, lan,Legitim acy in In ternational S ociety  (Oxford  
University Press Oxford: 2005), Buchanan, A llen and Robert O. Keohane, The leg itim acy  o f  g lo b a l  
g overn an ce  institu tions (Ethics and International Affairs: 20: 4: 2006) 405-437 , Hurd, Ian, Legitim acy, 
P ow er, a n d  the sym bolic  life o f  the UN S ecurity  Council (Global Governance: 8: 2002) 35-51 and, Zum , 
M ichael, G lo b a l G overnance an d  L egitim acy P roblem s  (Government and Opposition: 39: 2: 2 004) 2 60-  
287
166 Conlon, Sovere ign ty  (2004)
167ICISS, R 2P (2001) pg 52 and pg 55
168 Evans, G areth,The respon sib ility  to pro tect: An idea w hose tim e has com e a n d  gone?  (D avid D avies  
M em orial Institute Lecture University o f  Aberystwyth: 2008)
162
Chapter Three Kate Seaman
humanitarianism o f the 1990s has ended and "military overstretch and the prioritisation 
o f strategic concerns to the virtual exclusion o f humanitarian ones is the sad reality o f  a 
post 9/11 world."169 Unfortunately "the new term does not solve the fundamental 
problems o f insufficient political will or provide a politically realistic blueprint for the 
changes in state practice that would be required to make the responsibility to protect 
meaningful in policy and operation term s."170
The United Nations is still operating with a "lack o f coherent doctrine underpinning 
the growing number o f mandates that fall between traditional peacekeeping missions 
and armed engagement with a specific adversary or adversaries.” 171 It also faces the 
difficulties inherent in "securing general agreement among states about the legitimacy
o f humanitarian intervention because it is impossible to spell out in advance the
circumstances in which such interventions might conceivably be justified."172 If  R2P is 
to become operational through the UN then "the world community must match the
• 173demands made on the organization by the resources given to it."
More time will also need to be spent on the practicalities o f planning and resourcing 
m issions.174 In most interventions and “in most o f the countries where intervention 
takes place, a peace process coincides with a double political process o f
169 W eiss,H um anitarian intervention (2007) pg 55
170 M acfarlane, S. N eil and Carolin J. Thielking and Thomas G. W eiss, The respon sib ility  to  p ro tec t:  is 
anyone in teres ted  in hum anitarian intervention?  (Third World Quarterly: 25: 5 2004) 977-992
171 Luck, Edward C., The UN an d  the R esponsib ility  to  P rotect (Policy A nalysis B r ie f The Stanley  
Foundation: 2008)
172 Roberts, H um anitarian A ction  (1996)
173 ICISS, R 2P (2001) pg 52 and pg 55
174 For an insight into how the UN DPKO is attempting to achieve this see United Nations, A new  
p a rtn ersh ip  agenda: C harting a new horizon fo r UN peacekeeping  (N ew  York: United Nations 
Department o f  Public Information 2009)
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democratization and state building.” 175 This increases the number o f tasks which any 
UN mission needs to be capable o f undertaking and therefore increases the demand on 
resources. It is true that "All conflicts have underlying causes and almost all have 
possible solutions. More often than not the greatest determinant o f a successful 
outcome to any involvement will be whether key decision makers can take the time to
1 7  Aunderstand the causes, and have the political will to vigorously pursue a solution." 
Getting the key states to sustain that political will is however another key challenge 
faced by those proponents of R2P. The problem is that by the time a crisis is brought to 
the attention o f the Security Council it is generally beyond the limited scope o f any 
preventive measures. This then requires some form of intervention, be it military or 
diplomatic, which requires exponentially more resources than prevention as it requires 
a commitment to the intervention and rebuilding process. These situations tend to be 
more complex and dangerous and the Security Council is often unable, if not unwilling, 
to commit the resources.
The UN has become directly involved in promoting the concept o f global 
governance and the role that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, 
has taken in helping to rebuild states in post conflict situations, through resolutions 
mandating peacekeeping operations, plays a key role in the transmission o f the 
particular norms and ideals associated with that concept. These norms and ideals then 
influence the way in which these states are reconstructed which is then having a direct
175 Pouligny, Beatrice, Peacekeepers am i local so c ia l actors: The n eed  f o r  D ynam ic, c ross-cu ltu ra l  
analysis  (G lobal Governance: 5: 4: 1999) 403 - 425
176 Laurence, Com m odore Tim, H u m a n ita r ia n  A ssistance an d  Peacekeeping: An uneasy a lliance?  (RU SI 
W hitehall Papers Series 48: 1999) pg 3
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impact on the way in which operations mandate by the Security Council are viewed by 
the wider international community.
The development o f norms such as R2P is directly connected to the development o f 
the concept o f Global Governance. The problem for the UN is that peacekeeping 
operations being mandated are now being directly associated with the norms o f global 
governance which is problematic as many member states o f the organisation, and many 
states which face potential interventions in the future, view norms such as R2P as 
nothing more than an extension o f the neo-liberal agenda, and as little more than a 
mask for powerful states to continue to do as they please. The emphasis placed on 
rebuilding states as liberal democracies and the ways this is being used to underline the 
importance o f creating an international system o f stable, democratic states has placed 
increasing pressure on UN peacekeeping operations as the number o f tasks they are 
required to undertake has increased exponentially.
The issue o f power within the Security Council is examined in the following chapter 
which argues that asymmetrical power relations within the Council are having a 
negative impact on peacekeeping operation mandates as these are utilised by member 
states to transfer particular norms and ideals to conflict situations. This transfer is then 
directly impacting on the development o f the idea of global governance as the UN 
becomes involved in the reconstitution o f states that can once recovered, move forward 
to become responsible members of the international community, and partners in 
resolving global problems.
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Chapter Four Kate Seaman
Power within the Security Council and the failure to manage violent conflicts: 
Whose to blame?
The previous chapter argued that the UN plays a key role in the transmission o f 
norms throughout the international system and that peacekeeping is one o f  the tools 
which it uses to do so. Following on from this it argued that the organisation was being 
overwhelmed by the tasks assigned to it by member states, in particular in relation to 
the aims o f the development o f global governance. This chapter continues that line o f  
argument by looking at the role o f the Security Council and the ways in which 
particular member states are utilising their power and influence. It argues that the 
asymmetrical power relations within the Council are having a negative impact on 
peacekeeping operation mandates as these are utilised by member states to transfer 
particular norms and ideals to conflict situations. This transfer is then directly 
impacting on the development o f the idea o f global governance as the UN becomes 
involved in the reconstitution o f states that once recovered, can move forward to 
become responsible members o f the international community, and partners in resolving 
global problems.
The understanding o f power in global governance is paramount as it leads to
numerous questions over the development and role which various institutions and
actors play in the process. It informs opinion on who is responsible for decision making
in global governance and whether it is states or other actors who really control the
agenda. Power relations in global governance are not only a matter o f  "the ability o f
one actor to deploy discursive and institutional resources in order to get other actors to
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defer judgem ent to them ."1 It is also a matter of who is setting the agenda, who is 
producing or influencing the actions o f numerous actors and whether or not these actors 
are truly independent or overwhelmingly influenced and controlled by others with more 
power? It is important to establish whether “International organisations matter not only 
because states have designed rules to resolve problems, but because those IOS 
themselves are independent actors that interact strategically with states and others"2 or 
if  states are the most important actors controlling the actions o f international 
organisations. Questions o f power also lead to important questions concerning the role 
o f non state actors and how they wield power and influence. Without understanding the 
power structures within global governance there is no way to fully understand and 
appreciate the complexities within the system.
At the end o f the Cold War it was argued that there was “now a genuine prospect of 
the Security Council fulfilling the role envisioned for it in the UN charter."3 This 
chapter is going to examine the extent to which this has been achieved. Is the Security 
Council fulfilling its mandated role, or is it instead being utilised by its most powerful 
members to fulfil another agenda? In the late 1990s it seemed that great powers "found 
the UN a useful place to dump intractable conflicts as conflicts peripheral to their core 
security interests."4 With the continuing shifts in what constitutes a security threat this
'Barnett and Finnemore in Barnett, M ichael, and Raymond Duvall, P o w er in g lo b a l govern an ce  
(Cam bridge University Press: Cambridge: 2005) pg 169
2Hawkins and W ade in Hawkins M ichael J. and Darren G. Lake, David A. N ielson , D aniel L. Tierney, 
D elegation  a n d  agency in in ternational organizations  (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2006)  
Pg 200
3 ICISS, The respon sib ility  to  p ro tec t  (Ottawa 2001) pg7
4 Barnett, M ichael and Martha, Finnem ore,Rules fo r  the W orld International O rganiza tions in G lo b a l  
P olitics  (Cornell University Press London: 2004) pg 122
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may no longer be the case, and if  this is true, then the Security Council and its ability to 
function becomes even more important than it was before.
The United Nations Security Council and Global Governance
The international system at the end o f the Cold War was a system in transformation. 
The continuous conflict between the two superpowers was coming to an end and it was 
hoped that states would now be able to work together in “forging cooperative solutions 
to global problems."5 Alongside the transformation in state relations was the ongoing 
phenomenon o f globalization, fuelled by developments in technology and the 
increasing openness o f state borders. This ongoing transformation led to a search for 
new ways to understand the international system and the actions o f states. As explored 
in previous chapters global governance theory was one explanation offered for 
understanding
“the efforts to manage and solve world scale problems through cooperative 
and collateral policies and measures by various types o f actors, active on the 
different universal, regional, national and sub-national realms o f social 
life.”6
The UN Security Council has been one o f the key actors in the international system
since its creation. With the end o f the Cold War and the apparent victory o f liberal
democracy the ability o f the Council to act was vastly increased. It was a
“Very exceptional period between 1990 and 1995, when on the whole a very 
large range o f things could be done which had never been possible to do in 
the cold war. Taboos were overthrown and great tracts o f policy area opened
5 Hauss, Charles,B eyon d  C onfrontation  (Praeger: Westport: 1996) pg 113
6 Hakovirta in Hakovirta, Harko, G loba! O rder a n d  G overnance  (Academ y o f  Finland: Finland: 2 0 0 2 ) pg  
12
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up in which the UN and the Security Council were able to reach consensus 
to do something.”7
This period o f exception was important in the development o f the role which the 
Security Council plays today. The taboos which were removed included the inability o f 
the Council to intervene in areas previously out o f bounds due to the conventions o f 
sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs. This removal o f restrictions 
enabled the UN to intervene in situations as varied as Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti.
As states across the world entered into the process o f democratisation the
"revolution in governance at the national level had an immediate effect on discussion o f
governance issues within the council"8, it was now possible for the Council to consider
intervention without the consent of governments. The other important factor in this
development was, as Hannay notes, the ability o f the Security Council to reach a
consensus on what action to take and where. This consensus had been sorely lacking
during the Cold War as the adversarial relationship between the USA and USSR was
played out within the Security Council. With the council now both willing and able to
take action peacekeepers were given ever expanding mandates, in areas where they had
previously been unable to act. This led to the Security Council authorising actions
which involved the UN in much wider projects, projects which in essence involved the
rebuilding o f states often within a specified framework o f liberal democracy. As
Roberts argues this then means that
"The UN is best seen, not as a vehicle for completely restructuring or 
replacing the system of sovereign states, so much as ameliorating the
7 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6lh October 2009
8 W eschler in M alone, David M., The U nited Nations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: London: 2 0 0 4 ) pg 
72
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problems spawned by its imperfections, and managing processes o f rapid 
change in many distinct fields."9
The UN, in the post Cold War system is the "only IGO with global scope and nearly 
universal membership whose agenda encompasses the broadest range o f governance 
issues."10 Because o f this the organisation has become the focal point for the 
development o f Global Governance theory and a key component in the process o f 
creating an international system suitable for the promotion o f the ideas contained within 
it. The organisation’s involvement in governance issues has increased dramatically 
since the end o f the cold war as the concepts o f good governance, human rights and 
democratisation have become interconnected with the key foundations o f the 
international system including sovereignty. The Council has had a clear role to play in 
this connection as its decisions "have eroded concepts o f state sovereignty firmly held 
during the cold war, altering the way in which many of us see the relationship between 
state and citizen the world over."11 This is clearly demonstrated with the development 
o f new norms such as the Responsibility to Protect, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter.12 The Council was "built on the assumption that five o f the strongest 
nations have the right and duty to safeguard the globe"13, however this assumption is 
now under question as the actions o f the Council come under question both for their 
efficacy and legitimacy. For some states
9 Roberts and Kingsbury in Roberts, Adam and Benedict, K ingsley, U nited  Nations, D iv id e d  W orld  
(Clarendon Press Oxford: 1994) pg 6!
10 Karns, Margaret P. M ingst, Karen A. Jn ter national O rganizations  (Lynne Rienner: Boulder: 2 004) pg  
97
11 M alone in M alone, Security  C ouncil (2004) pg 1
12 See Chapter Three Pages 141 - 166
13 B osco , David L,F ive to Rule Them A ll (Oxford University Press N ew  York: 2009) pg 3
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“governance at the global level will only be acceptable if  it does not 
supersede national governance and if  its intrusions into the autonomy o f 
states and communities are clearly justified in terms o f cooperative 
results."14
The failure o f the council to produce results in an increasing number o f situations has 
led to questioning o f the viability o f the Council in today’s international system.
At the same time as the international system was undergoing a transformation at the
end o f the Cold War, the council too was undergoing both a
“quantitative and qualitative transformation, one that placed it at the very 
heart o f global governance as states turned to the security council for action 
in a number o f the major humanitarian and conflict situations that broke out 
with the end o f the superpower competition."15
The role o f the Council in the development o f Global Governance has become 
increasingly important as the Council becomes increasingly involved in issues which 
previously fell under the restrictive concept of sovereignty. Part of the reasoning behind 
the development o f Global Governance was an attempt to resolve the problems based 
on the reality that “the key notions o f the sovereign state and the sacrosanct national 
community, still dominant in international politics, are lagging behind the reality 
created by globalization.” 16 The need to tackle global problems was coupled with a fear 
that if those problems were not addressed that states would be "likely to retreat behind 
protective barriers and re-create the conditions for enduring conflict."17 This need and 
“the search for a world peace regime places the United Nations, whose raison d ’etre has
14 K eohane and N y e  in N ye, Joseph S. and John D. Donahue, G overnance in a  g lo b a liz in g  w o r ld  
(B rookings Institution Press Cambridge, M assachusetts: 2000) pg 14
15 Rosenau, James N ., G overnance in the 21st C entury  (Global Governance: 1 1 1995)
16 M essner in K ennedy, Paul; M essner, Dirk and Nushceler, Franz, G lo b a l Trends a n d  G lo b a l  
G overnance  (Pluto Press London: 2002) pg 37
17 Barnett and Duvall in Barnett, P ow er (2005) pg 1
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always been peacekeeping, in the centre o f strategies aimed at securing peace.” 18 As
Chesterman argues,
“the most rapid recent growth in administration has been in international 
security. In addition to the assertion o f expanding powers over postconflict 
territory through the 1990s— culminating in the United Nations exercising 
effective control over East Timor from 1999 to 2002, and ongoing quasi­
sovereign control o f Kosovo— the sanctions committees o f the UN Security 
Council routinely make decisions with substantial impact on countries and 
individuals. Since September 11, 2001, the Council has also been the 
vehicle for swift and extensive powers to be asserted in the fields o f 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation, at times acting as a kind o f global 
legislature.” 19
As the organ with the designated responsibility for international peace and security, this 
then places the Security Council at the forefront o f solution finding for global 
problems.
The role o f the Security Council in the development o f the Global governance 
agenda can be viewed in a number of ways. For authors such as Edward Luck it 
represents “the closest approximation to global governance in the peace and security 
realm yet achieved."20 For others such as David Bosco however, "even the council's 
vigorous post-cold war activity has fallen well short o f effective global governance.”21 
These differing opinions are based on assessment o f council activities on the ground, 
and on the Council’s ability to develop internationally respected norms. With one o f the 
key arguments based on whether “the key contributions o f international society to the
18 M essner and N uscheler in K ennedy, G lobal trends (2002) pg 179
19 Chesterman, Sim on, G loba liza tion  Rules: Accountability, Power, an d  the P ro sp ec ts  f o r  G lo b a l  
A dm in istra tive  Law  (G lobal Governance: 14: 2008) 39-52
20 Luck, Edward C .,U nited  N ations Security  Council P ractice  a n d  P rom ise  (Routledge: London: 2006) 
Pg3
21 B osco ,F ive (2009) pg 4
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security o f states have been in the realm o f gradual norm development more than in the 
realm o f responses to specific conflicts."22 What the authors agree on however is the 
key role that the UN Security Council has to play as a “consensual body that is 
recognised by all countries as a legitimate arbitrator in international relations.”23 The 
ways in which the Council gains legitimacy will be examined in the next section.
What then becomes important to understand is who is influencing council decisions 
and why? In a system where sovereignty is still an important concept "international 
organizations must be presented as not autonomous but instead as dutiful agents."24 If  
the Security Council is then nothing more than a dutiful agent, whose dutiful agent is 
it? If  as Keohane argues "institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what 
governments must do; rather they help governments pursue their own interests through 
cooperation."25 Whose interests are being pursued through the Security Council?
Within Global Governance
"Perceived problems are first designated to the global and then characterized
as unsusceptible to an effective solution at the state level. By this double
move, the order and authority inside o f the state is taken outside into the
26"global" and substituted by governance beyond the state."
This removal o f problems from a state to a global level only increases the importance o f 
international organisations such as the UN and the Security Council. In fact one o f the 
key criticisms o f global governance "is posed by the lack o f institutions suitable to
22 Zacher in Vayrynen, Raimo, G lobalisa tion  a n d  g lo b a l governance  (Rowm an and Littlefield: 2 0 0 1 ) pg  
51
23 Interview with M O D O fficial 2 4 th February 2009
24 Barnett and Finnerm oe in Barnett, P ow er (2005) pg 172
25 K eohane, Robert,A fter H egem ony  (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 1984) pg 246
26 Spaith in Lederer, Markus and Philipp S. M uller, C ritic izing G loba l G overnance  (Palgrave M acm illan  
N ew  York: 2 0 05) pg 32
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enforce compliance with international agreements.”27 Another criticism is that global
governance serves hegemonic interest and insinuates them into international orgs and
28regimes , an argument which is backed up by Susanne Soederberg who argues that
“one way universal norms of a hegemonic state like the US are transmitted to other
subordinate states is through international organisations such as the UN.”29
The role o f hegemonic states is however questioned by Keohane who argues that
"What international regimes can accomplish depends not merely on their 
legal authority, but on the patterns o f informal negotiation that develop with 
them. Rules can be important as symbols that legitimize cooperation or as 
guidelines for it. But cooperation, which involves mutual adjustment o f the
TOpolicies o f independent actors, is not enforced by hierarchical authority.”
For him changes in an actor's behaviour cannot be enforced, they must instead be o f
mutual benefit to occur. Whether change which occurs is forced or not is one o f the
biggest challenges facing Global Governance theory, with questions as to whether the
theory is, rather than serving hegemonic interests, instead blind to the power factor o f
both the theory's foundations and international relations and is thus at best a utopia for
a world in the future.31 The failure of global governance seems to rest on
"A general failure to understand how the council continues to coexist with 
an older form o f international relations still based on sovereign states
32pursuing their national interests."
The influence o f this older form of international relations is clear to see in the Security 
Council, an organisation based on the power structures at the end o f World War Two.
27 M essner in K ennedy, G loba l trends (2002) pg 59
28 M essner and N u scheler  in Ibid. pg 154
29 Soederberg, Susanne,G loba l G overnance in Question  (Pluto Press: London: 2006) pg 6
30 K eohane,A fter hegem ony (1984) pg 237
31 M essner and N uscheler in Kennedy, G lobal trends (2002) pg 154
32M alone in M alone, Security  Council (2004) pg 1
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Because o f the structure o f the organisation, and the influence given to the five 
permanent members with the power o f the veto, it is extremely important to understand 
how these members utilise that power and influence in order to uncover the underlying 
foundations o f the concept o f global governance and the reasons why the norms 
associated with the concept have gained such influence in the international system 
today. The foundations o f the concept are rooted in a liberal tradition, and the 
enforcement o f the norms associated with this, such as democratisation, good 
governance, and respect for human rights, have led to an increase in tasks for 
peacekeeping operations. It has also led questions o f legitimacy as to the mandating o f 
these operations, particularly in relation to enforcement o f those norms which might not 
necessarily fit with the local political climate in which the intervention is occurring. 
This then leads to broader questions around the development o f the concept o f global 
governance and whether or not it is a mask for more powerful states to justify 
interventions which otherwise might be viewed as illegitimate.
The following section o f this chapter examines the role o f power and influence 
within the Security Council and the ways in which supporters o f the development o f the 
concept o f Global Governance have failed to understand the ongoing impact o f the issue 
o f power. It argues that the more powerful states are having a dramatic impact on the 
role the UN is playing in the development of global governance and that they are 
utilising their influence and resources to selectively enforce the norms associated with 
the concept. It then argues that this is having a detrimental impact on the development 
o f the concept as the legitimacy o f the enforcement o f those norms is called into
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question. This then directly impacts on the arguments outlined later in Chapter Six, in 
relation to the impact this is having on United Nations peacekeeping in the field.
Power, Influence and Resources in the Security Council
The Security Council was designed in the aftermath o f the Second World W ar to
reflect the power structure o f the international system at the time. Following the horrors
o f the war the founders realised that
“An effective collective security system requires a central decision making 
organ that is empowered to say how and when collective force is to be used, 
with adequate military force available on call to carry out that decision”
The Security Council was intended to fulfil that role. Composed o f fifteen members, ten 
elected and five permanent, it was assigned “primary responsibility for the maintenance 
o f international peace and security.”34 The five permanent members were also given the 
veto. This was a compromise required to ensure the participation o f all the great powers 
o f the time and was seen as a means to avoid the lack o f participation which had led to 
the failure o f the League o f Nations. Overtime as the structure o f the international 
system has altered the veto has become more contentious and pressure is mounting as 
calls for reform of the Council increase, the issue o f reform will be examined in chapter 
eight. This section examines the power o f both the Security Council and its member 
states. It argues that the understanding o f the use o f power and influence in the Security 
Council offers a unique insight into the problems of power within global governance. It
33 R iggs, R.E and J.C. Plano ,The UN, In ternational O rganisation  an d  W orld  P o litic s  (D orsey Press 
London: 1988) pg 125
34United Nations, United Nations Charter Article 24 (1), 
www.un.org/en/docum ents/charter/chapter5.shtm l (12th April 2010)
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also argues that certain members o f the council have more influence than others and 
that this influence is being utilised in pursuit o f the development o f global governance, 
in some cases to the detriment o f the council’s role as international peacekeeper.
In order to examine the role o f power within the Security Council it needs to be 
examined in two different ways, the use o f power and influence within the council and 
the use o f power and influence by the council as a whole. The council is composed o f 
fifteen individual member states, each o f whom has their own agenda and is working 
towards achieving that. This section begins by arguing that understanding how the 
council works, who has the influence and why is key to understanding many o f the 
problems it faces in relation to the creation and mandating o f peacekeeping operations.
When looking at the Security Council it is important to remember that “the council 
is first and foremost a political institution that functions in concentric circles o f interests 
and influences."35 These circles are outlined by Gambari as follows; on the very 
outskirts o f the Council are the non-permanent members who do not also align 
themselves with the Non-Aligned Movement (N A M )/6 One ring closer in is the non­
35 Gambari in M alone, S ecurity  C ouncil (2004) pg 519
36 N on-aligned M ovem ent: The N on-A ligned M ovem ent is a M ovem ent o f  115 members representing 
the interests and priorities o f  developing countries. Formed during the Cold War, the M ovem ent has its 
origin in the A sia-A frica Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. At the m eeting Third W orld 
leaders shared their problems o f  resisting the pressures o f  the major powers, m aintaining their 
independence and opposing colonialism  and neo-colonialism , especially western dom ination. The 
criteria for becom ing a member o f  the N on-A ligned M ovem ent are The country should have adopted an 
independent policy based on the coexistence o f  States with different political and social system s and on  
non-alignm ent or should be show ing a trend in favour o f  such a policy. The countiy concerned should be 
consistently supporting the M ovem ents for National Independence. The country should not be a m em ber 
o f  a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context o f  Great Power conflicts. I f  a country has a 
bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member o f  a regional defence pact, the agreement 
or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context o f  Great Power conflicts. I f  it has 
conceded military bases to a Foreign Power the concession should not have been made in the context o f  
Great Power conflicts. Being part o f  a broad based coalition gives members o f  the m ovem ent more 
influence on the council than non-permanent m ember states who are not associated with N A M . For more
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permanent members who are aligned with the NAM, thus achieving a marginally higher 
level o f influence. These outer circles include all o f the elected ten members (E10).37 
M oving closer to the inner circle are the permanent five (P5), the UK, USA, Russia, 
China and France. Gambari then goes on to argue that there are then two further circles 
within the P5, the P3 constituting o f the UK, USA and France and the PI which is the 
USA by itself. The positioning o f the USA at the centre o f the Security Council is 
highly contested, however with its continued predominance within the international 
system since the end o f the Cold War its influence over Council action is hard to 
ignore. In fact it can be argued that "little o f substance can happen in the UN system 
without American cooperation - and little happens without American resources."38
For academics such as Craig N. Murphy the continued dominance o f the USA within 
the Council is an indication that
“The UN structure is clearly out o f date, relative to the original intent o f the
security council which was to represent the balance o f power as it was
*20
expected to be reconstructed after the Second World War.”
This argument is borne out by Roberts and Kingsbury who note that while the balance 
of power within the international system has shifted what is clear is that "Inequality, if  
not hegemony, is a fundamental feature o f international life, and it would be remarkable
information see N on-A ligned M ovem ent, http://www.nam .gov.za/background/history.htm  (26th  
Septem ber 2010)
37 E lected 10 members: This refers to the ten non-permanent members, elected by the General A ssem bly  
for tw o-year terms and not elig ib le for immediate re-election. The number o f  non-permanent members 
w as increased from six to ten by an amendment o f  the Charter which came into force in 1965. For more  
information see United Nations, United Nations Security Council W ebpage, 
<http://ww w.un.org/sc/m em bers.asp> (26th September 2010)
38 Puchala, Donald J., A m erican in terests a n d  the UN  (Political Science Quarterly: 97: 4: W inter 1982 - 
1983) pg 574
39 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3 rd September 2008
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if  it were not reflected in the practice o f the UN."40 The question o f the representative 
nature o f the Security Council has become increasingly important, particularly in 
relation to the perceived legitimacy o f peacekeeping operations. The argument is, as 
outlined by Joseph Stiglitz, that "the west has driven the globalization agenda, ensuring 
that it gains a disproportionate slice o f the benefits, at the expense o f  the developing 
world"41 and that the Security Council has played a key role in this because o f the 
domination o f western developed states. The issue o f reform will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter eight, however in relation to the arguments in this chapter the key 
question is how this inequality is impacting on the actions o f the Security Council.
In order to assess the impacts o f power and influence within the council there also 
needs to be a clarification o f the form which this power and influence takes. For 
example Barnett and Duvall offer several different conceptions o f power and its use 
within the international system. They outline four different categories o f power within 
international relations, compulsory power, institutional power, structural power and 
productive power. Compulsory power follows in a similar vein to a realist 
understanding o f power. They do not however limit this power only to state actors and 
instead emphasises that all actors within global governance have resources which 
would enable them to utilise compulsory power in order to resolve conflict or achieve 
particular aims. It is essentially "how states are able to determine the content and 
direction o f global governance by using their decisive material advantages."42 In the 
Security Council compulsory power could be understood as ways in which states
40 Roberts and Kingsbury in Roberts, U nited N ations (1994) pg 45
41 Stiglitz, Joseph,G loba liza tion  a n d  it's discontents  (Penguin: London: 2002) pg 7
42 Roberts and Kingsbury in Roberts, U nited N ations (1994) pg 45
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attempt to control the actions o f the Council in relation to particular conflicts, steering 
them towards action in places where national interests are at stake and away from those 
that are not as strategically important. The use o f this form of power would fit with the 
arguments explored in Chapter One43 in relation to critics o f Global Governance such 
as Murphy and Soederberg, and their contention that the development o f the concept o f 
Global Governance is being dominated by powerful states pushing a particular agenda. 
The use o f  compulsory power, not only by states, but by other actors, also undermines 
arguments made by supporters o f the development o f global governance, such as 
Rosenau and Held that it is purely an ideological undertaking and that interactions in 
the development o f the concept take place in a space devoid o f power.44
Barnett and Duvall then go on to discuss the idea of institutional power which is a 
form o f indirect control through both formal and informal institutions. This form o f 
power is often viewed as "the ability of great powers to establish international 
institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions o f 
advantage into the future."43 This understanding of power is directly applicable to the 
Security Council which was established to ensure the maintenance o f peace and 
security but also ensured the pre-eminence of the permanent five with the provision o f 
the veto. The Council, it can be argued, has also been utilised to further the interests o f 
certain states, particularly in relation to the spread of norms and ideals. The concept o f 
institutional power also fits with the arguments outlined by Keohane that states utilise
43 For more see  Chapter One Pages 45-49
44 See Rosenau, James 'N.^Along the dom estic-foreign fron tier: exploring governance in a  turbulen t w o r ld  
(Cam bridge University Press Cambridge: 1997) pg 6-7 and Held, David and Anthony M cG rew, 
G overn ing  globaliza tion : Power, authority  a n d  g lo b a l governance  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2002)
45 Barnett, M ichael and Duvall, Raymond, Pow er in international po litic s  (International organisation: 59:
1: 2 0 0 5 ) pg 58
180
Chapter Four Kate Seaman
international organisations to achieve their own objectives and that there is a need for 
greater accountability in these organisations.46 The issue o f accountability is also raised 
by critics o f  Global Governance such as Murphy, who examines Cox’s idea o f the 
nebuleuse and argues that if  this phenomenon is occurring then there is a need for 
actors within that sphere to be held accountable.47
Following on from this is their examination o f structural power and how this is used 
by states and other actors to determine social capacities and to shape self understanding 
and objectives; again an understanding o f power which would fit with the analysis o f 
Cox’s understanding o f pcwer from social processes.48 Finally they examine the idea o f 
productive power and how this influences the production o f social identities and creates 
classifications o f states and people. Barnett and Duvall’s understanding o f compulsory 
power can also be compared to N ye's understanding o f hard power, the use o f coercion 
to gain support for action. This form of power is in direct comparison to ‘soft power’ 
whereby states utilise their culture and ideology in order to attract support.49
The use o f ‘soft power' Nye argues is key to the pre-eminence o f the USA. This is 
backed up by other academics such as Gaan who argues that unlike dominant states in 
the past the USA “has managed to convince rather than force the conquered to accept
46 For more see  Introduction Pg 11
47 For more see Murphy in W ilkinson, Rorden, The G loba l G overnance R eader  (Routledge: London: 
2005)
48 See Cox, Robert W ., S ocia l fo rces , s la tes a n d  w o r ld  orders: B eyon d In ternational R elations Theory. 
(M illenium : 10:2: 1981)
49 For more on ‘soft pow er’ see Keohane, Robert and Joseph S. N ye,P ow er a n d  In terdependence  (Scott, 
Foresman and Co: London: 1989) also N ye, Joseph S., Soft P ow er an d  A m erican  F oreign P o licy  
(Political Science Quarterly: 119: 2: 2004)
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every major aspect o f its culture."50 Within the Security Council the USA utilises its
‘soft power’ to gain support for actions and resolutions and in order to be successful
“it has to attract the other key members o f the security council, the so called 
P4, so it needs to make sure that it has policies that they see as legitimate 
otherwise they can veto or prevent policy going ahead.”51
The ability o f the USA to use its ‘soft power’ to gain support has, in the eyes o f 
academics such as Soederberg, directly contributed to the hegemony o f the USA both 
within the council and globally.52 However, following the intervention in Iraq in 2003 it 
can be argued that the USA has squandered its ‘soft power’ and that this has led to a 
loss o f legitimacy for the USA in the eyes o f the council and the wider international 
community.53
From the above analysis it is clear to see that the development o f the concept o f 
Global Governance has not, as its supporters argue, occurred in a space devoid o f 
power. Rather it has developed because o f the influences o f powerful states who wish 
to utilise its norms to further their own agenda, in the same way they have utilised other 
forms o f power to do so in the past. Although the focus has shifted from ‘compulsory’ 
or ‘hard’ power to the use o f ‘soft’ power as a means o f influence, it is clear that states 
are still utilising international organisations, and therefore institutional power, or as 
Cox argues, power from social processes, to further their own agendas. The use o f this 
kind o f power, institutional and soft, lends legitimacy to the actions o f states. The 
importance o f that legitimacy has been clearly demonstrated by the loss o f ‘soft’ power
50 Gaan, Narottam, G lobaliza tion  and  the in ternational system : econom ic a n d  p o litic a l changes  
(International Studies: 43: 3: 2006) pg 308
51 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye 7th May 2008
52 Soederberg,G loba l G overnance (2006)
53 N ye, Joseph S., The new Rom e m eets the new barbarian s  (The Economist: 362: 8265: 2 0 0 2 ) 23-25
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which the USA has faced in the period following the intervention in Iraq, which was 
perceived as illegitimate by powerful members o f the Security Council such as 
France.54
The need for other states to view actions as legitimate has been a continuous
challenge to the member states within the Council, particularly in two recent situations.
The first was the NATO bombing in relation to Kosovo in 1999; the second was the
2003 invasion o f Iraq.55 In both situations the legitimacy o f the actions proposed by the
USA and its allies was questioned. In both cases no Security Council resolution was
provided in support o f the action undertaken. This then raised the question o f  the gap
between law and legitimacy. As Thakur outlines
“When NATO launched a ‘humanitarian war’ without UN authorisation in 
Kosovo, it raised a triple policy dilemma: 1 To respect sovereignty all the 
time is sometimes to be complied in humanitarian tragedies; 2 To argue that 
the Security Council must give its consent to international intervention for 
humanitarian purposes is to risk policy paralysis by handing over the agenda 
either to the passivity and apathy o f the Council as a whole, or to the most 
obstructionist member o f the Council, including any one o f the P5 
determined to use the veto clause; 3 To use force without UN authorisation 
is to violate international law and undermine world order. The three 
propositions together highlight a critical law-legitimacy gap between the 
needs and distress felt in the real world and the codified instruments and 
modalities for managing world order. Faced with another Holocaust or 
Rwanda-type genocide on the one hand and a Security Council veto on the 
other, what would we do? Doing nothing would progressively de-legitimise 
the role and undermine the authority o f the Security Council as the 
cornerstone o f the international law enforcement system. But action without 
UN authorisation would be illegal and also undermine the lawful authority 
o f the Security Council. The law-legitimacy distinction was to resurface
54 For more on the loss o f  soft power see, N ye, Joseph S., US p o w e r  an d  stra teg y  after Iraq  (Foreign  
Affairs: 82: 4: 2003) 60-73 and N ye, Joseph S., The decline o f  A m erica's soft p o w e r  (Foreign Affairs: 83: 
3 :2 0 0 4 )  16-20
55 See also Chapter F ive Pages 225-228
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four years later over Iraq and leave many Westerners rather less comfortable 
than the Kosovo precedent.”56
These two examples have raised large questions both within and around the Council
and have raised the issue o f exceptionalism within the Council. This has bred a sense o f
resentment within and towards the council, with some states arguing that the “rules
apply to everyone else not those with power.”57 This resentment then causes problems
for the Council in securing support for and mandates for peacekeeping operations as
"the resentment o f the council's elected members to the hegemony o f the five (has) also
contributed to the breakdown of close and regular coordination."58 This problem was
highlighted by Professor Johnstone utilising the above examples, who stated that
“the problem is if the security council doesn’t act to authorise an 
intervention and isn’t able to stop it, which it can never do if it’s a powerful 
country or coalition o f countries, then there is probably not much it can do 
to react either. So to imagine the Security Council condemning some action 
by one o f its members especially one o f its permanent members is just not 
realistic. I mean the Russians tried that when NATO intervened in Kosovo, 
they introduced a resolution condemning it and that resolution was defeated 
twelve to three or something. You know the Security Council couldn’t 
possible adopt a resolution condemning the US intervention in Iraq so the 
Security Council can 't really react.'09
The problem for other members of the Security Council then stems from the reaction
after the intervention, because as Johnstone goes on to illustrate
“If  there’s a humanitarian crisis, if there’s a security crisis then the Security 
Council has some responsibility to help clean up the mess even though it 
was not responsible for the mess, but there is risk that in so doing it looks
56 Thakur, Ramesh, Law, L egitim acy an d  the U nited  Nations (M elbourne journal o f  international law: 11: 
2010) 1-26
57 Interview with Former UN official 2 6 th August 2009
58 B o sco ,F ive (2009) pg 197
59 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 ld July 2008
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like it is condoning the original breach o f international law. So that’s why 
it’s going to end up being a very political thing.”60
There is however another side to this argument which is made by academics such as
Adam Roberts who argues that
"Sometimes the willingness o f one or more member states to use force in 
support o f proclaimed Security Council objectives may actually galvanize 
the other security council members to take action, because o f concern that, 
otherwise, they or the council as a whole would become irrelevant."61
The real question here is “in what ways can or should the security council reengage in 
the situation which has initially flown in the face o f international law, the UN charter, 
and the Security Council’s responsibilities?”62 Should the UN become involved in post 
invasion scenarios or is this likely to encourage more unilateral actions which leave the 
international community to fix the inevitable mess? There is no easy answer to this 
scenario and it is one which the Security Council is currently facing, as Hurd argues 
“the most common malady identified at the Council is that the membership o f the 
Council contains such inequalities that it threatens to delegitimize the body as a 
whole.”63 In both Kosovo and Iraq the Security Council had passed a whole raft o f 
resolutions prior to the interventions, these resolutions can then be utilised by the 
interveners to justify their actions. The issue then becomes one o f power and perception 
as Weiss argues, “there is a question o f perception here but ultimately states do what 
they want to do and particularly powerful ones.”64 The problem then becomes, as
60 Ibid. Johnstone
61 Roberts in M alone, Security  C ouncil (2004) pg 139
62 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
63 Hurd, Ian, M yths o f  M em bership: The P olitics o f  Legitim ation in UN Security  C ouncil R eform  (G lobal 
Governance: 14: 2008) 199-217
64 Interview with Professor Thomas G. W eiss 9th July 2008
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Johnstone states, “how to force the Security Council, permanent members in particular, 
to be more responsive and responsible in dealing with the rest o f the membership.”65 
Because if  a "states voluntary compliance depends on their perceptions o f the 
legitimacy o f the council and its actions - its symbolic power"66 then “the chief 
determinant o f failure or success will be the quality o f decisions made by member 
states in the Security Council, led by the permanent five states."67
The problem for the Security Council and the wider United Nations is that it’s
"Independence is highly constrained: member states, especially the 
powerful, can limit the autonomy of International Organisations, interfere 
with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve 
them."68
This then limits the situations in which the organisation can act, as was explored in the 
previous chapter in relation to the development o f peacekeeping throughout the Cold 
War. As former Ambassador to the Security Council Sir Jeremy Greenstock explains, 
“If you take Africa type peacekeeping operations all fifteen members o f the Security 
Council normally want to do their best for the wretched state in trouble.”69 This 
statement is however contradicted by the level and type o f action which the UN has 
undertaken in Africa, both in the past and today. For example the complete failure o f 
the international community to respond to the genocide in Rwanda, the ongoing crisis 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the situation in Darfur, as well as the limited
65 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
66 Karns,In ternational organ izations (2004) , pg 114
67 Thakur, Ramesh, From  Peacekeeping to Peace operations  (Conflict Trends: 4: 2004) For m ore on the 
perception o f  legitim acy see Hurd, M yths of M em bership (2008) also, Hurd, Ian, Legitim acy, P ow er, a n d  
the sym bolic  life o f  the UN Security  Council (Global Governance: 8: 2 0 02) 3 5 -5 land Clark, 
\m ,L eg itim a cy  in In ternational S ociety  (Oxford University Press Oxford: 2005)
68 D iehl in Diehl, Paul F., The p o litics  o f  g lo b a l governance  (Lynne Riener: usa: 2001) pg 11
69 Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock 8th Decem ber 2009
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involvement in the ongoing collapse o f Somalia. It is clear that whilst the members o f
the Security Council make politically expedient statements, the real problem is finding
the resources and support for taking action. What is clear is that "when humanitarian
and strategic interests coincide, a window of opportunity opens for those seeking to act
on the humanitarian impulse in the Security Council.”70 For example the NATO
intervention in the Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the First Gulf W ar and the
Australian led intervention in East Timor. In situations where strategic interests do not
coincide with the humanitarian crisis however, the outcome is much different. In those
situations it seems more like states are “using the UN as a 'dustbin' into which they
throw urgent and difficult matters that they cannot tackle themselves."71
It is clear from past results that
"When the council is united, its members can wage war, impose blockades, 
unseat governments, and levy sanctions, all in the name o f the international 
community. There are almost no limits to the body's authority."72
The problem then stems from how to unite the council in order to achieve those 
successes. With the cost of peacekeeping operations, the provision o f troops and 
resources "membership in the magic circle o f the permanent five naturally involves 
heavy costs, as well as privilege."73 These costs do not however mean that the 
permanent five have carte blanche to do as they please. The issue of exceptionalism has 
been raised ever more increasingly as the elected members, troop contributing 
countries, and developing powers attempt to increase their influence within the Council.
70 W eiss in M alone, Security  C ouncil (2004) pg 37
71 Roberts, Adam, The UN a n d  international security  (Survival: 35: 2: 1993)
72 B o sco ,F ive (2009) pg 3
73 Roberts, The U N  (1993)
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There are increasing calls for more inclusive deliberations, more participation and more 
transparency74 on the part o f both the permanent five and the Council as a whole.
The perceived lack o f legitimacy, which will be discussed in the following section,
is also having an impact on the amount o f power and influence the Council has in the
wider international system. Being at the forefront o f responses to crises has meant that
the Council has become “empowered to decide if there is a problem at all, what kind o f
problem it is, and whose responsibility it is to solve it."75 Following the situation in Iraq
however the United Nations was viewed by many as a broken flush, an organisation ill
suited to the challenging times the international system was facing. The council in the
past was an example o f International Organisations that
"Are powerful not so much because they possess material and informational 
resources but, more fundamentally, because they use their authority to orient 
action and create social reality."76
Following the end o f the Cold War, and even during the Cold War, the Council had 
a profound impact on the way key foundations o f the international system were viewed. 
The expansion o f what constitutes a threat to international peace and security has been 
based on the wording o f Council resolutions and actions authorised by the Council. 
Actions which have led to the emphasis on human rights which now pervades the 
international system, the suggestion that sovereignty should be conditional on 
responsibility, these are examples of ways in which the Council has been “defining 
meanings, norms of good behaviour, the nature of social actors, and categories o f
74 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
75 Barnett, Rules f o r  the W orld (2004) pg 14
76 Ibid. pg 6
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legitimate social action in the world."77 However, despite its past influence, the 
Security Council is now facing questions as to whether or not it is the only legitimate 
and legitimating body that exists in the international architecture.78
The following section o f this chapter examines how the question o f representation 
on the council is impacting on the perceived legitimacy o f its actions. It argues that the 
failure to reform the council has enabled the legitimacy o f its operations to be called 
into question but it will also argue that reform poses its own set o f problems. It is clear 
that “weighty responsibilities are landing on the shoulders o f an organisation that 
national governments have deliberately kept weak.”79 What is less clear is whether 
reform o f that organisation will improve or undermine its ability to act in crisis 
situations.
Representation and legitimacy
As the balance o f power in the international system has shifted there have been 
increasing calls for reform o f the Security Council to make it a more representative 
body. The argument is that "expansion would increase the council's legitimacy"80 and 
that "a broader and more diverse council might persuade more states to participate in 
peacekeeping, to comply with sanctions, and to settle their disputes peacefully."81 
These arguments are born out by academics and practitioners alike with one official
77 Ibid. pg 7
78 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating 28th August 2008
79 Power, Samantha, Business as usual a t the UN  (Foreign Policy: 144: 2004)
80 B o sco ,F ive (2009) pg 203
81 Ibid. pg 203
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arguing that it should improve force generation82 by increasing the buy-in o f member
states. While academics including Craig N. Murphy support this argument, stating that
“If  it were possible to get the kind o f Security Council reform that would 
reflect the balance o f power as it currently is that many peacekeeping 
operations coming from the global level would be more legitimate.” 8^
The issue o f legitimacy has become increasingly important in the face o f recent
challenges to Security Council, including the 2003 invasion o f Iraq. As former
Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock explains
“the UN took a heavy legitimacy hit in the immediate aftermath o f  the 
invasion o f Iraq. It took a hit from the republicans in the US who felt the 
UN was useless in overthrowing a very illegitimate Saddam Hussein 
regime, who had killed and tortured so many of his own people, had used 
chemical weapons etc. It was seen by others, particularly by many 
developing countries and some European countries as being impotent in the 
face o f the US desire for regime change against international law. So there
84was a legitimacy hit in both those camps immediately after 2003.”
For a period o f time it seemed that the UN had become irrelevant, that the 
international system would revert to a system of unilateral interventions. As Professor 
Adam Roberts argues, the failure o f the Council to agree was a clear demonstration o f 
the lack o f a UN based collective security system, and showed that the UN is not at the 
heart o f the existing international security system. The inability to agree undoubtedly 
showed the limitations of the organisation. At the same time the fact that the operation 
proved questionable, was based on questionable grounds and went wrong in the 
occupation phase, proved the Security Council was right to be nervous.85 This is
82 Interview with M O D O fficial 24th February 2009
83 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd September 2008
84 Interview with Sam D aw s 9lh Decem ber 2009
85 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts 8lh Decem ber 2009
190
Chapter Four Kate Seaman
substantiated by Sam Daws went on to state that “the fact that no weapons o f mass 
destruction were found in Iraq I think in some ways resulted in an uplift o f  legitimacy 
o f UN processes.” 86
Since its creation the authority o f the Security Council has been continuously 
challenged
“If you read a history o f the Security Council it’s always had this sort o f 
rollercoaster ups and downs ever since it was established. The interesting 
thing is its resilience it comes back from the dead as many times as Lazarus,
0*7
you know it’s astonishing.”
Despite these challenges the Security Council continues and this continuance is in part 
based on the strength o f it’s legitimacy within the international community. According 
to David Bosco this legitimacy comes from a number of areas, representativeness, 
effectiveness, power, and procedural propriety.88 This idea is backed up by Barnett and 
Duvall who argue that International organisations have to demonstrate legitimacy in 
two ways, procedurally and substantively.89 The question is then raised as to whether or 
not the Council is meeting these necessary requirements for legitimacy.
If  you begin with representation the Council is clearly not a reflection o f the world 
as it is today, instead it reflects a power balance which is long gone. This leads to the 
argument, as Hurd outlines that that “the Council’s legitimacy is in peril unless the 
body can be reformed to account for recent changes in world politics.”90 Which then 
raises the issue o f reform, should the membership and structure o f the Council be
86 Interview with Sam Daw s 9 th Decem ber 2009
87 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6 th October 2009
88 B osco ,F /ve (2009)
89 For more see  Barnett, P ow er (2005)
90 Hurd, M yths o f  M em bership (2008)
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altered to make the council more representative, and would this indeed increase the
legitimacy o f the body? As mentioned above there are arguments to suggest this would
be the case, and whilst there is “an obvious tension between size and representation” 91
as one UK mission official noted
“It should not be forgotten that if  we do nothing with the council the 
dynamic within the council changes routinely anyway, in terms o f which 
particular member states belong on it and that is something that the 
expansion or contraction or whatever will have no impact on.92
This was borne out by Lord Hannay who stated
“I don’t m yself ever buy this idea that the Security Council, constituted as it 
is now, is completely discredited, incapable o f doing anything, its all a lot o f 
nonsense frankly. Just look at it, you’ll see its doing things every day and do 
people say well because you've only got x number o f people, three 
Africans, it cannot be legitimate. Well no o f course they don’t say that, it’s 
not true, it’s simply not true. Do the three Africans on the security council 
have a very big weight in what’s done in Africa o f course they do, they 
don’t need to be five in order to do that, its not going to make that much 
difference. So I think it’s an overrated subject and one which every time it’s 
put to the test and you fail, it diminishes the legitimacy o f the institution 
which is what the people who put forward the reform proposals are said to 
be trying to support, so I think they ought to be more cautious.9-1
This was contradicted by Professor Craig N. Murphy who argued that if  reform 
occurred it “would be easier for example for UN peacekeeping to operate in Africa, in 
parts o f Africa, rather than having to operate with the AU” he did however then go on 
to state that “my sense is that Security Council refonn is almost impossible.” 94
91 Interview with UK M ission O fficial 27lh August 2008
92 Interview with UK M ission Official 27th August 2008
93 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6 th October 2009
94 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd September 2008
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There have been several attempts to raise the question o f Security Council reform, 
originally in 1993 with the establishment o f the General Assembly working group on 
reform, in the High Level Panel Report95, and at the world summit in 2005. None o f the 
suggestions have been successful and as Lord Hannay implies lead to a scenario which 
only continues to undermine the legitimacy o f the organisation. Whilst reform o f the 
Council would indeed make the institution more representative, there are still too many 
unanswered questions as to whether or not it would improve the capabilities and 
efficacy o f the organisation. Although it would improve buy in from developing states 
as to the legitimacy o f operations it would not necessarily improve the provision o f 
troops capable o f undertaking the increasingly complex peacekeeping missions which 
are being mandated.
The next standard relates to the efficacy o f the organisation, whether or not it is 
fulfilling its mandate, and producing substantive results. For some academics such as 
Joseph Nye, whilst "highly technical organisations may be able to derive their 
legitimacy from their efficacy alone....the more an institution deals with broad values, 
the more its democratic legitimacy becomes relevant."96 Therefore for Nye, the 
outcome is not as important as the process o f decision making. For other academics 
however the outcome is more important in the provision o f legitimacy which in relation 
to the Security Council this entirely depends on the interpretation o f its mandate. Under 
the Charter it is given primary responsibility for the maintenance o f international peace 
and security. What this means is however open to a variety o f interpretations. There
95 United N ations, H igh L evel Pane! R eport on Threats, C hallenges a n d  Change, A m ore Secure World: 
our sh a red  respon sb ility  2004)
96N ye, Joseph S., G lobaliza tions dem ocratic  deficit (Foreign Affairs: 80: 4: 2001)
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have been a number o f abject failures on behalf o f the Security Council including 
Rwanda and Somalia, there have however also been a number o f successes, including 
Cambodia, Mozambique, and El-Salvador. For some the failures are a clear 
demonstration o f the "inadequacies o f the council's strategies to date for sustaining the
• • • 07peace it sometimes helps establish." Lord Hannay, a former ambassador on the 
Security Council, believes however that “the UN has learned quite a lot o f lessons, its 
become much more professional in its operations, its headquarters staff are much better 
organised, in the field it on the whole seems to be a bit better” whilst still recognising
QO
that “there are still terrible failures.” These failures, it can be argued may help
improve the Council
"by revealing the structural weakness o f the council manifested in the lack 
o f accountability, the non affirmation o f prevailing legal principles, and the 
non representative nature o f the council's composition."99
The failure to deal with these problems will only further undermine the authority the
council has within the international system.
The issue o f power has been dealt with above so the final standard is based on
procedural propriety. For practitioners such as Sir Jeremy Greenstock
“You get clear legitimacy from a UN security council resolution because 
that has gone through a process and careful thought by quite experienced 
minds backed up the secretariat etc. And it has an established base, in the 
UN which is a treaty based organisation which obliges its member states to 
do certain things under certain conditions, so you've got legitimacy through 
the UN Security Council being properly used to lay the basis for a 
peacekeeping operation.”
97 M alone in M alone, Security  C ouncil (2004) pg 3
98 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6 ,h October 2009
99 Adelm an and Surhke in M alone, Security  Council (2004) pg 484
100 Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock 8th Decem ber 2009
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The level o f transparency in the inner workings o f the Security Council has however 
raised questions as to the propriety o f actions taken. As Polman explains "only the 15 
members o f the security council know the details o f the negotiations which lead to 
resolutions."101 This has led to calls for greater transparency in decision making
relating to initiation o f mandates, mandate renewal and closure or winding down of
• •  102missions. Because, “as the council acts on behalf o f the whole membership, it has a 
special obligation to act as transparently as possible” although Bailey and Daws do give 
this statement the caveat “so long as this does not interfere with its primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security."1(b
The lack o f transparency within the council has led to claims that member states are
"approving UN missions in Africa, and then having nothing to do with them ."104 That
the lack o f representation o f those directly benefiting from operations, and those
providing the largest proportion o f troops has resulted in questionable legitimacy for
the Security Council. Now is the "time for the international community to be doing
more to close the gap between rhetorical support for prevention and tangible
commitment."105 The problem is then, according to Thomas G. Weiss
“whether the security council will ever sign off on anything and since it was 
unable to do anything in Rwanda or in Kosovo, on one occasion the 
Security Council did nothing, or did too little too late, and on the other 
occasion they did nothing and therefore NATO did something too soon and 
too early according to other observers. I think even an unreformed Security
101 Polman, Linda, We d id  nothing  (Penguin: London: 2003), pg xiii
102 Interview with Sam Daws 9th Decem ber 2009
103 Bailey, Sydney and Sam Daws,77/e procedure  o f  the U nited N ations Security  C ouncil (Clarendon 
Press Oxford: 1998), pg 393
104 Polman, We d id  nothing (2003) , pg xiii
105ICISS, R 2P (2001) , p g l9
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Council is unlikely to take a humanitarian decision and a reformed Security 
Council would never take such a decision.” 106
If the Council’s legitimacy remains in question then it will only become harder for it to
intervene in ongoing crises around the globe. As Chesterman argues
“there is a reason why matters of international peace and security were 
delegated to a smaller body with special rights accorded to the most 
powerful countries of the day. If  the cost o f greater accountability were that 
the capacity o f the Security Council to respond to a crisis suffered, many 
would argue that the cost would be too great. In this respect, those who urge 
the Council to make decisions in a transparent manner open to a wide range 
o f contesting viewpoints should be careful what they wish for: the only 
example o f the Council functioning in this manner in recent years is on the 
handling o f the Iraq file during 2002-2003. The rifts to which this gave rise 
are the reason why reform is on the agenda today.” 107
The failure o f the council over the past two decades to produce results in an 
increasing number o f situations has led to questioning o f the viability o f the Council in 
today’s international system. This is despite the dramatic shift in the type o f 
interventions which the council has undertaken. There has been a clear move towards 
more intervention into crises which would have previously been deemed to fall within 
the concept o f state sovereignty. The failure o f the Council to deal with several o f these 
situations, such as Somalia and Rwanda, has left the organisation open to attack.
What is clear is that the Security Council has become involved in much larger 
projects than ever before. It has become involved in rebuilding entire state 
infrastructures in post conflict situations. Through these projects the Security Council 
has then become a key component in the development o f global governance. Within the
106 Interview with Professor Thomas G. W eiss 9 th July 2008
107 Chesterman, G lobaliza tion  rules (2008) pg 46
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projects it is undertaking it is also enabling the transmission o f very particular norms 
and ideals across the globe. This transmission o f norms then makes it important to 
understand whose ideals are being transmitted and why?
In the case o f the Security Council this is even more important as the role o f 
peacekeeping operations in the transmission o f concepts such as democracy, good 
governance and human rights has led to questioning o f the legitimacy o f such 
operations. The role o f the Council in the development o f Global Governance has 
become increasingly important as the Council becomes increasingly involved in issues 
which previously fell under the restrictive concept o f sovereignty. As the organ with the 
designated responsibility for international peace and security, this then places the 
Security Council at the forefront o f solution finding for global problems.
Within Global governance the removal o f problems from a state to a global level 
only increases the importance of international organisations such as the UN and the 
Security Council. As Zurn argues, “the removal of numerous decisions from the circuit 
o f national and democratic responsibility gives rise to nonnative problems, which in 
turn lead to growing acceptancy problems and resistance to global governance.” 108 An 
issue which is further underlined by the reality that that the role o f hegemonic states is a 
defining factor in how these organisations are viewed by the wider international system. 
In relation to the Security Council the actions it is able to take are based on its 
perceived legitimacy within the international system. This legitimacy is unfortunately 
again being questioned as the role of powerful states and the influence they have on
108 Zurn, M ichael, G loba l G overnance an d  Legitim acy P roblem s  (Government and Opposition: 39: 2: 
2004) 260-287
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Council actions is once again called to the fore. Recent situations such as Kosovo and 
Iraq have demonstrated the inability o f the Security Council to deal with its more 
powerful members and this inability has placed the institution in a precarious position.
It now seems that the inequality within the Council, between permanent members 
and non-permanent, developed countries and developing, troop contributors and those 
mandating the operations is having a negative impact on the actions o f the Council 
itself. The next chapter examines three o f the issues connected to this inequality which 
are having a large impact on the provision o f peacekeeping operations; sovereignty, 
legitimacy and conditionality. It argues that the Security Councils legitimacy, whilst 
under scrutiny is still robust. It also argues that there has been a clear shift in the 
concept o f sovereignty, that there are new conditions being applied in order for states to 
earn this right and that this is making it easier for interventions to occur. Finally it 
argues that this is having a direct impact on peacekeeping operations as they are asked 
to undertake a much wider variety o f tasks than ever before.
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Sovereignty. Conditionality and Legitimacy: What makes an intervention 
legitimate?
In the previous chapter the role o f power within the Security Council was examined. 
The chapter argued that the asymmetrical power relations within the Council are having 
a negative impact on peacekeeping mandates as powerful member states utilise their 
influence to ensure that these mandates enable the transference o f particular norms o f 
governance and responsible statehood to conflict tom societies. It also argued that the 
transfer o f these norms is directly impacting on the development o f the idea o f global 
governance as the UN has become involved in the reconstitution o f states that, once 
recovered, can move forward to become responsible members o f the international 
community, and partners in resolving global problems.
Through these projects the Security Council has then become a key component in 
the development of global governance. The chapter also argued that because o f this 
transmission o f norms it is then important to understand whose ideals are being 
transmitted and why? In the case of the Security Council this is even more important as 
the role o f peacekeeping operations in the transmission o f concepts such as democracy, 
good governance and human rights has led to questioning o f the legitimacy o f such 
operations. As the perception o f legitimacy is key to the success o f peacekeeping 
operations the basis for the legitimacy o f operations as well as the current problems the 
organisation is having in ensuring the perception o f legitimacy is examined in more 
detail in this chapter.
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This chapter argues that there has been a clear shift in the concept o f sovereignty, 
that there are new conditions being applied in order for states to earn this right and that 
this is making it easier for interventions to occur. Because o f this change in the concept 
o f sovereignty it also argues that the international system is moving towards a reality 
where sovereignty is becoming conditional and that the concept o f sovereignty is not 
being applied in a consistent and equal manner in relation to interventions. Due to this 
inequality in application the chapter goes on to argue that the legitimacy o f all 
peacekeeping operations is now being called in to question. It also argues that the 
traditional limitations o f neutrality, non-use o f force and respect for sovereignty, which 
was based on the concept o f host state consent, are no longer being applied and that this 
is having a direct impact on peacekeeping operations as they are asked to undertake a 
much wider variety o f tasks than ever before.
This chapter then goes on to argue that the concept o f consent is critical to the 
success o f peacekeeping operations and that undermining this concept is one o f the key 
factors in the loss o f legitimacy within peacekeeping operations. This loss o f legitimacy 
has then directly contributed to states searching for alternatives to either supplement or 
replace the UN in its capacity as the leading international peacekeeper. This chapter 
argues that although there are plausible alternatives to the UN these alternatives face as 
many, if  not more, challenges than the UN and that they in fact may lead to a more 
unequal and potentially more volatile international system than is currently in place.
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The evolving concept of sovereignty
Since the signing o f the Treaty o f Westphalia state sovereignty has been based on 
the concept o f "the independent and unfettered power o f a state in its jurisdiction."1 
Throughout the Cold War the “strict observance o f the sovereignty o f nations remained 
the foundation o f international law”2 and this was illustrated by the importance the UN 
placed on gaining consent from the host state or states before deploying any 
peacekeeping mission. However, since the end o f the superpower conflict at the end o f 
the 1980s the strict observance o f state sovereignty and the right o f non-intervention 
has become contested and the Security Councils "decisions have eroded concepts o f 
state sovereignty firmly held during the cold war, altering the way in which many o f us 
see the relationship between state and citizen the world over."3 The key shift in Council 
decisions has been based on the realisation at the international level that "sovereignty 
cannot be a licence for states to massacre their citizens with impunity."4 Throughout the 
1990s this realisation manifested in the attempts made to establish a norm of 
humanitarian intervention3 supported by "the claim that in the most appalling cases of 
brutality and slaughter, a state should temporarily forfeit the right to protection from the 
norm o f non-intervention."6 The argument for limitations on the right o f non­
1 W eiss, Thom as G . ,H um anitarian Intervention  (Polity: Cambridge: 2007) pg 12
2 M essner in K ennedy, Paul; M essner, Dirk and Nushceler, Franz, G lo b a l Trends a n d  G lo b a l
G overnance  (Pluto Press London: 2002) pg 51
3 M alone in M alone, David M., The U nited N ations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: London: 2 0 04) pg 1
4 W heeler, N icholas J., Legitim ating H um anitarian Intervention: P rincip les a n d  p ro ced u res  (M elbourne  
journal o f  international law: 2: 2001) pg 6
5 For a detailed analysis o f  Humanitarian Intervention see W oodhouse, Tom and O liver
Ra.msbo\hdLm,Humanitarian Intervention in C ontem porary C onflict: A reconceptualiza tion  (Polity
L o n d o n :1996)
6 W heeler in W elsh, Jennifer M., H um anitarian Intervention an d  In ternational R ela tions  (Oxford  
University Press Oxford: 2004) pg 37
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intervention was furthered by academics such as Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen who 
argued that sovereignty entails certain responsibilities for which governments must be 
held accountable, both towards their national constituencies and to the international 
community. As illustrated in Chapter Three this argument has led directly to the 
development o f the concept o f the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).8 This section is 
going to examine the idea that sovereignty is not a concrete idea but is rather a fluid 
concept which has been "arbitrary, contested and ever changing."9 It will argue that 
there has been a shift in the understanding o f what a state must be in order to be 
sovereign and that although sovereignty "remains the dominant legitimating 
principle...it is no longer conceived as an inherent right."10
The ICISS report in 2001 outlined four key challenges to sovereignty in today’s 
international system. The first challenge relates to the emphasis now placed on the 
importance o f self determination and the accompanying willingness o f some states and 
non-state actors to either redraw borders to enable this or to pursue violent conflict in 
order to attain this. The second relates to the expanded definition o f threats to 
international peace and security which have made it much less challenging to breach 
the traditional notions o f sovereignty and non-intervention. Many o f these newly 
defined threats can be directly attributed to the third challenge which is the recurring 
collapse o f state authority, as evidenced in states such as Somalia. The final challenge 
that the traditional concept of sovereignty faces is the heightened importance which is
7 For more see: Cohen, Roberta and Francis M. Deng,A/asses in fligh t: G loba l C risis o f  In ternal 
D isp lacem en t (Brookings Institute USA: 1996)
8 See Chapter Three Pages 141 - 166
9 M oreno in Hobbs, H eidi, Pondering Postin ternationalism  (SU N Y  Press Albany: 2000)
10 W heeler in W elsh, H um anitarian Intervention (2004) pg 37
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now attached to popular sovereignty and the idea that in order to be legitimate a state 
must be seen to represent the needs and wishes o f the majority o f its population, whilst 
also respecting the minorities within its borders.11
These four specific challenges coupled with the development o f globalization and 
global governance, which emphasis the importance o f non-state actors "call into 
question basic understandings o f the primacy o f the territorial state."12 Academics such 
as Thomas G. Weiss argue that with the development o f global governance 
"sovereignty's status and relevance are contested increasingly within international 
organisations and forums.” 13 That many of the newer actors within international 
relations, such as NGOs, international organisations and advocacy networks, are posing 
a direct challenge to the sovereignty and autonomy o f the nation-state and that 
sovereignty is no longer the unique preserve o f states. This contestation o f sovereignty 
would however be challenged by critics o f the development o f the concept o f Global 
Governance, such as Muller and Lederer, who would instead argue that the concept is 
simply masking the fact that specific actors, especially powerful states, are influencing 
the development o f the international system more than others.14 The undermining, or 
relocation, o f sovereignty is also open to question when you examine the continued 
emphasis which the Security Council places on reconstituting sovereign states in post 
conflict societies. This emphasis on sovereignty is a contradiction to arguments
11 ICISS, The respon sib ility  to  pro tect: Background, Research, B ibliography  2001)
12 M ingst in Vayrynen, Raimo, G lobalisation  an d  g lo b a l governance  (Rowm an and Littlefield: 2 0 0 1 ) pg 
88
13 W eiss, Thom as G., Governance, G o o d  governance a n d  G lo b a l G overnance: conceptual a n d  ac tu a l 
challenges  (Third World Quarterly: 2 1 :5 : 2000) 795-814
14 See Lederer, Markus and Philipp S. Muller, C riticizing G loba l G overnance  (Palgrave M acm illan N ew  
York: 2005)
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outlined by writers such as Ian Hurd who argues that today "sovereignty exists 
wherever processes o f legitimation create powerful institutions o f authority in world 
politics."15 Although his argument would fit with the notion of increased emphasis on 
self determination and the fact that "sovereignty is less and less seen as resting in nation 
states and more and more seen as resting in 'peoples' themselves."16 The selectivity 
with which the Council chooses to intervene in conflicts involving issues o f self- 
determination again calls into question the extent to which sovereignty has been 
relocated from states to people.
The emphasis on self determination can be traced to Woodrow Wilson who 
established self determination as one o f the key foundations for recognised statehood.17 
It gained further support following decolonisation, although it was subdued by the Cold 
War, it again gained traction in the early 1990s as various intrastate conflicts witnessed 
the attempted secession of separatist groups and regions, including the Former 
Yugoslavia and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many of these conflicts have led 
directly to the expansion o f what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
the second challenge to sovereignty. The consequences o f these conflicts including
15 Hurd, Ianf l f te r  A narchy  (Princeton University Press Princeton: 2007) pg 185
16 Conlon, Justin, S overeign ty  vs. Human Rights or sovereign ty  an d  human righ ts  (Race and Class: 46: 
7 5 :2 0 0 4 )  p g 7 8
17 For a com prehensive look at these ideals and W ilsons other contributions to the developm ent o f  
international norms see: Link, Arthur S., The p a p ers  o f  w oodrow  w ilson  (Princeton University Press 
Princeton: 1966 - 1994 ). For more on self-determination seeM arc W eller, Barbara M etzger and N iall 
Johnson, Settling  Self-determ ination D isputes: C om plex P ow er-sharing in Theory a n d  P ractice  (Brill: 
N ew  York 2008) also, Hannum, WnvsXflutonomy, Sovereign ty  an d  Self-determ ination: The 
A ccom m odation  o f  C onflicting Rights (P rocedural A spects o f  In ternational Law) (U niversity o f  
Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia 1996). For a more European focus on the issue o f  national self- 
determination see  Ronen, Dov, The challenge o f  ethnic conflict, dem ocracy a n d  s e l f  determ ination  in 
C entra l E urope  (Frank Cass: London: 1997) and for a focus on the connection between globalisation and 
self-determ ination see David R. Cameron, Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, G lobaliza tion  a n d  self- 
determ ination: is the nation sta te  under siege?  (Routledge: London: 2006)
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large scale refugee problems, internal displacement o f populations and humanitarian 
crises have led the Security Council to adopt much broader mandates authorising 
interventions into situations which would have previously been deemed to be within the 
domestic jurisdiction o f a state. This has led to a questioning o f the continuing 
relevance o f the norm of non-intervention which was previously seen as “a vital rule for 
encouraging order in a world without international government."18
The importance assigned to non-intervention has been eroded as it has become clear 
that "classical notions o f sovereignty provide a poor basis for policy with respect to the 
post-intervention political decisions in troubled societies."19 With the shift in conflicts
from interstate to intrastate it is now more important for the international community to
20be able to intervene within the sovereign borders o f a state. This does however raise 
important questions as to the continuing relevance o f other key foundations o f the 
international system, in particular the continued importance o f the concept o f 
sovereignty itself, as for some academics such as Martha Finnemore "the necessary 
condition for sovereignty among states is non-intervention."21 If the international 
community is then able to intervene much more easily, perhaps under a norm o f
humanitarian intervention, this then potentially “represents a serious threat to the
11
element o f order constituted with international society."^ This argument is borne out 
by practitioners in the field who then undermine the importance o f recognising
18 D oyle , M ichael W ,,W ays o f  War an d  P eace  (W .W . Norton and Co.: N ew  York: 1997) pg 411
l9W elsh in W elsh, H um anitarian Intervention (2004) pg 276
20 For a detailed look at the norm o f  non-intervention see  'W oodhouse,H um anitarian Intervention (1996)
21 Finnemore, Martha, The purpose o f  Intervention  (Cornell University Press: London: 2003) pg 7
22 Knudsen in Pugh, M ichael, The UN, p ea ce  a n d fo rce  (Frank Cass London: 1997) pg 150
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“what you are unleashing by doing it. You’ve got to think about the effect 
it’s going to cause on the ground, invading a sovereign territory. Ok you 
might stop an immediate situation if you had the capability to get there at 
the right place at the right time, but what do you unleash following on from 
that, are you prepared then to pour more forces in etc?”23
The fear is that making interventions easier to undertake or creating "a right o f
humanitarian intervention represents a serious threat to the element o f order constituted
with international society."24 That "restraint in intervention politics is what makes a
world o f sovereign states possible."25 The reality is however that
"Organizations such as the UN, the international monetary fund, and the 
organization for security and cooperation Europe are entrusted with drafting 
new constitutions and judicial arrangements, recreating financial 
institutions, and creating civilian police - in essence remaking entire 
states."26
The need for international organisations to undertake these kinds o f projects has only 
increased as the number o f state failures has escalated. This then directly links the 
requirement for less emphasis on non-intervention to the third challenge facing 
sovereignty, that o f the collapse o f state authority. The difficulty is that even in 
situations where the state has lost its authority “enduring notions o f sovereignty make it
27 •difficult for outside countries or international organisations to step in." This problem
23 Interview with UK M ission O fficial Two 2 7 lh August 2008
24 Knudsen in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 150
25 Finnem ore,Intervention (2003) pgvii
26 Barnett, M ichael and Martha Finnem ore,Rules f o r  the w o rld  (Cornell University Press N ew  York: 
2 0 0 4 ) pg 2
27 W axm an, M atthew C., Intervention to sto p  G enocide an d  M ass A troc ities  Council on Foreign  
R elations:2009) pg vii
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extends from the principle o f sovereignty by right, whereby the principle o f  sovereignty 
"even applies in cases where formal state capacity is practically nil."28
In order to understand the importance placed on sustaining state sovereignty, even if 
that sovereignty is an illusion, the relationship between statehood and global order also 
needs to be examined. As Christopher Clapham argues, there is in the eyes o f most 
actors within the international system “no alternative to the state as the key regulatory
29agency at the local level." This then means that state collapse is viewed not only as a 
local problem but as a threat to systemic stability. Therefore the need to ensure stability 
has led to continued emphasis on rules and norms which may no longer be suitable or 
even applicable to the system today. This is because "International society is based on a 
set o f normative structures, with sovereignty being the foremost o f them” and many 
states are concerned that “if these structures are undermined it may lead to either 
unadulterated anarchy or unmitigated hegemony or a combination o f the two - anarchy 
within and hegemony without."30 It is also important to recognise the differing levels o f 
importance given to the concept o f sovereignty by different states.
Despite the challenges above for many developing and former colonial states 
sovereignty is still viewed as an essential protective shell providing protection from 
outside intervention. As Michael Walzer argues this shell has been key to these states 
development o f self determination, providing respite from the fear o f external 
intervention which was so detrimental in the past. For Walzer however, this shell
28 Berdal, M ats and David M. M alone,G reed  an d  Grievance: Econom ic agendas in C ivil W ars (Lynne 
Rienner: London: 2000) pg 40
29 Clapham in Cochrane, Feargal, Duffy, Rosaleen, Selby, Jan, G loba l governance, conflict a n d  
resistance  (Palgrave McM illan: 2003) pg 41
30 Roberts in W elsh, H um anitarian Intervention (2004) pg 82
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breaks down when popular sovereignty is called into question and this issue links in 
with the final challenge to sovereignty as outlined in the ICISS report. 31 Although in 
theory the
"International system currently rests on the assumption that the world is 
constituted o f independent, sovereign states, equal in their rights and 
prerogative though greatly differing in their size, degree o f development and 
military strength."32
In reality the “degree and extent o f each country's sovereignty depends on the reach o f 
it's global power."33 This becomes increasingly important in relation to the 
development o f norms of intervention, including humanitarian intervention and the 
more recent concept o f R2P.
With more emphasis being placed on the "obligation o f a state to protect the welfare 
o f its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community"34 
many weaker states feel more exposed to intervention with the fear being that they will 
be classed as a weak or failing state; In other words a state that does “not measure up to 
western role models in international political prestige, wealth, military prowess and 
national unity."35 For these states the reality o f "an evolving customary international 
law that protects human rights and limits sovereignty and that is binding on all states,
31 See W alzer, M ichael, The m oral standing o f  states: A response to  fo u r  c ritic s  (Philosophy and Public  
Affairs: 9: 3: 1980) and 1C1SS, The respon sib ility  to p ro tec t (Ottawa 2001)
32 Ottaway, Marina and Bethany Lacina, International interventions a n d  im perialism : L essons fro m  the  
1990's (SA IS Review: XXIII: 2: 2003)
33 Gaan, Narottam, U nited States, G lobalization  a n d  the international system : E conom ic a n d  p o lit ic a l  
challenges  (International Studies: 43: 3: 2006)
34 United Nations, High L evel Panel Report on Threats, C hallenges a n d  Change, A m ore Secure World: 
our sh a red  respon sb ility  2004)
35 W eiss,H um anitarian intervention (2007) pg 65
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whether or not they have ratified existing human rights treaties"36 does not represent a 
step forward in international relations. Instead "they conjure up images o f  colonial 
domination under the guise o f the 19th century 'standard o f civilization' doctrine."37 
These states will vigorously defend their sovereign rights including the right to the rule 
o f non-intervention which as Walzer argues “is the respect that foreigners owe to a 
historic community and to its internal life."38 This then poses problems for international 
society when states that vigorously defend their external sovereignty have no capacity 
to ensure their internal sovereignty, when they are unable to administer and control 
their territory. They then become "unconventional political units with dramatic security 
implications"39, states with externally recognised sovereignty but no internal control. 
The break up o f the Former Yugoslavia provides a good example o f this. The collapse 
bred a number o f conflicts that straddled the line between civil war and interstate 
conflict which then meant that the need to define sovereignty and responsibility over 
territory became problematic.40
This need to define the responsibilities of sovereign states has been coupled with a 
growing body of legal and academic writing justifying international intervention in 
defence o f human rights. The following section goes on to argue that sovereignty is 
now viewed by some states as conditional on a state being able to meet particular 
responsibilities, both internal and external. It then argues that despite this apparent
36 Con Ion, S overeign ty  (2004)
37 A yoob , M ohammed, H um anitarian Intervention an d  In ternational Society. (C over sto ry) (G lobal 
Governance: 7: 3: 2001) 225
38 W alzer, The m oral standing (1980)
39 W eiss ,H um anitarian intervention (2007) pg 67
40 W elsh in W elsh, H um anitarian Intervention (2004) pg 61
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evolution in the concept o f sovereignty not all states agree with these developments. It 
also argues that not all states believe that sovereignty should be conditional and goes on 
to argue that this is having a direct impact on peacekeeping operations as making 
sovereignty conditional has resulted in the need for consent for interventions being 
eroded, despite the questions this then raises as to the legitimacy o f such operations.
The conditionality of sovereignty
The previous section outlined the apparently "evolving nature o f sovereignty"41 
arguing that over time the concrete basis o f the principle has been eroded, although the 
nature o f this erosion is not accepted by all states. This section goes on to look at the 
ways in which sovereignty has become a concept with conditions. It argues that in 
many cases today "sovereignty yields to the demands o f international peace and 
security.”42 Many o f the changes in the way in which sovereignty is understood can be 
directly attributed to the developments in the concepts o f humanitarian intervention and 
human security as explored in Chapter Three.45
Following the end o f the cold war, and the claims o f the victory o f liberal 
democracy, arguments were made that the world should no longer tolerate regimes 
which did not promote or respect the idea o f human rights, that those states who 
violated human rights should forfeit their right to be treated as a legitimate sovereign. 
The culmination of these arguments has been the attempts within the UN to develop the
41 Johnstone, Ian, US- UN rela tions after Iraq: The end  o f  the w o r ld  (order) a s  w e  know it?  (European  
Journal o f  International Law: 15: 4: 2004) 813-838
42 W eiss,H um anitarian intervention (2007) pg 16
43 See Chapter Three Pages 125-130
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concept o f the Responsibility to Protect. This concept then makes sovereignty 
conditional on the behaviour o f states; as Mark Duffield argues "the R2P uses threats to 
human security to argue that sovereignty should now be regarded as contingent."44 The 
arguments in favour o f the concept are supported by other writers such as Fukuyama 
who argues that
“The state retains a critical function that cannot be replaced by any 
transnational actor: it remains the only source o f power that can enforce a 
rule o f law. But for that power to be effective, it must be seen as 
legitimate."45
This then raises the question of how a state becomes legitimate, how does a state meet 
the necessary conditions o f sovereignty, and who decides when these conditions have 
been met? It also raises issues in relation as to what type o f conditions a state should 
match in order to be sovereign, must it be a democratic state, or are other forms o f 
government acceptable. What level should its respect for human rights be at in order to 
ensure secure sovereignty? There are also problems in relation as to how to assess 
criteria or conditions as many of them would be subjective and therefore open to 
interpretation.
One potential way around these problems is outlined by Grugel and Piper who 
suggest that the sovereignty o f states is already limited, that "the global codification o f 
rights limits the sovereignty o f states in principle, by setting uniform and global 
standards."46 This codification could include various treaties and international
44 D uffield, Mark,D evelopm ent, Security  an d  Unending War (Polity Cambridge: 2007) p g l2 0
45 Fukuyama, Francis,A fter the N eoC ons  (Profile B ooks London: 2006) pg 10
46 Grugel, Jean and N icola  Piper,C ritica l P erspectives on G loba l G overnance  (Routledge: London: 2007)  
Pg 2
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agreements including the Human Rights Charter, and perhaps most importantly the 
United Nations Charter. Every member state o f the United Nations agrees to abide by 
the rules outlined in the Charter. Because o f this agreement Former Secretary General 
Kofi Annan argued that in fact there is no conflict between intervention and 
sovereignty; That UN authorised interventions, because o f their basis on the consent o f 
host governments, or through the invocation o f Chapter VII o f the Charter when 
consent is not forthcoming, avoid abrogating sovereignty as the states, by becoming 
members o f the organisation, have already agreed to abide by these rules and therefore 
these limitations on their sovereignty.47 This argument is also supported by academics 
such as Thomas G. Weiss who suggests that “states continually agree to have their 
sovereignty impinged upon in a number of ways whether its trade law, immigration 
law, and in the case of the UN Charter Security Council decisions.” The problem with 
this argument is that not every state is having its sovereignty impinged upon to the 
same extent, or with the same level o f agreement for that impingement.
The extent to which states agree to have their sovereignty breeched is also 
questionable in relation to Security Council interventions based on consent as "behind 
the consensus is an assumption that the state has a government with effective territorial 
control, allowing it to offer or refuse consent."49Attempts have been made to 
circumnavigate this problem in the developing concept o f R2P which, while “it is very 
carefully stated that the primary responsibility of the state is to the citizen, the state to
47 Annan, K ofi, Two concepts o f  Sovereign ty  (The Econom ist 18th September 1999)
48 Interview with Professor Thomas G. W eiss 9th July 2008
49 W eiss ,H um anitarian intervention (2007) Pg 4
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which the citizen belongs is responsible for ensuring their security.”50 The
responsibility o f the international community is based on the caveat that it only be
applied in situations when
“the state becomes incapable o f fulfilling the responsibilities to which it’s 
sovereignty entitles it, like Somalia where there is no state, there’s a country 
but there isn’t a state, there are no state institutions. That it is only in those 
situations that the international community has gradually moved on to 
ground which suggests that it, the international community, in most cases 
acting through the security council o f the United Nations has a residual 
responsibility in those circumstance.”51
The problem with this argument is that in most cases the Security Council and the 
wider international community fail to meet their responsibilities to intervene and 
prevent the disastrous consequences which result from state failure. While the 
responsibility might be assumed to exist, both on behalf o f the state and the 
international community, it is more often than not an unfulfilled responsibility. The 
failure to fulfil this responsibility stems in part from the fear o f establishing an 
"international norm of'pro-democratic' intervention."52
This dilemma is further explained by Robert Jackson who notes that "while states 
have a responsibility to pursue international justice where they can, they should not
53jeapordize other fundamental values in the process." In other words the moral 
obligation to prevent war trumps the moral obligation to promote human rights and
50 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
51 Ibid, Hannay.
52 W eiss,H um anitarian intervention (2007) Pg 49
53 Jackson, Robert, 77?e G loba l Covenant: Human conduct in a  w o r ld  o f  s ta tes  (Oxford U niversity Press: 
Oxford: 2000) pg 291
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democracy elsewhere.54 Although for academics such as Weiss “we have now limped 
towards a notion in which state sovereignty means not just a unit that has a language 
and a people and exercises some authority but that has another component that includes 
protecting ones population”55 he does recognise that the concept “needs to be 
consolidated in customary law.”56 He argues that "sovereignty is not dead but it is 
hardly as sacrosanct as it once was."57 This stance is however contradicted by others in 
the field including Lord Hannay who states that while the option for international 
intervention exists
“I wouldn’t say that it was a challenge to the doctrine o f state sovereignty, 
it’s often said that it’s the end o f the Westphalian principle. I think that’s 
putting it very glibly and to me, these reductions, this willingness to get 
involved in national communities is a kind of a default option, it’s only the
58option you go to when all else fails, it’s not a preferred option.”
The continued importance o f sovereignty is further emphasised by the fact that United 
Nations "membership is based on formal sovereignty rather than a substantive 
definition o f justice - in particular it makes no practical demands on its members to be 
democratic or to respect the human rights of its citizens."59 Because o f this "the UN is 
one o f the last bastions of national sovereignty."60 The variation in acceptance o f  any 
shift in sovereignty is also apparent in the selective importance which the Security 
Council continues to place on the norm. In some cases sovereignty is taken as
54 Ibid. pg 291
55 Interview with Professor Thomas G. W eiss 9th July 2008
56 Ibid, W eiss.
57 W eiss, G overnance (2000)
58 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6 th October 2009
59 Fukuyam a,4//er the N eo-cons (2006) pg 158
60 Urquhart in Chesterman, Sim on, Secretary  or G eneral?  (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 
2 0 0 7 ) pg 31
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inviolable, but in others the Council is more willing to undermine the norm in order to 
undertake interventions. The willingness to undermine state sovereignty can also be 
connected to interventions where member states interests are also at stake, as examined 
below.
The best example o f this is the case o f Somalia, where prior to the intervention a 
request for assistance was received from a Somali Diplomat, o f the former Somali 
government which was no longer in existence. This diplomat was then present at the 
Security Council meeting in relation to the ongoing crisis but was not allowed to speak 
in case any member o f council challenged the authority o f the diplomat to do so, as the 
government of Somalia was no longer in control of the territory. The presence o f the 
diplomat then meant that "the council was thus able to sustain the fiction that it was 
operating with the consent of Somalia itself."61 Although some academics argue that 
the nation state is in decline and that "the Westphalian system o f absolute state 
sovereignty now is falling without a replacement in sight."62 This argument is 
contradicted by the actions of both states who continue to emphasise the importance o f 
their sovereign rights and their right to non-intervention and by the actions o f the 
Security Council which still seeks consent before deploying operations.
Despite this however it can be argued that sovereignty is indeed conditional. That 
member states when undertaking entry to the United Nations have agreed to certain 
restrictions on their actions. It is not conditional on the basis o f human rights or good 
governance unless the Security Council decides that the failure to meet those conditions
61 Hannay, D avid ,New W orld D isorder  (I.B . Tauris: London: 2009) pg 108
62 Gaan, U nited  S ta tes (2006) pg 312
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then constitutes a threat to international peace and security, at which point the states 
sovereignty can be abrogated by a peacekeeping mission based on a chapter seven 
mandate. While states have been concerned by the development o f new norms such as 
R2P and by the fear that, "the consequences o f this new understanding of 
sovereignty...would destroy the very pillars o f international order without offering a 
robust alternative."63 The reality is that the Security Council has, at least in theory, the 
power to undermine their sovereignty without the need for reference to any norm or 
concept. In the past the Councils power has been limited, both by international 
circumstances and by resources but in recent interventions there has been a steady 
increase in the number o f Chapter VII mandates being issued, the council has become 
more willing to act with limited consent. This new willingness to act is however 
bringing its own set o f problems to the Security Council and to peacekeeping 
operations. A perceived lack of consent has in some cases led to a perceived lack o f 
legitimacy in relation to peacekeeping operations. As legitimacy is key to the success o f 
any operation it is o f paramount importance that it be retained. The next section looks 
at the issue o f consent in operations and whether or not the shifts in sovereignty have 
made it unnecessary for the deployment o f operations, or if because o f the need for 
legitimacy, both real and perceived, means that consent is still an important factor in 
the successful deployment o f peacekeepers.
63 W elsh in W elsh, H um anitarian Intervention (2004) pg 53
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The end of Consent?
Consent, along with impartiality and non use o f force, is a key foundation o f 
traditional peacekeeping operations. Throughout the Cold War the issue o f consent 
could make or break a peacekeeping operation as non-intervention defined as "the 
prohibition o f military incursions into states without the consent of the government"64 
was a bedrock principle o f the international system. Since the end o f the Cold War 
however there has been a downgrading of the principle as outlined by Adam Roberts 
who identifies three key crises which contributed to this. The first crisis followed the 
success o f the First Gulf War, following the removal o f Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
Saddam Hussein began a campaign o f persecution against the Iraqi Kurds in the north 
o f the country. In order to prevent this no-fly zones or a Kurdish safe haven, was 
established over the north of the country to prevent the continued attacks. Known as 
Operation Provide Comfort it was undertaken by a coalition o f military forces who 
based their actions on Security Council Resolution 688.6:> This was done without the 
consent o f the Iraqi government and was one of the first operations to be established 
without direct consent. The legality of the operation was later questioned as the 
resolution did not explicitly authorise the creation o f the safe haven, but it still 
represents a clear step towards the reduction in the necessity o f consent. The second 
operation which also reduced the importance of consent was the establishment in 1992 
o f the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia.
64 Roberts, Adam, H um anitarian A ction in War (Adelphi Papers: 305: 1996)
65 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 688, available at http://daccess-dds- 
nv.un.org/doe/R E SO U JT lQ N /G E N /N R 0/596/24/lM G /N R 059624.pdf7O penE leinent (29th July 2010)
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Established under Security Council resolution 743 the operation again was not based on 
a request or the consent of a host government.66
The final crisis was the collapse o f Somalia and the establishment o f the United 
Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). The operation was established by Security 
Council Resolution 77567 in but it is Security Council Resolutions 79468 o f the 3rd 
December 1992 which David Hannay identifies as “probably the most astonishing 
single document to be agreed in the immediate post-Cold war period at the UN" 
because "it swept aside the whole notion, or fiction in the case o f Somalia, o f consent 
by the host nation."69 The resolution established the United Task Force (UNITAF) 
which under the leadership o f the United States o f America undertook Operation 
Restore Hope to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Hannay also identifies this 
resolution as the closest document the UN has ever produced which comes close to 
recognising a legal case for humanitarian intervention. The situation in Somalia will be 
examined in more detail in chapter seven. Following these three key crises Adam 
Roberts went on to argue that the downgrading of consent was taking peacekeeping into 
dangerous territory and that peacekeeping as a tool o f the United Nations was not 
prepared to deal with the potential consequences o f this type o f action.70 What is clear 
is that “the UN confronted a decision in these cases; either depart from the rules o f 
impartiality and consent in order to confront the humanitarian emergency or allow these
66 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 743, available at http://daccess-dds-
nv.un.org/doc/RESO LUT1O N/G EN/N RO/011 /02 /IM G /N R 0011 Q2.pdf?QpenElement (29 th July 2010)
67 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 775, available at http://daccess-dds-
nv.un .ore/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 9 2/410 /10/1M G /N 924101 0.pdf?OpenElem ent (29 th July 2010)
68 United N ations, Security Council Resolution 794, available at http://daccess-dds-
n v. un .ore/doc/U N  DOC/G EN/N 92/7 72/1 I/PD F/N 92772 1 l.pdf?O penElem ent (29th July 2010)
69 Hannay ,N ew  w o r ld  d isorder (2009) pg 109
70 Roberts, Adam, The crisis in p eacekeep ing  (IFS: 2: 1994)
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rules to determine the limits o f its humanitarianism."71 This then had a direct impact on 
the development o f future peacekeeping operations and the extent to which they relied 
upon the consent o f the host state.
The three crises also raised the question o f who consent should be sought from?72 In 
the case o f Somalia the government had completely collapse and was therefore 
incapable o f either requesting assistance or providing consent. In the Former 
Yugoslavia the break up of the Federation meant that only one o f the states had a 
functioning government which was recognised as such by the international community, 
this reflected the reality that although "effective and legitimate states remain the most 
solid foundation for international society, the reality of the post-cold war worlds has 
frequently seen the opposite."73 Without an effective state to ask for assistance who 
then should the UN seek consent from?
In many cases the UN would resort to utilising a similar concept to that o f 
‘negotiated access’74 used by development agencies whereby they would negotiate with 
all of the combatants in an attempt to gain consent for the deployment o f an operation, 
often based on a formal peace accord. The difficulty o f the lack o f legitimate 
governments to provide consent has led to the creation o f different forms o f consent as 
identified by Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams. They identify three main forms o f 
consent including, variable consent when the level and nature o f consent changes across
71 Barnett, M ichael and Martha, Finnemore,Rules for the W orld In ternational O rganizations in G lo b a l 
P olitics  (Cornell University Press London: 2004) pg 123
72 B ellam y, A lex J., The 'next stage' in p eace  operations theory?  (International Peacekeeping: 11 : 1 :  
2004) 17-38
73 W elsh, Jennifer M., From Right to Responsibility: H um anitarian In tervention a n d  In ternational 
Society  (G lobal Governance: 8: 4: 2002) 503
74 For a detailed look at negotiated access see: W eiss, Thomas G .,S w o rd  an d  salve: C onfronting new  
w a rs an d  hum anitarian crises  (Rowman and Littlefield: N ew  York: 2006)
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the mission timeframe, multilayered consent were consent has to be sought at different 
levels, including local, national and regional and finally, malleable consent where 
consent is influence through consent management.75 The issue o f malleable consent has 
however raised some concerns due to the fact that "while consent remains critical for 
the support o f UN operations by key member states, it has increasingly been coerced 
through economic and political pressure."76 This has raised questions relating to the 
legitimacy o f interventions if consent has been coerced because state consent is viewed 
as an important source o f legitimacy77 for interventions. The perceived lack o f 
legitimacy has the potential for negative consequences for operations on the ground as 
"UN operations in internal conflicts have to pay at least as much attention to local 
sources o f legitimacy as they do to that more distant source o f legitimacy, the 
council."78 If  an intervention is not viewed as legitimate by the population it is working 
amongst, that then places peacekeepers at increased risk o f attack.
The problem o f the perceived legitimacy of operations is examined in the following 
section of the chapter. The following section argues that the reduction in the importance 
o f consent along with the attempts to undermine the importance of sovereignty have 
had a negative impact on the United Nations legitimacy within the international system. 
It also argues that this loss of legitimacy has contributed directly to states search for 
alternatives to the Security Council as a legitimating agent for interventions. It then 
goes on to argue that while these alternatives have potential they should be maintained
75 Bellam y, A lex  J. and Paul D. W illiam s,Understanding P eacekeeping  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2 010)
76 Zaurn in L ow e, Vaughan and Adam Roberts and Jennifer W elsh and Dom inik Zaum, The U n ited  
N ations Security  C ouncil an d  War (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008), pg 171
77 H urd,After A narchy (2007)
78 Lowe, Roberts, W elsh and Zaum in Lowe, Security Council (2008) pg 28
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under the influence o f the Security Council in order to prevent the uneven development 
o f peacekeeping capacities across the globe.
The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Legitimating Agents.
In the sections above this chapter has argued that there has been a shift in the 
concept o f sovereignty and that the changes in the way this concept is viewed has led 
directly to a reduction in the importance placed on gaining consent for peacekeeping 
operations before they are deployed. Following on from this the chapter now examines 
the ways in which these changes are impacting on the perceived legitimacy o f 
peacekeeping operations. It argues that despite recent setbacks the United Nations 
"remains an important source o f legitimacy in world politics"79 but that this legitimacy 
is increasingly contested by member states that are searching for alternatives to the 
Security Council to guarantee international peace and security. The section begins by 
examining the ways in which both the Council and operations gain legitimacy before 
arguing that these forms of legitimacy are being questioned by member states who feel 
that the Council is unrepresentative and therefore unable to provide legitimate 
mandates. It goes on to argue that this perceived loss o f legitimacy has directly 
contributed to the increasing influence o f regional organisations in the field o f 
peacekeeping but that this influence needs to be carefully managed to prevent the 
development o f unequal capabilities across the globe.
79 N ye, Joseph S., US p o w e r  a n d  strategy> a fter Iraq  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 4: 2003) 60-73
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Following the end o f the Cold War and the success o f the First Gulf W ar it seemed
as if  the Security Council had received a new lease on life. That it might finally be able
to fulfil the role assigned to it in the Charter to be the predominant body for securing
international peace and security. However after several failures on behalf o f  the
Security Council to act in a timely and appropriate manner questions were raised as to
the continued legitimacy o f an institution that was failing to fulfil its mandate. These
questions were raised despite the fact that "since the Kuwait operation o f 1990, the
council has been treated as the most relevant international institution for granting or
withholding collective legitimation for international war."80 The most recent challenge
to the legitimacy and power o f the Council was sparked by the invasion o f Iraq in 2003.
The divisions created within the Council were perhaps the most challenging situation
the institution had faced since the start o f the Cold war. As UK Ambassador to the
Council at the time Sir Jeremy Greenstock explains the potential danger the Council
faced in dealing with the situation. He argues that
“To have a division o f that depth and intensity and nasty in the Security 
Council was clearly not good for the UN system. Big states when they are 
trying to avoid blaming themselves will blame other states, but they’ll also 
blame the UN for not doing something. States that wanted the UN to be 
involved will blame the US for not using the UN. It all gets contentious and
o t
the arguments used are sometimes forced and unreasonable and bitter.”
At the time these arguments, which were as Ambassador Greenstock describes, 
unreasonable and bitter, could potentially have led to the destruction o f the Council. It 
raised serious questions among member states about the relevance o f an institution
80 Hurd,/(//<?/• A narchy (2007) pg 124
81 Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock 8lh Decem ber 2009
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which could not prevent the actions o f a great power, actions which were viewed by 
many member states, including other permanent members o f the Security Council as 
illegal under international law.
The irony is that the key arguments around the invasion o f Iraq were based on the
attempts to pass a second resolution, one which would have justified the invasion
explicitly; as opposed to the implicit authorisation that the USA was arguing appeared
in the earlier resolutions. This clearly demonstrates the importance that states attach to
the legitimacy which a Council resolution can provide. In fact as Ian Hurd argues "the
controversy at the council was over the legitimacy that comes from a Council
resolution. The two camps were aiming for the same goal, to appropriate that
legitimacy for themselves."82 This argument is supported by other academics such as
Thomas G. Weiss who puts forward the argument that the push for a second resolution
was eventually dropped because, as the USA and other members o f the coalition
“had signed on to the Charter it would have been harder to move ahead had 
there been a Security Council vote because one would have ignored what 
was a vote with one veto, two vetoes, three vetoes whatever. Frequently 
that’s why no resolution comes to the floor. The resolution to invade Iraq in 
February-March 2003 was taken off the table and the United States and the 
coalition moved ahead without Security Council approval which some 
people interpret as illegal; but it would have been even more illegal if  they 
had pushed it to a vote, gotten three vetoes and eight votes and still gone
83ahead. So they chose not to do that.”
Again this demonstrates the importance which states place on having their actions 
viewed as legitimate, and the legitimacy which a UN Security Council Resolution can
82 Hurd,4/?e/- A narchy (2007) , pg vii
83 Interview with Professor Thomas G. W eiss 9lh July 2008
223
Chapter Five Kate Seaman
provide. The debates around the invasion o f Iraq and the Security Councils failure to 
prevent it could have resulted in one o f two outcomes, it could have “if things had gone 
better and the US was triumphantly saying look it just goes to show that sometimes 
good things, legitimate actions require us to defy the will o f the security council, defy 
the UN Charter” 84 it could potentially have undermined the relevance o f the Security 
Council and led to a situation where the future o f the institution was questionable. But, 
as Ian Johnstone then goes on to argue “it just didn’t happen. Now if  anything its 
starting to look like it’s enhanced the credibility of the UN because it has demonstrated 
that however messy and difficult these things are you have a better chance o f success if 
you do it through multilateral channels than unilaterally.” 85
The fact that the UN has emerged from the controversy surrounding the invasion o f 
Iraq is a clear illustration of "how the council's actions have contributed to the 
development o f a set o f legitimate and effective norms to govern state behaviour."86 
The invasion o f Iraq contravened several established norms o f international relations 
and because o f this has come to be viewed as both illegitimate and illegal. The UNs 
unwillingness to be party to the invasion has in some respects contributed to the 
organisations survival, although many of the questions raised by the invasion still 
remain unanswered. The main problem is as Sir Jeremy Greenstock argues that 
“international legitimacy is a fuzzy concept.”87 It is open to interpretation which means 
that the legitimacy of the council is also open to interpretation. This also means that
84 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
85 Ibid, Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
86 Steven R. Ranter in M alone, Security Council (2004) , pg 591
87 Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock 8lh Decem ber 2009
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"the power o f the council is called into question by contests among the powerful states 
regarding how legitimacy should be interpreted."88 Because o f this it is then important 
to understand where the Council gets its legitimacy from in order to ensure that it can 
be retained.
The main basis o f Security Council legitimacy stems from its accepted position as 
the prime organisation dealing with matters relating to international peace and security. 
As Scholte argues “legitimate rule prevails when people acknowledge that an authority 
has a right to govern and that they have a duty to obey its directives.”89 In relation to 
the Security Council this means that member states recognise the right o f the Council to 
govern in matters relating to international peace and security and in theory recognise 
their duty to obey its resolutions, even if they do not do so in practice. This recognition 
is provided by member states acceptance o f the Charter and the acceptance that “the 
only legitimate authority for action, other than self defence, is a council resolution."90 
Although this assertion has also been challenged as Joseph Nye argues. He argues that 
although
“The Security Council still has the legitimacy that comes from the UN 
charter, that actions under article seven have a legal basis stronger than 
other actions. There are for example people who would say that you can’t 
limit yourself just to the Security Council because o f the problem o f the veto 
and the case that’s often used to illustrate that is Kosovo. The argument is 
that the Security Council didn’t approve the bombing of Serbia over Kosovo 
but that it would be justifiable under international humanitarian law, and the 
fact it was a multilateral operation undertaken by NATO provided 
legitimacy. So there’s a dispute, some people say well it was legitimate but
88 U u rdylfter A narchy (2007) , pg 7
89 Scholte in W ilkinson, Rorden, The G lobal G overnance R eader  (Routledge: London: 2005) pg 333
90 Lawrence, Com m odore Tim, H um anitarian A ssistance an d  Peacekeeping: An uneasy a lliance?  (RU SI 
W hitehall Papers Series 48: 1999) pg 47
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not legal, others say no you could make it legal under the evolving 
international humanitarian law.”91
Although there are arguments to be made that the intervention in Kosovo was 
legitimate, if  not strictly legal, following the intervention the argument was made that 
rather than encouraging action outside o f the Security Council it in fact “discouraged 
the members from doing things out with a Security Council resolution in the future.”92 
This unwillingness to intervene independently o f the Security Council can be attributed 
to a number o f factors, not only the lack o f perceived legitimacy and legality, but also 
the reality o f the costs o f interventions.
The charter basis is not however the only way in which the Security Council gains 
legitimacy. It also gamers legitimacy in two other key ways as defined by Barnett and 
Duvall, these are Procedural legitimacy and Substantive legitimacy. Procedural 
legitimacy comes from the transparency of actions, the democratic deliberation and the 
extent o f local participation. While substantive legitimacy is dependant on the decision 
output o f the Council and the amount of consistency and the values associated with that 
output.93 The substantive legitimacy o f the Council is directly tied to the outcomes and 
conduct o f peacekeeping operations. As Lord Robertson argues “legitimacy comes 
from a UN Security Council resolution and it comes from the conduct o f any 
operation.”94 This argument is backed by academics such as Welsh, who argues that 
"judgements about the legitimacy of an action depend not only on which international
91 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye 7lh May 2008
92 Interview with Lord G eorge Robertson 28 th July 2009
93 See Barnett, M ichael, and Raymond Duvall, P ow er in g lo b a l governance  (Cambridge University  
Press: Cambridge: 2005)
94 Interview with Lord George Robertson 28th July 2009
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bodies give it formal approval, but also, quite properly, on perceptions o f  the facts on 
the ground."95 This is reflected in the reality that “operations on the ground that are not 
regarded as legitimate by the citizens o f the country you are working in are a 
problem.”96 In order to ensure legitimacy on the ground Ian Hurd argues that 
operations must demonstrate three key facets, favourable outcomes, fairness and correct 
procedure and that without these, no operation can achieve both local and international 
legitimacy. 97 The problem is again that legitimacy is a subjective concept and not 
everyone will have the same idea o f what constitutes a favourable outcome, or what the 
correct procedure is. This is equally as important because "the degree o f legitimacy also 
derives from the perceived effectiveness o f the operation"98 but again not everyone 
involved will have the same idea o f what constitutes an effective operation. This then 
makes substantive legitimacy hard to achieve.
The Security Council has also faced problems in achieving Procedural legitimacy. It 
has faced "legitimate complaints from the rest o f the membership about the lack o f 
transparency in Security Council proceedings."99 Particularly in relation to the use o f 
informal consultations and the lack o f influence o f Troop Contributing Countries 
(TCCs) in the creation and reformulation o f peacekeeping mandates. The Security 
Council has also faced accusations that "far from replacing power politics, the 
legitimation o f the council changes the context o f power politics by institutionalizing
95 W elsh in W elsh, H um anitarian In tervention (2004) , pg 85
96 Interview with Sir Jeremy G reenstock 8th Decem ber 2009
97 Hurd^4fter A narch y (2007) , pg 7
98 Graeger and N av o sse lo fe  in Pugh, The UN (1997) Pg 259
99 Hannay,/Vew w o r ld  d iso rd er  (2009) pg 146
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it."100 That the Council is merely a representation o f more traditional power politics and 
that the continuation o f the veto prevents weaker states from influencing decisions. In 
other words the argument is that powerful actors are using the UN for collectively 
validated legitim acy101, that they are using the Security Council in situations where an
operation "needs the imprint o f multi-lateral legitimacy to escape charges o f neo-
• 102imperialism." This argument is backed up by writers such as Joseph Nye who 
recognises that “use o f the UN is one o f the important ways to legitimise policies.” 103 
The argument is that states do so because "the UN ' stamp' o f approval has a more 
intangible benefit, by enhancing both the lawfulness and the political acceptability o f 
the proposed military campaign."104 Gaining UN approval for operations is one way 
which states can therefore enhance their ‘soft’ power as explored in Chapter Four.105
The problem is that these charges question the legitimacy o f the council which in 
turn reduces the power and influence o f the organisation.106 Because as Ian Hurd 
explains "without understanding the peculiar nature o f power based on legitimacy, one 
cannot understand the behaviour and effects o f the council." This is because "the 
council has power when it is seen as legitimate and loses power as that perception 
recedes."107 Many of the questions relating to the Councils legitimacy stem from 
concerns about “whether the UN decision-making process adequately represents the
100 Hurd,/tf te r  A narchy (2007) pg 133
101 Smith and W eiss in W eiss. Thom as G.. B eyon d U S  su bcon tracting  (St Martins Press N ew  York:
1998)
102 Johnstone, U S -U S  (2004)
103 Interview with Professor Joseph N y e  7 th May 2008
l04L ow e, Roberts, W elsh and Zaum in L ow e, S ecurity  C ouncil (2008) pg 26
105 See Chapter Four pages 181 - 183
106 See Abram owitz, Morton and Thom as Pickering, M aking in tervention work: Im proving the U S 's  
a b ility  to  act (Foreign Affairs: 87: 5: 2008) 100-109
107 HurdM fter A narchy (2007) pg 2/3
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interest o f actors in the region o f the conflict"108, whether the region is Africa, Asia, the
Middle East or elsewhere. These questions have led to an increasing emphasis on the
use o f regional organisations, such as the African Union because
"they can provide legitimacy, local knowledge, and experience, and some 
resources especially in the form o f personnel. However, they also suffer 
several limitations, including a lack o f mandate, the difficulty o f 
maintaining impartiality and forging common positions, limited resources 
and organisational shortcomings."109
The incorporation o f regional organisations under the UN system is covered under
Chapter VIII o f the Charter but it w asn't until the 2005 report Tn Larger Freedom’ that
the potential these organisations represent was formally recognised.
In the report then Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that
"The time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment o f an 
interlocking system o f peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United 
Nations to work with relevant regional organisations in predictable and 
reliable partnerships."110
It was hoped that the international system was about to see
"the rapid emergence o f a two tier conflict management system, where 
regional organisations or groupings of states assume primary responsibility 
for mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities within their 
geographical area. The UN is at the apex of this system, providing 
authorisation, legitimacy, monitoring, advice, and where needed, diplomatic 
and material support."111
l08Samii and Sidhu in Pugh, M ichael and W .P.S Sidhu. The I X  a m i reg ion a l secu rity  (L ynne Rienner: 
London: 2 0 0 3 ) pg 259
109 A lagappa, Muthiah, R egion al institutions, the U X  a n d  in ternational secu rity  (Third W orld Quarterly: 
1 8:3 : 199 7 )4 2 1 -4 4 1
110 United N ations, In la rg er F reedom  (2005), available at 
http://www .un.orti/laracrfreedom /contents.htni. (2 9 th July 2010)
111 Jackson, Richard, The dangers o f  reg ionalisin g  in ternational conflict m anagem ent: The A frican  
experience  (Political Science 52: 41: 2000)
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The increasing emphasis being placed on the utilisation o f regional organisations stems
partly from the realisation that "exclusive reliance on the UN Security Council to
112authorize intervention often erodes the credibility o f threats to intervene" due to the
failure o f the Council to intervene in a timely and appropriate manner in some crisis
situations. For others "this sub-contracting to other organizations is a new development
caused by the need to back-up or replace peacekeeping operations by the use o f
force."113 In fact it is in relation to those operations which require more force that an
interesting development has occurred. As Boulden notes,
"in response to regional military initiatives taken without Security Council 
authorisation, it has demonstrated relatively little concern for ensuring the 
primacy o f the charter and has been remarkably unprotective o f its own 
turf."114
This lack o f protectiveness for the primacy of the charter can be attributed to a number 
o f causes. For authors such as Fukuyama it is a clear demonstration that “the UN, while 
useful in certain functions like peacekeeping and nation building, is structurally limited 
with regard to both legitimacy and effectiveness." u~ For others the willingness o f the 
UN to allow regional organisations to act independently "serves as a useful cover for 
the UN security council choosing to prevent the UN from playing a greater role."116 
Again the use o f regional organisations has led to questions as to the capability o f the 
United Nations as an international peacekeeper. The somewhat sporadic use o f these
112 W axm an, Intervention (2009) pg 16
113 W hite in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 58
114 Boulden in Boulden, Jane, D ealin g  w ith  C onflict in A frica  (Palgrave M acm illan N ew  York: 2 003), pg 
29
115 Fukuyam a,/l//er the N eo-cons (2006) pg 157
116 Olanisalam  and Ero in Pugh, The UN (2003) pg 233
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organisations is again an illustration o f the selectivity o f Council members, and the 
importance which they assign to some interventions to the detriment o f others. It is a 
demonstration that “the complexities o f the international political system militate
117against developing a predictable and reliable inter-locking system.”
Although the use o f regional organisations does represent "one way o f addressing
110
the growing gap between demand and supply and reducing the burden on the UN," it 
also poses a lot o f challenging questions. The first question relates to the risk that “the 
danger in allowing greater unauthorized regional enforcement action as opposed to
consensual peacekeeping is that they are likely to be abused by the regional
superpower."119 Rather than making peacekeeping more representative and responsive 
this would then only exacerbate power politics on a regional level rather than an 
international level. Another argument for the utilisation o f regional organisations is that 
decentralisation, delegation and cooperation would lighten the burden on the UN, 
especially in relation to resources. But there are questions as to the potential for 
regional organisations to fulfil this devolved responsibility, particularly in relation to 
the inherent weaknesses o f many regional organisations in capabilities and resources, 
plus the potential difficulty regional actors may face in remaining impartial in a conflict 
situation.120 Although some academics such as Fawcett argue that "The UN and 
regional actors are intimately and increasingly linked in a common security building
117 Saijoh Bah, A. and Bruce D. Jones, P eace  O pera tions P artnersh ips: Lessons a n d  Issues fro m  
C oordin ation  to  H yb rid  A rrangem ents  (N ew  York: Center for International Cooperation 2 0 08) pg7
118 Alagappa, R egion al Institu tions (1997)
1,9 W hite in Pugh, The UN (1997) pg 58
120 Berdal, M ats, W hither UN peacekeep in g?  (IISS: London: 1993)
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project in which a de facto division o f labour has em erged."121 This ignores the reality
that “reliance on regional operations may mean that a greater burden is carried by those
who are comparatively ill equipped to do so."122
One o f the key testing grounds for the utilisation o f regional organisations has been
Africa, it is on this continent that
"the limitations o f the UN have especially been exemplified in conflict- 
stricken African states where the demands for peacekeepers are arguably the
greatest and regional contributions to UN peacekeeping face the most
1 21constraints."
It is the limitations o f the UN and the challenges they have faced in several complex
conflicts which have led to arguments by academics such as Craig N. Murphy that the
African Union would be better “able to do things that particularly the UN cannot do
because o f the greater legitimacy that comes from being Africans, and African troops
and African governments.” 124
The problem is that in some cases the use o f regional organisations can undermine
the UN as one field operative argues
“It undermines the UN in cases again like UNAMID where you end up with 
some kind o f hybrid. What the AU lacks, specifically lacks, is resources and 
therefore the AU is always looking to get the resources o f the UN. It is quite 
keen to have ownership o f some missions and UNAMID is a case in point, 
but what we have ended up with is an organisation which the UN funds and 
the AU is still providing most o f the assets or members o f the AU are 
providing most o f the assets and that hasn't been helpful.” 125
121 Fawcett in Pugh, The UN (2003)  pg 12
122 Forman and Grane in M alone, Security  C ouncil (2004)
123 N eeth ling, Theo, In ternational p ea cekeep in g  trends  (Politikon: 3 1 :1 :  2004) 49-66
124 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3 rd Septem ber 2008
125 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 2 7 th August 2008
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This then leads to a blurring o f lines between what the UN wants to achieve and what 
the AU is working towards on the ground. It only serves to make the operation more 
complex and convoluted. It is also a clear demonstration that "there is an immense gulf 
as regards means and resources that effectively separates organisation in the developed 
world from regional organisations in the developing world."126 Although academics 
such as Robert Rotberg argue that “regional or sub-regional organizations need to be 
encouraged to intervene militarily for peace in their own areas” and that “big power 
training and funding ought to be made available to prepare for and sustain such regional 
or sub-regional intervention capabilities.” 127 This ignores completely "the inadequacy 
o f regional organisations as a substitute for the U N ."128
The reality is that the use o f regional organisation instead o f the UN “may be 
politically expedient, but it does not represent a conceptual solution."129 Instead as 
Marrack Goulding argues the increased utilisation o f regional organisations is in fact 
contrary to the ethical vision o f universalism which the UN claims to represent because 
o f the vast differences between the capabilities o f regional organisations it would be 
unethical for people in a region to receive only the level o f peacekeeping that region 
can provide. Goulding is arguing that increased emphasis on the use o f regional 
organisations and decentralization will lead to the fragmentation o f security concerns 
and that in turn could lead to a 'peacekeeping apartheid.'130 It could also potentially
126 N eeth ling, In tern ation al pea cek eep in g  trends (2004) pg 63
,27Rotberg in Rotberg, Robert, P eacekeepin g  a n d  P eace  Enforcem ent in A frica  (Brookings Institute 
W ashington: 2000)
128 Hannay ,N ew  w o r ld  d iso rd er (2009) pg 28
129 M ayall in W elsh, H um anitarian In tervention (2004) pg 138
130 G oulding, Marrack,P eacem onger  (John Murray (Publishers) Ltd.: London: 2002)
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lead to "a brewing competition between the United Nations and regional
• 1Uorganizations" in which the primacy o f the Security Council would not be
guaranteed. This situation becomes even more realistic when you look at arguments
such as those raised by Sam Daws who notes that
“There is a greater, and will in the future be, an increasing requirement that 
all international institutions prove their value for money and their 
effectiveness. The debate, the narrative will increasingly shift to looking at 
burden sharing and subsidiarity and looking at the global regional 
collaboration on the basis o f cost with the global economic climate e tc .132
The problem is that although the UN is strong in some aspects such as troop access,
in the eyes o f many member states it lacks other important tools. As one UK official
outlined
“The UN lacks organisation and administrative skill and also military 
planning skills in comparison to the EU and NATO. NATO has the best 
planning, the military planning is very focused (logistics / tactics). There is 
also the problem of the small numbers in the UN in comparison to the EU 
and NATO particularly in relation to qualified military and administrative 
sta ff/’133
Another official outlined the key differences between the UN and the EU in particular:
“Some of which is related to the way in w hich the EU operates. It operates 
much more as a nation state if you like rather than the UN which operates as 
a massive bureaucracy. In the sense that if the EU is looking at a 
peacekeeping mission or a peacekeeping scenario the EU looks at it from a 
much more pragmatic point of view than the UN does. The UN tends to 
look at it through a completely political prism and therefore you get 
missions like UNAMID set up which have no real clear military 
peacekeeping goal, or achievable clear peacekeeping goal. Whereas the EU 
on the other hand will look at it and say do we have the means to achieve
131 B osco , David L ,F ive to  Rule Them A ll  (Oxford University Press N ew  York: 2 009) pg 174
132 Interview with Sam D aw s 9 ,h Decem ber 2009
133 Interview with M O D  O fficial 24th February 2009
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this? If yes then we might go and do it if no well we won’t even consider it 
any further. That’s not what happens here (at the UN), here the political 
pressure continues in the security council so the UN can end up getting 
those kinds o f missions. So in that sense the EU can be quite helpful. It also 
has forces o f course which are much more capable than the average forces 
that come forward as troop contributing countries in the UN.” 134
The increasing importance o f regional organisations can be attributed to the fact that 
"legitimated international organizations affect how states perceive their interests and 
the payoffs o f available policy choices." 133 Regional organisations are gaining 
increasing legitimacy, particularly larger organisations such as the European Union 
which has in some respects superseded the sovereignty o f its member states.
The growing influence o f these organisations also explains why "an emphasis on 
questions o f legitimacy is growing as the belief in the inevitability o f a state-centred 
balance o f power is in decline." 136 This is not to say however that the Security Council 
will become irrelevant. Instead its importance may even increase. Among the many 
considerations that could point in such a direction is that it can authorise the use o f 
force and o f peacekeeping operations in a wide range o f circumstances, including the 
use o f force by regional organizations. “Technically speaking under the UN charter 
regional uses o f force should be reported to the UN Security Council and any action 
should be under Council mandate.” 137 This need for Council oversight is supported by 
other academics such as Ian Johnstone who although he is “not one who thinks that the 
UN needs to be the sole peacekeeper” still recognises the need for Council oversight
134 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 27 th August 2008
135 \\\\r<\,After A narchy (2007) pg 111
136 Ibid. Pg 9
137 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts 8lh Decem ber 2009
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while making the argument that “there are plenty o f situations where a security council
mandate and a coalition or regional organisation could do just as well as the UN.” 138 As
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall argue however
“The key danger is that those with the military capacity will take on such 
interventions outside the ambit o f the United Nations, and will thereby 
forfeit the international legitimacy upon which such operations in the end 
depend.” 139
At the moment “a UN Security Council resolution is the gold standard of 
legitimacy.” 140 However should the influence o f regional organisations continue to 
increase it is clear to see that the Security Council needs to be even more careful to 
ensure its own continued legitimacy and position at the top o f the pile as "the more the 
Security Council is asked to do and adjudicate on, the more important the council's own 
legitimacy becomes."141 As Tanner argues “such a system cannot be created top down, 
but rather it needs to be built on peacekeeping practices, norms, and interdependent 
relations o f states and institutions.” 142
This chapter has looked at several key issues which impact on the perceived 
legitimacy o f a peacekeeping operation. It has argued that there has been a change in 
the concept o f sovereignty and that the international system is now moving towards a 
situation where sovereignty will be conditional. It also argued however that this shift in 
sovereignty is not recognised by all states and that it is also not being applied on an
138 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3 rd July 2008
139 Ram sbotham , O liver and Tom W oodhouse and Hugh M ia 11,Con tem porary  C onflict R esolution  (Polity  
Press Cambridge: 2006) pg 147
140 Interview with M O D  O fficial 24 th February 2009
141 B ellam y, A lex  J.,R esponsib ility  to  p ro te c t  (Polity: Cambridge: 2 0 09) pg 23
142 Tanner, Fred, A ddressin g  the P erils  o f  Peace O perations: T ow ard  a  G lo b a l P eacekeep in g  System  
(G lobal Governance: 16: 2010) 209-217
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equal basis across the international system. Following on from that the chapter argued 
that there has been a marked reduction in the importance o f the issue o f consent in 
relation to peacekeeping operations, this reduction is directly attributable to both the 
changes in sovereignty and the increasing number o f weak or failing states who are 
incapable o f providing such consent.
The reduction in the importance o f consent has made it easier for the UN to 
intervene but conversely has made interventions much harder to undertake on the 
ground. It has increased the complexity o f such operations as peacekeepers now have to 
negotiate with multiple parties to ensure access. It has also heightened the fears o f 
weaker states and has led to a loss o f legitimacy for some operations which are viewed 
as illegitimate on the ground. This perception o f illegitimacy has led some member 
states to search for alternatives to the Security Council in order to secure peace and 
security, but these alternatives come with their own set o f problems and challenges as 
argued above.
Following on from this and the previous chapters. Chapter Six combines all o f the 
issues discussed and examines the impact these are having on peacekeeping operations 
in the field. The chapter argues that the development o f global governance, with its 
emphasis on liberal democracy, has led to the UN undertaking much wider and more 
varied tasks than ever before. It argues that the increased number o f tasks within 
mandates has not been matched by an equal increase in resources and political will and 
because o f this operations are unable to achieve their goals. This failure to achieve 
favourable outcomes then leads states to question the legitimacy o f such operations,
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particularly in relation to the sometimes marked disparity o f resources between 
different interventions. This then also raises questions as to how these operations are 
mandated and to questioning o f the power and representation on the Security Council.
The issue o f power is also connected to the changes in the concept o f sovereignty which 
having made interventions easier to create has also had the effect o f making 
interventions more complex in the field. Increased complexity in operations can also be 
attributed to the increase in the number o f actors operating within conflict zones and the 
need for peacekeeping missions to coordinate all o f  these actors whilst also working 
towards its own agenda.
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Chapter Six: The impact of the development of Global Governance on 
Peacekeeping Operations in the field.
Following on from previous chapters this chapter argues that the development o f 
global governance, with its emphasis on liberal democracy, has led to the UN 
undertaking much wider and more varied tasks than ever before. It argues that the 
increased number o f tasks within mandates has not been matched by an equal increase 
in resources and political will and because of this operations are unable to achieve their 
goals. This leads into the arguments examined in the following chapter which argues 
that the failure to achieve favourable outcomes then leads states to question the 
legitimacy and validity o f such operations, particularly in relation to the sometimes 
marked disparity o f resources between different interventions. This then also raises 
questions as to how these operations are mandated and to questioning o f the power and 
representation on the Security Council. The issue o f power is also connected to the 
changes in the concept o f sovereignty w;hich. having made interventions easier to create 
has also had the effect o f making interventions more complex in the field. Increased 
complexity in operations can also be attributed to the increase in the number o f actors 
operating within conflict zones and the need for peacekeeping missions to coordinate 
all o f  these actors whilst also working towards its own agenda.
Utilising four case studies this chapter argues that the development o f the concept of 
Global Governance1 is having a detrimental impact on peacekeeping as operations are
1 For a detailed exploration o f  the ideas and concepts o f  Global Governance see Chapter One.
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given ever increasing mandates. It also argues that the UN has become involved in the 
transmission o f the norms associated with the concept o f Global Governance, including 
democratisation, good governance and respect for human rights, and that through this 
transmission has become involved in a much wider range o f tasks associated with the 
creation o f a society o f ‘good’ states based on the liberal democratic model. It argues 
that this emphasis is causing problems in the UNs ability to intervene in conflicts, 
particularly in relation to resource allocation and in the questions it raises as to the 
legitimacy o f the interventions taking place as UN interventions have become 
associated with a western dominated agenda. It looks at the new organisations 
developing peacekeeping abilities and how all o f these organisations are coordinated 
within the field. It also looks at the disparity in both resources and action in relation to 
the different case studies and examine the reasoning behind this arguing that certain 
conflicts are more important in relation to the development o f the liberal project than 
others. This chapter provides a practical application o f the theoretical concepts o f the 
previous chapters. It demonstrates the ways in which the development o f the concept o f 
Global Governance and the application o f the norms associated with this concept have 
increased the tasks UN peacekeeping operations are mandated to undertake. This 
connection between the development o f the concept o f Global Governance and the 
increasing tasks will provide a new perspective on the problems facing peacekeeping 
operations and the evident disconnect between rhetoric and reality within UN 
operations.
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The four case studies utilised in this chapter are the interventions in Somalia and The 
Former Yugoslavia. The intervention in Somalia includes the initial UN intervention 
UNOSOM I, the UN mandated intervention by the United States UNITAF and the 
second UN intervention UNOSOM II. While the interventions in the Former 
Yugoslavia include the UN interventions UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina, UNCRO in Croatia, UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, UNMIK in Kosovo 
and UNMIBH in Bosnia Herzegovina. For the purposes o f this study the case study on 
the Former Yugoslavia will focus specifically on UNPROFOR, and UNMIBH as well 
as the NATO intervention which resulted in the establishment o f UNMIK. The 
intervention in Burundi falls under a single operation ONUB while the intervention in 
the DRC covers two different but consecutive operations MONUC and the more recent 
incarnation MONUSCO. These case studies provide a useful insight into the 
development o f UN peacekeeping operations. They cover a broad time period from the 
1990’s to the present day and have occurred in a variety o f geographical locations. This 
means they can be utilised to analyse responses o f the Security Council in relation to 
different geo-strategic issues which is particularly relevant when examining the 
resources and political will in relation to each mission. These case studies also involved 
a large number o f other actors, including single states, non-governmental organisations, 
and other international organisations such as the European Union and NATO. Again 
this makes them useful in assessing the impact which these organisations have on wider 
UN peacekeeping. Finally these case studies are also important as they offer a chance to 
analyse many o f the theoretical issues raised in earlier chapters in a more practical way.
241
Chapter Six Kate Seaman
All o f the interventions raise questions and issues in relation to the ways in which UN 
peacekeeping is being utilised to further the development o f the concept o f Global 
Governance. These questions relate to issues o f sovereignty and consent as explored in 
the previous chapter, as well as the increasing emphasis being placed on the creation o f 
liberal democratic states in post conflict countries which was explored in chapter four. 
They also provide a chance to examine the impact o f the power structures within the 
Security Council and the increasing influence o f regional and other organisations.
This chapter begins by providing an insight into the role o f the UN in relation to the 
case studies before moving on to analyse key issues relating to the individual 
interventions that can then be applied to wider peacekeeping operations. These issues 
will include the mandating and resourcing o f operations, the increased complexity of 
co-ordinating with other organisations, the globalisation o f local conflicts and the 
dangers o f state building as well as the potential for the creation o f alternatives to the 
UN. It argues that the development o f the global governance project has directly 
hampered the success o f peacekeeping operations and led to the large disparity between 
what the UN says it will achieve and what it is actually capable o f achieving. It also 
argues that this has then in turn left the UN open to direct challenges to its authority in 
the field o f peacekeeping and the search for alternative ways o f securing international 
peace and security.
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The United Nations in Somalia
Somalia collapsed into civil war as two opposing factions struggled to assert their 
right to power. With no central government to ensure stability the country was quickly 
divided between various rival militias as other clans became involved in the conflict 
seeking a chance to assert their influence. The violent conflict disrupted all areas o f 
Somali life and most dangerously the agricultural process. The inability to produce 
enough food coupled with the displacement o f huge numbers o f the population 
combined to produce one o f the worst humanitarian disasters o f the nineties. Although 
the descent into civil war was a major factor in the following humanitarian crisis, the 
problems the country can be traced even further back. 'T h e  famine that gripped 
Somalia in 1992 resulted from the degeneration o f the country's political system and 
economy” and this degeneration began under the rule o f Siad Barre who with his 
manipulation o f aid left Somalia with no functional administration (and essentially no 
government income except aid flows).”3 Both Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar 
liken the process o f state collapse in Somalia to a long and complex degenerative 
disease, which "left behind little but the wreckage o f distorted traditions and artificial 
institutions, a vacuum that the most ruthless elements in the society soon filled."4 It was 
the humanitarian crisis rather than the collapse o f the state which prompted 
international intervention. The images o f starving children displayed on television
2 Clarke, W alter and Jeffrey Herbst, Som alia  a n d  the fu tu re  o f  hum anitarian in tervention  (Foreign  
Affairs: 75: 2: 1996)
3 G ilkes, Patrick, From  pea cek eep in g  to  p ea ce  enforcem ent: The Som alia p reced en t  (M iddle East Report: 
1 8 5 :1 9 9 3 )
4 Samatar, Terrence Lyons and A hm ed ,Som alia: S ta te C ollapse, M ultila teral In tervention a n d  S tra teg ies  
o f  P o litica l R econstruction  (Brookings: W ashington D.C: 1995) pg 24
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screens across the world introduced the so called ‘CNN effect’ into humanitarian 
interventions as world leaders were galvanised into taking action. “International 
perceptions o f the Somali war were straightforward and naive: thugs were looting 
humanitarian aid and a military intervention would allow the population to gain free 
access to food and thereby escape starvation.” 5 The situation on the ground however 
was much more complex.
The United Nations had been involved in providing humanitarian relief within
Somalia prior to the collapse o f the Barre Government. However following the descent
into civil war “amid increasing security concerns, the United Nations withdrew its relief
operations in mid-1991, leaving only a few NGOs to deal with the escalating
humanitarian crisis.”6 At the time
“neither the means nor the will existed in the UN to mount a major 
humanitarian response to the swelling crisis. International assistance for the 
first year and a half o f the civil war was left to the International Committee 
o f the Red Cross and a handful o f relief agencies.”7
The failure o f the United Nations to engage with the problems in Somalia was so 
detrimental that it led to the unprecedented situation of the ICRC publicly criticising the 
operations o f the UN within the country in late 1991. Unfortunately in many ways 
Somalia was a victim o f timing, with the crisis in Somalia starting “at a time when the 
international community was completely focused on the beginning o f the second Gulf
5 M archal, Roland, W arlordism  a n d  terrorism : how  to obscure an a lrea d y  confusing situation? The case  
o f  Som alia  (International Affairs: 83: 6: 2007)
6 W estern, Jon, Sou rces o f  hum anitarian intervention  (International Security: 26: 4: 2 002) 112-142
7 Bryden, M atthew, Som alia: the w a g es o f  fa ilu re  (Current History: 94: 591: 1995) pg 145
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War.” It wasn’t until 1992 that Somalia began to gamer much attention on the 
international scene. The introduction o f Resolution 733 marked a renewed interest on 
the part o f the United Nations with the problems o f the failed state. This resolution 
implemented an arms embargo on Somalia which many analysts likened to closing the 
gate after the horse has escaped. This was closely followed by the implementation o f 
peace talks between the major warring factions. Following the signing o f a ceasefire the 
UN provided a mission designed to observe the ceasefire and to ensure the safe delivery 
o f humanitarian aid. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was ill equipped to 
deal with the situation in Somalia and with only 5009 lightly armed observers it was 
never likely to succeed in fulfilling its mandate to ensure the safe delivery o f the huge 
amount o f aid pouring into the country. The situation rapidly deteriorated until “every 
instance o f communal tension had the potential to quickly escalate into a much more 
lethal conflict” 10. By the time UNOSOM I was replaced by a US led force in the form 
o f the United Nations authorised Unified Task Force (UNITAF), Somalia was “an 
anarchistic battleground for rival warlords” 11.
The UNITAF forces arrived in Somalia on the 9th o f December 199212 setting 
another precedent within the UN as the first operation mandated under Chapter VII of 
the Charter to be deployed within an internal conflict. The American led operation had 
a very clear mandate “to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations
8 M archal, W cirlordism a n d  terrorism  (2007)
9 N ations, United, The U N  a n d  Som alia  (Department o f  Public Information UN: N ew  York: 1996)
l0Ibid. pg 215
11 Am brose, Stephen and Douglas Brinkley ,R ise to  G lobalism  (Penguin: London: 1997) pg 404
12 United Nations, The U N  and Som alia
http://w w w .un.org/D epts/dpko/dpko/co m ission/unosom lbackgr2.htm l#three (20th April 2010)
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• * 1 3within Somalia” . The forces were not under UN control and instead reported directly
to the American military command who were determined to “deploy a large force
capable o f controlling the violence and making it clear to the faction leaders that order
would be restored with or without their cooperation.” 14 The aims o f the mission were
limited to opening supply routes for aid and protecting those routes until a newly
formed UN operation was in place. The intervention o f the USA in Somalia “suggested
that humanitarian intervention was securing a new legitimacy in post-Cold War
international society” 15 unfortunately this newfound legitimacy was to be short lived.
The US forces were replaced by the reconfigured UNOSOM II in March 1993 with a
much broader mandate it was hoped that the new UN force would help bring order to a
country in anarchy. The new mandate included tasks which can be associated with the
growing influence o f the norms associate with global governance including, the
development o f democratic institutions, with the Security Council “expressing it’s
readiness to assist the people o f Somalia in  to participate in free and fair
elections” 16 and the mission being tasked
“to assist the people o f Somalia to promote and advance political 
reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors o f Somali society, 
and the re-establishment o f national and regional institutions and civil 
administration in the entire country.” 17
13 N ations,Som alia  (1996) pg 32
14 Pugh, Trevor, The use o f  fo rce  in U N  pea cek eep in g  opera tion s  (Oxford U niversity Press Oxford: 2002) 
p g l6 9
15 W heeler, N icholas L e a v in g  S tran gers  (O xford U niversity Press Oxford: 2 0 0 0 ) pg 172
16 United N ations, United N ations Security Council R esolution 814 http://daccess-dds- 
n y .un .org /doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 93/226/18/lM G /N 9322618.pdf?O penEIem ent (19th April 2011)
Ibid.
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The mandate also called for the protection o f human rights and placed direct emphasis 
on the role o f civil society “in the process o f political reconciliation.” 18 Whilst 
mandating the mission to undertake these roles, roles which would normally have been 
the preserve o f the state, the Security Council placed continued emphasis on the 
uniqueness o f the situation in Somalia. It was hoped that the mission would be 
successful in achieving these aims and that Somalia would be reconstituted as a 
functioning sovereign state, however it was not long before the situation deteriorated.
The UN involvement in Somalia came to a swift end with an attack on a Pakistani 
contingent attempting to conduct a weapons inspection the USA then ordered 400 o f its 
rangers to begin the hunt for the warlord who had claimed responsibility resulting in the 
deaths o f 18 American soldiers and the end o f the political support for the operation.
The United Nations in the Former Yugoslavian Republics
The United Nations involvement in the Former Yugoslavia began on the 25th o f 
September 1991 when the Security Council accepted resolution 713.19 This resolution
called on all states to enact a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries o f
20weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia." This was followed by several further 
resolutions condemning the violence in the region and in 1992 the Security Council
18 Ibid.
19 United Nations, United N ations Peacekeeping W ebsite
http://w w w .un.org/en/peacekeeping/m issions/past/unprof b.htm (20th August 2010)
20 United N ations Security Council Resolution 713, http://daccess-dds-
nv.iin.org/doc/RESO LUTlO N/G F.N/NRO /596/49. lM G /N R 059649.pdl?Q penE lem ent (20 ,h August 2010)
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established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) under resolution 743.21 
UNPROFOR was beset with problems from its inception, the mandates were out with 
its ability to achieve and they only became more complex and demanding as the 
situation escalated. By the end o f the initial UN involvement in the region the Security 
Council had passed over 60 resolutions in relation to UNPROFOR.22 As in Somalia 
many o f these mandates contained reference to the norms o f global governance 
including democratisation, good governance and respect for human rights. For example 
in resolution 1031 in 1995 the mission was given the responsibility o f  ensuring “the 
conduct by others o f other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free 
and fair elections.”23 Then in 1996 the mission was tasked with
“advising law enforcement agencies on guidelines on democratic policing 
principles with full support for human rights, and investigating or assisting 
with investigations into human rights abuses”24
Again the UN Peacekeeping mission was authorised to undertake responsibilities 
normally assumed to be under the jurisdiction o f a sovereign state. A situation which 
was still continuing in 2002 when the mission was again tasked with providing
“a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective 
jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in
21 United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, http: dacccss-dds-
nv.un.org/doc/R lvSO LU H Q N/Cil-N  NR0 01 1 /02/IM G  NROOI IQZ.pdtVOpenElement (20 ,h August 2010)
22 Ryan, Stephen, The UN a n d  in ternational p o litic s  (M acM illan: London: 2000) pg 115
23 United N ations, Annex 1A o f  the Dayton Peace Agreem ent as Referred to in Security Council 
Resolution 1031, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 95/405/26/P D F/N 9540526.pdf?O penE lem ent (19th April 2011)
24 United N ations, United N ations Security Council Resolution 1088, http://daccess-dds- 
n y .un .org /doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 97/026/19 /P D F /N 9702619.pdf?O penElem ent (2nd M ay 2011)
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accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for 
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.”25
The emphasis o f these norms and ideals created an enormous amount o f work for the 
peacekeeping mission in an ongoing conflict situation which was one o f the most 
complicated the UN had faced. Alongside the demands for national self-determination 
amongst the once united republics was the plan for a greater Serbia being instigated by 
the then Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic had an overall aim o f an 
ethnically pure Serbia dominating the region and the first step towards achieving this 
plan was the invasion of Croatia in 1991. The fighting in Croatia was focused around 
the Krajina peninsula where there was a large Serbian minority. By the time the United 
Nations peacekeepers arrived in Croatia the Serbs had gained roughly a quarter o f the 
territory, a situation which was frozen by the arrival o f the UN troops.26 The fighting in 
Croatia also marked the beginning o f the war crimes in the region with the shelling o f 
the cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar. Although initially deployed as a peacekeeping 
mission in Croatia the United Nations was soon facing a clear example o f “mission
**27creep” as the conflict in Croatia was quickly followed by the conflagration in Bosnia 
where a three way conflict ensued between the various factions.
The conflict in Bosnia was even more devastating as it followed a "centuries-long 
tradition o f accommodation and mutual coexistence o f different religious communities
25 United Nations, United N ations Security Council Resolution 1423, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 02/477/85/P D F/N 0247785.pdf?O penE lem ent (2nd M ay 2011)
26 Zim m erm an, Warren, The last am b a ssa d o r  (Foreign Affairs: 74: 2: 1995)
27 M ission Creep: Refers to the changing o f  the mandate o f  peacekeeping operations from humanitarian 
to more combat orientated operations. The main exam ple o f  this was in the intervention in Som alia. 
M ission Creep is seen as a problem as o f  ten the troops involved in the operation are not equipped to 
handle the escalation in tasks required by the m ission change.
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and nationalities"28 along with "historical patterns o f coalition politics and compromise, 
coupled with deeply-rooted traditions o f cooperation and coexistence in everyday
29life." There were three main factions in the Bosnian Conflict, Bosnian-Serbs who 
wanted to join a greater Serbia, Bosnian Muslims who wished to retain independence 
from both Serbia and Croatia, and Bosnian Croats who wished to join with Croatia. The 
division o f Bosnia was pursued ruthlessly by both the Serbian Leader Slobodan 
Milosevic and the Croatian Leader Franz Tudjman, “as a place where Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims, had coexisted more or less peacefully for centuries, Bosnia was an affront and 
a challenge to these two ethnic supremacists.”30 The UN intervention was also 
complicated by the international recognition o f some o f the seceding republics which 
placed operations in a grey area, particularly in relation to the issue o f consent which, 
as already argued in chapters three and four, is often key to the success o f peacekeeping 
operations.31
UNPROFOR was replaced in Croatia in March 1995 by the United Nations 
Confidence Restoration Operation, UNCRO. which was predicated on the main policy 
basis o f the UN within Croatia and Bosnia, the establishment and protection o f safe 
havens with the aim o f protecting ethnic minorities within the region. In May 1995 
President Tudjman o f Croatia expelled the UN force from Croatia leaving the UN little 
choice but to supervise the evacuation o f Serbian refugees. Following the reintegration 
by force o f two o f the regions under UN protection. Krajina and Western Slavonia,
28 D onia, Robert J. And John. V .A . F \ne.B osnia-H ercegovina: A Tradition b e tr a y e d (C. Hurst and Co.:
London: 1 9 9 4 )pg 280
29 Ibid. pg 280
30 Zim m erm an, The last am b a ssa d o r  (1995)
31 For more on consent see Chapter Three pages 146 - 160 and Chapter Four pages 169 - 186
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UNCRO forces remained only in Eastern Slavonia and the Prevlaka peninsula. UNCRO 
was replaced in 1996 by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia,
32UNTAES, whose task was the peaceful reintegration o f the region into Croatia and by 
the United Nations Mission o f Observers in Prevlaka, UNMOP,33 whose task was to 
monitor the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula. The expulsion of the UN from 
Croatia is a clear demonstration o f the need for consent in the operation o f 
peacekeeping missions, and is also a demonstration o f what can occur when 
peacekeeping troops outstay their welcome, in many cases freezing the conflict and not 
allowing a resolution to the underlying causes. As one observer o f the conflict in 
Croatia argues,
“When there were problems about how to find a lasting solution, in a way 
they became a burden. When you want to find a lasting solution and you 
have a force which is in the way and cemented like the case o f Cyprus, the 
UN forces themselves get an unwelcoming reception by one faction or one 
warring party. Because one party wants to find a lasting solution and they 
are not here to help find the solution, they are here to keep peace and the 
other party may not be that eager to find a lasting solution, and then people 
find themselves in a very unpleasant position."’4
In this case the UN forces were overrun by Croatian troops who forcibly regained their 
territory. However the fall o f the safe areas w ithin Croatia demonstrated the inability o f 
the UN troops to act in defence o f the protected populations and quickly led to attacks 
on safe areas within other republics and the UN was ill equipped to prevent them. The 
most horrific collapse o f a safe haven occurred in Srebrenica where the UN forces had
32 United N ations http://wwvv.un.org/en/pcacekeeping /m issions/past/unlaes.htm  (20th August 2010)
33 United N ations http://wavw.un.oru/en/peacekeepine/inissions/past/unm op/background.htm l (20th  
A ugust 2010)
34 Interview with Igor Ilic Reuters 6th August 2009 6,h August 2009
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no choice but to stand aside and watch as thousands o f Muslim men and boys were 
taken aside and slaughtered. These failures occurred despite the fact that the troops had 
a clear mandate to protect those within the protected areas and have led to several 
investigations into the failings o f both the individual troops and the wider 
organisation.33
The war in Bosnia was finally halted with the introduction o f the Dayton Accords, 
this peace agreement coincided with the increased isolation o f the Bosnian Serbs as the 
Croats and Muslims had formed a federation, under the threat o f US economic 
sanctions. It also coincided with the Croatian Armies capture o f the Serb territory in the 
Krajina peninsula which effectively removed UN protection for Serbs in the region. 
Serbia itself also came under attack through NATOs 'operation deliberate force’36 an 
air campaign designed to advance the cause o f peace in the Balkan region and a prelude 
to greater intervention in the region. The Dayton Accord was based on the mutual 
respect for the sovereignty o f each 'state ' in the eyes o f the agreement, Croatia, Bosnia 
and the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (comprised o f Serbia and Montenegro). Bosnia 
was divided into two entities. 51% of the territory formed a Muslim-Croat federation 
and 49% a Serb Republic.37 Following the signing o f the peace agreement in 1995
35 For the full report into the fall o f  Srebrenica see: United Nations
httn://\vvvvv.un.ora/pcace/srebrenica.pdf accessed 39th Auuust 2 0 1 0 . See also Human Rights Watch ‘The 
fa l l  o f  S rebren ica  a n d  the fa ilu re o f  UN p ea cek eep in g '  available at 
http://w w w .hrw .oru/en/node/85087/section/3 (29th August 2010).
36 For a detailed analysis o f  N A T O s air campaign see:O w en, Col. Robert C. O w en, D elibera te  Force: A 
ca se  s tu d y  in effective a ir  cam paigning: F inal R eport (A ir University Press M axw ell A irforce Base, 
Alabama: 2000)
37 Trbovich, Ana S.,A leg a l g eo g ra p h y  o f  y u g o s la v ia ’s  d isin tegra tion  (O xford University Press N ew  
York: 2008), pg 320
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UNPROFOR in Bosnia was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
Herzegovina (UNM IBH).38
The war in Bosnia tested the capacities o f the UN and pushed the organisation to its
limits. It provides a good example o f the limitations to what the UN is capable o f
achieving in an ongoing conflict zone. It also demonstrates the importance of
coordination with other organisations which is highlighted by the role o f NATO in the
conclusion o f hostilities in the region. The Yugoslav conflict also provided the United
Nations with a means to demonstrate another o f its unique tools, the use o f preventive
deployment. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, UNPREDEP, was the
last o f the three interlinking peacekeeping operations which replaced the original
UNPROFOR in the region. Deployed at the request o f the President o f Macedonia its
mandate was to monitor the border between Macedonia and Serbia as well as the
borders with Albania. Although unique
“The mission has demonstrated that preventive deployment is an effective 
form o f peacekeeping and that results can be achieved even with a small, 
almost symbolic deployment o f United Nations peace-keepers, if it is done 
at the right time and with a clear mandate.”39
The signing o f the Dayton peace accord did not however signal the end to hostilities in 
the region which again flared up in 1999 when Serb forces invaded Kosovo causing 
large scale population displacement and leading to another NATO air campaign
38 United N ations http://w w w .un.org/en/peacekeeping/m issions/past/unm ibh/ (2 0 th A ugust 2010)
39 United N ations http://www.un.O rg/en/peacekeeping/m issions/past/unpred_b.htm #PREVENTIVE (2 0 th 
A ugust 2010)
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followed by large scale UN involvement.40 The final mission deployed in the region is 
still on patrol today. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, was deployed in 
June 1999 following the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. The mission was 
given a comprehensive mandate and was asked to undertake a “transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development o f provisional 
democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal 
life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.”41 For the purposes o f this research the chapter will 
focus mainly on the deployment o f UNPROFOR although it will make reference to the 
other operations when appropriate.
The United N ations in B urundi
The conflict in Burundi is directly connected to the history o f ethnic violence within 
the Great Lakes Region o f central Africa.42 Since gaining independence in 1962 
Burundi has seen outbreaks o f large scale ethnic violence no less than five times with 
massacres o f both Hutu and Tutsi occurring in 1965. 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993.43
40 For a com prehensive look at the developm ent o f  the conflict in K osovo see: Mertus, Julie,A.050vo:
H ow  M yths a n d  Truths s ta r te d  a w ar  (U niversity o f  California Press California: 1999) See also Ignatieff, 
M i c h a e l , Lite: N ation building in Bosnia, K osovo  a n d  A fghanistan  (Vintage: London: 2003) and 
Naumann, Klaus, NA TO. K osovo  an d  M ilitary Intervention  (G lobal Governance: 8: 2002) 13-17
41 Untied Nation http:/7\v\vw.nnmikonline.ora' UN M IK O N1.1 X 1 .2 0 0 9 la n ce .h tm  (20th August 2010)
42 For a detailed look at the history o f  Burundi see Krueger. Am bassador Robert and Kathleen Tobin  
Krueger From  b lo o d sh ed  to hope in Burundi (University o f  Texas Austin: 2007), Vandeginste, Stef, 
Pow er-Sharing, C onflict a n d  Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years o f  Trial a n d  E rror  (Africa Spectrum: 
44: 3: 2009) 63-86 , Schw eigcr, Romana. Late Justice f o r  Burundi (International and com parative Law  
Quarterly: 55: 3: 2006) 653-671 and LeMarchand. Renediurundi: Ethnic C onflict a n d  G enocide  
(University o f  Cambridge: Cambridge: 1994)
43 For a detailed breakdown o f  the events around the m assacres see Gasana, Jean Marie and Henri 
B oshoff, Burundi: C ritica l challenges to the p ea ce  p ro cess  (Institute for Security Studies:2003), D aley, 
Patricia,G ender a n d  G enocide in Burundi: The Search f o r  S pa ces o f  P eace  in the G rea t Lakes R egion  
(James Currey: London 2008) and Daley, Patricia, C hallenges to  P eace: C onflict Resolution in the G rea t  
Lakes R egion o f  A frica  (Third World Quarterly: 27: 2: 2006)
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These massacres are intertwined with the ethnic violence in neighbouring Rwanda with
both sides drawing a direct connection between the 1965 and 1972 genocide o f Hutu in
Burundi and the 1994 genocide o f Tutsi in Rwanda.44 As Uvin states
“The destructive mirror-like situation o f these two countries is unique in the 
world. Events in one country are interpreted and used by its (radical) 
neighbours to confirm their worst suspicions and fears. The rulers in 
Rwanda have reinforced the "truth" o f their racist ideology by pointing to 
the massacres o f Hutu (by the Tutsi-dominated army) in Burundi in 1965,
1972, 1988, 1989, and 1993 to "prove" that all Tutsi seek the ruthless 
oppression o f the Hutu. Conversely, Tutsi rulers in Burundi have pointed 
since 1960 to Rwanda to demonstrate that, if given the chance, the Hutu are 
little more than genocidal killers.”45
Whilst Rwanda garnered world attention for the genocide in the 1990s Burundi, holding 
its first democratic elections in 1993, was lauded as an example which the rest of Africa 
should hope to follow. The hope was short lived as only five months after the election 
o f pro-Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye he was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers leading 
to another downward spiral into ethnic violence. This would continue with brief periods 
o f respite until the signing o f the Arusha Peace Agreement for Burundi in August 
2000.46 Unfortunately the peace talks did not include two o f the key Hutu rebel groups 
the National Council for the Defence o f Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and Palipehutu the 
Forces for National Liberation (FNL).
44 See LeMarchand,Zfarz/Mc//
45 U vin , Peter, E thn icity  a n d  P o w er in Burundi a n d  R wanda: D ifferen t P ath s to  M ass Violence 
(Com parative Politics: 3 1 :3 :  1999) 253-271
46 The full text o f  the agreem ent is available online, see  Burundi, Arusha Peace Agreem ent for Burundi, 
http://ww w.issafrica.org/A F/profiles/Burundi/arusha.pdf (4th M ay 2011)
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Following the establishment o f the transitional government in 2001 the fighting 
between government forces and these two groups intensified.47 This continued until the 
FDD signed a peace agreement with the government in 2003 leading to the 
establishment o f the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). This mission was the 
first undertaken by the African Union and was a clear demonstration o f the new 
organisations willingness to undertake interventions. AMIB was established as a 
replacement for the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) which had 
been on the ground since 2001 as part o f the original Arusha Peace Agreement with the 
main aim o f protecting politicians returning to take part in the peace process. AM IB’s 
mandate was substantially larger and more complex involving tasks including 
overseeing the implementation o f the peace agreement, supporting the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and contributing to the stability 
o f the political and economic situation. From the outset AMIB was beset with logistical 
problems as it became clear that “African states were unwilling to fund the operation 
sufficiently”.48 This led to the conclusion outlined in the Secretary Generals report that 
“the financial and logistical constraints under which AMIB is operating prevent the 
force from fully implementing its mandate."49 Following the report the Security
47 For an exam ination o f  the roles o f  different rebel groups see Watch, Human Rights, Burundi: To 
P ro tec t the P eople: The G overnm ent S pon sored  'Self-defense' P rogram  in Burundi (Human Rights 
Watch: 13: 7A: 2001)
48 For analysis o f  the African Union M ission see  W illiam s, Paul D ., The A frican  Union: P ro sp ec ts f o r  
R egion al P eacekeep in g  after Burundi c$ Sudan  (R eview  o f  African Political Econom y: 33: 108: 2006)  
3 52-357
49 United N ations, Report o f  the Secretary General on Burundi, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 04/297/96/P D F/N 0429796.pdf?O penE lem ent ( 19th April 2011)
256
Chapter Six Kate Seaman
Council authorised the establishment o f the United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB).
ONUB was established under resolution 1545 which noted the continued problems 
in ensuring stability within Burundi and determined that it constituted a threat to the 
international peace and security o f the region.50 The mission was tasked with a number 
o f roles and as Boshoff argues was “conceptualised as a fully fledged multifunctional 
mission and given responsibilities in areas which transcend traditional peacekeeping 
activities.’01 This multifunctional mandate included tasks which involved “extending 
State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and 
judicial institutions.” 52 The mandate also emphasised many o f the norms associated 
with global governance. These included contributing to “the successful completion of 
the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure 
environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place’OJ and carrying 
out
“ institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national 
defence and internal security forces and. in particular, the training and 
monitoring o f the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully 
respect human rights and fundamental freedom s."'4
These tasks underline the importance of establishing democratic principles and support 
for human rights within Burundi, both norms which have also been promoted within the
50 United Nations, United Nations Security Council R esolution 1545 http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 04/359/89/P D F/N 0435989.pdf?O penE lem ent (19th April 2011)
51 B oshoff, Henri, The U n ited  N ations M ission  in Burundi (O N U B) O verview  (African Security Review: 
1 3 :3 :2 0 0 4 )5 7 -5 9
52 United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1545
53 Ibid.
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development o f the concept o f global governance. Because o f the complexity o f the 
tasks it was authorised to undertake ONUB did not complete its mandate within the 
initial period and was extended by Security Council Resolution 1577 for a further 
period o f six months.55 The mandate was extended several times after the initial 
extension until the mission was concluded in December 2006 with the completion o f 
the first democratic elections in 12 years and the DDR o f over 22,000 combatants.56 
The UN mission then shifted its focus towards reconstruction with the establishment o f 
the Integrated Political Office in Burundi (BINUB). The conclusion o f the 
peacekeeping operations has not however coincided with a conclusion o f hostilities 
within Burundi. Although the last remaining rebel group the FNL signed a peace 
agreement with the government in September o f 2006 it only held for ten months.
There was a further resumption o f hostilities in 2008 before a second treaty between the 
two sides was signed in May 2008. This then led to the FNL laying down its arms in 
order to become a fully fledged political party in April 2009.^  The subsequent 
elections in 2010, with only one candidate standing for president, were marred by 
suggestions o f violence and intimidation and renewed tensions have heightened fears o f 
a resumption o f the previous conflict.
55 United N ations, United N ations Security Council R esolution 1577, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 04/630/54/P D F/N 0463054.pdf?O penE lem ent (4th M ay 2011)
56 United N ations, Press Release on com pletion o f  O N U B  mandate,
http://w w w .un.org/en/peacekeeping/m issions/past/onub/B A C K G R O U N D .pdf (4th M ay 2 011)
57 B B C , Leader o f  Burundi rebels disarms http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/w orld/africa/8006267.stm  (4th M ay 
2011)
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The United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic o f Congo (DRC) has been 
described as the 1st African world war.38 It is estimated that the five years o f conflict 
between 1997 and 2002 resulted in the deaths o f at least three million people, either as a 
direct result o f fighting or through the resulting humanitarian crisis which caused 
widespread malnutrition and the spread o f disease.39 Even after the conflict was 
declared officially over the problems continued as the International Rescue Committee 
reported in 2004;
“A year after the war in the Democratic Republic o f Congo officially ended 
on 30 June 2003, more than one thousand civilians continued to die every 
day. Most o f the deaths were caused by disease and malnutrition and could 
have been prevented if outbursts of violence had not impeded access to 
humanitarian aid.”60
The conflict began in 1997 with the removal o f the authoritarian dictator Mobutu 
Sese Seko. Mobutu gained power in a military coup in 1965 following five years of 
unrest after the country gained independence from its former colonial power o f 
Belgium. The removal o f Belgian forces during the transition to independence was 
overseen by one o f the first large scale UN peacekeeping operations, the United
58 See Prunier, Gerard A frica 's  W orld War: Congo, the Rw andan genocide, a n d  the m aking o f  a  
continen tal catastrophe. (Oxford University Press N ew  York: 2009)
59 W ebsite, B BC , Dem ocratic Republic o f  C ongo Country Profile  
http://news.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/world/africa/country p rofiles/1076399.stm ((8th M ay 2011))
60 International R escue Com m ittee, M orta lity  in the D em ocra tic  R epublic o f  C ongo: R esults f ro m  a  
N ationw ide Survey. C on du cted  A pril- Ju ly 200 4  (N ew  York: International R escue Com m ittee and Burnet 
Institute:2004)
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Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).61 Renaming the country as Zaire Mobutu 
established a kleptocracy, based on his authoritarian rule, and accumulated international 
influence as an ally in the US proxy war against Soviet backed Angola.62 Following the 
end o f the cold war however US interest waned and M obutu’s power began to falter.
Then in 1994 following the genocide in Rwanda groups o f Hutu rebels, who had fled 
the country following the victory o f the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), began to 
launch attacks into Rwanda from bases in Zaire. This then left Zaire open to attack 
from Tutsi rebels chasing the perpetrators o f the genocide across the border and these 
groups steadily gained control o f much o f the eastern borderlands. This invasion 
sparked a rebellion against Mobutu, backed by the governments o f Rwanda and 
Uganda, and in May o f 1997 the rebel groups captured the capital, renamed the country 
the Democratic Republic o f Congo and installed Laurent Kabila as President. 
Following a rift between Kabila and his supporters in 1998 he ordered all Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops to leave the DRC. This led to a further rebellion supported by Rwanda 
and Uganda leading Kabila to call on Zimbabwe. Namibia and Angola to intervene on 
his behalf.63 The conflict raged on until 1999 when the six countries involved signed a 
ceasefire agreement, the Lusaka Accord.64 However as Daley argues
61 For more on O N U C  see United Nations. United N ations Peacekeeping W ebsite ONUC, 
http://w w w .un.org/en/peacekceping/m issions/past/onucB .htm  (17th May 2011)
62 For an interesting investigation o f  M obutu's reign see W rong. M ichela,/w the F ootsteps o f  Mr. Kurtz: 
L iving on the Brink o f  D isa ster in M obutu's C ongo  (Harper Perennial London: 2002)
63 For a detailed breakdown o f  the rebellions see  Patrikarakos, David, D eliver us fro m  evil (N ew  
Statesman: 2 0 10) , Prunier,/f//7CY/'.y W orld W ar , and B oulden, ian e ,P ea ce  enforcem ent: the U nited  
N ations experience in Congo, Som alia, a n d  B osnia  (Praeger W estport: 2001 )
64 For the text o f  the agreement see  Dem ocratic Republic o f  C ongo, The Lusaka Accord, 
http://w w w .iss.co.za/af/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/2lusaka.pdf (8th May 2011)
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“The Lusaka Peace Accord, signed in 1999, that ended the war has not 
stemmed the violence. The Lusaka Peace Accord was essentially a ceasefire 
agreement without a peace agreement which led to neither a ceasefire nor 
peace.”65
The ceasefire was intended to aid the establishment o f and Inter-Congolese Dialogue
(ICD) working towards a political resolution to the crisis. The main problem with this
was that it gave legitimacy and equal status to all parties to the conflict regardless o f
their standing before the agreement. Following the signing o f the accord the UN
Security Council authorised, through resolution 1279, the establishment o f the initial
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo
(M ONUC).66 The mission was initially mandated to oversee the disengagement of
forces and observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement and maintain a liaison
between all the parties involved in order to establish the ICD. Since that initial
authorisation the mission has grown into one o f the largest and longest running
peacekeeping operations ever undertaken. The Security Council has so far passed fifty
resolutions in relation to the mission and the list o f  tasks it has been mandated to
undertake has grown exponentially.67
Despite the signing o f a peace agreement the situation in the DRC remained unstable
and the peacekeeping mission face numerous challenges in completing its mandate. As
Smis and Oyatumbwe outline
“ Unfortunately, the government obstructed the mission from the start, 
withholding adequate security guarantees while insisting that the mission
65 D aley , C hallenges to  P eace
66 For the full text o f  the resolution see  United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution  
1279, http://w w w .un.org/ga/search/view  doc.asp?sym bol=S /R E S/l279(1999) (8th May 2011)
67 See United N ations, United N ations Peacekeeping W ebsite M O N U C , 
http://w w w .un.org/en/peacekeeping/m issions/m onuc/resolutions.shtm l (8th M ay 2011)
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should only deploy in rebel-held areas preventing the mission from carrying 
out its mandate.”68
In 2001 the President Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one o f his bodyguards and 
he was quickly replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. The new president then proceeded to 
engage in a fresh round of peace talks with Rwanda, Uganda and the various rebel 
groups. The result o f  these talks was the negotiated withdrawal o f all troops from the 
Congo and another round o f UN backed peace negotiations which resulted in the 
Global and All Inclusive Agreement. Under the new agreement rebel groups and 
opposition parties would be free to participate in the interim government. Following the 
agreement an interim constitution and government were established with a referendum 
date on the new constitution set for 2005 with elections to follow in 2006.
Throughout this period hostilities and violence continued in the eastern parts o f the 
DRC, most notably the Ituri and Kivu provinces. As the UN forces on the ground were 
already stretched the Security Council, in resolution 1484 o f May 2003, authorised the 
deployment o f an Interim Emergency Multinational Force until the UN mission could 
be reinforced.69 This multinational force was conducted under the auspices o f the 
European Union and was codenamed ARTEMIS. This was the first military mission 
conducted by the European Union outside o f Europe and without the involvement o f
68 Sm is, Stefaan and W amu O yatam bwe, C om plex P olitica l Em ergencies, the In ternational C om m unity  
& the C ongo C onflict (R eview  o f  African Political Econom y: 93/94: 2 002) 411-430
69 S ee United N ations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484, 
http://w w w .un.org/ga/search/view _doc.asp?sym bol:=S/R ES/1484% 282003% 29 (9th M ay 2011)
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70 * * •NATO. The operation remained in place until September o f 2003 when it was 
replaced by a brigade o f Bangladeshi soldiers operating under MONUC.
For the next three years the UN force remained in position conducting a large scale
mission involving both military and civilian components. The mission was tasked with
a variety o f responsibilities including contributing to “the successful completion o f the
electoral process....by assisting in the establishment o f a secure environment for free,
transparent and peaceful elections”71 and to assist “in the promotion and protection of
human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons.”72
The mission was also mandated to
“provide assistance, during the transition period, for the reform o f the 
security forces, the re-establishment o f a State based on the rule o f law and 
the preparation and holding o f elections, throughout the territory o f the 
Democratic Republic o f the Congo.”7j
Again these mandates provided by the Security Council resolutions demonstrate an 
increased emphasis on norms which are associated with the development o f the concept 
o f global governance, in particular democratisation, respect for human rights, and the 
importance o f good governance and the rule o f law. In the Congo however, the Security 
Council has gone one step further in order to ensure the implementation o f these norms 
and has become actively involved in combating the rebel groups in order to ensure the
70 For more on the role o f  the EU see. Homan. K ees O peration  A rtem is in the D em ocratic  R epublic o f  the 
C ongo  in A. RICCI, E. K Y TO M A A , F aster a n d  m ore united?  (European Union Brussels 2006)
71 See United N ations, United N ations Security Council Resolution 1565, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 04/531 /8 9 /P D F /N 0 4 5 3 189.pdf?O penElem ent (19th April 2011)
72 Ibid.
73 United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1493, 
http://w w w .un.org/ga/search/view  doc.asp?sym bol=S/R E S/1493% 282003% 29 (17th M ay 2011)
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reestablishment o f the Congo as a functioning state.74 This has moved MONUC from 
the role o f peacekeepers to peace enforcers and adds an additional layer o f complexity 
to the operations o f the mission, especially in relation to garnering local legitimacy.
Following the elections in 2006, which were marred by violent outbursts, the UN 
troops become involved in clashes with the forces o f General Laurent Nkunda, the 
National Congress for the Defence o f the People (CNDP). For the next two years 
Nkunda waged a campaign to gain control o f the eastern provinces, a campaign which 
was only halted with his arrest by the Rwandan Government in 2009.7:5 The UN troops 
have also been involved in various altercations with other rebel groups including the 
Rwandan-Hutu rebels the Democratic Forces for the Liberation o f Rwanda (FDLR) and 
the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA were founded in Uganda by 
Joseph Kony following the civil war in the mid-1980s and are notorious for their 
practice o f kidnapping children, often forcing them to brutally murder their parents, 
then enslaving them into their rebel forces.76 The presence o f these groups has also led 
to joint military operations between the government forces o f the DRC and the 
Rwandan Army, as well as the Ugandan armed forces.77 The violence between the 
various groups has led to large scale population displacement and the civilian 
population has also become the focus o f much of the violence with mass rapes being
74 For more see Autesserre, Severine. I). R C ongo: E xplain ing P eace Building Failures, 2 0 0 3 -2006  
(R eview  o f  African Political Economy: 34: 113: 2007) 423-441
75 See W ebsite, B B C , Nkunda’s spectacular fall, http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/w orld/africa/7846940.stm  
((17th May 2011))
76 For more on the LRA and its aim s see Vinci, Anthony, E xisten tia l M otiva tions in the Lord's R esistance  
A rm y's Continuing C onflict (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: 30: 4 2007) 337-352
77 See Report, Security Council, Historical Chronology o f  the Dem ocratic Republic o f  the Congo  
http://w w w .securitycouncilreport.O rg/site/c.glK W L eM T IsG /b.2880409/k .91D 6/D em ocratic_R epublic_of 
_the_Congobr_H istorical_Chronology.htm  (17th May 2011)
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utilised as a tool o f warfare.78 Today the situation on the ground in the DRC is as 
difficult as ever. In 2010 the country celebrated fifty years o f independence but the 
country is far from free o f conflict. In July 2010 MONUC was renamed the United 
Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo 
(MONUSCO). Despite the ongoing crisis on the ground the government has called for 
the scale down o f MONUSCO operations before the upcoming elections in 2011.
The next section o f the chapter utilises the above case studies to demonstrate the 
connection between the development o f global governance and the ongoing problems in 
peacekeeping, particularly in relation to the way operations are resourced and 
mandated.
Resources and Mandates
During the 1990s the demand for UN peacekeeping missions increased 
exponentially. There have been sixty three peacekeeping missions to date since the first 
operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle 
East, was mandated in 1948. Forty Six o f these missions were created after the end o f 
the Cold War in 1990.79 The increased number o f peacekeeping operations was both a
78 For an in depth look at the sexual v io lence in the DRC see United Nations. R eport o f  the P anel on 
R em edies a n d  R epara tion s f o r  Victims o f  Sexual Violence in the D em ocra tic  R epublic o f  C ongo to the 
H igh C om m issioner f o r  H um an Rights (N ew  York: United N ations 2 0 09), Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative, C haracterizing  Sexual Violence in the D em ocra tic  R epublic o f  the C ongo  (Boston: Open 
Society Institute 2009), and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, "Now, the w o r ld  is w ithout m e ”: An  
investigation  o f  sexual vio lence in E astern  D em ocra tic  R epublic o f  Congo. (Boston: O xfam :2010)
79 A ll figures from United Nations W ebsite http://w ww.un.org/en/peacekeepinp/bnote.htm  (21st August
2010)
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demonstration o f the new freedom o f action which the United Nations gained following
the collapse o f the Soviet Union and o f
“The increasing volatility and unpredictability o f a global security system in 
which the near-certainties o f the Cold War had been replaced by a ‘violent 
peace’, with conflicts continuing across most regions o f the world.”80
The end o f the Cold War not only heralded an increase in the number o f violent 
conflicts raging around the globe; it also saw a shift in the form o f the conflicts being 
fought. The focus was no longer on inter-state violence with clear divisions between 
combatants instead the conflicts were involving large portions o f the populations as 
ethnic, religious and tribal groups became involved in disputes over land, resources and 
the survival o f their individual cultures.81 This shift in the type o f conflicts led the 
United Nations into unchartered territory as the organisation undertook a large range o f 
new tasks which included, the monitoring and running o f elections in Namibia, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique. The protection o f civilian 
inhabitants in designated United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), in Croatia, Bosnia 
and Rwanda. Assuring the delivery o f humanitarian relief in both Yugoslavia and 
Somalia and the reconstruction o f governmental and police functions in El Salvador,
g->
Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. “ Peacekeeping was and is no longer a 
simple matter o f interposing troops between two warring factions, instead "today's
80 Rogers, Pau\,Losing C on tro l (Pluto Press London: 2 002) pg 132
81 For an analysis in the changing realities o f  conflict see  M isra, A m alendu,/>o//7/cs o f  C iv il Wars: 
Conflict, In tervention  a n d  R esolution  (R outledge London: 2008)
82 Roberts, Adam, The c ris is  in pea cek eep in g  (IFS: 2: 1994)
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peace operations are complex affairs that involve a range o f activities that go to the
83heart o f domestic governance."
Unfortunately the increase in demand for peacekeepers coincided with the so called 
peace dividend, as one UK mission official explained the increased demand occurred at 
“a time when a lot o f member states armies are getting smaller, the so called peace
84 _ • •dividend, so you’ve got this demand and supply is going down.” The reduction in 
troop numbers is directly attributable to the end o f the Cold War as states took the 
opportunity to downsize and reconfigure their military forces. This has led to a situation 
where most developed states have “limited troop numbers with multiple commitments.”
As the official goes on to explain this then means that “funding is not the problem, the 
lack o f troops is the problem.”85 The availability o f funding is however directly 
challenged by academics such as Griffin, who argues that there is a significant shortfall 
in the financial capacity o f the United Nations to operationalise meaningful 
multidimensional operations, o f the type increasingly in demand.86 For example in 
2008 the peacekeeping budget was “estimated at $6.8 billion, representing only about 
half o f one percent o f global defense spending” but, “the United Nations estimated that, 
as o f 30 April 2008, outstanding contributions to peacekeeping amounted to $2.3
83 Johnstone, Ian, US- U N  re la tion s after Iraq: The en d  o f  the w o r ld  (order) a s  w e know it?  (European 
Journal o f  International Law: 15: 4: 2 004) 813-838
84 Interview with UK M ission O fficial T w o 27th August 2008  27 th August 2008
85 Interview with Former U N  O fficial 26 lh August 2008
86 For more see  Griffin in W ilkinson, Rorden, The G lo b a l G overnance R eader  (Routledge: London:
2005)
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billion” The lack o f troops is also questioned by academics such as Ian Johnstone 
who argues that
“the supply o f peacekeepers is going up. A lot o f  countries that weren’t 
really doing much in the past are just starting to do it now, including brazil, 
china, Indonesia, you know big countries that have a lot to offer, So there’s 
a fair amount o f willingness to provide troops.”
He does however go on to stress that the willingness to provide troops is however
undermined by the lack of
“ability and willingness to provide special forces and the sorts o f things you 
need for the more robust operations and that’s when the real problems arise.
When it’s not just a matter o f throwing thousands and thousands and
88thousand o f badly equipped, badly trained troops at a problem.”
So while forces are available they are not necessarily o f the right kind or calibre to
perform the tasks asked o f them. As Paddy Ashdown argues "the trouble is that it
requires a special kind o f soldier to do this job ."89 The need for a special kind o f soldier
is however coupled with a demonstrated unwillingness on the part o f states with those
types o f soldiers to place them under UN command. As Craig N. Murphy explains
“The actual commitments o f resources have to be put together, not just from 
the Security Council members, but from everybody else and the 
commitments come based on what other priorities for using those resources 
might be. You know you go back to kind of the simple story about Rwanda 
back in 1994 and the one argument about the Clinton administration which 
was unwilling to give a few million dollars worth o f jamming equipment 
and aeroplanes to central Africa. One of the arguments is they didn't want to 
lose American lives but another one of the arguments is that the value o f 
Rwandan lives was less than the cost that would be associated with shifting 
equipment from certain places in the United States to certain other places.
87 Sheehan, N adege, U n ited  N ations P eacekeeping: L im itations a n d  P rospects  (The E conom ics o f  Peace 
and Security Journal: 3: 2: 2008) 74-80
88 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2 0 0 8 3 rd July 2008
89 A shdow n, Paddy,S w ords an d  P loughshares  (Phoenix London: 2008) pg 72
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So that you know there’s this declaratory policy thing which is what the 
States collectively can agree on and then there is the actual priorities, and 
peacekeeping in many places around the world is a very, very low 
priority.”90
Rwanda as one o f the UNs biggest failures is a clear demonstration o f the
unwillingness o f member states to provide resources when an intervention holds little
national interest, or when a permanent member state such as France opposes it. The
unwillingness o f some member states to provide troops is counterbalanced by the
provision o f troops from other nations, even if these troops are perhaps o f a lower
standard. As one former peacekeeper argues for some countries “it’s a big deal to get
on a UN mission because o f the money that’s involved” however the troops provided
are not without issues as the peacekeeper goes on to explain
“we had issues with people that really should have been sent home for their 
own and for other peoples good. We had lots o f issues with confidentiality 
and things like that and I think that is a big problem. But for other countries 
the money difference is huge, and that influences trying to get on these 
missions, how people get on these missions and not wanting to leave them, 
maybe when it’s not the best thing for themselves or others.”91
As the cost o f troops deployed on peacekeeping missions is covered by the UN, having
troops deployed is an attractive offer for many developing countries that might not
otherwise be able to support their military forces. As Durch outlines
“ U N  o p era tio n s o ffe r  unusual op p o rtu n ities  for  f ie ld  e x p e r ie n c e  to  th e  d e v e lo p in g  
co u n tr ies  that con tr ib u te  m o st o f  its troop s and p o lic e . T h ere  is  a lso  p restig e  
a sso c ia te d  w ith  in tern ation al d e p lo y m e n ts , p erhaps a se n s e  o f  c o m p e tit io n  w ith  
reg io n a l r iv a ls , and U N  troop  re im b u rsem en ts m ay o ffe r  a net fin a n c ia l g a in  to  the
90 Interview with Professor Craig N. Murphy 3 rd Septem ber 2008
91 Interview with Army M edical O fficer 8th July 2 0 0 9 8 th July 2009
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contributing government. Given the increased risk associated with many current 
UN operations, such gain might be considered the equivalent of hazard pay.”92
The UN represents a substantial income for some military forces, this does not 
however guarantee that the forces provided are capable o f undertaking the tasks 
assigned to them. This problem is highlighted by one former peacekeeper who argues 
that “the requirement for big cost items is always a difficulty and relatively speaking
QTthere are very few nations that have the capability or the capacity to do that.” The 
importance o f capable forces is also emphasised by academics such as Michael Pugh
94who argues "the international force above all must be militarily credible" and in many 
cases the credibility o f the troops being deployed is at best questionable. The credibility 
o f troops deployed by the UN is not only being questioned in relation to their military 
capacity but also in relation to their behaviour whilst on deployment. With the increase 
in peacekeeping missions there has also been an increased in what Thakur et al call the 
‘unintended consequences o f peacekeeping.'93 These consequences include an increase 
in the abuse and exploitation o f both the local population and mineral resources in the 
countries o f deployment, most notably in the DRC.96 Such cases o f abuse not only
92 Durch, W illiam  J. and M adeleine L. England. The p u rp o ses o f  p ea ce  opera tion s  (N ew  York: Center 
for International C ooperation:2009) pg 7
93 Interview with Col. Ian MacFarlane 8°’ July 2009
94 R uggie in Pugh. M ichael, The US, p ea ce  a n d  fo rc e  (Frank Cass Fondon: 1997) pg 14
95 A oi, Chiyuki and C edric  de C oning a n d  R aw esh Thakur. ( nin tended  consequences o f  peacekeeping  
(Electronic briefing paper: Center for International Political Studies: 56: 2007)
96 For more on this see Save the Children. P olicy  Brief: Sexual exp lo ita tion  a n d  abuse o f  children  by  a id  
w orkers a n d  p ea cek eep ers  Save the Children 2009). Csaky. Corinna. S o o n e  to  turn to: The under 
reportin g  o f  ch ild  sexual exp lo ita tion  a n d  abuse by  a id  w orkers a n d  p ea cek eep ers  (Save The Children 
2008), Harrington, Alexandra, Victims o f  P eace: C urrent A buse A llega tion s aga inst U .S. P eacekeepers  
a n d  the Role o f  Law in P reven ting Them in the Future  (bepress Fegal series: 630: 2 0 0 5 ) ,  W ebsite,
United Nations, UN peacekeepers involved in abuse are being punished, world body says, 
http://w w w .un.org/apps/new s/story.asp ?N ew slD = 32857  ((18th May 2011)). A lso  H ughes, Donna, The 
N atasha Trade: The Transnational Shadow  M arket o f  Trafficking in Women (Journal o f  international
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Q7contravene the Blue Helmets Code o f Conduct they also undermine the legitimacy o f 
any UN mission both within that country and on the international stage. The UN is 
however limited as to how it can respond to such cases with the worst punishment for 
offenders extending to redeployment or repatriation to their own country as 
peacekeepers are currently exempt from prosecution by the International Criminal 
Court.98 Following the repatriation o f offenders their own governments are expected to 
undertake the appropriate prosecutions however in reality this rarely occurs.99 One 
justification for the lack o f prosecutions might stem from the potential backlash in 
relation to the provision o f troops which could occur if prosecutions became more 
frequent and immunity was removed.
The problem is as one official argues that with
“more and more peacekeeping missions, where will we get these people 
from? It’s the force generation, whether it be military, police or civilian 
experts to go on peacekeeping missions and that's certainly from the UN 
experience is getting worse rather than better.'’100
Affairs: 53: 2: 2 0 00) 625-651 . M ackay, Angela. Sex and the Peacekeeping Soldier: The N ew  UN  
Resolution, h ttp://w w w .peacenew s.info/issues/2443/m ackay.htm l ( 18th May 2011) and Rehn, Elisabeth  
and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Women. War a n d  Peace: The Independent E x p e rts ' A ssessm en t on the Im pact 
o f  A rm ed  C onflict on Women a n d  Women s Role in P eacebu ild in g  (N ew  York: UNIFEM  2002) and 
United Nations, Report o f  the Panel o f  Experts on the Illegal Exploitation o f  Natural Resources and 
Other Forms o f  Wealth o f  the Dem ocratic Republic o f  the Congo. 
http://ww w.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm
97 See United Nations, Ten Rules: Code o f  Personal Conduct for B lue H elm ets.
http://cdu.unlb.org/UNStandardsofConduct/TenRulesCodeofPersonalConductForBlueH elm ets.aspx (18th 
M ay 2011)
98 See United N ations, UN peacekeepers exem pted from war crim es prosecution for another year 
http://w w w .un.org/apps/new s/story.asp ?N ew slD = 7402 (18th M ay 2011)
99 See Elliot, Francis and Ruth Elkins, UN shame over sex scandal
http://w w w .independent.co.uk/new s/w orld/politics/un-sham e-over-sex-scandal-431121 .html (1 8th May
2011)
100 Interview with UK M ission O fficial Two 27th Auuust 2008 27th August 2008
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This sentiment is echoed by Lord Robertson the former Secretary General o f NATO
who argued that the biggest problem is not only getting the troop numbers but that
“getting usable, mobilisable forces is the biggest challenge and problem that w e’ve got”
and that this needs to be “properly and effectively sorted before you can actually talk
about any kind o f intervention.” 101 The problem is that the inability to generate troops
has come at a time when
"Both the conditions that gave rise to civil wars and those that resulted from 
them argued for a more holistic approach to keeping peace that went beyond 
military and security priorities to address issues o f governance, democratic 
legitimacy, social inclusion, and economic equality that, if properly treated, 
might enable war-torn countries to increase their resilience to new rounds o f 
violence."102
The involvement o f the UN in the resolution o f these new issues can be attributed to the 
development o f the concept o f Global Governance which is emphasising the 
improvement o f democratisation, good governance, and respect for human rights. As 
Tanner argues, “a rethinking o f the role o f peacekeeping as an instrument o f global 
crisis response could help to strengthen global governance in peace and security.” 103 
The creation o f stable sovereign states has now become incorporated into the mandates 
o f UN peacekeeping operations, involving the organisation in a much wider variety of 
tasks. However these larger tasks and civilian elements require a more comprehensive 
approach or as one FCO official put it “big missions require force generation” 104 and it
101 Interview with Lord G eorge Robertson 28 ,h July 2009
102 C ousens and Chetan in C ousens, Elizabeth M. and Chetan Kumar, P eacebu ild ing  a s  P o litics  (Lynne  
Rienner London: 2001) pg 1
103 Tanner, Fred, A d dressin g  the P erils  o f  P eace O perations: T ow ard a  G loba l P eacekeepin g  System  
(G lobal Governance: 16: 2010) 209-217
104 Interview with FCO O fficial 2 0 lh May 2009
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is this kind o f force generation which the UN seems unable to produce. This argument
is backed up by academics such as Welsh and Roberts who argue that
"the sheer number o f operations and the multi-tasking o f UN forces have 
also created severe strains on the organisations limited capacity for 
mounting, managing, and sustaining operations, and revealed major 
bottlenecks (seemingly resistant to reform) especially in the areas o f 
logistics organisation and in the planning for large scale operations."105
This problem is not however unique to the UN, it also affects the capabilities o f
regional organisations particularly in Africa as Craig N. Murphy argues
“Even inside regions one o f the things you are seeing is the difference 
between say ECOWAS peacekeeping and AU Peacekeeping as a whole. 
ECOWAS is a little bit more effective because the Nigerian military for a 
variety o f reasons has perceived it as being desirable to have Africa as fairly 
stabilised. The large militaries o f the rest o f Africa none o f which actually 
add up to the level o f the Nigerian military, don’t see stability in 
neighbouring countries as really being that important a thing, so its hard for 
African governments to even get resources from Africa as well. Again it’s 
the priorities, whatever the immediate priorities for those particular 
resources that are necessary."106
This is a clear demonstration o f what Rotberg and Weiss argue is the skewed 
allocation of resources and personnel among geographical areas107 an issue which was 
explored previously in Chapter F ive108 and an issue which is particularly relevant to the 
original African Union operation in Burundi. The African Union Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) was the precursor to the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). As 
one o f the first operations undertaken by the African Union, the mission in Burundi was
105 Berdal in L ow e, Vaughan and Adam Roberts and Jennifer W elsh and Dom inik Zaum, The U nited  
N ations Security  C ouncil a n d  W ar (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008) pg 191
106 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3 rd September 2008
107 Rotberg, Robert and Thom as G. W eiss From  m assacres to  genocides: The m edia, p u b lic  p o lic y  an d  
hum anitarian crises  (W orld Peace Foundation Cambridge 1996)
108 S ee Chapter F ive pages 231 -241
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seen as a clear demonstration o f the new willingness o f  the organisation to undertake
interventions within its member states. A willingness most clearly demonstrated in the
constitutive act o f the African Union which outlines “the right o f the Union to intervene
in a Member State pursuant to a decision o f the Assembly in respect o f grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” 109 Despite
the organisations emphasis on authorising interventions the AU faced similar problems
to the UN in terms o f troop provision and funding. As the mission progressed
“it was clear that African states were unwilling to fund the operation 
sufficiently, which became part o f the reason for transferring the 
peacekeeping baton to the UN force ONUB in June 2004.” 110
This problem is not however unique to the African Union and the issue o f troop 
provision and logistical planning is also problematic for the United Nations which 
seems in some cases incapable o f preparing for a complex peacekeeping mission. This 
inability to prepare and provide for large scale operations is clearly demonstrated in 
both the intervention in Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia.
The original UN mission UNOSOM 1 "was undermanned and overmatched by 
warring Somali clan m ilitias."111 With only 50 military observers and 500 security 
forces there was little hope that it would be able to achieve its mandate to protect the 
large amount o f humanitarian aid flooding into the country. In an attempt to redress this 
Resolution 775 (august 1992) authorised an increase in the number o f security forces to 
be deployed by a further 3,000, however by December o f 1992 the number deployed
109 See African Union, Constitutive Act o f  the African Union Chapter Four 
http://ww w.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act (4th May 2011)
110 W illiam s, The A frican Union
Dobbins, James, The UN's role  in nation building  (Survival: 46: 4: 2004-2005) 81-102
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had only increased to 564. The failure o f UNOSOM I led the Secretary General to 
present the Security Council with five options.112 At this Point the United States offered 
to undertake an enforcement operation and UNITAF or ‘Operation Restore Hope’ was 
established. The operation was established with one main aim “to establish a secure 
environment for humanitarian operations within Somalia.” 113 The ability o f the USA to 
quickly deploy troops to Somalia and stabilise the situation is a clear demonstration of 
the impact that the right kind o f resources deployed at the right time can have. 
However, the US was unwilling to become involved in any long term operation to 
ensure the reconstitution o f the Somali state and because o f this the situation only 
escalated.
There was an attempt made to address this escalation with the deployment o f the 
second UN mission UNOSOM II. As soon as the Americans felt that the security 
situation in Somalia had stabilised they handed over control to the UN and UNOSOM 
II. The new UN force was now responsible for ensuring political reconciliation between 
the parties involved: assisting in the creation o f political and administrative structures; 
disarming and demobilising the various militias; enforcing the arms embargo placed on 
the county; re-establishing the police force and judicial system; overseeing the return of 
refugees; aiding the de-mining process and ensuring the rehabilitation and
112 The five options presented were as fo llow s they could expand UN O SO M  and retain the original 
principles o f  the m ission and its mandate: com plete w ithdrawal w as the second option available leaving  
the aid agencies to negotiate their own agreem ents with the conflicting parties: they could construct a 
large show  o f  force with UN O SO M  in the hope that it would deter the factions from attacking both U N  
forces and aid agencies; a country w ide enforcem ent operation undertaken by m ember states on behalf or 
the U N  w as the fourth option tabled or finally a country w ide operation conducted under the control o f  
the U N . For more see: Sutterlin, James S., 7 he UN a n d  the m ain tenance o f  in ternational security  
(Praeger: Connecticut: 1995) pg 63
113 N ations ,Som alia (1996) pg 32
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reconstruction o f Som alia.114 It was expected to achieve all o f this with less than half 
the number o f troops which the Americans had provided for the UNITAF operation.
Whilst “the previous UN and US forces had confined their mission to securing
humanitarian relief activities” UNOSOM II, with a much smaller number o f troops was
given an extended mission involving
“the introduction o f grassroots democracy, a process which would put the 
United Nations at cross purposes with every warlord in the country. The 
result was a resurgence o f violence to levels that residual US and UN troops 
proved unable to handle.” 115
This resurgence o f violence then led to an escalation in the UN and US response, 
following the attack on a Pakistani contingent in which 24 peacekeepers died both 
UNOSOM II and the remaining US Quick Reaction Force essentially became parties to 
the conflict. With their attempts to hunt General Aidid the UN, in the eyes o f the 
Somalis lost its neutral role. The failure to provided adequate support for the operation 
directly led to the escalation o f the conflict, the attacks on the UNOSOM II troops and 
the perception that the UN was becoming another party to the conflict. . The inability to 
deal with the ongoing conflict was in part due to the failure o f the Security Council to 
provide a clear and achievable mandate for each UN intervention. UNOSOM II was a 
clear example o f the ways in which “the functions and mandate o f a peacekeeping force 
are affected by the nature o f the conflict" and the reality that “if a force is given a 
mandate unsuited to the type o f conflict in which it is positioned it will be unable to
114 Halim in Ginifer, J., B eyon d  the em ergency: developm en t w ith in UN p e a c e  m issions  (Frank Cass 
London: 1 9 9 7 )pg 76
115 D obbins, Nation build ing (2004-2005)  81-102
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achieve its purposes.” 116 This not only had negative consequences for the UN troops in
Somalia but also for the organisation as a whole. Unfortunately
“The resulting setback had a knock-on effect. Successful peacekeeping 
depends critically on the parties to the conflict having respect for and 
confidence in the United Nations. The humiliation and ineffectiveness o f 
UN troops in Somalia-and, at about the same time, in Bosnia- undermined 
their credibility in other theatres. 'Welcome to Mogadishu' was the banner 
held aloft by demonstrators on the quayside in Port-au-Prince who 
succeeded in turning away a US Navy ship that was to land the advance 
party o f a new peacekeeping operation in Haiti.” 117
As Goulding highlights this problem was not unique to Somalia, the operation in 
Bosnia was also facing similar issues.
The original UN mission in the former Yugoslavia was deployed within Croatia, 
under the acceptance o f a peace agreement by all parties. However as the conflict
spread the mandate for the operation increased to cover Bosnia. Although as Roberts
118argues “mission creep is natural” within a peacekeeping operation the problem in 
Bosnia was that “unlike Croatia where the frontline was more or less defined and it was 
then easier to monitor what was going on, on the ground, in Bosnia the frontline was 
not defined at all.” 119 This change in operational situation was coupled with the fact 
that
“the peacekeeping forces were relatively lightly armed and their mandate 
was not to impose peace but to keep peace. So whenever there were 
sporadic clashes on the ground it was not an easy task for them to intervene,
116 W hite, N .D,7/?e U n ited  N ations a n d  the m aintenance o f  in ternational p ea ce  a n d  secu rity  (M anchester  
University Press M anchester: 1990) pg 209
117 G oulding, Marrack, The U n ited  N ations a n d  conflict in A frica  since the C o ld  W ar (African Affairs: 
9 8 :3 9 1 : 1999) 155-166
118 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts 8th D ecem ber 2009
119 Interview with Igor Ilic Reuters 6th August 2009
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they immediately tried to negotiate cessation o f hostilities, the ending o f 
clashes or hostilities but it was not always an easy task and even more so 
because they tried o f course to remain neutral.” 120
As the conflict in Bosnia was ongoing there was a need for an understanding that "the
use o f force may be necessary to prevent a more catastrophic development
121occurring." However the reality o f the situation on the ground was that the troops did 
not have the necessary equipment in order to make the necessary displays o f force, as 
one former peacekeeper put it “you’re there, you’ve got a mickey mouse pistol, these
179guys have got AK47’s they’ve got RPG’s, they’re properly tooled up.” “ This then 
raises the most important question o f all, as Roberts argues; is the mandate properly 
resourced? Providing an example from the Bosnian conflict, Roberts details how the 
Force Commander o f UNPROFOR in Bosnia, General Michael Rose, would not even 
read the numerous Security Council resolutions as he knew he “could not do all the 
tasks outlined with the resources he had.” 12:> This is a clear demonstration o f the 
increasing disconnect between the rhetoric o f Security Council resolutions and 
mandates, and the reality o f what troops are capable o f achieving on the ground. An 
issue highlighted by General Rupert Smith who argues that in Bosnia, “the existence 
and actions o f the Security Council negatively affected events ... The consequence o f 
this failing was the destruction o f the credibility o f the UN.” 124
120 Ibid. Ilic
l2lBerdal in L ow e, Security  C ouncil (2008) pg 197
122 Interview with Dan Doherty Cl MIC 2nd July 2009
123 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts 8th D ecem ber 2009
124 Smith in L ow e, S ecurity  C ouncil (2008) pg442
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The loss o f credibility is something which has haunted the United Nations 
throughout various operations, most recently in the DRC where it had to call in support 
from the European Union to provide resources until the United Nations could bolster its
• 125 •own operations. Credibility has also been a problem for other organisations including
the African Union whose capability was also questioned following the failures in
Burundi, where “operational difficulties raise the question o f what capacity African
states currently possess to conduct complex and multidimensional peace operations.” 126
The problem was best articulated by the head o f the A U ’s Peace Support Operations
Division, Bereng Mtimkulu who asked
“How well can the AU salvage institutional pride when clearly it cannot 
stay the course in complex operations owing to fragile structures and 
unpredictable funding and other resources?” 127
As Williams argues “Africa's capacity to keep the peace on the continent is woefully 
short o f what is required.” 128 Again the problem is the resourcing and funding o f 
increasingly complex peacekeeping missions.
Roberts argues that under-resourcing is a natural problem in those instances where 
no one state is really in charge and committed to resolving the situation. Indeed, that 
this is one o f the main problem with multilateralism. There is not enough emphasis 
placed on the potential interests o f state in resolving the conflict: if you are going to get 
states involved you need to make them feel committed. Again he utilises the example o f
125 See H om an,O peration A rtem is in the D em ocratic  R epublic o f  the C ongo  in , and Ulriksen, Stale 
Ulriksen; Catriona Gourlay and Catriona M ace, O pera tion  A rtem is: The sh ape  o f  th ings to  com e?  
(International Peacekeeping: 11:3: 2004) 508 - 525
l26W illiam s, The A frican Union
127 M tim kulu, Bereng, The A frican Union an d  P eace  Support O pera tions  (P eacekeeping Trends: 4: 2005)
128 W illiam s, The A frican Union
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Bosnia in the summer o f 1995 when the large number o f British and French troops were 
provided for a rapid reaction corps. Which in turn made those states more committed to 
resolving the conflict;129 as argued above this was also demonstrated in Somalia, with 
the success o f the UNITAF operation under US command, in comparison to the 
perceived failures o f the UN controlled operations. The same could also be argued in 
relation the EU operation ARTEMIS in the DRC, which was viewed by politicians in 
Europe, including the then French President, as an excellent chance to demonstrate the 
potential o f the European Union in relation to peace support operations, without the 
inclusion o f N A TO .130 This is a clear demonstration that not only are peacekeeping 
missions drastically under-resourced but that "the Security council's involvement in 
peacekeeping - as evidenced by the mandate(s) given and the resources allocated to a 
mission - continues to be shaped, for better and worse, by the strategic calculations o f 
the P5 ."131
The apparent disconnect between resolutions and the resources provided to meet 
those resolutions is also clearly demonstrated in Bosnia and the DRC. Following on 
from resolution number 749132 which called for the cessation o f hostilities resolution 
number 752133 in May 1992 reaffirmed the call for the cessation and respect for the 
previously signed peace agreement. This was swiftly followed two weeks later by
129 Interview with Professor Adam roberts 8th Decem ber 2009
130 See Ulriksen, O pera tion  A rtem is (2004)
131 Berdal in L ow e, Security  C ouncil (2008) pg 202
132 United N ations W ebsite http://daccess-dds-
n v . un .org/doc/R F. SO L U T lO N /G E N /N R 0/011 /02 /IM G /N R 001102.pdf?QpenElem ent (21st A ugust 2010)
133 United N ations W ebsite http://daceess-dds-
nv.un.org/doc/R ESO LUTIO N/G EN/NR O /Q 11/11/1M G/NR00111 l.pdf?Q penElem ent (21st A u g u st2010)
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resolution number 757134 which established the no-fly zone over Bosnia along with 
other economic restrictions. Then in June o f 1992, as the conflict intensified, 
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged via resolution 758135 in order to 
ensure the security o f the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery o f humanitarian 
assistance to that city and its environs. Following resolution 749lj6 the then Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros Ghali submitted a report to the security council in which it 
was estimated that between ten and fifteen thousand troops137 would be needed to 
stabilise the situation in Bosnia. However by February 1993 troop deployment numbers 
had only reached 8,723.138 This was despite the fact that the mandate had been further 
enlarged in September 1992 authorising UNPROFOR to support efforts by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys o f released civilian detainees if the 
International Committee o f the Red Cross so requested. The increased humanitarian 
nature o f the mandate was based on the fact that "humanitarian relief remained the one 
mission on which all council members could agree."lj9 However much emphasis was 
placed on providing humanitarian assistance it "could not obscure the reality that 
humanitarian relief was a substitute for the more difficult decisions that would have
134 United Nations W ebsite http://dacccss-dd.s-
n v . u n .org/doc/R F.SO LU Tl O N /G F.N /N R0/0 111 6 IMG NROOI I 1 6.pdf?O penElem ent (21st August 2010)
l35United Nations W ebsite http://dacccss-dds-
nv.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRQ/QI 1 17 IMG K R 0 0 1 1 17.pdf?QnenElem ent ( 2 1 st August 2010)
l36United Nations W ebsite http://daccess-dds-
nv.un.org/doc/R E SQ L l.n iQ N /G E N /N R O ,011 .02 /IM G /N R 001 102.pdf?Q nenElem ent ( 21st August 2010)
137 United N ations, F urther rep o rt o f  the S ecre ta ry  G en era l P ursuant to  S ecurity  C ouncil R esolution  749  
(S /23900 . 12th M ay 1992)
138 Durch, W illiam  J., UN  peacekeeping, A m erican Politics, a n d  the uncivil w a rs o f  the 1990s (Palgrave 
M acM illan: London: 1996) pg 239
139 B osco , David L,/wvc? to  Rule Them A ll  (Oxford University Press N ew  York: 2009) pg 177
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been required to end the w ar."140 The situation in the DRC is remarkably similar with
no less than fifty resolutions passed by the Security Council since the mission began.141
The mission has been mandated with a variety o f tasks many of which are unrealistic
“considering the size o f the mission and the unfriendly context in which it had to
operate.” 142 Moreover as Neethling argues, the Security Council seems to “have learned
little from the failed UN missions in Rwanda and Somalia where it had been shown
that, to be effective, the mandate should be clear and realistic and be accompanied by
sufficient means to be credible.” 143
The situation on the ground in Somalia, Bosnia and the DRC is a clear
demonstration o f "a startling gap between the council's resolutions and the resources it
provided to enforce them ."144 It also highlights the
"obvious contradictions between resolutions by the UN Security Council 
reacting to public demands to do something on the one hand - and the 
reluctance o f governments to provide troops for UN missions on the other 
hand."145
The lack o f consistency was clearly demonstrated in Bosnia with “council decision 
making becoming increasingly, as the mission wore on, divorced from realities on the 
ground, making the resulting mandates incapable o f translation into realistic military 
objectives for UN peacekeepers."146 The issue of translation o f council mandates or 
resolutions in to operational realities is important, as is the interpretation o f those
140 Ibid. Pg 177
141 See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping W ebsite M O N UC,
142 Sm is, C om plex P o litica l E m ergencies
143 N eeth ling, Theo, P eacekeep in g  C hallenges in the D R C  (Africa Insight: 2000)
144 B osco ,F /ve (2009) , pg 194
l45Biermann and Vadstet in Biermann, W olfgang and Martin Vadstet UN P eacekeep in g  in Trouble: 
Lessons L earned  fro m  the F orm er Yugoslavia  (A shgate Aldershot: 1998) pg 21
146 Berdal in Lowe, Secu rity  C ouncil (2008) pg 199
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mandates. As Holt and Berkman argue, a process o f ‘mandate creep’ means that peace 
engagement has come to include achieving democracy, post-conflict rehabilitation, 
justice and civilian protection. Operational concepts are not keeping pace with mission 
m andates.147 The danger o f differing interpretations was also highlighted in relation to 
the US led UNITAF intervention in Somalia. The operation was not under the control 
o f the UN which meant that the interpretation o f the mandate and hence the aims o f the 
mission were established by the Commanders o f the operation, in this case the US 
military. The American Command decided that “the goal was to deploy a large force 
capable o f controlling the violence and making it clear to the faction leaders that order 
would be restored with or without their cooperation.” 148
In the eyes o f the Americans, including President Bush, the mission had clearly 
defined and limited objectives, to open supply routes, get the aid moving and prepare 
the way for a more traditional UN peacekeeping force. This was in direct contradiction 
to what the Secretary General had hoped UNITAF would achieve, namely the complete 
disarmament o f the factions involved in the conflict. The Americans had no desire to 
become embroiled in the complex process o f disarming the factions, they wanted a 
clean exit from Somalia and this unfortunately signalled to the factions involved that 
the Americans, although exerting their influence at the moment would not be a 
continuous thorn in their side and would fairly soon be leaving Somalia in the 
somewhat less capable hands o f the UN. As the United Nations has learned over the
147 H olt, V ictoria K. and Tobias C. Berkm an,The im possib le  m andate? M ilita ryp rep a rd n ess, the  
resp o n sib ility  to  p ro te c t a n d  M odern p e a ce  opera tiosn  (The Henry L. Stim son Center W ashington D.C:
2006)
l48Pugh,(7.K? o f  fo rc e  (2002) pg 169
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last decade, no amount o f good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to 
project credible force if  complex peacekeeping is to succeed.149
The failure to deal with the disarmament o f all the factions involved in the conflict 
meant that
“ Instead o f remaining neutral... the United States and United Nations ended 
up enhancing the roles and status of the warlords. U.S. rules o f engagement 
in Somalia forbade any interference in Somali-on-Somali violence, despite 
President Bush's rhetoric in defining the mission. Most important, the failure 
to disarm the major combatants meant that the United States and the United 
Nations in effect sided with those who had the most weapons, leaving the 
weak and defenceless to abandon hope.” 130
The problem stemmed from the way in which the US and the UN dealt with those in
charge o f the factions, in order to secure the safe delivery o f aid the faction leaders had
to be negotiated with, or fought against, this led to them gaining status within the
overall peace process despite the fact that
“The warlords were widely seen as war criminals who had plunged Somalia 
into chaos and famine. Instead o f arresting the warlords, the US treated 
them as legitimate political players at a time when they were on the 
backfoot and their authority was ebbing. Thereafter, the UN's freedom o f 
action in searching for a political solution was severely circumscribed by the 
involvement o f the faction leaders."'31
By treating them as legitimate players the UN then gave them legitimacy. This led to 
their influence increasing as time went on. It also in many respects led to the 
development o f an aid based economy and an increasing use for black market trading. It 
was clear from the outset that "the warlords benefited financially from the criminal
149 For more see: N ations, United, R eport o f  the P anel on U nited  N ations P eace O pera tions to  the 
S ecre ta ry-G en era l (N ew  York: United N ations General A ssem bly 21st August 2000)
150 Clarke, Som alia  (1996)
151 Patman, Robert G ., D isarm ing Som alia  (African Affairs: 96: 385: 1997) 509-533
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activities o f their supporters” 152 and that “the country's entire political and economic
systems essentially revolved around plundered food.” 153 The situation stemmed from
the fact that “countries such as Somalia are not able to produce even enough food for
their own people.” 154 Warlords were then using plundered food to buy loyalty and to
gain influence. This food was being plundered from aid agencies, agencies which it was
the responsibility o f the US and UN Forces to protect. However,
“When U.S. troops intervened in December 1992 to stop the theft o f food, 
they disrupted the political economy and stepped deep into the muck o f 
Somali politics. By re-establishing some order, the U.S. operation inevitably 
affected the direction o f Somali politics and became nation-building because 
the most basic component o f nation-building is an end to anarchy.” 135
The problem then became the failure o f the forces to follow up on the need for nation 
building within Somalia.
The failure in Somalia stands in direct contradiction to both the missions o f the AU 
and the UN in Burundi whose main aim was the re-establishment o f a functioning 
government within the state. The problem in Burundi however was the direct 
connection between the push for democratization and the corresponding increase in 
violence. As Fein argues the relationship between democratization and violence has 
long been recognised.156 A relationship clearly demonstrated in Burundi where
152 Ibid.
153 Clarke, Som alia  (1996)
154 Lauderdale, Pat and Pietro Toggia, An indigenous v iew  o f  the new  w o r ld  order: Som alia  a n d  the  
ostensib le  rule o f  law  (Journal o f  Asian and African Studies 34: 1999) 157-177
155 Clarke, Som alia  (1996)
156 Fein, H elen, M ore M urder in the M iddle: L ife-In tegrity V iolations a n d  D em o cra cy  in the World, 1987  
(Human Rights Quarterly: 17: 1995) 170-191
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“the most recent and most extreme rounds o f  violence are the direct result o f 
processes o f democratization set in motion in large part by pressure from the
international community.” 157
The problem is that, as Uvin outlines, if there are no well-organized and powerful
explicitly democratic groups within a country then “the process o f democratization can
be easily subverted by those who have most to lose.” 138 This can then lead to a
situation more extreme than that at the start. As “Burundi is second only to Rwanda on
the list o f states subject to recurrent bouts o f ethnic insecurity” 159 the only way to
prevent a return to that violence is to “develop a system o f government that protects the
security and rights o f the minority, while providing the ethnic majority with the
political benefits that they have been deprived o f for so long.” 160 However as Brown
and Kaiser go on to argue “
“The ethnicisation o f politics, often reinforced by politicians themselves, 
promotes competition for access to resources, rather than the 
institutionalised compromise that theoretically characterises a 
democracy.” 161
This then leads to a recurrence o f violence as demonstrated within Burundi. The
continuing cycles o f violence tested the UN peacekeeping operation however the
162mission was declared a success and the mandate completed in December 2006. 
Despite the completion o f the peacekeeping mission tensions within the country remain 
high, with post-election clashes in 2010 increasing fears o f a return to civil war.
157 LeMarchand,/iz//zw<7/
158 Uvin, D ifferent P ath s to  M ass Violence
159 LeMarchand,Z?wrw/7i//
160 Brown, Stephen and Paul Kaiser, D em ocratisa tions in A frica: A ttem pts, H indrances a n d  P ro sp ec ts  
(Third World Quarterly: 28: 6: 2007) 1131-1149
161 Ibid.
162 See United Nations, Press Release on com pletion o f  O N U B  mandate,
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In comparison with Burundi which had only eight resolutions passed by the Security 
Council,163 the sheer number o f resolutions passed in relation to the conflict in Bosnia 
seemed to imply that the forces on the ground had "a clear cut inability to carry out and 
enforce the resolutions o f the Security Council."164 However this suggestion fails to 
take into account that, as Bosco argues "the gap between the council's lofty resolutions 
and the reality on the ground was startling."165 The troops involved in UNPROFOR 
faced an exceedingly difficult and complex situation on the ground as “they could not 
impose anything on to the warring parties as they were not specifically mandated to do 
so.” 166 They were being asked to undertake a peace enforcement operation with only 
the mandate and resources o f a peacekeeping operation. This meant that UNPROFOR 
“lost much of its prestige and credibility by trying, and failing to operate by political 
means in a situation which was defined by military forces."167
Although as one UK mission official argues “UN peacekeeping can be more robust 
and more aggressive where it needs to be and it can protect civilians and all the rest o f 
it” he then goes on to emphasise that “it can 't solve the ills o f the world, people expect 
too much of it and w e've ended up mandating missions that are, I think expecting way 
too much from it.” 168 This argument is supported by academics such as Fortnam who 
argues that UN peacekeeping is
163 See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping W ebsite - O N U B , 
http://w w w .un.org/en/peacekeeping/m issions/past/onub/ (20th April 2 011)
164 Rosenau, James N ., G overnance in the l i s t  C entury  (G lobal G overnance: 1 1 1995) pg 142
165 B o sco ,F ive (2009) pg l81
166 Interview with Igor Dice Reuters 6th August 2009
167 Vayrynen in Pugh, The U N  (1997) pg 35
168 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 27th August 2008
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"asked to perform miracles, turning countries in which political institutions, 
economic infrastructure, and the very fabric o f society have all been 
devastated by civil war, into stable, functioning, democratic states."169
It is clear from the above examples that while there is a definite consensus that has 
evolved on the desirability o f UN intervention in humanitarian situations "there is a 
long distance between agreement on goals and a shared perspective on the provision o f 
the necessary means" and that while there is a need for collective action in volatile 
situations the United Nations should fill that void as "the best available means o f 
achieving a modicum o f governance."170 If the UN is to be successful at creating that 
governance then the issue o f resources needs to be addressed. As argued in a CIC report 
“Collective support to peacekeeping will be severely weakened if  there are significant 
gaps between expectations and performance on the cases that attract most political 
scrutiny.” 171The organisation also needs to address the apparent selectivity in the 
application o f the norms associated with Global Governance in order to ensure that 
operations in the field retain local as well as international legitimacy. What is less clear 
is what the role o f other organisations such as NGOs should be. One o f the key 
arguments o f supporters o f the development o f Global Governance is that these 
organisations can provide improved accountability and representation in the 
international system. This argument fails to take into account the structures o f many 
NGOs, whose democratisation and accountability can be somewhat questionable. It
169 Fortnam in Ed: Jarstad, Anna K. and Tim othy D. Sisk, From  w a r to  d em ocracy  (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge: 2008), pg 39
170 Rosenau, James N ,,The stu d y  o f  w o r ld  po litics: g lob a lisa tio n  a n d  g lo b a l govern an ce  (Routledge: N ew  
York 2005)pg  143
171 Center for International Cooperation, Building on Brahimi: P eacekeepin g  in an  E ra o f  S tra teg ic  
U ncerta in ty  (N ew  York: Center on International Cooperation 2009)
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also fails to address the problem that many NGOs have a western dominated, or 
western influenced agenda, again not a characteristic which is likely to improve the 
representation and accountability within the international system. The following section 
o f this chapter argues that NGOs and other international organisations are having a 
detrimental impact on UN peacekeeping operations in the field as they complicate the 
operational environment o f the organisation. It also argues that there is a clear lack o f 
coordination between the various organisations operating in the field and that this is 
again impacting on the ability o f the UN to negotiate a resolution to any ongoing 
conflicts.
Co-ordination with other organisations
The increased demand for peacekeeping operations following the end o f the Cold 
War was coupled with a marked increased in the number o f actors involved in those 
operations. The end o f the Cold War not only removed the restrictions on the ability of 
groups to wage war, without the restrictive influence o f the Superpowers many groups 
intent on achieving self-determination instigated civil wars, it also “removed many of 
the international constraints previously placed in the way o f providing humanitarian 
assistance in rebel or politically contested areas."172 Many felt that “the geopolitical 
straitjacket was at last being removed and it seemed that humanitarians could set their 
own agenda for the first tim e"173, what this agenda should be and how it would be 
enacted however was much debated. Within the international system there was however
172 D uffield, Mark,G lo b a l G overnance an d  the new w ars  (Zed B ooks London: 2001) pg 31
173 DeW aal, A lex ,F am in e C rim es  (James Currey Oxford: 1997) pg 133
289
Chapter Six Kate Seaman
increasing political support for “a broad political and military commitment using 
international laws, norms and organisations to facilitate protection and assistance for 
affected populations in complex emergencies.” 174 ‘Complex emergency’ is a post-Cold 
War term used to define and explain a particular type o f conflict, usually within a state. 
A ‘complex emergency’ can be defined as “large-scale social breakdown and 
population displacement (caused by conflict arising for multi-causal reasons)” 175 and 
they are viewed as “dissolving the conventional distinctions between people, army and
176government” making them especially difficult to resolve and extremely dangerous to 
work in. Duffield further expounds this definition in a report for UNICEF in which he 
defines complex emergencies as “deep, protracted political crises engendered by 
profound social change” 177 and goes on to detail several unique characteristics o f these 
emergencies. The impact o f a complex emergency is one o f the most unique and 
important aspects; they have the ability to destroy cultural institutions, collapse 
education and health care, erase market economies and business and to remove the skill 
base.
Complex emergencies make it particularly difficult to gain access to and provide 
protection for vulnerable people, as the government is often either contested or 
completely collapsed which also makes it difficult to ensure the security o f any 
personnel working in the area. It is important that any intervention is flexible and that it 
has a continuous flow o f information from a variety o f sources. One other major
174 Lautze, Sue, A ssistance, P ro tec tion  a n d  governance  netw orks in com plex em ergencies  (Lancet: 364: 
20 04)
175 D u ffie ld ,G lo b a l govern ace  (2001) pg 86
176 Ibid. pg 87
177 D uffield, Mark, C om plex P o litica l E m ergencies  An exploratory report for UNICEF: 1994)
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problem with intervening in complex emergencies is the tendency for those intervening 
to become party to the crises. This means, “Complex emergencies present significant 
challenges to aid workers who should now more fully understand the political, 
economic and military dimensions o f modem crises.” 178 Whilst the aim o f intervening 
is to ensure that “all innocent civilians caught in warfare on any side o f a conflict 
should as a matter o f principle have access to assistance” 179 however “the commitment 
to being operational in the field is the most enduring and transparent principle followed
by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and it leaves them open to
* 180manipulation” . These issues have caused numerous problems for international
organisations and NGOs alike. In fact in many cases, such as Somalia, Yugoslavia, and
the DRC the United Nations "have found their efforts complicated by the variety o f
international actors involved in humanitarian crises."181 This added complication can be
attributed, as Berdal argues, to the Post Cold War preferences o f Western Powers who,
by encouraging a multiplicity o f actors with divergent interests, have complicated the
environment in which peace operations are conducted.182 For example in the DRC as
Smis and Oyatambwe argue
“Confronted with this complex political emergency, the international 
community, which has a responsibility for maintaining peace and security, 
adopted an ambiguous attitude. Its inaction jeopardises long established 
legal and humanitarian principles o f international relations while
• 183challenging the relevance o f conflict resolution mechanisms.
178 Lautze, A ssistance (2004)
179Anderson, Mary B. ,D o  No H arm  (Lynne Rienner: London: 1999) pg 55
180 D eW  aa\,Fam ine crim es (1997) pg 146
181 Fosdick, Anna, C onflict m anagem ent learn ing? (G lobal G overnance: 5: 4: 1999)
182 Berdal in Furley, O liver and Roy M ay, P eacekeeping  in A frica  (Avebury: London: 1998)
183 Sm is, C om plex P o litica l E m ergencies
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Rather than ensuring a coordinated response the international community instead 
allowed the situation within the DRC to escalate to the point where it is now viewed as 
“A frica’s First World War” .184
The complications posed by the increase in actors was also clearly demonstrated in
Somalia where the coordination o f various agencies and actors posed a large problem
for the UN; “where humanitarian operations are concerned there are even more actors
on stage, including many agencies within the wider UN system and an enormous
number o f NGOs.” 185 All o f these agencies were having a direct impact on the conflict
through the provision o f aid yet there was no real system in place to coordinate or
minimise that impact. As there was no central state it was essentially a free for all for
NGOs and the warring parties to do as they pleased with no focus on the long term
effects. This is partly due to the fact that
“The UN deals with the most urgent problems at a certain time, given its 
limited resources and the inherent tendency o f organizations to have short- 
range planning and attention. Once a crisis abates, UN members and the 
international media tend to turn away from it. Accordingly, the diplomatic 
efforts and resources needed to ensure long-term stability are often not 
present.” 186
184 See PrunierA fric a 's  W orld  War
185 G oulding, The U n ited  N ations (1999)  155 - 166
186 D iehl, Paul F. and Jennifer R eifschneider and Paul R. H ensel, U n ited  N a tion s in tervention  an d  
recurrin g  conflict (International organisation: 50: 4: 1996) 683 - 7000
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From this stand point “for states it seems humanitarianism is too valuable to be left
to humanitarians” 187 and that NGOs are facing a loss o f their independent space. This
issue was raised by Lord Hannay who argued that
“ In particular I think the NGOs have terrible difficulties working out 
whether it is a greater evil to intervene by force or to have a lot o f people 
killed and not intervene and in places like Somalia and so on they find it 
very difficult. My view is they would do well to not think that they are a 
kind o f alternative government that has to have a view on it. They’d do 
better to just keep their heads down, particularly o f course if they are 
humanitarian, simply make the best use that is possible o f the opportunities 
that are offered to carry out their mission which is to deliver medicine food 
or whatever it may be. But the difficulties come in circumstances where 
very often in a peace operation the NGOs have to work very closely with 
the UN or the regional organisation, that doesn't shock me at all, it shocks 
some NGOs but then I’m sorry I think they are not living in the real 
world.” 188
For Hannay there is a failure on behalf o f NGOs to accept that they play an 
inherently political role within conflict zones, one which they failed to acknowledge in 
Somalia with detrimental consequences.189 Many NGOs wish to believe that they are 
extra-political that they have no impact other than the provision o f humanitarian aid, as 
Weissman argues "we should remember that modem humanitarian action developed out 
o f armed conflicts in the 19th century by asking 'who needs help because o f this war?' 
instead o f 'who is right in this w ar?'"190 This sentiment does not however fit with
187 R ie ff  in W eissm an, Fabrice, In the sh adow  o f'J u st li a rs' Violence , P olitics a n d  H um anitarian Action  
(Hurst and Company: London: 2004) pg 296
188 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th O ctober 2009
189 For more see  W eiss, Thom as G., Principles, P o litics a n d  H um anitarian A ction  (Ethics and 
International Affairs: 13: 1999) 1-22
190 Brauman and Salignon in W eissm an, In the sh adow  (2004)  pg 273
293
Chapter Six Kate Seaman
modern day conflicts where aid can become a political tool in the conflict, helping to
support the parties and enable them to continue the fighting. As David Keen argues
"Conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels 
or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members o f armed 
gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect 
opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under 
these circumstances, ending civil wars become difficult. Winning may not 
be desirable; the point o f war may be precisely the legitimacy which it 
confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crim es."191
Keen also argues that in many cases, such as the Former Yugoslavia, the ethnic conflict
and hatred can be shaped by the fighting rather than shaping the fighting and that
"Part o f the problem with much existing analysis is that conflict continues to 
be regarded as simply a breakdown in a particular system rather than as the 
emergence o f an alternative system of profit, power, and even 
protection."192
It is the failure o f the NGOs to acknowledge their role in creating and sustaining these 
alternative networks or systems o f profit and power which raises questions as to their 
future role in peacekeeping operations.
The problem is that “there is in the humanitarian NGO world o f course an inbuilt 
tension between them and the military in general, or peacekeeping operations in 
general.” 193 The inbuilt tension, or suspicion in some cases is generated by both sides. 
Humanitarian agencies in most cases are afraid o f losing their independence and most 
important their perceived impartiality and neutrality which enables them to operate in 
hostile environments. Whereas among the military, as one military operative explains
191 K een, David, The econom ic functions o f  vio lence in c iv il w a r  (Adelphi Papers: 320: 1998)
192 Ibid.
193 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 27 ,h August 2008
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“There is a perception amongst working soldiers that lots o f the aid agencies 
go round in big white 4 X 4 ’s, don’t achieve a lot, seem to have a lot o f 
meetings and sometimes bring their own challenges with them and are o f 
dubious benefit, and sometimes get the soldiers into positive danger and 
also come knocking on the door sometimes and expect to be protected and 
looked after.” 194
This argument was taken further by another former peacekeeper when talking about the
coordination o f different agencies in the field;
“coordination does it exist? It ought to exist but it does not exist well. Most 
soldiers are suspicious o f non government organisations, irrespective o f 
what their background is because they tend to have their own agenda and for 
the best o f reasons I accept that they will run to their agenda even if  it is not 
necessarily appropriate from our point of view at the time. I suppose non 
government organisations under certain circumstances say we are here, we 
are independent, and we don't have to take orders from you. That is very 
true except there is a threshold over which they may step which causes 
difficulties for other people and to try to coordinate that is a nightmare, is an 
absolute nightmare. So on a massive scale or on a larger scale which would 
be the United Nations it is an absolute quagmire and again the best you 
could achieve would be lowest common denominator. That's what I've seen 
on the ground and sometimes all you've wanted to do would be to grab 
throats and say right this is what you are going to do and it's not negotiable.
This is what we are try ing to achieve and you are either with us or against 
us, but that's just a British soldier speaking having been frustrated."193
The need for coordination is paramount, but if you take the above argument it would 
appear that coordination in the field is minimal at best, not only between the NGOs and 
any troops on the ground, but between the various NGOs them selves.196 The potential 
hazards to peacekeeping troops are twofold, first there is a risk that NGOs will
194 Interview with Army M edical O fficer 8th July 2009
195 Interview with Col. Ian M acFarlane 8th July 2009
196 For a detailed look at the role o f  N G O S see Schim m el, Volker, H um anitarianism  a n d  Politics: The 
D an gers o f  C o n tr ived  S epara tion  (D evelopm ent in Practice: 16: 3/4: 2006) 303-315
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contradict or counteract any policies which the UN might attempt to apply, as Hannay 
argues, NGOs
“must not spend a lot of time promoting alternative policies, they’d do an 
awful lot better saving their money if they were doing that. They can 
advocate different policies to the UN and the governments that are 
supporting an operation at headquarters, but having them sort o f kibitzing in 
the field and saying you know I wouldn’t do it this way you should do it that 
way is really a recipe for dividing councils and for failure.” 197
NGOs attempting to propose alternative policies run the risk o f undermining the UN 
operation in the eyes o f the population which in the long run will only be detrimental to 
the overall security situation, making it more difficult for the NGOs themselves to 
operate in the field.
The above perception o f NGOs is however challenged by operatives in the field, in
particular one ICRC delegate who argued that
“There is this almost myth that you the NGOs are uncoordinated. You don’t 
work together that we need you know one central coordinating person like a 
Lord Paddy Ashdown that comes in and makes things happen and gets 
everybody working towards the same end etc. But I think that not only 
undermines extensive coordination that does go on. I think it also fails to 
understand, what is the role of the UN particularly in the context o f where 
peacekeeping is going on. or post conflict recovery is going on, and what is 
the role o f an organisation like the ICRC. That is not there to maintain peace 
or to seek peace but is actually there to deal with the humanitarian
198consequences.
The problem is that in dealing with the humanitarian consequences o f conflict, aid 
agencies can both directly and inadvertently impact on the continuation o f that conflict. 
The provision o f aid is both a humanitarian and a political act. A reality which has in
197 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
198 Interview with ICRC D elegate 23rd February 2009
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part been recognised by scholars who emphasise the potential role for NGOs in
improving the democratic accountability o f the development o f global governance199,
this role is however questioned by other academics such as Luck who argues that
NGOs, by their very nature, are unsuited for a governance role.200 As well as providing
comfort to those in need it also enables combatants to both control the flow o f aid, if
agencies are negotiating access, or to prevent the distribution o f  aid to the other side by
compromising the security o f the aid agencies themselves. The lack o f security is also
the basis for the real disconnect between the two sides which rests on the perceptions of
what needs to be done in a conflict environment.
For military personnel the first priority will always be security, securing the
environment to enable other actions to occur later, for humanitarian agencies however
the first priority is helping those in need. This does however, according to Roberts
leave NGOs open to criticism as
"Some o f the emphasis on humanitarianism is vulnerable to the criticism 
that it reflects the natural desire to do something in the face o f disaster, and 
a tendency to forget that in all these cases the disaster has been man-made, 
and requires changes in policies, institutions and possibly even in the 
structure o f states and their boundaries."-
The failure o f aid agencies to recognise this can often lead the two sides into direct 
conflict, and this is only exacerbated in situations where aid agencies become reliant on 
the military for their own security as occurred in both Somalia and Bosnia. In situations 
such as these the two sides “are working together but because o f the rivalry, because o f
199 Scholte, Jan Aart, C ivil Soc ie ty  a n d  D em ocra tica lly  A ccou ntable  G lo b a l G overnance  (Governm ent 
and Opposition: 39: 2: 2004) 211-233
200 Luck, Edward C., R ediscoverin g  the sta te  (G lobal Governance: 8: 2002) 7-11
201 Roberts, Adam, H um anitarian A ction in War (Adelphi Papers: 305: 1996)
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the violence, because o f being seen to take sides, the aid agencies try tend to try to keep
202to their own thing.” Again the issue is the consequences for aid agencies o f being too 
closely identified with military forces in a conflict situation which means that "the 
balance is between achieving good working level cooperation and avoiding too close 
identification."203
The situation can also be complicated further if  aid agencies bring in private security 
as they did in Somalia due to the fact that relief aid workers and foreign journalists 
became
“favourite targets as gunmen resumed control o f large areas o f the city. The 
subsequent upsurge o f attacks persuaded prominent aid organizations like 
the Save the Children Fund to continue spending nearly $10,000 per week 
hiring local gunmen to provide 'security'.”204
This spending then placed even greater emphasis within Somali society on the
importance o f owning a gun. The gun in Somalia was a means to make a living. The
reality was that “such spending reflected what was seen as an ambiguous UNITAF
commitment to relief agency security."-0' There was on behalf o f the US and aid
agencies within Somalia a failure to recognise the
“ inescapable reciprocity between civil and military goals. Military 
commanders cannot expect a failed state to become inherently peaceful and 
stable and their efforts to be worthwhile in the long run without the work o f 
developmental and civil affairs experts. Likewise, humanitarian workers 
must recognize that the relief goods they handle in failed states can become 
the currency o f warlords."-06
202 Interview with Dan Doherty CIMIC 2nd July 2009
203 Lawrence, Com m odore Tim, H um anitarian A ssistance a n d  Peacekeeping: A n  uneasy a lliance?
(RU SI W hitehall Papers Series 48: 1999) pg 61
204 Patman, D isarm in g  Som alia  (1997) Statistics from The Sunday Tim es, 3 January 1993.
205 Ibid.509-533
206 Clarke, Som alia  (1996)
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The need for coordination cannot be ignored but it has led to serious debate as to the 
extent o f such coordination some operatives, particularly those from a military 
background
“feel that missions should be integrated because one of the principles o f 
producing a decently run operation is unity o f command. If  you have no 
unity o f command then you lose control o f what’s going on, on the ground, 
and you’re potentially doing things that are counter productive. Some o f the 
humanitarian agencies, OCHA for instance, don’t have that view and they 
think that there should be clear water between what humanitarians do and 
w hat’s going on in a peacekeeping mission you know it’s a difference o f 
opinion. My experience o f having that argument with various people, their 
counter to my argument that we need to have a coherent response is that ah 
but we get on very well together and we always talk and actually you know 
that’s the point. I mean in fact all that is doing, all that is doing by having an 
integrated mission is formalising that relationship so that you are forced if 
you like to talk to each other even if the personalities don’t match and in
907some cases personalities don 't match.”"
The problem is that to a large extent any coordination today is dependant on the
personalities o f the staff involved as Sam Daws argues
“ it is dependant on the relationship between the Secretary General’s special 
representative involved in the peacemaking side and the force commander 
concerned. So that relationship is important and whether those two can work 
together in the situations where it's not one and the same person, then you 
can have better outcomes.”208
This reliance on personality places many peacekeeping operations in a precarious 
position, not only in terms o f coordination between the two branches o f the operation, 
civilian and military, but in terms o f relations between the factions involved in the
207 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 2 7 lh August 2008
208 Interview with Sam D aw s 9th Decem ber 2009
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conflict, the peacekeepers and the NGOs on the ground. There is also the very real
potential for there to be a clash o f personalities between the SRSG and force
commander, a situation which could seriously hamper any progress within a
peacekeeping mission. The potential for clashes is not however only based on
personalities but also on how different operatives from different backgrounds approach
different problems. As one former peacekeeper explained
“You try to get people to listen. It’s like any kind o f business you need to 
know who they are, you establish a relationship, can you drop in for a cup o f 
tea. You try to pull them together, you try to assist them, again you can’t 
influence them at all because they want to be totally self contained. You try 
to provide them with information, so it is always face to face. It’s about 
relationships, you get meetings, you bring groups together, and you just get 
them to try to work together try to sort things. Most organisations are in 
competition a lot o f the time, they want to be seen as our organisation is 
doing this and hence more charity money goes their way if  that makes 
sense? It’s rivalry, it’s rivalry among each other, rivalry. Also their people 
have been killed because they have been seen to be working with the 
military people perceived them to be passing on information and all this 
kind o f thing.”209
As Doherty explains above, it is not only the problem of rivalry between the military 
and civilian operatives but also a problem o f rivalry between different NGOs 
competing for the same funding from the same sources. A rivalry which can lead the 
organisations to attempt ever more challenging operations in order to ensure the next 
round of funding, a rivalry which can lead to the duplication o f resources in an 
operation and a lack o f concern and focus on those in need.
209 Interview with Dan Doherty CIMIC 2nd July 2009
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The rivalry between the different branches o f a peacekeeping mission can have a
negative effect on the success o f that operation and again the issue is the tension
between security and the provision o f humanitarian aid. This tension has only increased
in recent years as Daws explains
“It is an issue particularly because the civilian components o f peacekeeping 
have increased exponentially. So peacekeepers aren’t now principally blue 
bereted or blue helmeted troops. Particularly within the kind o f security 
context which is shifting and civilians being more in the firing line almost 
literally that sort o f coordination is valuable. Safety is not principally about 
coordination it’s about having clear guidance and protocols and that 
civilians are given sufficient protection to be able to operate, but the UN 
will need to continue to look at what is possible in terms o f international and 
also local national staff in theatre and what needs to happen in other 
ways.”210
The arguments for full integration are far from resolved and these are only further 
complicated when you factor in the increasing role o f other organisation outside o f the 
UN family, in particular the use o f NATO forces, which is viewed by many as a purely 
military alliance, hence making NGO coordination with any o f these forces even more 
tremulous. There have however been moves towards solidifying the role o f civil society 
in the reconstruction o f states with specific reference to the importance o f civil society 
being made in both peace agreements and peacekeeping mandates.211
As explored in the previous chapter there have been moves towards the creation o f 
alternatives to the UN in the field o f peacekeeping operations, and for many regional
210 Interview with Sam Daw s 9th Decem ber 2009
211 See for exam ple B ell, Christine and Catherine O'Rourke, The P eople's P eace?  P ea ce  A greem ents,
C iv il Society, a n d  P a rtic ip a to ry  D em ocracy  (International Political Science R eview : 28: 3: 2 0 0 7 ) 293-  
324 , Burundi, Arusha Peace Agreem ent for Burundi, United N ations, United N ations Security Council 
R esolution 1118, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G E N /N 97/178/44/P D F /N 9717844 .pdf?OpenElem ent (18th April 2011), and 
United N ations, United N ations Security Council Resolution 814
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organisations represent the future o f peacekeeping operations, and the chance to create
a more stable form o f multilateralism to ensure international peace and security. The
European Union and NATO are two actors who have taken on increasing roles in
peacekeeping operations. NATO in particular has embraced this new role, and in many
ways it has provided "a welcomed means to gain new relevance in the post cold war 
212period." These newer actors in peacekeeping are not without their challenges 
however.
One o f the key problems is, as Bellamy and Williams argue the uneven occurrence 
o f regionalisation, not all regions have developed capabilities to the same extent and 
more importantly not all regional organisations are confined to their own regions.213 As 
one UK mission official explains different organisations have different capacities, for 
example
“the EU can do things that the UN cannot. Some of which is related to the 
way in which the EU operates, operates much more as a nation state if you 
like rather than the UN which operates as a massive bureaucracy. If the EU 
is looking at a peacekeeping mission or a peacekeeping scenario the EU 
looks at it from a much more pragmatic point o f view than the UN does, the 
UN tends to look at it through a completely political prism and therefore 
you get missions set up which have no real clear military peacekeeping goal, 
or achievable clear peacekeeping goal. Whereas the EU on the other hand 
will look at it and say do we have the means to achieve this if yes then we 
might go and do it if no well we w on't even consider it any further. , So in 
that sense the EU can be quite helpful. It also has forces o f course which are 
much more capable than the average forces that come forward as troop 
contributing countries in the UN." He then goes on to argue that other
212 Forman and Grane in M alone, David M., The U nited  N ations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: 
London: 2 0 0 4 ) pg 298
213 B ellam y, A lex  J. and Paul D. W illiam s,U nderstan din g  P eacekeep in g  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2010)
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organisations do not have the same capacities, organisations such as the AU, 
which he argues “what the AU lacks, specifically lacks is resources.”214
This lack o f resources was clearly demonstrated in Burundi, resulting in the handing 
over o f control to the United Nations.215 This argument was also backed by an MOD 
official who noted that some organisations lack the administrative skills and also 
military planning skills in comparison to the EU and NATO. In his opinion “NATO has 
the best planning. The military planning is very focused in relation to logistics and 
tactics” and there is a need for this to be transferred to other organisations. He also 
noted the problem o f the small numbers o f military staff within the UN in comparison 
to NATO.216
The lack o f capacity o f some organisations is directly connected to the involvement
o f other actors however there is still the issue o f control and mandating o f operations.
Some academics such as Roberts do not believe that it is only the UN that is capable of
intervention. Other bodies, with or without UN authorization, can also act as
interveners, and may sometimes be successful. He argues that
“a number o f other bodies have engaged in certain kinds o f intervention 
without attracting serious accusations o f acting in a colonial manner. Both 
NATO and the EU have intervened in Bosnia in the years since 1995 -  in 
both cases with UN authorization. This intervention has not attracted 
negative comments despite having a colonial sounding figure in charge with 
the glorious title o f ‘high representative'. Also even in situations such as the 
UKs intervention in Sierra Leone which had the potential for being seen as 
blatantly colonial, there were demonstrations in favour o f the UK 
remaining.” 217
2,4 Interview with UK M ission O fficial T w o 27th August 2008
215 See this chapter pages 254- 258
216 Interview with M O D O fficial 24 lh February 2009
217 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts 8th Decem ber 2009
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Although arguing in favour o f the ability o f other organisations to intervene, Roberts
does however accept that the UN has a form o f primacy over regional bodies:
“Technically speaking under the UN Charter regional uses o f force should be reported
to the UN and then if the Security Council is able to act they should come under 
218Council control.” The problem then becomes the fact that the UN cannot dictate to 
regional organisations and in many cases "the leverage available to the UN to ensure 
accountability is limited to its moral authority and, at time, the resources that it can 
make available."219 Although practitioners such as Former UN ambassador Sir Jeremy 
Greenstock argue that all interventions “should be retained under UN control,” and that 
“the UN charter allows for regional organisation to follow their own initiatives so long
990as they follow the principles o f the UN charter.” “ The problem is that many regional
organisations do not classify themselves as or associate themselves with the United
Nations under Chapter VIII o f the charter, which subordinates regional organisations to
the will o f the Security Council. This then means that although an operation “if it has a
mandate to use force should be authorised by the security council''221 according to
Boulden the Security Council
"In response to regional military initiatives taken without Security Council 
authorisation, has demonstrated relatively little concern for ensuring the 
primacy o f the charter and has been remarkably un-protective o f its own 
turf."222
218 Ibid. Roberts
219 Alagappa, M uthiah, R egional institu tions, the UN a n d  in ternational secu rity  (Third W orld Quarterly: 
18:3 : 199 7 )4 2 1 -4 4 1
220 Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock 8th D ecem ber 2009
221 Interview with Sim on B agshaw OCHA 28 th August 2008
222 Boulden in Boulden, Jane, D ealin g  w ith  C onflict in A frica  (Palgrave M acm illan N ew  York: 2003) pg  
29
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This is a clear demonstration that “the hierarchy envisioned in the charter does not
223hold.” While academics such as Thomas G. Weiss argue that there is a clear need for 
an international division o f labour based on who does what best or better, the ability o f 
the international system to produce such a division is hampered by the lack o f a 
straightforward hierarchy and the lack o f accountability in regional security to the UN. 
It is clear that in many ways the United Nations is not viewed as the prime organisation 
for keeping the peace, and in some places regional organisations are viewed as more 
powerful, particularly because o f the practical operational capabilities o f regional 
organisations.224
The use o f regional organisations not only poses credibility issues to the UN but also 
practical coordination issues in the same way that the increasing role o f NGOs has 
represented an issue. This was particularly true in Bosnia with the coordination between 
UN peacekeeping troops under UNPROFOR command and the NATO air strikes. The 
role o f NATO in Bosnia was to provide the coercive military capacity required to create 
a solution to the conflict. The coordination was based upon the ‘dual key' approach in 
which any NATO action had to be approved by both the UN and NATO before it could 
take place. This caused large delays in the ability o f NATO to deploy air strikes in a 
timely manner. When the arrangement was first introduced the UN key was held by 
Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Yugoslavia, 
however following the massacre in Srebrenica Akashi's key was given to
223 A lagappa, R egional Institu tions (1997) , pg 436
224 Smith and W eiss in W eiss, Thom as G., B eyon d  UN su bcon tracting  (St Martins Press N ew  York:
1998)
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UNPROFOR’s military commander, French General Bernard Janvier. The NATO key
was held by Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Commander o f Allied Forces Southern
Europe in Naples. The ‘dual key’ approach was not the only hamper to both
coordination and action between the UN and NATO
“N A TO’s inertia was, in part, a reflection o f UNPROFOR’s composition. 
Many Allies including Canada, France and the United Kingdom, had 
deployed their own peacekeepers in UNPROFOR and feared that a more 
robust approach towards the Bosnian Serbs would produce a backlash 
against their troops. Meanwhile, the United States, which did not have 
troops on the ground, was pushing a “lift and strike” policy -  lifting the 
arms embargo against the entire region that penalised in particular the 
Bosnian Muslims and striking the Bosnian Serb targets from the air.”225
There were clear disagreements over how best to proceed which were only resolved 
with the authorisation o f ‘operation deliberate fo rce '226 by both the UNPROFOR 
commander and the NATO commander, who both held the necessary keys to instigate 
the air strikes. The air strikes however signalled the end o f the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia as it essentially became a peace enforcement operation instead. This 
again highlights the complications of coordination with other organisations, especially 
organisations with a higher level o f military capacity than the United Nations. It can 
lead to the United Nations becoming involved in operations it is not capable of 
undertaking, and perhaps more detrimental is the potential for the United Nations to
225 N A T O  w ebsite http://w w w .nato.int/docu/review /2005/issue3/englisli/h istorv.htm l (21st A ugust 2010)
226 For an in depth analysis o f  the role o f  both the UN  and N A T O  in Bosnia see  the Report o f  the 
Secretary General pursuant to General A ssem bly resolution 53/35 available at http://daccess-dds- 
nv.un .org/doc/U N D O C /G F-N /N 99/348/76/lM G /N 9934S76.pdt70penE lem ent (2 3 rd August 2010)
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become a party to the conflict in the eyes o f the belligerents which leaves its troops 
open to attack and kidnapping, as then occurred in Bosnia.227
The reality is that greater coordination with other international organisations is
unavoidable as the UN itself does not have the resources or capacity to deal with the
increasing number o f tasks it is being asked to undertake. As Sam Daws highlights
“The debate, the narrative will increasingly shift to looking at burden 
sharing and subsidiarity and looking at the global regional collaboration on 
the basis o f cost with the global economic climate etc. So NATOs 
development out o f area has been very interesting, and it for example in 
Afghanistan, has been blessed by the UN Security Council. There is an 
interesting wider debate going on in most capitals o f Donors about the 
extent to which there is coordination between military, foreign office and 
overseas development budgets and to have a more holistic approach to 
countries where there is instability. So I think in many ways that debate is 
stronger than the international architecture in terms o f burden sharing/’228
This burden sharing will become increasingly important if the UN is to continue to 
undertake tasks o f the magnitude o f previous operations, tasks which now involve the 
total reconstruction o f states as opposed to more traditional peacekeeping. The 
following section o f this chapter goes on to argue that these roles along with the 
increasing globalisation o f local conflicts represent a clear danger to the UN and that 
the organisation needs to be careful as to the extent in which it becomes involved in 
state or nation building activities.
227 B B C  W ebsite http://news.bbc.co.uk/ l/h i/w orld/am ericas/892592.stm  ( 23rd A ugust 2010)
228 Interview with Sam D aw s 9th Decem ber 2009
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The globalisation of local conflicts and the dangers of state building
In his 1992 report “An Agenda For Peace” then Secretary General Boutros Boutros
Ghali outlined his plans for involving the United Nations in much broader situations,
ones which constituted peace building, essentially the reconstruction o f failed states.
Behind his argument was the belief that
“Existing UN guidelines and rules o f engagement were designed for 
traditional peacekeeping and do not offer adequate conceptual and 
organizational guidance for the United Nations' new peace-building roles.
At root, full-scale peace-building efforts are nothing short o f attempts at 
nation building; they seek to remake a state's political institutions, security
7 7Qforces, and economic arrangements.” “
The report represented
“the ambition o f some within the UN system to tackle simultaneously and in 
a coordinated manner different military, political and humanitarian roles - 
restoring peace, assisting refugees and war victims, encouraging respect for 
human rights and promoting socio-economic development."2^ 0
It also seemed to suggest that "peace operations should be in the business o f rebuilding
war-shattered societies along liberal democratic lines."2’1 The intervention in Somalia
was seen by some within the UN system as a test case for the new multilateralism being
lauded in the post Cold War era. It was felt by many that "an era might be dawning in
which Western governments, freed from the constraints o f the cold war, would use their
armies to save strangers in places far away from hom e."2’2 For others however
“the initial deployment in Somalia was. with hindsight, a mistake. It 
reflected the mood that prevailed in New York in 1992. A spectacular run o f
229 Bertram, Eva, R e-inventing G overnm ents (Journal o f  C onflict R esolution 39: 3: 2 0 05) 387-418
230 Roberts, H um anitarian A ction (1996) pg 1 1
231 Bellam y, U nderstanding peacekeep in g  (2 0 10) p g 4 1
232 W heeler,Saving stran gers (2000) pe 172
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UN successes (especially the operation in Namibia) had created a kind o f 
inebriation in New York and a feeling that the UN could not put a foot 
wrong. Added to this was a certain pressure from the new Secretary- 
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for more peacekeeping in Africa. He was 
the first African Secretary-General, with deep experience o f Africa after 
serving for many years as the Minister responsible for Egypt's relations with 
that continent. This made him sensitive to complaints that Africa was not 
getting its fair share o f the UN's new successes (at that time only four o f the 
14 post-Cold War peacekeeping operations had been in Africa). With 
hindsight, the Secretariat (including the writer himself) was not rigorous 
enough in analyzing whether the conditions for successful peacekeeping 
existed before it recommended to the Security Council that new operations 
be established in Africa.”233
In Somalia the UN also became involved in wider range o f activities than it was
used to undertaking. However “the implications o f the United Nations' move into peace
building are too often overlooked. Peace building takes the United Nations into territory
unexplored by UN practitioners and uncharted by UN strategists or scholars. Many of
its peace-building tasks cast the United Nations in entirely new roles.”234 Roles which
the organisation is ill equipped to undertake. The UN is reliant on its member states for
the resources to undertake these missions and if the resources are not provided it should
be made clear that the UN should not attempt to undertake the mission. If it does
continue to undertake these kinds o f missions then
“The implications are significant for the organization's credibility; only a 
perception o f UN effectiveness will lead warring parties to seek the 
organization's counsel and member states to lend support to such operations.
This question o f capability guides oft-repeated concerns about the need for 
adequate financial and technical capacities for peacekeeping and peace­
building operations. Attention to such issues is justified and important. But
233 G oulding, The U n ited  N ations (1999) 155 - 166
234 Bertram, R e-inventing G overnm ents (2005) 387-418
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unfortunately, all o f the technical capacity in the world will not create the 
necessary conditions for UN success in peace building.”235
The UN needs to leam that even the apparently neutral provision o f humanitarian aid 
can have negative consequences on the development o f a conflict. Aid in Somalia 
became a key factor in the ability o f the warlords to sustain the violent conflict. There 
needs to be more care taken in the distribution o f aid, the control and supply o f aid to 
ensure that it is not a factor in the continuation o f conflicts. There cannot be a 
humanitarian intervention o f any kind without paying attention to the impact this will 
have on the political situation. There is a need for more coordination between the 
humanitarian agencies involved on the ground and those involved in attempting to 
broker a political solution.
There was a failure to recognise the impact that the involvement o f the international 
community was having on the conflict in Somalia. It was assumed that, as in traditional 
peacekeeping missions, the insertion o f forces would simply halt hostilities, enable the 
delivery o f aid, and would eventually resolve the crisis. It was for the most part a 
failure to recognise the very unique circumstances o f the Somali case. Whilst for the 
most part
“UN peacekeeping missions can restore order for a time, and in limited 
areas they cannot tackle the source o f the disorder, which is political and 
requires a political solution. The international community has been treating 
symptoms, not causes, he continues, because peacekeeping focuses on 
stopping conflict, not remedying the underlying causes o f it. Moreover, the 
current system allows economic and humanitarian aid to fall into the hands 
o f those who serve to perpetuate the situation. The aid that is donated is too
235 Ibid.
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easily routed away from those who most need it by corrupt officials, street 
gangs, or warlords.”236
Both the UN and USA failed to recognise that although they were claiming neutrality in 
their actions, the reality was that as soon as they became involved in the conflict they 
became a party to the conflict. Aid within Somalia was used to gain power and 
influence and “food supplies were confiscated by warring factions as part o f a struggle 
to succeed a deposed ruler.” The failure o f the UN to recognise the importance o f this 
meant that
“When the UN policy escalated to include the disarming o f various factions 
to facilitate relief efforts, the policy jeopardized the United Nations' neutral 
role. Unless all factions were disarmed simultaneously and in equal 
measure, observers warned correctly, the United Nations would upset the 
balance o f power and be perceived as another belligerent in the divisive 
struggle.”237
The problems within Somalia were symptomatic o f a greater problem within UN 
peacekeeping, the failure to tackle the causes o f disorder. In ongoing conflicts Post 
Cold War
“the international response has been to insert non-participatory and non- 
accountable institutions o f conventional relief, along with armed protection. 
Political distance has been achieved by defining this form o f 
humanitarianism as the only possible type o f intervention. But military 
humanitarianism. distrustful o f indigenous political relations and 
institutions, cannot provide a long-term solution. The manner in which 
internal wars are fought dictates that emergency assistance cannot help but 
affect the dynamics o f the conflict.”2 ’8
236 Johnson, Paul, C olonia lism  is back a n d  not a  m oment too  soon  (N ew  York Tim es M agazine: April 
18th 1 9 9 3 )4 3 -4 4
237 Bertram, R e-inven ting G overnm ents (2005) 387-418
238 D uffield , Mark and John Prendergast, S overeign ty  a n d  in tervention  after the C o ld  War: L essons fro m  
the E m ergency R e lie f  D esk  (M iddle East Report: 187/188: 1994)
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This was clearly demonstrated in the intervention in Bosnia as well, where
"international implementation efforts have also exerted a contradictory 
effect on Bosnia's democratic development, consistently calling for 
democratization but with progress that alternately foster or undermine 
democratic capacities in Bosnian political society."239
The intervention in Bosnia is a clear demonstration o f the fact that the UN "faces the 
problem o f building democracy in war-torn societies in ways that are fundamentally 
undemocratic."240 As Judith Large argues "Peace-building is nothing less than the 
reallocation o f political power"241 and as Howard goes on to emphasise today "through 
the mechanisms o f multinational, multi dimensional peacekeeping, the UN and its 
sponsors seek to transform states emerging from civil conflicts into places o f liberal 
democracy in the western image."242 However peacekeeping operations through their 
mere presence on the ground adversely affect and in many ways undermine the 
sovereignty o f the state in which they are deployed. They affect the incentives and 
behaviour o f indigenous actors in political, military and economic situations, an impact 
which has become known as the 'large footprint' and as Fortnam argues while they 
"help keep the peace very effectively...they do not necessarily foster 
democratization."243
239 C ousens in C ousens, P eacebu ild ing  as po litic s  (2001) Pg 114
240 Chesterman, Sim on You, the P eople: The U nited  Nations, T ransitional A dm inistration , a n d  S ta te- 
B uilding  (O xford University Press Oxford: 2004) pg 7
241 Large in Cochrane, Feargal, D uffy , Rosaleen, Selby, Jan, G lo b a l governance, conflict a n d  resistance  
(Palgrave M cM illan: 2003) pg 114
242 Howard, Lise Morje,L7V P eacekeep in g  in C ivil W ars (Cam bridge University Press Cambridge: 2008)  
pg 341
243 Fortnam in Ed: Jarstad, From  w a r (2008) pg 74
312
Chapter Six Kate Seaman
As explained above the international intervention in Bosnia has had a contradictory 
effect on the democratisation o f the country and the same has occurred in Somalia. 
Unlike in Bosnia in Somalia there was no government to prevent external intervention 
in the crisis. The Security Council then faced a decision as to how to justify any 
intervention with the problem that the provision o f consent is underwritten by the 
“assumption that the state has a government with effective territorial control, allowing 
it to offer or refuse consent."244 This problem led to the groundbreaking arguments 
outlined in Resolution 794 which mandated the UNITAF operation. Within this 
resolution the humanitarian disaster in Somalia was constituted as a threat to 
international peace and security, the first time a humanitarian situation had been 
labelled as such. Also included within the resolution was particularly emphasis on the 
uniqueness o f the situation in Somalia which had raised numerous difficult questions.
One o f the most important issues raised was whether or nor Somalia was still a 
sovereign state. This question was predicated on the collapse o f the Somali 
government and whether this collapse had led to loss o f sovereignty for the Somali 
state. It then became the case that whether or not Somalia existed became dependent on 
the collective judgement o f the society o f states, as sovereignty is the defining mark o f 
membership o f that society. In this sense “states survive either by virtue o f their will 
and capacity to remain sovereign, or by virtue o f the externally granted right to 
territorial integrity and political independence, that is, by virtue o f the principle o f non-
244 W eiss, Thom as G . ,H um anitarian Intervention  (Polity: Cambridge: 2007) pg 41
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intervention.”245 In relation to Somalia the state had no capacity at all in which to
remain sovereign and the question then became does a state which is no longer 
classified as sovereign in respect o f being “an independent entity in terms o f its own 
constitution” does it then still retain the right o f non-intervention which “has 
traditionally been regarded as a logical sequel to sovereignty in the sense o f 
constitutional independence.”246
Whilst the Security Council could not demonstrate a loss o f sovereignty and had to 
therefore classify the problems within Somalia as a threat to international peace and 
security, it had, in raising the question o f Somalia’s sovereignty, demonstrated the 
inability o f the state to protect that right on both a regional and international level.
There was no central government in control o f the territory and therefore no 
overarching authority to oversee the development o f the state. This undermining o f  the 
position o f Somalia as a sovereign state was in direct contrast to the increasing 
emphasis that was being placed on “continuing the fiction that Somalia was still a 
sovereign nation-state."247 Although “there is no doubt that Somalia was without an 
effective government with territorial control at the time o f the UN authorization o f
Operation Restore Hope” and that “the internal conditions in Somalia were closer to
anarchy than to empirical statehood,”248 this reality was challenged by the Security 
Council. Whilst the operation in Somalia was lauded as a new type o f peacekeeping 
operation, designed to protect the distribution o f humanitarian aid in an ongoing
245 Sem b, Anne Julie, The new pra c tic e  o f  UN au th o rised  in terventions  (Journal o f  Peace Research: 37:
4: July 2000)
246 Ibid.
247 Herbst, Jeffrey, R esponding to  s ta te  fa ilu re  in A frica  (International Security: 2 1 :3 :  1996)
248 Sem b, U N  au th orised  in terventions (2000)
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conflict, the UN and its member states were unwilling to act to address the causes o f
that conflict. They continued to position Somalia as a sovereign nation state capable o f
rebuilding and this was coupled with the problem that
“the idea that Somalia was not able to rule itself—now or for a long time 
went so deeply against the organizational grain o f the United Nations that an 
approach incorporating long-term reconstruction was never considered.”249
The problem stems from the reality o f
“The current complete disassociation between a country's economic and 
political performance and its sovereign status means that, no matter how 
poorly a country performs, the international community continues to give it 
legitimacy, pretends that it is a functioning state, and supports efforts to 
preserve its integrity.”230
The Security Council had, in its resolution, succeeded in both undermining the 
sovereign status o f the state o f Somalia, whilst simultaneously avoiding the need to 
intervene in order to prevent even greater failure within the state. The reality was that in 
order to gain the support for an intervention “The United States and the United Nations 
had to pretend that Somalia could resume self-government quickly.” Unfortunately 
“that pretence almost automatically led them to cooperate explicitly and implicitly with 
the warlords.”251
The real problems stemmed from the unwillingness o f the international community 
to become embroiled in a long project o f state building. They wanted Somalia to be a 
simple operation o f humanitarian aid distribution and to continue “the illusion that one 
can intervene in a country beset by widespread civil violence without affecting
249 Clarke, Som alia  (1996)
250 Herbst, S ta te  F ailure (1996)
251 Clarke, S om alia  (1996)
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domestic politics and without including a nation-building component.”252 This
approach ignored the reality that “ultimately civil wars are about the distribution o f
power”253 and that
“Attention must be devoted to rebuilding the institutions whose collapse 
helped bring on disaster. Stopping a man-made famine means rebuilding 
political institutions to create order. No intervention in a troubled state such 
as Somalia can succeed in a few weeks. Unless development aid and 
external assistance address the long-term political and economic 
implications o f an intervention, it is doomed.”234
In Somalia the UN and its member states wanted to avoid becoming entangled in a
peace building project, because
“Peace building is nothing less than the reallocation o f political power; it is 
not a neutral act. The claim that there are objective standards o f human 
rights and o f democracy to which all parties may be held without prejudice 
may be ethically and theoretically compelling. But in the highly politicized 
context o f creating or re-creating a state's institutions, it is politics and 
power that dictate who will interpret such standards and how.”233
By failing to attempt to rebuild the Somali state and involving itself only in the 
distribution o f aid throughout the ongoing conflict, the UN became “simply another 
party to Somalia's civil war and thus become part o f the problem rather than the 
solution to the country's crisis.”236 This failure has directly contributed to the increased 
globalisation of the conflict, particularly in relation to the inability o f the state to deal 
with external forces.
252 Ibid.
253 Patman, D isarm in g  S om alia  (1997)
254 Clarke, Som alia  (1996)
255 Bertram, R e-inven ting G overnm ents (2005)
256 Patman, D isarm in g  S om alia  (1997)
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The unwillingness to become involved in the reconstruction o f  Somalia was in direct
contrast to the emphasis which was placed on ensuring the survival and reconstruction
o f  Bosnia following the UN intervention. The reconstruction o f Bosnia was based on
the concept that "all o f  the basic peace deals are forged within an ideal image that an
external (western) liberal democratic system will be placed over the post-civil war
society, with the hope that some approximation o f the ideal will be created by the
overlay o f  new institutions.”257 However the resulting peace agreement and the
"attempts to create a multi ethnic Bosnia by delineating ethnic territories may in fact
have strengthened authoritarian tendencies and complicated intergroup relations."258
What the UN failed to realise in Bosnia is that
"A lasting solution to civil war depends not simply on creating incentives 
for the acceptance o f peace, irrespective o f how exploitative it may be, but 
on the creation of a peace that takes account o f the desires and the 
grievances that drove people to war in the first place."259
The UN also did not take account of the fact that "institutions created before the
conflict has been fully stabilised will reflect the character o f the conflict, not what the
country needs for a stable and enduring peace."260As Paddy Ashdown goes on to argue
"It is not the interveners' job to replicate their own countries in faraway 
places. It is their job to give the people o f the country concerned the chance 
to choose their own ultimate form o f government - even if  the result is one 
which makes us feel uncomfortable.261
257 Howard, UN pea cek eep in g  (2008) pg 341
258 C ousens, P eacebu ild in g  as po litic s  (2001) pg 203
259 Berdal, Mats and David M. M a \on e,G reed  a n d  G rievance: E conom ic agen das in C ivil W ars (Lynne 
Rienner: London: 2000)pg 39
260 Ashdown,Swore/s (2008) pg 99
261 Ibid. pg 136
317
Chapter Six Kate Seaman
In Bosnia the western powers appeared to be unresponsive to objective problems and 
more concerned with maintenance o f a particular liberal type o f international order.262 
This concern led to a situation in which they effectively froze the conflict situation and 
then rewarded the aggressor state, Serbia, with 49% o f the territory and their own 
independent federation within the Bosnian State.263 The conflict in Bosnia was a classic 
demonstration o f conflict as a product o f transitional times. As Boulden argues many o f 
today’s modem conflicts are the “product o f the struggle for power among different 
groups in the country in the vacuum that results from the transition"264 in this case the 
collapse o f the former Communist Federation. In Burundi the conflict can be attributed 
to the shift o f  power following independence, with the violence stemming from the 
differing expectations of both ethnic groups. Whereas in the DRC the conflict has 
tended to be attributed to resources but could also be viewed through a regional lens 
and connected to the various conflicts based on power transitions occurring along its 
borders and within its own government.
The emphasis that the UN placed and continues to place on the reconstruction o f states 
into liberal democracies ignores the fact that as Jennifer Welsh argues "attempts to 
remake the world's political communities into liberal democracies are likely to lead to 
war, not peace."265 For example as Lemarchand argues
262 B ellam y, A lex J., The 'next stage' in p ea ce  operations theory1? (International Peacekeeping: 11 :1 :  
20 04) 17-38
263 G oodby, James E., When w a r w on out: Bosnian P eace  P lan s B efore D ayton  (International 
N egotiation: 1 :1: 1996) 501-523
264Boulden in Boulden, Conflict in A frica  (2003) pg 13
265W elsh in W elsh, Jennifer M., H um anitarian Intervention a n d  In ternational R elations  (O xford  
University Press Oxford: 2 0 04) pg 62
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“What makes the DRC so potentially unstable, in other words, is that the 
distribution o f power formalized by the 2002 Agreement reflects a particular 
moment in the play o f forces on the ground, leaving out some critically 
important players.266
It also represents as one former peacekeeper notes “a very difficult and dangerous path 
to go down because who sets the standards?”267 The problem is as the peacekeeper goes 
on to argue that
“Firstly, since the end o f the Cold War the certainties have gone, military 
men tend to like certainty but the only thing you can guarantee is 
uncertainty. So I think that if anything, intervention is probably more 
complicated now because there are too many players who are not 
necessarily aligned as they were once previously. Secondly I think the 
United Nations as an organisation, because o f the desire for nations outside 
o f the Security Council to have a say, its focus is probably more fragmented 
than it was. O f course that probably makes it much more difficult to get a 
United Nations resolution for intervention in an area and even if  you do get 
that resolution I rather suspect that it will represent the lowest common 
denominator. Sadly consensus takes a long time to build and for military 
intervention in support o f a political end game you often require to move 
quickly and with resolve. Therefore its probably more difficult to get that 
level of resolve to allow the practitioners who are going to go in to either 
keep the peace, or more likely peace enforcement. Because although we 
tend to talk about peacekeeping, the reality is that assumes there is a peace 
to keep, and by and large my view is that doesn't seem to be the case. You 
have to impose the peace to keep it."268
As the peacekeeper argues the United Nations is based on consensus which means that 
everything is brought down to the lowest common denominator. In order to get 
everyone to agree you have to agree with the member who wants to do the least. Which
266 LeMarchand, Rene, C onsociationalistn  a n d  p o w e r  sh aring  in Africa: R w anda, Burundi, a n d  the  
D em ocra tic  R epublic o f  the C ongo  (African Affairs: 106: 422: 2006) 1-20
267 Interview with Col. Ian M acFarlane 8lh July 2009
268 Interview with Col. Ian M acFarlane 8lh July 2009
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when you are involved in a conflict situation is not necessarily the best way to help 
resolve the crisis or to ensure success. He also highlights the uncertainty which the UN 
is currently facing today. As it has become involved in larger projects the need for 
resources has increased, however the push from member states for the UN to do more 
has not been matched by the resources to do so.269
These arguments highlight the important fact that, “the international community 
should be under no illusions that peacekeeping will be able to transform war-torn states 
into ideal democratic societies."270 As an organisation which operates based on 
consensus the UN is restricted in what it can achieve, especially in an environment o f 
ongoing conflict. This is a lesson which Lord Hannay argues that the UN has learned, 
he states that
“they have learned quite a lot o f things yes and nobody would attempt again 
I don’t think enforcement operations. They would always be treated as 
authorisations to someone else, another organisation or a coalition o f the 
willing to take action and that has very frequently been the case and it seems 
to work better that way."271
This is a direct consequence o f the situation in the mid 1990s which he outlines in his 
book, a new world disorder, whereby the UN must recognise the need for an 
intervention end state, as “states were failing and the UN was in many cases proving 
unable to prevent that happening and poorly equipped to deal with the consequences 
when they had failed."272 Following past failures the UN has recognised, as Ramesh
269 For an in depth analysis o f  the role o f  the UN  in the international system  today see M acQ ueen,
N orrie,P eacekeep in g  a n d  the in ternational system  (R outledge N ew  York: 2006)
270 Fortnam in Ed: Jarstad, From  w a r (2008) pg 77
271 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
272 Hannay, D avid,N ew  W orld  D iso rd er  (I.B . Tauris: London: 2009) pg 75
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Thakur argues that "political neutrality has too often degenerated into military 
timidity"273 and that "impartiality should not translate into complicity with evil."274 
Although in the mid 1990s it seemed that "inaction in the face o f atrocity was becoming 
a common posture for the council"275 today the Council seems more willing to 
undertake even more ambitious projects than ever before, including the transitional 
administration o f both Kosovo and East Timor.
Although the UN has learned some lessons it still has a long way to go. It still faces 
large scale problems in both the mandating and resourcing o f its operations, particularly 
in relation to the often wide disparity between the resources provided in relation to the 
goals to be achieved. The emphasis o f particular goals in those mandates, such as the 
creation o f a stable democratic state from a post conflict society, needs to be carefully 
monitored to ensure that the end state suits the society, and the capabilities o f the 
peacekeepers to achieve that. While the failures can in part be blamed on the need for 
the Security Council members to be seen to be doing something, if it continues it will 
only further undermine the legitimacy o f the organisation. Because o f the tendency of 
the Council to make politically expedient statements, which may not be practically 
achievable, there needs to be a much more strategic approach to the mandating and 
resourcing o f missions. There also needs to be a reduction in the selective use o f 
particular norms, such as democratisation, good governance, and human rights, to 
justify interventions which in the long run undermine the legitimacy o f the institution.
In order to secure it’s position within the international system the UN also needs to
273 Thakur, Ram esh, F rom  P eacekeepin g  to P eace  opera tion s  (C onflict Trends: 4: 2004)
274 Ibid.
275 B osco ,F /ve (2009) pg 193
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establish a much clearer hierarchy, or organisational structure, for its dealings with 
other organisations, be they NGOs or other international organisations. If the UN does 
not work to protect its roles as the international peacekeeper it could become sidelined 
in the future, as has already occurred in Kosovo and to some extent with the US 
invasion o f Iraq. There is a clear need for coordination both on a strategic and tactical 
level with these organisations to ensure the greater success o f operations in the field.
The above case studies offer clear demonstrations o f how both the failure to 
intervene and the wrong type o f intervention can lead to the deterioration o f an entire 
country. They are a demonstration o f the need for greater control in undertaking 
interventions and the need to address the political as well as the humanitarian issues 
which underpin large scale conflicts and civil wars. Somalia has also become the focus 
o f interest in how large scale forces, economic globalisation, the war on terror, the 
influence o f new actors are impacting on the role o f the state, and if  it is possible for a 
state to function without a government. It is clear to see from the situation in Somalia 
that global forces are having a massive impact but that governments are still essential to 
control the influence they have and to ensure the survival o f sovereign states. Bosnia on 
the other hand is a clear demonstration o f how the pursuit o f a democratic end state can 
lead to the introduction of a solution which rewards the aggressors and leads to the 
permanent division o f a once multi-ethnic country. Burundi demonstrates the potential 
for positive interventions, when an operation is given a clear and concise mandate, is 
properly resourced and is able to achieve that mandate, even if it is unable to resolve all 
the underlying problems. The DRC however represents the complete opposite, the
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increasingly complex operation mired in an even more complex situation which is on 
the verge o f becoming a party to the conflict.
These four case studies provide an important insight into the role o f the United
Nations as an international peacekeeper and as an institution which is increasingly
shifting its focus to the reconstitution o f states in a liberal democratic format. As
Ramesh Thakur notes today
"the UN's dilemma is that it must avoid deploying forces into situations 
where the risk o f failure is high: not be so timid as to transform every 
difficulty into an alibi for inaction; and be flexible and agile enough to be 
able to adapt missions to fast changing political requirements and 
operational environments."276
The UNs involvement in state building does however pose serious challenges for the 
future o f the organisation and these challenges will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter Seven. It argues that the failure to achieve favourable outcomes then leads 
states to question the legitimacy o f such operations, particularly in relation to the 
sometimes marked disparity o f resources between different interventions. This then also 
raises questions as to how these operations are mandated and to questioning o f the 
power and representation on the Security Council. The issue o f power is also connected 
to the changes in the concept o f sovereignty which having made interventions easier to 
create has also had the effect o f making interventions more complex in the field.
276 Thakur, F rom  p ea cek eep in g  (2004) pg 7
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Chapter Seven: The end of legitimate interventions?
Chapter Six argued that the development o f global governance, with its emphasis on 
liberal democracy, has led to the UN undertaking much wider and more varied tasks 
than ever before. It also argued that the increased number o f tasks within mandates has 
not been matched by an equal increase in resources and political will and because o f 
this operations are unable to achieve their goals. Following on from the arguments 
outlined previously this chapter argues that it is this failure to achieve favourable 
outcomes then leads states to question the legitimacy o f such operations, particularly in 
relation to the sometimes marked disparity o f resources between different interventions. 
This then also raises questions as to how these operations are mandated and to 
questioning o f the power and representation on the Security Council. The issue of 
power is also connected to the changes in the concept o f sovereignty which having 
made interventions easier to create has also had the effect o f making interventions more 
complex in the field.
This chapter argues that the issue of power within the Security Council and the 
question o f representation is key to the creation o f peacekeeping operations, which 
carries on from the arguments outlined in chapter five. It also argues that the UN is the 
only organisation capable o f legitimising interventions despite the challenges it faces in 
the international system. It examines the idea that global governance is in fact 
weakening the UN by removing its influence in particular areas and bypassing it 
altogether in others. From this it argues that member states o f the United Nations have
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been selectively utilising the norms associated with Global Governance to justify 
interventions and have used Peacekeeping operations as a means to enforce those 
norms. It then argues that this role is detrimental to the organisation as it only serves to 
highlight the structural and organisational deficiencies o f the organisation. It argues that 
while reform of the Security Council is necessary to improve the legitimacy o f the 
organisation, and therefore the operations it mandates, it is unlikely to succeed as those 
states in a powerful position are unlikely to relinquish this status. It also argues that 
reform in fact could be detrimental as although it would make the organisation more 
representative it might also lead to more clashes and the potential for the council to be 
unable to act in the face o f international crises. Finally it argues that the UN needs to 
retain the prime position in relation to the authorisation o f peacekeeping interventions 
particularly in relation to the development o f international law and that it needs to avoid 
becoming nothing more than a rubber stamp for individual state actions.
The United Nations and State Creation: Beyond the original mandate?
In the previous chapter it was argued that the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations being mandated today are required to undertake a much broader range of 
tasks than ever before. It was also argued that this new range o f tasks is not being met 
with the necessary amount o f resources to ensure success. This change in the realities of 
peacekeeping operations can be directly attributed to changes within the wider 
international system. The United Nations operations being mandated faced increasingly 
complex situations as many states, facing a loss o f financial and military support at the
325
Chapter Seven Kate Seaman
end o f the Cold War, began to fail or completely collapsed. Also following the end o f
the Cold War the international system, for the first time, was dominated by
democratically governed states. This gave rise to the belief that the rules governing
democratic states had the ability to become the “dominant mode o f interaction in world
politics.” 1 This meant that the need to formulate a response to these situations was
paramount as “the idea o f statelessness is shocking, undermining the comfortable
assumption that the world rests on solid foundations and that there is a 'proper' way of 
•  •  2doing things." The ‘proper’ way o f doing things is based on the notion that "effective 
and legitimate states remain the most solid foundation for international society,” despite 
the fact that “the reality o f the post-Cold War world has frequently seen the opposite."3
Because o f the continued emphasis on the tradition foundations o f the international 
system the United Nations initial responses remained reliant on the traditional concept 
o f peacekeeping based on the norms of non-intervention, impartiality and consent. 
However
"These rules grew out o f the strategic and political environments in which 
peacekeepers were deployed and the function that they were supposed to 
serve. Rarely placed where there was ongoing conflict and never expected 
to enforce peace, peacekeepers were authorized to monitor an already 
existing peace agreement and thus help states stick to their political 
commitments, maintain a cease fire, and avoid a return to war." 4
1 Chan, Steve, In search  o f  dem ocra tic  p ea ce  (International studies Review: 41: 1: 1997) 59-91
2 M ayall in W elsh, Jennifer M ., H um anitarian In tervention a n d  In ternational R ela tions  (Oxford  
U niversity Press Oxford: 2 0 0 4 ) pg 134
3 W elsh, Jennifer M ., From  R ight to  R esponsibility: H um anitarian In tervention a n d  In ternational S ociety  
(G lobal G overnance: 8: 4: 2 0 02) 503
4 Barnett, M ichael and Martha Finnem ore,/?iv/« fo r  the w o r ld  (Cornell University Press N ew  York: 
2 0 04) pg 127
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The new crises emerging in the aftermath o f the Cold War did not however fit the
previous mould for peacekeeping interventions. Instead the United Nations
peacekeeping operations were faced with situations where "outgunned peacekeepers
had little chance o f imposing their will on more heavily armed states or o f operating
without states' consent.” There was however as Barnett and Finnemore go on to argue a
reluctance within the organisation to alter the foundational concepts o f peacekeeping as
“UN officials also worried that if they compromised their impartiality then they would
forgo a principal reason why states and others complied with their decisions."5 This
continued emphasis on impartiality, consent and non-intervention meant that the
organisation became
"caught between those who insist on the primacy o f universal human rights 
(enforced if  necessary by overriding national sovereignty) and those who 
worry about the danger o f aggressive military humanitarian intervention, 
especially when applied selectively by an international community that is 
ill-prepared and committed only in fits and starts."6
The inability o f the organisation to formulate an adequate response to the new
complex emergencies was based in part on a lack of resources and political will as
argued in the previous chapter and as outlined by Weiss, “the success in the cold war
and the post cold war being related to more traditional peacekeeping operations is
partially an operational question o f capacity." As he goes on to argue
“The UN doesn't do very well, when it comes to war fighting. They are 
much better at situations in which impartiality and neutrality are in evidence 
and can actually be applied in the operation. However a Chapter VII
5 Ibid. pg 127
6 Edwards, M ichael,Future P ositive  In ternational C oopera tion  in the 21 st C entury  (Earthscan: London: 
1999), pg 89
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resolution is quite different. It points a finger and says you’re wrong and 
I’m right, or there are sanctions against you, or an embargo against you, or 
there is going to be use o f military force if  you step over this line. That’s not 
something that the UN does very well, and so the question is whether if  it’s 
a Chapter VII operation which, by definition, means that you are not neutral 
and you’re not perceived as being impartial whether the UN ought to be 
involved at all.”7
As Weiss argues, the United Nations has difficulty in dealing with situations in which
the organisations neutrality can be questioned. Unfortunately the type o f conflicts in
which the organisation is increasingly involved do not enable the organisation to
remain strictly neutral, instead as Murphy argues
“it is impossible to remain strictly neutral in situations where there are 
armed parties that are going to engage any other armed party. In ways that 
they are going to try to pull you in to one side or the other so I think that 
becomes desirable, but an almost impossible goal. The effective 
peacekeeping missions that have had to sometimes take sides, have had very 
clear statements about what their mission is and what they are supposed to 
be doing. Clear enough that the commanders in the field and the special 
representative o f the secretary general can say under these conditions we 
will be leaning towards this group or that group. It's having that really 
defined mission and frankly the well defined mission is never going to say 
we are going to ally w ith this party or that party, or its very rarely going to 
do that. So I think it's really a matter o f a much more detailed mission and 
recognising that it is really very difficult to be strictly neutral."8
The problem is that this clarity in mandate and a well defined mission is often not 
provided. As one UN official highlighted, in relation to the protection o f civilians, there 
has been a failure to issue “clear guidance to force commanders on what that actually 
means and how they should interpret that and what it means for the rules o f
7 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss 9th July 2008
8 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd Septem ber 2008
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engagement.”9 As one former peacekeeper explains this lack o f  information is
anathema to the majority o f military forces, instead what troops want is to be given “a
timeline, tell us what you want to achieve and we’ll try to do it but please don’t leave us
hanging on the end o f a rope not actually knowing where we are going.” 10 The need for
a defined plan is also becoming increasingly important as the organisation becomes
involved in much broader tasks,11 which in many cases amount to the reconstruction o f
the architecture o f an entire state and where "Peacekeepers, as the agents o f an
international system set on just such a rebuilding o f 'conventional' politics and
accountable government, are seen as a major threat by warlords and their supporters."12
This problem was explored in more detail in an interview with UK mission officials
whose arguments are outlined below,
“The difficulty is you can pass a mandate, you'll also come across this 
difficulty where there are chapter six and chapter seven mandates mixed, 
you know you can pass a mandate which has chapter seven provisions, 
privileges and so on but actually have you given the forces the wherewithal 
to do that, and by wherewithal I mean not only the equipment to do it but 
also the training to do it"11
“The rules o f engagement, and the freedom o f language to " 14 
“And the force commander and the SRSG will always be conscious that if 
the UN does something which one of the spoilers thinks is going overboard 
then the safety and security o f the mission is at risk, and the safety and 
security o f UN mission is paramount in the mind o f an SRSG these days 
following attacks on the U N "1'"'
9 Interview with Simon Bagshaw OCHA 28 th August 2008
10 Interview with Col. Ian MacFarlanc 8th July 2009 8th July 2 0 0 9 8 th July 2009
11 For more on how the United Nations and various member states have worked towards improved  
planning see: Ramsbotham, O liver and Tom W oodhouse and Hugh M ial\,C on tem porary C onflict 
R esolu tion  (Polity Press Cambridge: 2006) pg 192 - 194
12 M acQ ueen, Norrie,P eacekeepin g  a n d  the in ternational system  (R outledge N ew  York: 2 0 0 6 ) pg 212
13 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 27th August 2008
14 Itnerview with UK M ission O fficial Three 2 7 th August 2008
15 Interview with UK M ission O fficial Two 27th August 2008
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“And it sounds like a simple issue, but actually if  you dig down into that 
you see the real dilemmas that they had, they might have a mandate that 
says they have freedom o f movement but you have to actually be able to 
enforce. So again it comes back to availability o f assets and it comes back to 
member states willingness to provide them and it comes back to the Security 
Council, making a mandate but also giving the force the capability o f 
carrying out this mandate properly.” ’6
As the second official highlights there is an increasing concern within the UN for staff
safety, following a number of attacks, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which were aimed
at the United Nations directly. The increase in attacks on the organisation can be
attributed to the new tasks it is undertaking. In the aftermath o f the Cold war
"The UN was not only offering to help states regulate their relations in new 
way to further mutual security but was also attempting to use its moral and 
delegated authority to shape the underlying constitution o f world politics - 
it's basic organizing principles and what actions were considered legitimate 
and desirable. It was also offering to spread those principles where they did 
not exist."17
These principles included an increasing emphasis on the importance o f human rights 
and democratic representation.
As Barnett and Finnemore argue “the result was that peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operations promoted a liberal and democratic model o f domestic order as 
they attempted to constitute new states and societies.” 18 As Pouligny argues "in most of 
the countries where intervention takes place, a peace process coincides with a double
16 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 2 7 ,h August 2008
17 Barnett, M ichael and Martha, Finnem ore ,Rules f o r  the W orld  In ternational O rgan iza tions in G loba l 
P o litic s  (Cornell University Press London: 2004) pg 129
18 Ibid. pg 130
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political process o f democratization and peace building"19 this means that the UN 
becomes involved in reconstituting the entire fabric o f a state. The promotion o f 
particular forms o f government in post conflict societies and the arguments around the 
connection between the necessity o f a stable society o f sovereign states in order to 
secure international stability has, along with the "centrality of the notion o f statehood to 
the global governance agenda"20 meant that the United Nations has become associated 
with the idea o f Global Governance. This has however also meant that the organisation 
has become associated with Global governance as "a coherent hegemonic project" and 
an "attempt to legitimate and consolidate the dominant, neo-liberal norms of 
globalisation."21 Unfortunately this association has been coupled with what Berdal 
argues is a "limited comprehension by UN forces o f the cultural and social impact o f 
their presence in a country."22 The combination o f the two has led to a backlash against 
UN operations, which has been clearly demonstrated by the attacks in Iraq and 
Afghanistan which directly targeted the organisation.
As Lord Hannay argues
“the only people who can decide what form the state can take are the people 
o f that state themselves, and they have to have the final determining word.
What the international community can do is to enable them to take those 
decisions and to make them stick, but they can 't take them for them and 
they should not take them for them .''2j
19 Pouligny, Beatrice, P eacekeepers a n d  lo ca l so c ia l actors: The n eed  f o r  Dynam ic, cross-cu ltura l 
an a lysis  (G lobal Governance: 5: 4: 1999) 403 - 425
20 Cochrane and D uffy in Cochrane, Feargal, D uffy, R osaleen, Selby, Jan, G lo b a l governance, conflict 
a n d  resistance  (Palgrave M cM illan: 2003) pg 222
21 Cochrane and D uffy in Ibid. pg 221
22 Berdal, M ats,W hither UN p eacekeep in g?  (IISS: London: 1993) pg 26
23 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th O ctober 2009
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The problem is that, as one former peacekeeper argues, the UN tends to take a different
approach. Rather than taking the time to listen to the population on the ground they
institute top down solutions in a system that the peacekeeper compares to “the salvation
army, you feed them first, you water them first, then you try and indoctrinate them,
that’s the way you go about doing it.”24 This approach contradicts the arguments made
by academics such as Berdal that "UN peacekeeping forces must enjoy and through
their actions be geared towards obtaining, a maximum measure o f local support."25 It
also causes issues for troops on the ground, as another peacekeeper argues
“it’s all very well having a democratic and liberal approach to life but I 
think you are rather putting the cart before the horse here, we need to 
impose some sort o f order before we start embarking upon what I would 
consider second order democratization programmes and its always a 
problem o f getting people to agree on the priorities.”26
This argument is supported by academics such as Edwards who states that “action on 
the causes o f the crisis is much more important: saving livelihoods not just lives, 
supporting vulnerable institutions not just people, rebuilding social as well as physical
• 7 7capital, and improving governance not just government." The problem is that the 
failure to get agreement on what to do when and how to do it has led to a situation 
where, as Ruggie argues “ in several recent UN peace operations, neither the UN, nor its 
member states strictly speaking has fully known what it has been doing or how to do 
it.”28 This is particularly dangerous given the increasing demands being placed on the
24 Interview with Dan Doherty CIMIC 2 nd July 2009
25 Berdal, U N  pea cek eep in g  (1993)  pg 26
26 Interview with C ol. Ian M acFarlane 8th July 2009
27 Ed w ards,/w /m v P o sitive  ( 1999)
28 R uggie in Pugh, M ichael, The UN. p e a ce  a n d  force  (Frank Cass London: 1997) pg 4
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organisation and is perhaps an indication that the organisation should place more 
emphasis on the involvement o f regional organisations, even though these pose their 
own problems.
The increased involvement o f regional organisations could be beneficial to the 
organisation and might also remove the question o f selectivity in UN operations. The 
issue o f selectivity in operations, as explored in chapter five, is directly attributable to
the role o f power relations and the influence o f national interests within the Security
29Council. As Sam Daws argues, this has not necessarily been detrimental to all 
operations as
“The various external reports have shown that UN nation building has been 
very cost effective, has greater legitimacy etc than similar, is more 
efficacious than similar US nation building exercises, so there was a famous 
RAND study that compared a number o f operations. So the UN rightly 
wants to preserve its reputation as an institution which can deliver in this 
area and that’s important. The main reason for selectivity lies in the fact that 
the UN is and particularly the security council is a marriage o f power and 
representation and there will be national interests involved in decisions,
particularly where money is involved and in terms o f the costs o f an
operation which heavily rests on developed country contributors to the UN, 
particularly the permanent five who pay a 25% peacekeeping premium. So 
that will certainly continue to be a consideration. That's not necessarily a 
weakness in the UN system, it's just a political reality that we don't live in a 
perfect world. So I think selectivity results from a combination o f member 
states accepting that priority should be given to where the need is greater but 
that there are limits on resources and that they need to be prioritised in part 
to reflect national interest."30
As argued in the previous chapter, the issue o f value for money is also becoming 
increasingly important in relation to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The
29 See Chapter F ive Pages 227 - 244
30 Interview with Sam Daw s 9th Decem ber 2009
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increasing emphasis on the use o f  regional organisations can in part be attributed to this
need for value for money and can also be connected with the argument that regional
organisation might in some ways be a more effective force for peacekeeping than the
United Nations. This is particularly relevant given the more complex situations into
which troops are being deployed, as Weiss argues once the operations cross the line
from traditional peacekeeping
“My sense is that once you step over that line it’s much better to use 
regional institutions rather than the UN. The real problem is that sometimes 
operations evolve; and in terms of making decisions a normal military 
would have a set o f contingencies. And you know that if  this happens, this 
consequence occurs; and if we take this fork, we do this; and if we take that 
fork, we do that; and if there’s an elevation in casualties or the use o f force 
or whatever it is, there’s a firm and rapid response. However in the UN 
you’ve got to go back to the Security Council, you've got to go back to the 
troop contributors and therefore if a situation starts out as something that’s 
more like a traditional peacekeeping operation and then morphs into 
something more violent you’ve got to go back to the council. The result is 
that the UN is involved on the ground in a way that doesn't use its
* 31comparative advantage.”
As Weiss outlines, UN peacekeeping operations tend not to be flexible in terms o f
operational advantage to respond to developing situations on the ground. Instead they
are often restricted by the rules of engagement and the constant need to refer back to
the Council when the situation changes. This, as one observer notes
“is something which deals with the very basis o f the UN as an organisation.
O f course in some situations it is not enough to be present on the ground and 
to watch what is going on and to report your experience, because o f certain 
atrocities that can happen in the meantime while you are watching and 
reporting but, on the other hand in order to act you have to have an 
authority. You have to be mandated to do something, and who gives that
31 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss 9th July 2008
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mandate, the UN and the UN consists o f 200 states with different views, 
different positions globally, different interests. So it is a political issue, to 
answer your question. I think it would be good if in some situations the UN 
forces were given support by some militarily more powerful organisations 
like NATO. But then again NATO is an organisation which largely reflects 
the views o f the western world.”32
This is one o f the key arguments in support o f increased reliance on regional 
organisations, that they will provide a more robust form o f peacekeeping, something 
which the UN is not capable o f producing. As Lord Hannay argues “as a broad rule o f 
thumb that beyond a certain level o f violence the UN is not likely to be able to cope, 
but if it cannot cope with any violence at all then it’s not a whole lot o f use and it has 
become a lot better at coping with that.”33 It would then be the case that in situations 
where violence is likely to occur that the UN should authorise a regional organisation to 
intervene.
The argument is that regionalization is providing "a new, intelligible vision o f global
governance"34 and argument supported by other academics such as David Bosco who
argues that "a host o f other organizations, many at the regional level, might fill the
governance vacuum."33 That these regional organisations might, as Hannay proposes
“become for example a kind o f stop gap mechanism to deploy in the early 
stages after a mandate has been granted but then to withdraw and leave it to 
a classical peacekeeping force later on. The disadvantages are o f course at 
least theoretically at least that these could be opened to abuse.”36
32 Interview with Igor Ilic Reuters 6th August 2009
33 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
34 Pugh in Pugh, M ichael and W .P.S Sidhu, The UN a n d  reg io n a l secu rity  (Lynne Rienner: London: 
2003) pg 33
35 B osco , David L ,F ive to  Rule Them A ll (Oxford University Press N ew  York: 2009) pg 253
36 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
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As Hannay notes this system would be open to potential abuse, the other problem with
this argument in favour o f the use o f regional organisations is the issue o f oversight.
The real problem is that "the hierarchy envisioned in the charter does not hold”37 and
the Security Council has little influence over the actions o f regional organisations other
than its moral authority, which in some cases is limited.
As the NATO intervention in Kosovo highlights “a global multilateral architecture,
embodied by UN-centred decisionmaking and implementation, has been made unsteady
by instances o f hegemonic reluctance to comply with multilateral commitments."38
This has meant the perception has become that "the major powers have relied
increasingly upon the council as a forum to authorize military action, in order to
maintain international goodwill for sensitive tasks, reduce the risk o f spoilers, and
preserve international order."39 This argument is backed up by other academics such as
Neethling who argues that "developed states are still heavily involved in peace support,
but their contributions fall outside the framework o f the official UN peacekeeping
system."40 An argument again illustrated by the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the
United Kingdom's intervention in Sierra Leone, and the ongoing situation in Iraq. As
Ambassador Colin Keating argues this situation occurs because
“When you essentially have one group of civilians killing another group o f 
civilians and there is a serious training and preparedness set o f exercises that 
need to be undertaken and is there political will for that, who actually has 
the capacity to begin such a process, well probably only four or five
37 A lagappa, Muthiah, R egional institu tions , the UN an d  in ternational secu rity  (Third W orld Quarterly: 
18:3:  1997)421-441
38 Samii and Sidhu in Pugh, The UN (2003) pg 255
39 Forman and Grane in M alone, David M., The U n ited  N ations Security  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: 
London: 2004) pg 295
40 N eeth ling, Theo, In ternational p ea cekeep in g  trends (Politikon: 31 : 1:  2004) 49-66
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countries in the whole world and they all seem somewhat distracted at the 
moment.”41
The reliance on a few countries to provide the key resources is also a huge challenge
which the United Nations has failed to resolve. As one former peacekeeper argues
“you have difficulties straight away that you have some nations who will 
sign up to what you might call the cheap and cheerful and what the cynics 
talk about barefoot infantry, there you go son in fact they might not be 
barefoot there’s a pair o f boots and a rifle and w e’ll call you an infantryman, 
off you go w e’ll pay you lots o f money or the united nations will pay you 
money or whatever.”42
But states are much less willing to provide the more important resources, as was argued
in the previous chapter. This problem is also highlighted by academics such as
Johnstone who argues that
“the problem o f mandates and resources not matching has been a problem 
for a long time and it still is and its not going to get better because the 
demands are going up, and while the supply is going up, but you know a 
few attack helicopters and a bit o f intelligence resources and what not and 
you know you could make a big difference in a lot o f problems. So the 
problem is still there. The solution I suggested is something that could be 
played around with but I think ultimately that the developed world, 
industrialised countries need to participate more and if its not troops then 
police, foreign police units and if its not foreign police units then 
engineering units and medical units and transport and helicopters and all o f 
those things. I think there are ways for them all to contribute more and it 
doesn’t even have to be the US because a lot o f times you know the US 
might do more harm than good but if it can provide logistic support it would 
make a difference and if many Europeans participated more it would make a 
difference. So 1 would say that's one o f the main quick fixes that 
peacekeeping needs, is more participation in UN operations by developed 
countries.”43
41 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating 28th August 2008
42 Interview with Col. Ian MacFarlane 8th July 2009
43 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
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The problem is that at the present moment the states that Johnstone argues should 
increase their contributions are heavily committed to non-UN actions and are therefore 
increasingly reluctant to contribute troops and resources to operations.
One o f the ways in which the United Nations and member states have attempted to 
deal with the issue o f resources is through the coordinated use o f NGOs in operational 
situations. As Professor Murphy argues “in cases o f complex emergencies the security 
council is consciously or unconsciously relying upon non-governmental organisations 
to do much o f the on the ground work o f taking care o f refugees and working with 
resettlement.”44 The integration o f NGOs is not without problems however, as Sam 
Daws argues
“There is a lot o f interest and controversy over the extent to which 
governments should seek to coordinate NGOs in theatre, for example in 
Afghanistan. Whereby NGOS sometimes feel that their impartiality is being 
affected by concerns that so called impartial development assistance doesn’t 
in fact help one party or another. And therefore potentially undermines, or 
does not support a military or political solution. I think, there are many in 
NGOs who are wise to the fact that they work in a political environment and 
that without security there can't be long term development. So it isn’t 
entirely a situation where both sides. NGOs and governments, can’t 
recognise what the other is saying but it is an enduring problem. Military 
have, in the UK context, and 1 think elsewhere have taken some pains to 
consult with NGOs to try and improve, not necessarily coordination but, at 
least communication on what respective roles are."45
The need for clearly defined roles is o f paramount importance. There needs to be a 
much clearer division o f labour, not only on the ground in operations but also at the 
political level. If the UN is to work with a wide range o f organisations there needs to be
44 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy 3rd Septem ber 2008
45 Interview with Sam D aw s 9th Decem ber 2009
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a clear structural hierarchy to ensure enough oversight o f operations and also to ensure
consistency in those operations. As Murphy argues there needs to examination o f
“how far can we go, what kind o f thing do we have to define, how much 
security do we actually have to create to imagine that these other actors who 
are going to do much of the hard work and be there on the cheap, and the on 
the cheap is the big thing because nobody, the major security council 
members don’t want to spend any money. 46
As one NGO member argues it is “difficult to imagine that the UN would continue to
do this kind o f thing without NGO involvement.”47 Particularly given the increasing
number and complexity o f the tasks peacekeeping operations are being mandated to
undertake. The need for coordination will therefore continue to be the key to the
success o f operations, as a source from the stabilisation unit argued
“the aspiration is that by taking a more coherent approach it will end up 
with fewer lives lost and a faster process for reaching the desired state 
where the host nation state is in the lead and the external military force is 
either just playing a traditional peacekeeping role or is removed from the 
country completely.”
The desire for the host nation to regain control is the impetus behind UN 
peacekeeping operations. The focus on the reconstitution o f states has however caused 
the organisation problems in the past, particularly in relation to the issues of 
sovereignty and legitimacy. The following section o f this chapter argues that the focus 
on the reconstitution of sovereign states in the traditional model has had a detrimental 
impact on the success o f peacekeeping operations. It also argues that this has led to a
46 Interview with Professor Craig N. Murphy 3rd September 2008
47 Interview with Dr M ick North I A N SA  16th June 2009
48 Interview with Source from the Stabilisation Unit 19,h June 2009
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loss o f legitimacy for the organisation and that the legitimacy it has retained is under 
threat from the development of new norms such as R2P.
Sovereignty, legitimacy, R2P and the future of the United Nations
As argued in previous chapters sovereignty remains one o f the key foundations o f
the international system and the United Nations plays a large role in securing the
continued importance o f the concept. Many o f the smaller member states o f the
organisation have “always looked to the UN as the guarantor o f their independence"49
and continue to do so today. The guarantee of independence stems from the United
Nations emphasis on respect for sovereignty and the principle o f non-intervention.
Since the end o f the Cold War and with the changes in the format o f conflicts across the
globe the support for these traditional norms has been tested because, as Berdal argues
"within the context o f intra-state and ethnic conflict, strict adherence to the 
normative principles o f consent, impartiality and the non-use o f force except 
in self-defence substantially reduces the operational efficiency o f a 
peacekeeping force."'0
The shift in the type o f conflicts to which peacekeeping operations are being deployed 
has been coupled with an increasing emphasis on the flexibility o f the concept o f 
sovereignty, as demonstrated with the development o f the concept o f the Responsibility 
to Protect. There has been a move within the international system to create a set o f 
criteria to identify what makes a state sovereign and the underlying argument is based 
on the idea that states are only legitimate if they meet certain basic standards o f
49M ayall in W elsh, H um anitarian Intervention (2004) pg 130
50 Berdal,U N  peacekeep in g  (1993)
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common humanity. As Chandler argues this then places the burden o f  justification for 
non-intervention on those states at risk o f being intervened in.51 In other words a state 
must be able to demonstrate that it is capable o f ensuring the basic human rights o f its 
population and fulfilling the responsibilities o f a sovereign state in order to ensure its 
right o f non-intervention within the international system.
Alongside the attempts to redefine the concept o f sovereignty, as Weiss argues, there 
has been a move towards the development o f an "international norm of'pro-dem ocratic'
• • 52intervention." This does not necessarily mean an intervention in favour o f an already 
established democratic government, but instead, as Weiss outlines, is the placing o f the 
establishment o f a democratic form of governance as a priority in all peacekeeping 
operations. In fact Weiss argues that the establishment o f forms o f democratic 
governance have been at the forefront o f the majority o f African interventions since the 
end o f the Cold War. The emphasis on democratic governance and the establishment of 
stable democratic states has also become increasingly important in recent years as Sam 
Daws also argues
“There is greater recognition from the international community that you 
can 't allow a state, whether it's a Somalia or Afghanistan, to fail for a long 
period o f time. That just creates a space in which transnational terrorist 
networks can operate. Terrorism has been around for probably thousands of 
years but the nature of terrorism in relation to international institutions has 
changed. I mentioned before about al-qaeda now seeing the nation state per 
say and international institutions as legitimate targets. So while the UN 
previously had to work particularly in civil war situations where there were 
terrorist attacks, those terrorist attacks were generally confined to the
51 Chandler, David, The respon sib ility  to p ro te c t? im posin g  the lib e ra l p e a ce  (International 
Peacekeeping: 11:1:  2004) 59-81
52 W eiss, Thom as G . ,H um anitarian Intervention  (Polity: Cambridge: 2 0 07) pg 49
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military and politicians o f the country concerned, sometimes the civilians as 
well but the nature o f suicide bombing and attacks on the UN have changed 
the kind o f security assessment for the feasibility o f operations. I do think 
they haven’t necessarily increased the recognition that the UN needs to do 
more nation building or peace building but it has increased the recognition 
that the international community through NGOs, governments, private 
sector, and international institutions and the governments concerned need to 
do more. 53
The changing perceptions o f the United Nations as Daws outlines above have made it 
even more important for the organisation to ensure the retention o f local legitimacy for 
any operations on the ground. Now more than ever “all intervenors need to understand 
and work with local solutions."54 The problem is, as outlined in the Brahimi report, that 
peacekeeping operations are facing even more complex environments in which the 
provision o f consent for operations is often unreliable, there is a failure on the behalf o f 
troops and their commanders to understand that impartiality does not mean neutrality 
and there is a fear o f utilising force to take on spoilers.35 In order to overcome these 
problems academics such as Johnstone argue that UN operations must pose a 'credible 
deterrence th rea t'56 the problem is again that the resources are often not provided for 
that deterrence to be achievable. Other academics such as Roberts have argued that 
there is a need for a change in understanding o f what impartiality means, that it is not 
an issue o f being impartial in relations with and between belligerents but is instead a
53 Interview with Sam D aw s 9th Decem ber 2009
54 Edwards,Future P o sitive  (1999) pg 91
55 United N ations, Brahimi Report, http://ww w.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/docs/part2.htm  
(12th April 2010)
56 Johnstone, Ian, The evo lu tion  o f  pea cek eep in g  po licy : unfin ished busin ess  (Journal o f  International 
Peace and Organization: 80 3-4: 2006)
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matter o f being impartial in carrying out Security Council resolutions.57 The need for
this legitimacy is again outlined by Daws, who argues that
“the relative importance o f nation states is the rise o f transnational actors 
such as al-qaeda who are both ideologically and fundamentally opposed to 
the concept o f nation states as the building block for an international system 
but also who see the United Nations as a biased organisation promoting 
western goals. Hence the attacks now in a number o f locations on UN 
humanitarian agencies by al-qaeda and that’s an awful and very disturbing 
development. It also again speaks to the issue that there is both the need for 
international legitimacy but also local legitimacy and that local legitimacy is 
contextual, it relates to things going on in that particular conflict zone but it 
can also relate to wider conflicts. So an attack on the UN in Afghanistan 
may relate to the failure o f the international community to address the 
Israeli Palestinian problem and conflict. So those things are, particularly in 
nation building, where you can’t have heightened security to protect UN 
civilian workers, that’s something that in terms o f political and operational 
legitimacy, is particularly to the fore.”38
As Daws argues the United Nations must be seen to be impartial and legitimate in order 
to be successful, an argument that is backed up by other academics such as Howard 
who argues that "peacekeeping is at it's best when the peacekeepers - both civilian and 
military - take their cues from the local population, and not UN headquarters, about 
how best to implement mandates."39 The problem is that operations are generally not 
given the freedom within operations to do so and are instead stuck in the cycle o f 
referring all matters back to the Security Council for further debate before action can be 
taken. This problem is highlighted by writers such as Crocker who emphasises the fact 
that the UN
57 Roberts, Adam , The c ris is  in pea cek eep in g  (1FS: 2: 1994)
58 Interview with Sam D aw s 9th D ecem ber 2009
59 Howard, Lise M orje,6W  P eacekeepin g  in C ivil W ars (Cam bridge U niversity Press Cambridge: 2008) 
P g 2
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“cannot manage complex political-military operations when its own 
structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set o f rival fiefdoms that 
resist unified command and control in the field at both the civilian and 
military levels. Basic change is needed on the issues o f delegation to the 
field, unity o f command in the field, and professional military backstopping 
and oversight from U.N. headquarters.”60
The need for change in the oversight and control o f peacekeeping operations is 
paramount given the changing context in which operations are being deployed. As 
Howard argues, "a doctrinal basis for robust UN peace operations must be formulated if  
the UN is to have a future in the terrain between traditional peacekeeping and 
warfighting."61 The creation o f a more robust doctrine for peacekeeping is not however 
the only hurdle, as Johnston argues "without sufficient resources any form o f doctrine is 
futile, and without doctrine, resources may prove to be ineffective or inert."62 As both 
Howard and Johnstone highlight there is a real need for the United Nations Security 
Council to spend more time assessing the outcomes it wants peacekeeping operations to 
achieve and to provide the resources necessary for those outcomes to be achievable. 
This issue was clearly highlighted in the Brahimi report in which it was argued that the 
mandates and resources for peacekeeping operations have to be guided by pragmatic, 
realistic analysis and thinking.63
One o f the ways in which this could be achieved is the development o f criteria 
which the Security Council would then apply to interventions before they occurred. 
This is not a new idea, and it has received much attention and debate since the mid
60 Crocker, Chester A ., The lessons o f  Som alia: Not everyth in g  w en t w ron g  (Foreign Affairs: 74: 3 :1 9 9 5 )
61 R uggie in Pugh, The U N  (1997) pg 11
62 Johnstone, P eacekeepin g  p o lic y  (2006)
63 United Nations, Brahimi Report (2010),
344
Chapter Seven Kate Seaman
1990s. The arguments in favour o f criteria to be applied to peacekeeping operations are
supported by practitioners such as Lord Hannay who states that “I think it would be
more predictable and more equitable if these criteria were there, not only were there but
were there to be used.”64 The criteria Hannay supports were clearly outlined in the High
Level Panel report on threats, challenges and changes and included four main criteria in
the assessment o f operations. First that the operation be o f proper purpose, or right
intention, that the intervention or use o f military force was the last resort, that the
intervention utilised proportional means, and that those involved in the intervention had
weighed the balance o f consequences and likelihood o f success.65 The problem with the
creation o f criteria, is as one former UN official argues, whether or not “it would be
applied consistently. Also there would be an inability to create a consensus about what
the criteria should be.”66 Another problem is raised by Johnstone, who although in
support o f criteria, highlights the fact that
“It’s only when you don't have consent or the consent isn’t reliable or the 
consent needs to be manufactured in a way that you need to start 
considering criteria and you start saying you know w e're at the point now 
where either we intervene coercively against the will o f the government or 
we collectively try to put so much pressure on the government 
diplomatically that it can 't resist saying yes to a peacekeeping presence. 
That’s sort o f what happened in Kosovo you know and Darfur to a certain 
extent. So I’m not, I wouldn't argue for a clear set o f criteria67
Rather than a set o f criteria Johnstone instead argues for
64 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
65 United N ations, H igh L evel PaneI R eport on Threats, C hallenges a n d  Change, A m ore Secure W orld: 
ou r sh a re d  respon sb ility  2004)
66 Interview with Former U N  O fficial 26 th August 2008
67 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
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“a set o f questions that the security council should ask itself when its 
contemplating the deployment o f a peacekeeping mission and perhaps a 
different set o f questions when its contemplating coercive intervention. And 
it did this in a way with respect to peacekeeping in May 1994, there’s a 
presidential statement in which it sets out a number o f considerations that 
ought to be taken into account in the decision to establish a mission. I think 
that needs to be updated and I think the sort o f criteria that you’re talking 
about here could be built into that kind o f set o f questions and 
considerations.”68
The use o f such a set o f criteria or questions might improve the doctrine and resources 
available for peacekeeping missions but it also raises a large number o f unanswered 
questions as to who would select such criteria and how evenly they would be applied. 
The incorrect or uneven application o f criteria could further undermine the legitimacy 
o f the organisation and further threaten the potential use o f peacekeeping operations in 
the future.
One o f the ways to avoid such problems would be a systematic overhaul o f the 
Security Council membership and the following section o f this chapter is now going to 
explore the various options available. It will argue that while reform of the Security 
Council is necessary to improve the legitimacy o f the organisation, and therefore the 
operations it mandates, it is unlikely to succeed as those states in a powerful position 
are unlikely to relinquish this status. It will also argue that reform in fact could be 
detrimental as although it would make the organisation more representative it might 
also lead to more clashes and the potential for the council to be unable to act in the face 
o f international crises. Finally it will argue that the UN needs to retain the prime 
position in relation to the authorisation o f peacekeeping interventions particularly in
68 Ibid. Johnstone
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relation to the development o f international law and that it needs to avoid becoming 
nothing more than a rubber stamp for individual state actions.
Representation and Reform
The issue o f Security Council reform has gained increased importance in recent
years as questions have been raised in relation to the perceived selectivity o f the
organisation in mandating and resourcing operations. The question o f membership has
also been raised as the power structures within the international system have changed,
with rapidly growing powers feeling unrepresented within the institution. These
questions have led some member states to question the legitimacy o f  the organisation a
question which is increasingly problematic as "the more the Security Council is asked
to do and adjudicate on, the more important the council's own legitimacy becomes."69
At a time when the Council is being asked to adjudicate on ever increasing tasks in
increasingly complex environments it needs to work to retain the legitimacy it has built
up since the organisation was created. As one UN official argues
“the security council is the ultimate guarantor o f the UN charter and 
specifies the conditions under which force can be used and I think that’s an 
important thing that there should be. Not withstanding the fact that there are 
then issues within the Security Council in terms o f the way power is 
distributed within the council."70
The issue o f power distribution was analysed in detail in chapter five where it was 
argued that the inequality within the Council, between permanent members and non­
permanent, developed countries and developing, troop contributors and those
69 B ellam y, A lex  J. R esponsib ility  to  P ro tec t (Polity: Cambridge: 2009) pg 23
70 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw OCHA 28th August 2008
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mandating the operations is having a negative impact on the actions o f the Council
itself.71 The inequality in power distribution has been pinpointed as one o f the reasons
for the large disparity between mandates and resources, an argument supported by
practitioners such as Sam Daws who argues that the problem extends from the fact that
“the security council is a fire fighting mechanism. Disputes will, first o f all 
its hoped, be dealt with by the nation state, the member state, all member 
states in conflict can solve their disputes. If that doesn’t work then it’s 
hoped that a regional actor can do it. If that doesn’t happen it will go to the 
UN. So the UN usually gets the more intractable conflicts, and also the 
conflicts where other things have been attempted and have failed. So the UN 
gets the hard cases. The main reason for the disconnect between mandates 
and resources is that there is a need for member states to tell their own 
publics that they are doing something but in fact in the cold light o f day and 
in the longer term there is a lot o f pressure for those resources to be delayed, 
diminished or used for other purposes.”72
The problem with the provision o f resources had led directly to failures in operations on 
the ground, as one observer notes in relation the Former Yugoslavia “often some 
political decisions were not followed quickly enough by substantial support to 
peacekeepers on the ground with all the means necessary for them to implement those 
decisions taken on the political level.”7j These failures only further undermine the 
legitimacy o f the organisation and lead to increased calls for reform and changes in the 
means o f representation. The arguments are that these reforms would lead to increased 
transparency and improvement in the Council's ability to respond to crises. These 
changes are however questioned by some practitioners, because as one UK Mission 
official argues
71 See Chapter Five Pages 227-244
72 Interview with Sam D aw s 9th Decem ber 2009
73 Interview with Igor Hie Reuters 6th August 2009
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“I don’t think additional transparency would make it any more likely 
because the arguments would always be at the level o f the individual 
violations and something like that is incredibly difficult to prove. Nobody’s 
going to stand up in the council and say w e’re not doing this because we 
like Sudan or because we get oil from them or whatever. People stand up in 
the council and say we’re terribly sorry but we don’t believe there’s a 
genocide happening there so it doesn’t apply.”74
This again highlights the role which both power and national interest play in Security 
Council decision making, and the problems the organisation faces in producing a 
unified response to crises.
There have been various attempts to institute a program o f reform, in 2003 then 
Secretary General Kofi Annan instituted what he termed ‘a radical overhauling o f 
intergovernmental m achinery’, beginning with the Security Council which resulted in 
the production o f the 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security 
and human rights for a ll. '73 The production o f this report as Edward Luck argues is part 
o f a cycle o f UN reform which has been ongoing since the organisation was founded. 
The first step is the statement by the Secretary General and national leaders that 
"profound changes in the global situation demand sweeping renovations"76 and that this 
requires fresh approaches and bold initiatives. The next step is the formation o f a blue 
ribbon commission to provide substantive depth, examples o f this include the High 
Level Panel on threats, challenges and change. Following the report o f the commission 
the Secretary General then translates the report into digestible policy steps, or as Luck
74 Interview with UK M ission O fficial Three 27 th August 2008
75 United Nations, In L arger F reedom  2005)
76 Luck, Edward C., H ow  not to  reform  the U n ited  N ations (G lobal Governance: 11:4: 2 005)
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argues "the secretary general proposes and the general assembly disposes."77 A clear 
example o f this is the watered down version o f R2P that appeared at the World Summit 
in 2005, in comparison to the large scale suggestions made in the report produced by 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. After the 
Secretary General’s recommendations the United Nations then moves to the 
engagement o f member states in an attempt to reach a decision point, the engagement is 
coupled with the hunt for modest measures capable o f attracting consensus. This is then 
followed by a culminating event, such as a summit or meeting. Following this event 
both the UN and member states then paint the reforms in glowing colours and proceed 
to talk o f unfinished business and further reforms that are needed which leads to the 
cycle beginning all over again. As Weiss argues it is a process o f evolution rather than 
reform and
“The history o f reform efforts geared toward making the Security Council 
more reflective o f growing UN membership and o f changing world politics 
since the organization's establishment conveys the slim prospects for 
meaningful change. UN founders deliberately divided member rights and 
roles by establishing a universal general Assembly with the most general 
functions and a restricted Security Council with executing authority for 
maintaining the peace— unanimity among the great powers was a 
prerequisite for action."78
From this standpoint reform efforts on a grand scale are somewhat futile as the 
foundations o f the Charter, as Weiss highlights, were designed to divide the rights of 
members in order to ensure the Security Council's ability to take action. This was based 
on the argument that "The prospects for peace and peaceful change can be enhanced
77 Ibid.
78 W eiss, Thom as G., The Illusion o f  Security  C ouncil Reform  (The W ashington Quarterly 2003)
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greatly by the collective leadership provided by a dominant coalition o f states able and 
willing to steer the system in a manner that offers incentives for others to follow."79 
This is a role which the Security Council has, for the most part, succeeded in fulfilling. 
If the founders did intend for the Security Council to stand apart from the broader 
membership this then raises the question as to whether the issue o f reform and the 
perceived problems o f the Security Council are political or structural. I f  as the High 
Level Panel report states “the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a 
source o f authority but to make the council work better than it has" 80 how should this 
be achieved?
There have been several different proposed options for the reformulation o f the
Security Council, as Lord Hannay states two different options are currently at the fore.
“O f the two formulas, formula A which is new permanent members, 
Germany, Brazil, India and so on, that's been tried. Formula B which is a 
new category o f longer term renewable members has some chance, it was 
killed in 2005 by the putative permanent members. Germany, Japan, Brazil 
and India. Whether they are wiser now I don 't know, that's being tested of 
course in the negotiations which have just begun in the general assembly but 
I think it's the only prospect for agreement. What would be the effect o f it, 
well the Security Council enlarged would be more representative, it would 
get some increase in legitimacy. 1 think it's fairly hard to argue it would be 
more effective but it might not be much less effective, but I think people 
really exaggerate when they say it would be more effective. It’s better to 
recognise the weaknesses in the council rather than to deny that they 
exist.”81
79 K egley , Charles W .C o n tro ve rs ie s  in in ternational re la tion s theory  (St Martin's Press: N ew  York: 
1995)pg 211
80 United N ations, Threats, C hallenges a n d  Change (2004)
81 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
351
Chapter Seven Kate Seaman
As Hannay illustrates above the more likely option to succeed, option B which is the 
creation o f a new category o f longer term renewable members, is unlikely to succeed as 
it is currently being blocked by the potential new permanent members who favour 
option A. These potential new permanent members favour this option for the obvious 
increase in both power and status which it would provide them. It would give them the 
opportunity to not only shape the debate but to play a more active role in the execution 
o f policy. There are however several obstacles to the proposed reforms. As Sam Daws 
argues
“The three obstacles to quick reform are first that the United States would 
find it difficult to get through the Senate an enlargement which significantly 
diminished US ability to secure resolutions and that is what any particularly 
large expansion of the council would create. Secondly the bar in the charter 
requiring both a two thirds vote in the GA and then two thirds o f  
governments to ratify it, including at that stage the P5, is very high and thus 
it’s easy for a blocking third o f countries to prevent any particular resolution 
or formulation which would expand the Security Council and third, because 
Africa which has 53 votes in the general assembly is divided between those 
African states that see benefit in a few of their number such as Nigeria,
South Africa or Egypt gaining permanent seats and the larger majority of 
African countries that are ambivalent or opposed to new permanent 
members for Africa means that the position for the African block has been 
put so high, for example having a veto for new African permanent members 
that it would never be acceptable to countries like the United States. 
Eventually when the G77 realise it's better to have some expansion than 
absolute standstill I think that it's possible having an intermediate solution
without immediate new permanent members is feasible, but only if  the
8")
council size remains small. 21 or 22." “
The obstacles highlighted by Daws are not easily overcome, and perhaps the most 
important to note is the emphasis he places on gaining US support for any changes to
82 Interview with Sam Daw s 9th Decem ber 2009
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the Security Council. The General Assembly has had an open ended working group on
Council reform, which as Hannay argues is recognition o f  the fact that "enlargement o f
the Security Council was not a matter to be decided, or even discussed by the council
itself; it was a matter for the whole membership."83 However Hannay also notes that
the working groups continued "reference to ratification was a reminder that behind all
this lay the power o f the US senate."84 Without the support o f the USA, which is as
argued in chapter five, the most powerful member on the Council, reform suggestions
are dead in the water. This again demonstrates the issue o f power within the Council
and why the need for reform is so important. As one UN official notes
“There’s a lot o f work going on around this at the moment and there’s a lot 
o f looking at the working methods and the membership and all those issues 
and its interesting. I think we just need to look at what’s happened in the last 
few weeks over Georgia and there I think w e've seen the limits o f the 
Security Council. What can realistically be expected and the power even 
just the threat of the veto and remember there was no security council 
resolution on the situation in Georgia. I think, in fact in Darfur as well, in 
the discussions and a lot of the resolutions that have been passed they get 
watered down because of the threat o f the veto. So I think that the veto is a 
problem there and we'll see how that changes in the next ten, fifteen years 
and whether the P5 will ever give that up. But I think you certainly need to 
have a body like the Security Council which is in a position to authorise the 
use o f force for humanitarian purposes if you like. But it's not perfect by 
any means we'll just have to see what happens.8^
The need for the Security Council is echoed by other practitioners such as Ambassador 
Colin Keating who argues that large scale reform is unlikely but that
83 Hannay, D avid ,N ew  W orld  D iso rd er  (I.B. Tauris: London: 2009), pg 146
84 Ibid. pg 146
85 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw O CH A 28th August 2008
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“The process o f incremental reform within the frameworks o f the present 
seems much more likely, the Security Council therefore I think is going to 
continue to be the preeminent feature o f collective efforts for international 
peace and security. Really the question is whether it works well or it doesn’t 
work well and for large parts o f the last sixty years it hasn’t worked well 
essentially due to the cold war and there was a period in the 1990s when it 
worked passably well but it’s been working much less well over the last five 
years. I think it’s also interesting to see that other entities such as, whether 
you think o f the AU or the OSCE, NATO, or the G8 they are all actually 
also having problems which kind o f mirror the difficulties o f  the Security 
Council. So the problems o f the Security Council actually aren’t unique to 
the Security Council at the moment. They are part o f the international 
condition that we are having to address.”86
As Keating argues the Council has faced issues at every stage o f its development, 
and it is interesting that he notes the problems now being faced by other 
intergovernmental organisations; Problems that have developed in relation to both 
representation and legitimacy in the eyes o f populations within states who are subject of 
interventions. This is an issue which has become increasingly relevant given the US 
intervention in Iraq and the impact that has had on the standing o f both the Security 
Council and the member states involved. The intervention o f Iraq clearly demonstrates 
the need for the Security Council to address the legitimacy issues it currently faces if  it 
is to retain its preeminent position within the international system. This only adds 
weight to the arguments in favour o f reform as one UN official argues, “if you had a 
more equitable security council where the power w asn't really vested in just five 
permanent members if there was a much more democratic approach to the issues 
amongst all fifteen member states then I think we would hopefully see stronger
86 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating 28th August 2008
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peacekeeping mandates if they’re needed.” 87 The increase in membership does however 
pose potential problems for the smooth functioning o f the council.
As one former UN official argues within the Council “there is not just a problem
with a lack o f consistency there are also many different viewpoints to each problem.
Often disputes are not about countries but about relations with each other (in the
security council and elsewhere).”88 Increasing the number o f viewpoints within the
Council could then potentially only increase the lack o f consistency o f  Council
decisions. This may in some ways be counteracted by the increased buy in o f potential
new Council members, particularly those who make large troop contributions to
peacekeeping operations. As Professor Ian Johnstone argues
“An ideal change in composition would in my view include major actors 
from each o f the developing regions especially those that have influence 
over the sorts o f things that the Security Council deals with. It would be 
very useful to have big peacekeeping countries from the developing world 
participating in the council, especially Africa because that’s where most o f 
the peacekeeping missions are. W e've got India contributing troops and 
Brazil now contributing more but Africa is where all o f the action is as far 
as UN peacekeeping is concerned. So more African representation, 
especially from countries that are participating in the missions, Nigeria,
South Africa, but also have influence over the dynamics would certainly 
help. It’s just whether you can come up with a formula that's not going to 
lead to such a great expansion and not give more in effect veto power over 
or give veto power to more countries. You could discover that the security 
council becomes paralysed in a way that it was during the cold war so a 
delicate balance needs to be struck here and I think its unfortunate that so 
much effort has in the past gone into seeking to expand the membership and 
maybe not enough into thinking about how to improve the working 
methods.” 89
87 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw OCHA 28th August 2008
88 Interview with Former U N  O fficial 26 lh August 2008
89 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
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Again Johnstone highlights the need for reform, and increased representation for
different regions and troop contributors, but he also highlights the potential problems
mentioned above. The problem o f the Veto power is a large stumbling block as the
power associated with the veto is what new potential permanent members are seeking,
but it also represents the potential to bring the Security Council to a standstill. As
Ambassador Keating argues
“permanence is permanence, once you are there permanently you’re stuck 
with whatever you have got and I think that kind o f accountability that says 
well we can’t always be sure that these current countries will be as nice as 
they now look and actually they may be inappropriate colleagues on the 
security council at some point in time.”90
The problem o f reform was well summed up by a UK mission official who stated
“Well find me an example o f an organisation that works better by getting 
bigger or a committee that works better by getting bigger, I can 't see in all 
honesty how it would make peacekeeping per se better or more effective, I 
can see how it would make decision making more representative and I can 
see how you can make with reform of the Security council in particular as a 
bargaining point, a bargaining chip if you like you could also on the back o f 
it get wide ranging reforms o f the general assembly that would make life a 
lot easier, so swings and roundabouts I guess but 1 wouldn't be convinced 
that you’d make peacekeeping better by security council reform .''91
This is where the real focus should be. not necessarily on improving representation, 
although this would improve legitimacy, but on improving the output and success o f 
Council mandated operations. The problem is that reform o f the council has become so 
politicised and opinion so polarized that progress will be sluggish at best.
90 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating 28th August 2008
91 Interview with UK M ission O fficial 27lh August 2008
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The issue o f new membership on the Council has also, as Weiss argues, been
focused on the wrong criteria for potential new members. He states that whilst it is
“True, the council does not reflect the actual distribution o f twenty-first- 
century power, yet reform proposals emanating from diplomats and analysts 
have never addressed the true imbalance between seats at the table and 
actual military capacity outside o f the Security Council chamber. They have 
sought to address, instead, the imbalance between the total number o f 
countries in the world and Security Council membership as well as to 
dispute the absolute veto right held by five countries.”92
Rather than focusing on representation and the disparity between the number of 
countries and the number o f countries with the veto, Weiss is instead arguing that 
reform should focus on those countries most capable o f providing resources to the 
operations which the Security Council mandates. This could potentially improve the 
capacities o f the organisation, the success rate o f operations and therefore the perceived 
legitimacy o f the Council. The need for reform to improve the UNs resources and 
capacities is however questioned by practitioners such as Lord Robertson who argues 
that
“I don’t think reform is a prerequisite for the UN having some standing 
force. Reform is another issue and 1 think reform should take place and the 
composition should be looked at again but you know that doesn't have to 
happen just in order to allow the UN to have some military muscle. My 
personal view is that the United Nations should have an ability to put 
together forces because NATO is very limited in the scope that it has, its not 
going to be a world policeman, it's done a lot o f things that an international 
policeman might do but it cant intervene in Africa it cant interfere in central 
America, you know its clearly not suited to doing that so ideally what you 
need to do is you need to create a NATO type operation, you know a 
planning, organising, capability building organisation in other parts o f the 
world as well, and you know to be part o f the UN machinery, that would be
92 W eiss, S ecurity  C ouncil Reform  (2003)
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the ideal. NATO can only help in certain circumstances at the moment and 
that’s likely to continue to be the only way it will operate.”93
Here Lord Robertson recognises the need for the UN to act as the world’s policeman as
regional organisations such as NATO are not capable o f undertaking such a role. He
also argues that the UN should be provided with more resources to undertake this role
because o f regional organisations inability to do so and that work needs to be done on
ensuring the UN has the planning and organisational capability to do so. The need for
increased firepower is recognised by others. As one observer argues
“it is welcome to have this kind o f firepower behind your mandate because 
it can help persuade the warring parties to accept certain things which 
otherwise they wouldn’t accept but on the other hand it is very difficult to 
define or to begin that kind o f mandate in the security council because o f the 
composition o f the security council and I think this is something which will 
remain a problem for UN peacekeeping in general in the future unless there 
is some kind of revision of the way in which the security council works and 
decides which is not I think very likely in the near future and I think, my 
opinion is it would be very convenient and helpful to have that kind o f 
support when necessary but I’m very sceptical about it's easiness to push 
through in the UN as an organisation because o f its structure now.”94
Again the problem is the composition o f the Security Council and the issue o f the 
creation o f mandates. There is a clear need for the UN to be able to undertake more 
robust operations, particularly in more complex conflicts where a peace agreement is 
not necessarily in place. The resources to undertake such an operation are however far 
from forthcoming.
93 Interview with Lord G eorge Robertson 28 th July 2009
94 Interview with Igor Ilic Reuters 6th August 2009
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Another problem in relation to the increased us o f force within operations was raised
by the UK mission officials. The problems relate in particular to
“who advises the security council and actually thereby hangs perhaps one o f 
the difficulties because in theory as a body the secretariat advise the security 
council but there’s a sort o f a tension between the security council slash 
member states and the secretariat in that there is a, there is a, I don’t want to 
characterise this wrongly but there is a certain degree o f a certain degree o f 
mistrust, is that the right, is that the right word? It’s not the right word”95
The issue o f advice, particularly in relation to large scale military planning and
organisation was raised again as another official argued that
“There is a real weakness in the system here, talking about peacekeeping, is 
where does the council get its military advice from, if  it doesn’t like that 
military advice does it just override that military advice and just carry on 
regardless?”96
Although within the UN charter under Chapter Seven Article 47 there was a provision
for the establishment o f a Military Staff committee
“to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the 
Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance o f 
international peace and security, the employment and command o f forces 
placed at its disposal, the regulation o f armaments, and possible 
disarmament.”97
The committee has in reality has had very little formal influence over the strategic 
direction o f armed forces under UN command, instead this is handled by the 
Department o f Peacekeeping operations. The explanation o f one officials experience
95 Interview with UK M ission  O fficial One 2 7 lh August 2008
96 Interview with U K  M ission  O fficial T w o 27 th August 2008
97 United N ations, C harter o f  the U n ited  N ations  Information, Department o f  Public: 1945), Chapter 
Seven, article 47
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demonstrates the problems the committee faces in providing coherent and cohesive
information as he notes
“I mean I arrived here and the military staff committee were discussing, the 
five o f us discussing how we could either expand the military staff 
committee to all fifteen or have more formal briefings from the secretariat, 
and all the rest of it and actually I thought well that's very simple so I wrote 
a half a size o f foolscap sized paper saying how we would do this and it just 
ran into political argument after political argument from the Russians, the 
French, everyone has an opposing view. This goes back to the intensely 
political nature o f the entire place its about politics, its not about anything 
else really and anything that even seems straightforward isn’t because 
everyone will have a different take on it and what this might mean further 
down so any aspiration that we might have that the military staff committee 
could be a you know a formal body for giving advice as a whole to the 
council is just never going to happen 1 mean perhaps we can make it more 
useful in spreading the advice around but in actually briefing the council as 
a one that’s not going to happen. There is no coherent military advice given 
to the security council as a whole other than from the secretariat and again 
there’s tensions, an example yesterday when Somalia is coming, it’s coming 
up and the secretariat are giving their coherent advice to the security 
council, well not all security council members really want to hear it, its’
• ”  n o
inconvenient so they don't hear it.
The two officials then compared the situation to that in other international organisations
as one noted that “o f course NATO and the EU do have more capable military councils
to give advice to the political leaders in these organisations"99 and the second argued 
that “ in the NATO, EU system there is no circumstance that I can think o f where the 
politicians would override the military advice if it were strong military advice and in 
here I have no such confidence at a ll."100 This is in direct contrast to the United Nations 
Security Council where as the officials argued the Council can select the advice to suit
98 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 27 lh August 2008
99 Interview with UK m ission official Two 27 lh August 2008
100 Interview with UK M ission O fficial One 2 7 th August 2008
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its political goals. This is an argument backed by academics such as Malone who
argues that within the Security Council and between member states "the compromises
necessary to achieve consensus among them can sometimes result in decisions that do
not match the needs on the ground."101 This relates directly to the arguments in the
previous chapter that, as Crocker highlights
“the linkage between UN peacekeeping mandates and the resources made 
available by member states must be better understood by Security Council 
members so that they do not approve missions that will expose UN 
peacekeepers to severe risk and the UN itself to ridicule.102
One solution to this problem is suggested by Johnstone who argues that for greater
success the UN should
“have the security council keep in draft form the resolutions establishing the 
mandate until enough troops, equipment etc. have been committed to fulfil 
that mandate. That would work because in a way it puts pressure on 
everybody to first o f all provide the resources or twist the arms o f countries 
that may provide the resources, twist the arms o f the government that is 
going to be the host o f this operation to allow these sorts o f things, and if  it 
doesn't materialise then you don't establish the peacekeeping mission which 
looks like it is doomed to fail from the beginning. The problem with that 
approach is that it just might become an excuse for interminable delay. You 
could have all the security councils members saying yes its very important 
that we do something about the terrible crisis in Darfur and they'd draft a 
beautiful sounding resolution and then say ok now secretariat go out and 
find the resources and then it sits there in draft form for months and months 
if not years and everybody's able to say oh we did our best, w e're trying to 
do our best where as you know getting the mandate sort o f generates a 
certain amount o f momentum."10j
101 Peck in M alone, Security  C ouncil (2004) , pg 329
102 Crocker, The lessons o f  Som alia  (1995)
103 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone 3rd July 2008
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Again the problem is the potential for the council to prevaricate over taking any action
or to delay in the provision o f resources until action would be futile. This potential
excuse for inaction must be avoided at all costs particularly at a time when "military
overstretch and the prioritisation o f strategic concerns to the virtual exclusion o f
humanitarian ones is the sad reality of a post 9/11 w orld."104 It is clear that, as Lord
Ashdown argues, "the UN is necessary as a prime mover in performing many tasks in
our increasingly interdependent world. But it is not good at managing conflict in
difficult circumstances."103 As Lord Hannay argues
“O f course there were absolute terrible disasters, Srebrenica, the Rwandan 
genocide, the retreat from Somalia, were complete disasters and you know 
and the UN made many mistakes at that time, so did everyone else and it 
paid quite heavily for it, but what always strikes me about the UN is that 
despite that and despite a very sharp dip in UN peacekeeping after the mid 
90s by the time o f the turn o f the century it was bounding up again and now 
it’s over a hundred thousand authorised for deployment. So I don’t think 
there is any doubt whatsoever about the indispensability o f the UN, its 
effectiveness remains open to doubt and open to being tested by spoilers and 
by people who don't accept agreements things like that and it has never 
found totally adequate and sometimes it has found completely inadequate 
responses to that."106
However, despite the inadequate responses and the numerous failures o f the 
organisation, it is still true that "peacekeeping is inconceivable without international 
cooperation and the legal mandate that only the UN Security Council can bestow."107 It 
is the legal mandate provided by the UN charter which gives the Security Council it’s
104 W eiss,H um anitarian in tervention  (2007) pg 55
105 A shdow n, Paddy,Sw ords a n d  P loughshares  (Phoenix London: 2008)
106 Interview with Lord David Hannay 6th October 2009
107 M essner and N uscheler in Kennedy, Paul; M essner, Dirk and N ushceler, Franz, G lo b a l Trends a n d  
G lo b a l G overnance  (Pluto Press London: 2002) pg 134
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influence but as Diehl argues "the ultimate value, viability and usefulness o f  the 
UN...depends precisely on its impartiality, objectivity and disinterestedness."108 This is 
a reality which could be drastically altered if  the format o f the council was changed in 
any way to include more countries from regions where peacekeeping operations are 
deployed.
It is clear that the United Nations Security Council continues to play an important 
role in securing international peace and security. It is also clear that it represents good 
value for money, although some may question in operations such as Cyprus whether the 
money being spent is being matched with results, as Weiss argues despite the question 
o f  “how can you spend money for 45 years and never get anything done? It seems to 
me that the expense is trivial in comparison with the results, that actually you would 
say it’s worth the gamble.” 109 This is particularly true when you recognised that "the 
cost o f one year o f US peacekeeping in Iraq is approximately the same as that for all 
UN peacekeeping operations from 1945 to the present day." 110 Although the United 
Nations Security Council is in need o f reform of some kind, the benefits must clearly 
outweigh the risk for it represent a positive step forward and as the argument above 
represent none o f the present options provide that security. There also needs to be 
recognition within the UN that the political goals within peacekeeping operations are 
placing the organisation in a precarious position, whereby potential future operations 
will lack legitimacy in the eyes of some member states. If more attention is not paid to
108 Washburn in D iehl, Paul F., The p o litic s  o f  g lo b a l governance  (Lynne Riener: usa: 2 0 0 1 ) pg 469
109 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss 9th July 2008
110 A shdow n ,Sw ords (2008) pg 160
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securing local legitimacy and local solutions the organisation risks irrelevance as states 
will turn to regional organisations to ensure their voices are heard.
All o f the changes debated above have occurred because o f the dramatic changes 
within the international system that have occurred because o f two key events, the end o f 
the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The United Nations is no 
longer operating in the relatively simple environment where states were the key actors. 
Instead there is an increasing need for a wider variety o f actors to share the burden o f 
securing international peace and security. There needs to be a reassessment o f 
peacekeeping doctrine within the UN to ensure that the operations being mandated are 
meeting the needs of the international system today. There also needs to be an 
understanding as to the wider implications o f peacekeeping missions, particularly in 
relation to the reformulation o f sovereign nation states, a task which is becoming 
increasingly associated with the organisation. If the UN is going to continue to 
undertake these tasks then it needs to work to ensure the support of its member states 
particularly in terms of the provision o f resources. In order to gain this support some 
type o f reform of the Security Council may be essential to ensure the buy-in o f member 
states, who if better represented might be more willing to reduce the current disparity 






First and foremost the United Nations was established to aid the creation o f a more 
peaceful and stable international system. One o f the ways in which it has attempted to 
create that system is through peacekeeping, preventing the spread o f conflict and 
hopefully helping to resolve situations within and between countries that are unable to 
resolve it themselves. The problem with this role and action today is that peacekeeping 
missions are being mandated to undertake increasingly complex tasks in conflict 
situations which are dramatically different to those which it was intended to help 
resolve. The UNs involvement in these crises is based on an inherently Liberal 
understanding o f the international system, the role o f states and the role o f other 
international organisations. This understanding o f the international system has been 
promoted by the development o f the concept o f global governance, a concept which is 
focused on how power should be diffused throughout the international system and more 
importantly on how people should be represented within the system as the world 
becomes more integrated. The most tangible form o f global governance is evident in 
the ways in which different actors within the international system, states, international 
organisations, and civil society are all involved in trying to create a more stable 
international system. The United Nations is a key actor in this tangible form o f global 
governance and plays a crucial role in the creation o f a more stable international system 
through its actions as an international peacekeeper. The importance o f the organisation 
is also evident in its position as the most governmental form o f control associated with
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the development o f the concept o f Global Governance. All o f  the above means that 
Global Governance represents a new way of analysing the role o f the United Nations 
within the international system, particularly in relation to the mandating o f 
peacekeeping operations.
The United Nations has become involved in both the promotion and enforcement o f 
many o f the norms associated with global governance, including human rights, good 
governance and democratisation. Although the UN is proscribing the boundaries for 
state action within the international system, states are still privileged within that system 
through the continued emphasis on the traditional concept o f sovereignty. Because o f 
this, the situation the UN now finds itself in is increasingly precarious. The organisation 
needs to continuously balance the demands o f member states for protection o f their 
sovereignty with the emphasis the organisation is placing on the above norms. The 
problems associated with this balancing act are only compounded by the changing 
realities of the international system. In the years following the end o f the Cold War the 
international system saw a “shift in world power toward a configuration that was 
simply incompatible with the way the UN was meant to function."1 The United Nations 
was based on the ideal o f sovereign equality o f all states but with only one superpower 
dominating the international system the “susceptibility o f the UN to the agendas o f the 
most powerful states"2 has only been magnified. The dominance o f powerful states 
within the organisation and the international system calls into question the way in 
which the theory o f global governance deals with the issues o f power and control.
1 G lem an, M ichael J., Why the Security  C ouncil F a iled  (Foreign Affairs: 82: 3: 2 003)
2 H eld, D avid ,G lo b a l C ovenant (Polity Press Cambridge: 2 0 04) pg 108
366
Conclusion Kate Seaman
The issue o f power within global governance has become politicised with debates 
around whether it represents an ideological project aimed at creating a fairer more 
representative international system or whether it represents a hegemonic project aimed 
at creating a very particular kind o f international system based on the supremacy of 
liberal democratic states. It is clear that without analysing the power structures within 
global governance there is no way to fully understand and appreciate the complexities 
within the international system. The issue o f power is also important in relation to the 
role o f international and regional organisations as the dominance o f  powerful states 
within these organisations undermines their ability to be more representative, 
accountable and democratic. There are more and more actors becoming involved in the 
international system and in the resolution o f international problems. These new actors 
represent both a gift and a curse for the United Nations; if managed properly they 
represent an opportunity to reduce the burdens on the organisation at a time when 
demands on the organisation continue to increase but the number o f resources being 
allocated to meet those demands is shrinking. If these organisations are not managed 
however they have the potential to challenge the authority of the United Nations within 
the field o f international peace and security. It is imperative that the United Nations 
demonstrates its capabilities as a coordinating agent within the realm o f international 
peace and security as this will enable the organisation to both demonstrate and maintain 
its relevance in an ever changing landscape. Particularly at a time when the 
organisation is becoming involved in challenging some o f the key concepts which make
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up the foundations o f the international system without fully examining the potential 
consequences o f those challenges.
There is an inbuilt tension between the increased role o f newer actors within the 
international system and the emphasis which the traditional norms o f sovereignty and 
non-interference place on the privileged position o f states. This is an area which 
requires much more investigation in order to find a resolution. What must be made 
clear is the impact this tension has on the ability o f organisations such as the United 
Nations to deploy operations in ongoing conflict zones. It also has a large impact on the 
gap between what the United Nations sets out to achieve and what it is actually capable 
o f achieving. An issue highlighted by Professor Adam Roberts who noted the increased 
aspiration within the international system for some form o f global governance and the 
connected increase in scope o f peacekeeping mandates as a tool for achieving this.3
The need to adhere to normative principles within the international system whilst 
also ensuring international peace and security was one o f the key factors in the creation 
o f the first peacekeeping operations. Overtime these operations have evolved, 
particularly in the Post Cold War period as the demand for interventions increased 
exponentially. However despite the increased demand for operations and the more 
complex environments in which interventions were taking place the organisation 
continued to apply the more traditional style o f peacekeeping operations, an application 
which led to several dramatic failures. Many o f these failures. Murphy argued, can be 
connected to the failure to accept the changes in the international system and the fact
3 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University, 8th Decem ber 2009
368
Conclusion Kate Seaman
that “the extent to which the balance o f  power system is central to cooperation and 
peacemaking”4 had changed. Since the end o f the Cold War peacekeeping operations 
have been based on emphasising how the domestic situations within particular countries 
can impact on the international system, in other words how domestic crises can become 
threats to international peace and security. This has been coupled with the perceived 
victory o f liberal democracy over communism a situation which has contributed 
directly to the emphasis the United Nations now places on the importance o f the 
development o f liberal democratic governance as the end state for post conflict 
societies.
In order to achieve this end state the organisation has become involved in
increasingly complex peacekeeping missions. However this involvement has created a
new crisis in peacekeeping, based not on a failure to act, but on the failure to take
appropriate action in the context o f individual crises. As one former UN official argued
“States are contracting out problems to the UN in the development o f global 
burden sharing. However the responsibility o f permanent members is not 
less if the problem is not in their strategic interests even though they often 
act as if it is.”5
The number o f tasks peacekeeping operations are required to undertake has increased, 
tasks which it does not have the resources to undertake. The lack o f resources provided 
in order for the UN to become an effective peacekeeping organisation has contributed 
directly to the ongoing crisis in peacekeeping operations and has led to questions o f
4 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy, W ellesley  C ollege, 3rd Septem ber 2008
5 Interview with Former U N  O fficial, 26th August 2008
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selectivity on the part o f the Security Council. As Sam Daws highlights in relation to
the problem o f selectivity
“It’s just a political reality that we don’t live in a perfect world. Selectivity 
results from a combination o f member states accepting that priority should 
be given to where the need is greater, but that there are limits on resources 
and that they need to be prioritised in part to reflect national interest.6
This reality does however mean that the disparity between the mandates being given to
operations and the resources provided to complete those missions has only increased in
recent years with troops being asked to take on ever more complex tasks in ever more
dangerous environments.
As one UK mission official emphasised
“Mandates are growing far too long and complex and with few resources to 
carry them out. So you might be able to do certain operative paragraphs 
quite well but others you can 't even touch properly because you just don’t 
have the resources to do it. The bigger you make a mandate, more complex, 
the more resources you need to give to that SRSG to do his or her job and if  
you don’t give them the resources they can 't do it and the rub is that 
member states don't want to spend more money on peacekeeping so w e’re 
giving them mandates, bigger, longer, more complex mandates without 
wanting to spend more money on peacekeeping."7
The problem with the mandates created by the Security Council was also highlighted by 
Professor Roberts who stated that “Mandates become a wish list o f  things it would be 
nice to get done. It is natural for them to change (mission creep). The real question is, is
6 Interview with Sam D aw s, U N A -U K , 9th D ecem ber 2009
7 Interview with UK M ission O fficial T w o, UK M ission , N Y C , 27h August 2008
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the mandate properly resourced?”8 An understanding supported by Professor Craig
Murphy who argued that
“the mandates that are given to peacekeeping missions are often given as a 
way of the members o f the security council being able to publicly say that 
this is our declaratory policy, this is what we want the world to look like, 
this is what we are would think would be a very good thing to have happen.
The actual commitments o f resources have to be put together, not just from 
the Security Council members, but from everybody else and the 
commitments come based on what other priorities for using those resources 
might be.”9
As Lord Hannay states “a perfect mandate is not ever going to be achieved because 
these mandates are the work o f many hands, they always contain some obscurities but 
some are worse than others.” 10 This sentiment was echoed by troops in the field who 
argued that “there is too much red tape and it needs to be clearly defined, clearly cut, 
clear rules o f engagement.” 11 Another former peacekeeper argued that the main problem 
with Security Council resolutions is that it will always “represent the lowest common 
denominator” 12 and that “things are much less clear cut and its much more difficult to 
get a political mandate.” 13 The peacekeeper also argued that this is contradictory to 
what troops on the ground require, that what they want is for the Security Council to 
“give us a timeline, tell us what you want to achieve and we'll try to do it but please 
don’t leave us hanging on the end o f a rope not actually knowing where we are
8 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University, 8th Decem ber 2009
9 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy, W ellesley  C ollege, 3rd Septem ber 2008
10 Interview with Lord David Hannay, 6th October 2009
11 Interview with Dan Docherty, CIMIC, 2nd July 2009  , CIMIC, 2nd July 2009  , CIMIC




going.”14 The failure of the Security Council to produce clearly defined mandates is
particularly problematic in ongoing conflict situations where the context o f the
operation can shift on an almost daily basis. The changes within a mandate, referred to
as mission creep, although accepted as inevitable by the majority o f practitioners in the
field also represent a potential threat to the continued legitimacy o f the individual
operation and the organisation as a whole. As Professor Weiss argued
“The UN’s comparative advantage is when there is something like a peace to 
keep and there is a necessity to turn the page on the conflict and move ahead. 
Lot’s o f studies including the RAND corporation suggest that the UN has a 
comparative advantage in that.” 15
Where the UN doesn’t do well he argues is “when it comes to war fighting, they are
much better at situations in which impartiality and neutrality are in evidence and can
actually be implemented.” 16 As Ambassador Keating notes this is one o f the ongoing
problems with peacekeeping missions stating
“This is currently one of the huge risks with respect to the positions o f some 
countries regarding Somalia, who felt the UN should send a force to replace 
the Ethiopians, so the Ethiopians can withdraw and they can fight the war to 
defend the government o f Somalia in its transitional phase. Well that’s a 
different kind o f operation to a peacekeeping operation and its completely 
fraudulent to call that peacekeeping, that is actually to fight a war, and it 
would overwhelm the capacity o f the UN at the moment to try and manage 
such an operation17
As Professor Johnstone argued it again “comes down to the mandate. Rarely will you 
see a mandate which says you know Serbs bad Bosniaks good, but you'll see a mandate
14 Ibid.
15 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss, SU N Y , 9th July
16 Interview with Professor Thom as G. W eiss, SU N Y , 9th July
17 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating, Security Council Report, 2 8 th August 2008
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which is likely going to lead the peacekeepers to have to take military action against one 
side.” Then he argues that you have to question whether this is “really peacekeeping or
is this fighting a war, an illegitimate war on behalf o f a not entirely legitimate
18 •government?” This is a question which can be directly applied to the ongoing UN
operation in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo and other operations where
peacekeeping missions have become involved in ongoing conflicts and where the
complexities involved and “intervention required is beyond traditional peacekeeping.” 19
The danger is as Daws argues that
“the institution could suffer if the mandate given by member states to 
operations is not matched by sufficient resources or military power to be 
successful and that that may produce a failure not just in the particular 
conflict situation but a wider damage to the institutions reputation for being 
an effective peacekeeper.”20
The problem, identified by one UK mission official, is that
“historically missions have been mandated without any clear idea o f who is 
prepared to stump up the wherewithal, the enablers and the troops and 
everything else, that's the principle problem, the problem is with member 
states, the member states unwillingness or otherwise to stump up the 
necessary goods.”21
This has been compounded by the downsizing o f many military forces in the post cold
22  • war period as Lord Robertson argues “getting usable, mobilisable forces is the biggest
18 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone, Tufts University, 3 rd July 2008
19 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University, 8th D ecem ber 2009
20 Interview with Sam D aw s, U N A -U K , 9th Decem ber 2009
21 Interview with UK m ission official one, UK M ission, N Y C , 27th August 2008
22 Interview with Former UN  O fficial, 26th August 2008
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challenge and problem that w e’ve got.”23 A problem also highlighted by Lord Hannay
who notes that the UN has difficulties in being able
“to find quick rapid reinforcements to a mission that is in trouble, these are 
really grave weaknesses and they need to be remedied, both the speed o f 
deployment and the ability to react to testing by spoilers or by awkward 
parties.”24
As explored however it is not only a problem o f finding enough troops, but also o f
engaging the right kind o f troops for the m issions’ requirements. As one former
peacekeeper explained
“you have difficulties straight away that you have some nations who will 
sign up to what you might call the cheap and cheerful the barefoot infantry, 
but the requirement for big cost items is always a difficulty and relatively 
speaking there are very few nations that have the capability or the capacity 
to do that.”25
The problem is that as Daws highlighted “there has been a decrease in actual troops 
contributed by countries like the UK.”“ This decrease is directly connected to the fact 
that, as on UK official explained “w e've got literally thousands o f troops o f one 
description or another deployed on other missions” which means that “we have nothing 
available and when you ask most western countries that’s the answer that you get.”27 A 
problem also recognised by former Security Council Ambassador Colin Keating who 
noted that it will often be “the western powers who will be most reluctant about it 
because they actually have so much of their military capacity already committed in
23 Interview with Lord G eorge Robertson , Former N A T O  Secretary General, 28 th July 2009
24 Interview with Lord David Hannay, 6th October 2009
25 Interview with C olonel Ian Macfarlane, UK Army (Retired), 8th July 2009
26 Interview with Sam D aw s, U N A -U K , 9th Decem ber 2009
27 Interview with UK m ission official one, UK M ission, N Y C , 2 7 lh August 2008
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non-UN operations in other parts o f the world.”28 The reality is that in many operations,
for example the DRC, the number o f troops required to “police the whole area would
take vastly more troops than countries are willing to put forward.”29 Or in ongoing
conflict situations, as Professor Nye argued, in order to
“control these groups that are running around killing. How could you do 
that? How many UN troops would it take? Vastly more than is going to be 
possible and that’s the part I find discouraging.”30
In more complex cases the UN will often “look to a member state to do it under the 
umbrella o f a UN mandate because quite apart from anything else the UN couldn’t react 
quickly enough to do anything about a Rwanda.’0 1 This is because as one UN official 
argued “the UN is not equipped to undertake enforcement action. If you want serious 
force you need a country to be in the lead.”32 The issue then becomes the maintenance 
o f the perceived legitimacy of the operations because “if the UN partnership is too close 
with what is in effect seen as an exercise in neo-colonialism then its credibility could be 
undermined.”33
As one FCO official noted “Public opinion in region o f deployment is key to 
success” and a large part o f the decision to deploy any troops on the operation.34 
Particularly as many of the risks are being increased because o f the perceived 
association o f the UN with the norms o f global governance and a liberal democratic 
ideology. This has also caused issues for the organisation in relation to its perceived
28 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating. Security Council Report, 2 8 th August 2008
29 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye, Oxford University, 7th M ay 2008
30 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye, Oxford University, 7th M ay 2008
31 Interview with UK m ission official one, UK M ission, N Y C , 2 7 th August 2008
32 Interview with Former UN O fficial, 26th August 2008
33 Interview with Professor lan Johnstone, Tufts University, 3 rd July 2008
34Interview with FCO O fficial, UK Foreign O ffice, 20 th M ay 2009
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neutrality and impartiality within the international system. As Daws argues many 
spoiler groups
“see the United Nations as a biased organisation promoting western goals, 
hence the attacks now in a number o f locations on UN humanitarian agencies 
by al-qaeda and that’s an awful and very disturbing development but it also 
again speaks to the issue that there is both the need for international 
legitimacy but also local legitimacy and that local legitimacy is contextual, it 
relates to things going on in that particular conflict zone but it can also relate 
to wider conflicts.’03
The Security Council plays a key role in the transmission o f norms from one part o f 
the international system to another. One o f the main ways in which it does so is through 
the mandates o f peacekeeping operations, mandates which emphasis the end state 
which post conflict societies should strive to attain in order to be reintegrated into the 
international system. The Security Council is responsible for the transmission o f 
standards o f appropriate behaviour and since the end o f the Cold War the end state has 
been proscribed in terms o f liberal democratic governance. It is clear that from the start 
“the UN was deeply influenced by the values o f the western democracies, and, in 
particular, by their insistence on the importance o f entrenched human rights." 36 By 
focusing on the transmission o f norms such as human rights, democratisation and good 
governance the argument is that the UN Security Council has become involved in the 
globalisation o f a particular model o f domestic governance and that the globalisation o f 
this model carries heavy shades o f neo-colonialism. As Roberts argues, “making a
35 Interview with Sam D aw s, U N A -U K , 9th Decem ber 2009
36M ayall in Ed: W elsh, Jennifer M ., H um anitarian Intervention a n d  In ternational R ela tions  (O xford  
University Press Oxford: 2004)
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country fit for western democracy raises issues locally and clearly has consequences.”37
The failure o f the council to engage with alternative forms o f governance and
government has again led to an increased loss o f legitimacy for the Security Council as
“operations on the ground that are not regarded as legitimate by the citizens o f the
country you are working in are a problem.”38
In the past the legitimacy o f an operation was based on the consent o f the host
government. Today however consent poses an increasing problem for both operations
on the ground and the Council at headquarters. In some operations it appears that
consent from anyone is better than no consent at all, a situation which can in many
cases elevate spoilers to a position o f legitimacy within a peace process. Traditionally
consent based operations have been the defining attribute o f UN peacekeeping. No
operation would be mandated without the consent o f the host government. This
therefore meant that there was, in the eyes o f the council, no need for conflict between
sovereignty and intervention. In recent interventions however the reliance on consent
has been reduced, as Johnstone highlighted
“ It’s only when you don't have consent or the consent isn’t reliable or the 
consent needs to be manufactured in a way that you need to start 
considering criteria and you start saying w e're at the point now where either 
we intervene coercively against the will o f the government or we 
collectively try to put so much pressure on the government diplomatically 
that it can’t resist saying yes to a peacekeeping presence.”39
It is therefore in the role o f norm development rather than in specific responses to crises 
where the real power o f the Security Council resides. The Security Council does not
37 Interview with Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University, 8th D ecem ber 2009
38 Interview with Sir Jeremy G reenstock, 8th Decem ber 2009
39 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone, Tufts University, 3rd July 2008
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however fit with the calls for increased representation and democratisation within the 
international system. It is a hierarchical organisation in which the power and influence 
o f certain states is apparent. The structure is outdated in relation to the way it represents 
the balance o f power within the international system yet it still remains an important 
institution, both as a template for future cooperation and for the work it currently 
undertakes. The real problem is the lack o f analysis as to the role o f power within the 
Council. Again this is the same debate as raised before in relation to the wider global 
governance project. If international organisations are key actors within the development 
o f global governance then their domination by a particular kind o f state gives credence 
to the suggestion that global governance is nothing more than a hegemonic project. 
W hat becomes clear is that in the case o f the UN “its achievements are determined by 
the degree to which the sovereign states, in which the real power resides, are induced to 
live up to their charter obligations.”40 The UN in the international system should in 
most cases be viewed as a stage and not as an actor capable o f initiating action 
independently o f its member states.
The UNs limited autonomy as an international actor was demonstrated most clearly 
by the US intervention in Iraq although in the eyes o f some member states it has gained 
credibility for refusing to support the war against Iraq others feel that it will only 
become even more irrelevant and that eventually the organisation could find itself 
“confined to mandating UN humanitarian, peacekeeping and transitional government
40 Finger, Seym our and Joseph R. Herbert,U S  p o lic y  in in ternational institu tions (W estview  Press 
Boulder: 1978) pg 9
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mop-up operations after US led military interventions.”41 The intervention again raised 
the issue o f exceptional ism within the Council, as the only remaining superpower the 
USA had once again taken action unilaterally in the face o f overwhelming international 
opposition. In the immediate aftermath o f the invasion the UN suffered a perceived loss 
o f legitimacy in the eyes o f the international community. It appeared that because o f 
the influence o f the USA within the Security Council “the UN and the western 
democracies are going to have to be into containment whether they want to be or not 
but that’s a question o f political will and the economic decision to do it”42 However the 
ongoing situation has restored some o f that which was lost to the Council as the failures 
o f the USA demonstrate the dangers o f unilateral action in comparison with broad 
based multilateral interventions. The situation also served to highlight the limitations 
placed on the UN by the reluctance o f the USA to place its troops under UN command. 
As Nye highlighted “there is a strong preference in the American military to have a 
leading role when American troops are involved” although he also emphasised that 
there have been “cases where there's been a willingness to delegate command, 
particularly within the NATO structure.”43
These organisations represent an alternative to the UN structure and many, such as 
the African Union, European Union, and NATO, who have become increasingly 
involved in peacekeeping style operations. The argument in favour o f these 
organisations is that they will offer increased accountability and representation through
41 M alone in Ed: M alone, David M ., The U nited  N ations Secu rity  C ouncil (Lynne rienner: London: 2004) 
P g 2
42 Interview with C olonel Ian M acfarlane, UK Army (Retired), 8,h July 2009
43 Interview with Professor Joseph N ye, Oxford University, 8th D ecem ber 2009
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greater local input, and will also reduce the increasing strain on the United Nations. As 
Johnstone argues, regional organisations have “strengthened the UNs ability to function 
in some places like.”44 Although he also recognises that they have
“complicated the UNs peacekeeping role, all o f these relationships and these 
partnerships between the UN and regional organisations have proven to be 
difficult and more time goes into trying to coordinate these relationships 
than actually doing the work on the ground.”43
There are also unanswered questions as to the legal authority o f regional organisations 
to mandate interventions and the potential for what Marrack Goulding termed a 
peacekeeping apartheid to develop. An increased reliance on regional organisations also 
represents a challenge to the authority o f the UN and has also increased the complexity 
o f  the operating situation in the field where the lack o f coordination and the risk o f 
organisations being played off each other is a real danger. As Ambassador Keating 
highlighted
“the interaction between the security council and regional organisations has 
got both significant potential opportunities but also if its not handled well by 
one or both sides o f the equation then it could actually be misused, to the 
detriment o f international peace and security. The international 
organisations that operate at the regional level are somewhat ephemeral by 
comparison to the UN at the present point in time and as a result the 
relationships often tend to be somewhat one sided."46
The risks are somewhat ameliorated by the benefits the organisations can provide 
including a faster response time and improved troop provision, as Simon Bagshaw
44 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone, Tufts University, 3 rd July 2008
45 Interview with Professor Ian Johnstone, Tufts University, 3 rd July 2008
46 Interview with Am bassador Colin Keating, Security Council Report, 2 8 th August 2008
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stated “they fill a gap in the sense that we don’t have the capacity to deploy as quickly 
as w e’d like, so they can get there much quicker and they’re often seen as much more 
acceptable to other African states.”47
These benefits do not however prevent the organisations facing similar charges to the 
Security Council in relation to accountability and legitimacy especially when there is a 
dominant regional hegemon.
The danger becomes clearer when you focus on the impact these different 
organisations are having on peacekeeping operations in the field. The UN now spends a 
large amount o f time and resources on coordinating different actors within operations in 
the field. These actors have a variety o f mandates and aims, and a huge variety o f 
different capacities. At the present moment there are too many actors in the system with 
no one regulating their actions or holding them responsible for any consequences o f 
these actions. This is especially dangerous if these actors have access to large amounts 
o f material resources. Newer actors such as NGOS and aid agencies also focus their 
attention on purely humanitarian interventions. These organisations emphasise their 
neutrality and impartiality and focus not on the political outcomes o f any conflict but 
on the provision o f aid to those in need. This only further complicates the operating 
situation for peacekeeping troops as humanitarian aid can have a marked impact on any 
ongoing political process and can potentially shift the balance o f power within a 
conflict. The failure o f some organisations to assess their political impact is an ongoing 
problem which again needs further research, particularly in relation to the coordination
47 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw O CH A, 2 8 th August 2008
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o f those organisations in the field and in connection with ongoing UN peacekeeping 
operations.
As one former peacekeeper noted
“Most soldiers are suspicious o f non government organisations, irrespective 
o f what their background is because they tend to have their own agenda and 
for the best o f reasons I accept that they will run to their agenda even if  it is 
not necessarily appropriate from our point o f view at the time.48
This lends itself to the argument that “there is in the humanitarian NGO world o f course
an inbuilt tension between them and the military in general, or peacekeeping operations
in general,”49 Perhaps because of a “sense that the humanitarian issues are marginalised
within the peacekeeping missions.”30 Whereas in many cases the peacekeeping
missions are reliant on other organisations to fulfil tasks, which although within their
mandate, are far outwith the reach o f their resources to undertake. As Professor Murphy
argues, many operations spend time focusing on
“how far can we go, what kind o f thing do we have to define, how much 
security do we actually have to create to imagine that these other actors who 
are going to do much o f the hard work and be there on the cheap, and the on 
the cheap is the big thing because nobody, the major security council 
members don't want to spend any money."31
This problem has also raised the question as to whether peacekeeping missions should 
be fully integrated, with the humanitarian, political, and military operations operating 
under a unified command structure. As one field operative stated
48 Interview with C olonel Ian M acfarlane, UK Army (Retired), 8 ,h July 2009
49 Interview with UK m ission official one, UK M ission, N Y C , 27 th August 2008
50 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw  O CH A, 28 ,h August 2008
51 Interview with Professor Craig N . Murphy, W ellesley  C ollege, 3rd Septem ber 2008
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“that missions should be integrated because one o f the principles o f 
producing a decently run operation is unity o f command, if you have no 
unity o f command then you lose control o f w hat’s going on, on the ground, 
and you’re potentially doing things that are counter productive.” 52
However he also stated that
“some o f the humanitarian agencies, OCHA for instance, don’t have that 
view and they think that there should be clear water between what 
humanitarians do and what’s going on in a peacekeeping mission. Their 
counter to my argument that we need to have a coherent response is that ‘ah 
but we get on very well together and we always talk’ and actually that’s the 
point. All that is doing by having an integrated mission is formalising that 
relationship so that you are forced to talk to each other even if  the 
personalities don’t match and in some cases personalities don’t match.”53
This is an ongoing problem and debate and one whose resolution is not 
straightforward.
Asides from the coordination o f the increasing number o f actors involved in 
peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Security Council also needs to work on 
improving the perception of these operations around the globe. They need to work on 
reducing the gap between the mandates and the resources provided to fulfil them. They 
also need to address the increasing lack o f clarity in the mandates as the situations in 
which they intervene become more complex. In order to do so there will need to be an 
in-depth assessment o f the impact which the Security Councils role o f norm 
transmission is having on the organisation, more attention needs to be paid to ensuring 
local legitimacy for operations rather than the top down approach which has been taken 
in the past. This may be easier said than done as the powerful states have a tendency to
52 Interview with UK  m ission official one, N Y C , 27 ,h August 2008
53 Interview with UK m ission official one, UK M ission, N Y C , 27th August 2008
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utilise the council to their own agenda. One way to avoid this is the creation o f specific 
criteria for interventions, a suggestion which has been made several times in the past. 
The problem is then whose criteria are being followed and also whether or not they 
would be fairly applied? Another option which is also being debated is reform o f the 
Security Council itself.
The argument is that a broader membership base that was more representative o f the 
power structure within the international system today would improve the legitimacy o f 
the council and reduce the inequality in the provision o f peacekeeping operations, 
particularly the perceived inequality in the application o f state sovereignty and the 
provision o f resources to operations. As one UN official notes
‘i f  you had a more equitable security council where the power wasn’t really 
vested in just five permanent members, if there was a much more 
democratic approach to the issues amongst all fifteen member states then I 
think we would hopefully see stronger peacekeeping mandates if they’re 
needed.”54
The mandates do not however represent the biggest problem; this is instead 
presented by the disparity in the resources provided to operations in different regions 
that has led some states to search for alternatives to the Security Council. The danger is 
however that by increasing the membership o f the Council you increase the number o f 
votes needed in order to authorise a mandate. The problem is that reform o f the council 
has become so politicised and opinion so polarized that progress will be sluggish at
54 Interview with Sim on Bagshaw OCHA 28 lh August 2008
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best. Instead the real focus should be, not necessarily on improving representation, 
although this would improve legitimacy, but on improving the output and success o f 
Council mandated operations.
Whilst the failures o f the UN are undeniable these failures should not be laid only on 
the organisation which is willing to admit its mistakes, instead blame should be passed 
on to the member states who failed to act to provide the organisation with the resources 
it needed to undertake the operations in the first instance. In the international system it 
is “the norms espoused by the most powerful actors which set the standard for the 
system as a whole”33 therefore “ if realpolitik is to be the sole motivation for supporting 
the UN it is not the UN that is failing but the privileged members using the UN as a 
scapegoat.”56 Member states are far too quick to pull out o f obligations, to deny the UN 
the resources it requires in order to maintain international peace and security. The UN 
has simply become another political tool o f governments, used to validate their actions 
and policies. It is used by member states to appear as if they are taking action in terms 
o f global crisis while buying them time to orchestrate a way to avoid becoming 
involved. In the future however, if the UN is ever to achieve the ideals on which it was 
established, member states will have to be much more willing to provide resources and 
to politically support the organisation and the Secretariat in what they are attempting to 
achieve. It is not conducive to the international system for what could be the most
55 Clapham, Christopher, Rwanda: p e r ils  o f  peacem akin g  (Journal o f  Peace Research: 35: 2: 1998)
56 D oyle , E .D. R eflections o f  a  UN p ea cek eep er  (International Peacekeeping: 10: 4: W inter 2 0 03)
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important organisation to be continuously sidelined and blamed for the actions of its 
member states.
Implications for Future Research
Throughout the previous chapters the project has demonstrated the complicated 
relationship between the development o f the concept o f Global Governance and the 
ongoing crisis in peacekeeping operations. As the concept o f Global Governance 
develops there needs to be a focus on the continuing impact o f both the theory and the 
more tangible elements o f the transmission o f the norms associated with the concept on 
the international system. There also needs to be more investigation into the potential 
detrimental impact o f linking the United Nations to explicitly liberal ideas particularly 
in relation to the backlash which is already occurring within Iraq and Afghanistan 
where the UN has been a direct target o f attacks because o f its association with the 
political program o f the intervening states.
The organisation and academics also need to move away from preconceived notions 
o f the relationship between non-governmental organisations and military forces 
involved in peacekeeping operations within ongoing conflicts. Instead there needs to be 
research into how to improve cooperation without threatening the perceived legitimacy 
o f either operation. There should also be an increased engagement with local sources o f 
authority in order to ensure legitimacy for future operations. The role o f  alternative 
organisations also needs to be carefully monitored and understood in order to ensure the
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greatest amount o f benefit to all involved. This is particularly important in relation to 
the uneven distribution o f resources between regional actors and the potential for the 
development o f a ‘peacekeeping apartheid’.
As explored, Global Governance provides a unique viewpoint on the United Nations 
and its role in the international system but there needs to be more focus on the issue o f 
power within the development o f the theory as without this it will lose its relevance. 
The United Nations is a unique organisation within the international system created at a 
very unique moment in history and the chances o f creating such an organisation again 
are extremely limited. The impact and legacy o f the organisation therefore need to be 
protected and its future secured through better informed decisions and more in depth 
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